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ABSTRACT
When historians have addressed the issue of maritime
lawlessness in the English colonies of North America their
attention almost invariably has been drawn to New England
where, according to the commonly held belief, opposition to
the navigation system of the home government was ~ost
fervent, concerted, and pervasive.
Rarely have researchers
examined local involvement in piracy, illicit trade, and the
unauthorized salvage of stranded or sunken vessels, or
wrecking, in the Chesapeake region where, scholars
customarily have maintained, the colonists willingly
participated in the imperial navigation scheme. Moreover,
historical investigations of freebooters and smugglers
traditionally have focused on the lawbreakers themselves,
generally neglecting the activities of coastal inhabitants
without whose support the outlaws could not have operated
and prospered.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, not only
did residents of the greater Chesapeake personally engage in
piracy, contraband trade, customs fraud, and wrecking, but
many more supported their actions by assisting and harboring
the perpetrators or by refusing to convict them in the
common-law courts.
In the provincial assemblies, other
colonists opposed legislative initiatives designed to
improve the enforcement of imperial policy in the maritime
sphere.
Compounding the enforcement problem in the greater
Chesapeake was the participation of both royal and
provincial officials -- including customs officers,
guardship commanders, and even colonial governors -- in
various contraband, duty fraud, and piratical schemes
themselves.
If British authorities wondered about the
sources of such behavior they did not have far to look for
precedents.
English piracy, smuggling, and wrecking
often tacitly approved and even actively promoted by highranking government officials -- dated back centuries before
the colonial era.
The coincidence of the periods of greatest complaint
about maritime lawbreaking in the Chesapeake with the
intervals of most active regulation of colonial affairs by
the home government suggests that inhabitants of the bay
region conducted illegal maritime activities continuously
between 1650 and 1750 and beyond.
Reports by customs
officials and guardship captains in the decade preceding the
Revolution, including accounts of violent resistance to
royal authority, indicate that compliance with the
Navigation Acts was no better than it had been in the late
seventeenth century when English authorities undertook a
major reform initiative designed to end abuses of the
system.

vi
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CHAPTER I
Lawlessness on the "sea frontiers'': The English Precedent

In the spring of 1722 Governor Alexander Spotswood
reported to England's Board of Trade that Virginia's
defenses finally had been strengthened sufficiently to
safeguard the colony's "sea frontiers" against attack by
pirates and other sea marauders. 1

Spotswood's statement is

significant in two respects: first, as a telling indication
that piracy had plagued the greater Chesapeake for over half
a century and, second, for the governor's use of the phrase
"sea frontiers."

In modern parlance "frontier" normally

refers to an unexplored or uninhabited region adjacent to a
settled, civilized country.

The governor's use of the term

to describe the interface between the land masses and the
estuaries, bays, and ocean of his colony clearly connotes
something different, however, since these regions in
Virginia had already been explored and to a considerable
extent developed well before Spotswood's tenure.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
"frontiers" referred to national borders, often military

1 CSPC, XXXIII,

#175, p. 86.
2
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boundaries between hostile nations. 2

Although no foreign

enemy effectively occupied the waters and shorelines of
Virginia for any extended period during the colonial era,
British officials were nevertheless engaged in an almost
continual struggle against covert forces of lawlessness that
threatened the authority of the colonial government and the
exercise of royal prerogatives, particularly the collection
of royal revenues.

To be sure, the governors and Royal Navy

guardship commanders assigned to the Chesapeake were mainly
concerned with threats posed by outside interlopers: foreign
invaders, displaced pirates from the Caribbean, and traders
from other colonies and nations who came in violation of the
En0lish navigation acts. 3

But official anxiety also

extended to the residents of Virginia, Maryland, and North
Carolina, a significant (though essentially indeterminate)
number of whom engaged in smuggling, aided and abetted
pirates, looted stranded vessels, and generally ignored
English maritime law as it was intended to apply to them.
2 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1961), val.
IV, 565-66.
3 Although the term "sea frontier" was not commonly
employed, even in Spotswood's time, the idea that it
represented undoubtedly was familiar to coastal residents of
the Chesapeake. A Virginia statute of 1700 entitled "An act
for the better strengthening the frontiers and discovering
the approaches of the enemy," for example, contained
provisions for the establishment of continuous watches in
Elizabeth City, Accomack, and Northampton Counties in order
to "keep a constant looke out to seaward by night and by
day" (William w. Hening, ed., The Statutes At Lar e: Bein
Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, 13 vols.,
1809-1823], III, 204, 208).
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Ironically, most of these individuals did not consider
themselves outlaws, at least not in the usual sense.

For

many, the pursuit of material gain -- especially in the
maritime sphere -- justified technical breaches of the law,
an attitude which seems to have derived from a long-standing
English tradition. 4

Furthermore, the social, political, and

economic transformation that colonial America was undergoing
in the 1650-1750 period, particularly during the last
quarter of the seventeenth century, helped to create an
environment in which objective right and wrong were not
always universally recognized or even readily
identifiable.

Accordingly, the concept of a "maritime

frontier," as used in this study, is meant to convey an idea
beyond a literal or historical definition of the term:
rather a place to which not only declared enemies and
habitual criminals, but also otherwise law-abiding citizens
resorted as a haven for conducting ''illegitimate"
enterprises beyond lawful control.

Such a maritime frontier

was defined not so much by political or geographical
boundaries as by a state of mind in which private
individuals and public administrators far from the seat of

4 Concerning popular attitudes toward illicit trade and
customs fraud in medieval England, for example, one
historian has concluded that "in the eyes of any
representative gathering of twelve good and lawful men,
smuggling was not an offence.
The smuggler was an honest
thief, not a criminal" (Neville Williams, Contraband
Cargoes: Seven Centuries of Smuggling [Hamden, Conn., 1961],
15) •
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imperial authority felt themselves at liberty to observe
those laws which suited them and disregard those which did
not.
The objectives of this study are to examine the various
forms of maritime lawlessness in which the colonists and
officials of the greater Chesapeake participated, trace the
development and perpetuation of attitudes in England that
contributed to the adoption of similar practices in the
colonies, assess the extent to which Chesapeake colonists
engaged in or supported such illegal enterprises, and
evaluate the procedures implemented by English and colonial
officials to control lawlessness in the maritime sphere.

A

concluding chapter attempts to establish the connections
between the different types of maritime illegality and those
who engaged in them and to define the social milieu in which
these activities were pursued.
The analysis focuses on three types of maritime
lawlessness: illicit trade, piracy, and the unauthorized
salvage of stranded or sunken vessels, commonly referred to
as "wrecking."

Although a number of studies on piracy in

colonial Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina have been
produced already, these works tend to focus more or less
exclusively on the escapades and personalities of the
freebooters themselves, generally ignoring the colonists'
roles as sympathizers, trading partners, and defenders of
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the pirates.

5

With regard to illicit trade, most scholars

have concentrated their attention on the northern
(especially the New England) colonies where noncompliance
with English trade and navigation laws was more overt and
opposition more openly defiant.

As an early royal colony,

Virginia in particular has been widely regarded as an
obedient outpost of British economic imperialism where a
relatively submissive population found advantage in a closed
imperial trading system and had little difficulty complying
with the mercantile policies of the crown.

The documentary

record suggests, however, that the attitudes and illegal
trade activities of the Virginia colonists may not have
differed from their northern neighbors as much as we
believe.

Apart from piracy and illicit trade, other acts of

maritime lawlessness such as the wrecking and looting of
ships have rarely received more than the passing attention
of scholars.
One of the most significant and revealing aspects of
the "maritime frontier" mentality is that the attitudes and
behavior associated with it were by no means restricted to
5 See, for example, Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age of
Piracy (New York, 1969); Donald Shomette, Pirates on the
Chesapeake,
(Centerville, Md, 1985); and Lloyd H. Will1ams,
Pirates of Colonial Virginia (Richmond, 1937). Robert E.
Lee, Blackbeard the Pirate: A Reappraisal of His Life and
Times (Winston-Salem, N.C., 1974) takes a legal approach to
the questions surrounding the notorious pirate's criminal
career while in North Carolina, especially his relationship
with the proprietary colony's authorities and the role of
Virginia's royal governor and Royal Navy personnel in the
buccaneer's defeat and the distribution of his booty.
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the colonies or to individuals of low socioeconomic status.
The notion that activities which were proscribed on land
might be tolerated, even encouraged, in the maritime sphere
had clear and ancient precedents in the home country.

The

fourteenth-century reign of Richard II, for example, has
been characterized as one "remarkable for the number of
pardons granted for acts of • • • wrecking, p-iracy, and
smuggling." 6

By the seventeenth century, lawlessness

involving gentlemen of high rank on the maritime frontier of
England had become a fairly commonplace affair and one which
would demonstrably influence the attitudes and actions of
England's overseas emigrants and descendants during the
col~nial

era.

As a result, not only slaves and servants,

common criminals, and free persons of modest means but some
of the foremost citizens and colonial officials -- including
customs collectors, Royal Navy officers, and governors -actively participated in various forms of illicit trade and
revenue fraud,

illegally sought to benefit personally from

shipwreck episodes, and even colluded with pirates.
Understanding maritime lawlessness in a greater
Chesapeake that includes Maryland and northeast North
Carolina -- in many respects a single economic region
requires that the phenomenon be viewed not as an isolated
aberration, but rather as consistent with, and a product of,
6 Henry Atton and Henry H. Holland, The King's Customs:
An Account of Maritime Revenue and Contraband Traffic in
England, 2 vols. (New York 1967), I, 28.
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an ethical environment which tolerated and even encouraged
such illegal activity during the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries in both the colonies and the home
country. 7
Chesapeake.

Nor, of course, was it a problem confined to the
In sentencing the "gentleman" pirate Stede

Bonnet to death in 1718, the chief justice of South Carolina
attributed the pirate's misdeeds directly to the harmful
effects of such a degenerate moral climate, expressing
regret that the principles of religion instilled in Bonnet
through his education had been corrupted, "if not entirely
defaced, by the Scepticism and Infidelity of this wicked
Age." 8

So pervasive and threatening had the manifestations

of the prevailing morality become by the end of the
seventeenth century, warned a New Jersey governor, that if
something was not done to curb the general spirit of
lawlessness "the strongest hand and the longest sword" would
constitute "the best titles to estates in the colonies." 9
It was convenient, of course, and perhaps only natural,
for English officials to identify distant or external
factors in the colonies as the source of the trouble: the
colonists' loose morals, the venality of provincial
7 Clive Senior, A Nation of Pirates: English Piracy in
Its Heyday (New York, 1976), 126-28.
8 Daniel Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates,
Manuel Schonhorn, ed., (Columbia, S.C., 1972), 1~8.
9 CSPC, XV, il2~3, p. 565; Joseph D. Doty, The British
Admiralty:Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration,
1689-1763 (Philadelphia, 193~), 69.
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officials, irresponsible proprietary administrators, and
even, perhaps, the occasional corrupt royal governor.
Seldom did anyone, much less crown authorities themselves,
suggest that the root causes might lie closer to home.

on

rare occasions, however, an astute social critic would
pierce the veil of hypocrisy.

Commenting on the second

volume of A General History of the Pyrates, for example, a
modern scholar has observed that contemporary author Daniel
Defoe "suddenly revealed another world shockingly analogous"
to that of the pirates and smugglers, "a world of
politicians and statesmen, in which a more sophisticated
group of robbers, thieves, and profligates" shamelessly
exploited their status and influence to violate, with
virtual impunity, the very same prohibitions which they and
their associates complained about so indignantly. 10
In defense of the influential men of Defoe's era,
official encouragement and support of illicit maritime
activities such as piracy and smuggling already had achieved
the status of time-honored traditions by the eighteenth
century.

Despite periodic attempts to suppress piracy as

early as the 1300s, the practice of conducting depredations
against foreign ships achieved respectability in England

1° Manuel Schonhorn in Defoe, History of the Pyrates,
xxxvii.
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during the following centuries.

11

The distinction between

piracy and privateering, never clear in the first place,
grew particularly blurred during the
rivalry in the reign of Elizabeth I.

yea~s

of Anglo-Spanish

As a result, piracy

became established rather firmly as an English institution,
a development regretfully acknowledged by the virgin queen's
successor, James I, who, as early as 1620, lamented that
"this accursed plague introduced by Queen Elizabeth by
permitting piracy to her subjects, is even now too deeply
rooted among these people." 12
If English sea marauding had a redeeming characteristic
(apart from contributing to the national treasury ar.d
serving as a "nursery" for English seamen), it was that
piracy constituted a remarkably egalitarian phenomenon for
its time, drawing active participation as well as financial
and logistical support from all classes of society.l3
Although most pirate captains appear to have come from
lower-class backgrounds, these maritime outlaws often were
11 c. L. Ewen, "Organized Piracy Around England in the
Sixteenth Century," Mariners Mirror, 34 (1949), 30-31; Helen
J. Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth
Century (London, 1931), 7; c. L. Kingsford, "West Country
Piracy: The School of English Seamen" in Prejudice and
Promise in Fifteenth-Century England (London, 1962) 92.
12 senior, Nation of Pirates, 8-9, 75.
13 Ewen, "Organized Piracy," 33; M. Oppenheim,
"Maritime History" in The Victoria History of the County of
Cornwall, William Page, ed., (London 1906) I, 489; Senior,
Nation of Pirates, 56; Henry Manwaring, The Life and Works
of Sir Henry Mainwaring, G.E. Manwaring and W.G. Perrin,
eds., 2 vols., (London, 1920-21), II: 41 n. 2.
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well connected socially. 14
freebooter

A late sixteenth-century

(who had developed a particularly dastardly

reputation for brutality toward his victims) boasted, for
example, that he had

11

better friendes in Englande than eanye

alderman or merchants of London, .. a claim echoed over a
century later by the infamous pirate Blackbeard who was
heard to brag that there was no home in North Carolina where
he was not a welcome guest.l5
Sponsorship by members of the English gentry and the
collusion of local officials and even England's lord high
admiral helped to promote piratical ventures and the
development of trading networks to dispose of the
freebooters'

loot. 16

With so many men of high rank

investing a personal stake in the pirates' success, official
efforts to control the marauders were, not surprisingly,
11

hesitating and ineffectual 11 and legal prosecutions often

amounted to little more than sham proceedings. 17

The case

of two Cornish squires who served on government commissions
14 B. Richard Burg, 11 Legitimacy and Authority: A Case
Study of Pirate Commanders in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, .. American Neptune, 37 (1977), 45-47.
1 5 Ewen, "Organized Piracy, .. 38~ Lee, Blackbeard, 66~
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77.
16 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against
the
Pirates (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 12-14~ David Mathew,
11
The Cornish and Welsh Pirates in the Reign of Elizabeth, ..
English Historical Review, 39 (1924), 337~ Ewen, 11 0rganized
Piracy," 38-41~ Senior, Nation of Pirates, 46, 84.
17 Cyrus H. Karraker, Piracy Was a Business (Rindge,
N.H., 1953), 34.
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inquiring into piracy while simultaneously engaging in or
actively sponsoring similar ventures themselves does not
appear to have been uncommon. 18
Local inhabitants collaborated with pirates most
intensively in the southwest of England and southern
Ireland. 19

Piracy had so many investors in Cornwall and

Devon, in fact, that any serious initiative to eradicate the
industry, one historian has speculated, might have incited
an insurrection in those counties. 20

Support was also

strong in London where many residents (known by their
contemporaries as "land pirates") defied royal authority by
aiding the sea robbers and facilitating their escape from
law enforcement officials. 21
Despite James I's efforts to suppress piracy, it was
his son, Charles I, paradoxically, who sanctioned acts of
piracy in the Red Sea and accepted a share of the proceeds
himself.22

James's grandson, Charles II, contributed to the

18 Kingsford, "West Country Piracy," 95-102.
19 senior, Nation of Pirates, 46; Ritchie, Captain
Kidd, 12.
In the second decade of the seventeenth century
~famous reformed pirate Sir Henry Mainwaring expressed
his conviction that, although acts of piracy were committed
more often in English waters, "yet in proportion Ireland
doth much exceed it, for it may be well called the Nursery
and storehouse of Pirates, in regard of the general good
entertainment they receive there" (Mainwaring, Life and
works, II, 15-16, 46-48).
20 Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 35.
2 1 Senior, Nation of Pirates, 120-24.
22 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 14.
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westward expansion of piracy into the Caribbean by not only
condoning the allegedly brutal exploits of Henry Morgan, but
by knighting the marauder and elevating him to the post of
deputy governor of Jamaica. 2 3

As long as piracy continued

to serve the economic interests of both the Jamaican
colonists and the royal government, the crown had little
incentive to discourage the practice.

England could not

afford to assign a naval fleet to the island, but Jamaican
governors, acting in accordance with the prevailing "no
peace beyond the line" doctrine that defined relations
between European powers in the New World, found that they
could promote the home country's imperial ambitions by
issuing buccaneers privateering commissions to attack
Spanish settlements and shipping. 24

Island merchants

23 Shirley Carter Hughson, The Carolina Pirates and
Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740 (Baltimore, 1894), 17; A. o.
Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America: Comprising a
pertinent and truthful description of the principal acts of
de redation and inhuman cruelt committed b the English and
French buccaneers against the Spaniards in America Lon on,
1973), passim; P. K. Kemp and Christopher Lloyd, The
Brethren of the Coast: British and French Buccaneers in the
south Seas (London, 1960), 21, 30-31; Violet Barbour,
"Privateers and Pirates in the West Indies," American
Historical Review, XVI (April 1911), 555, 563; RichardS.
Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the
English West Indies, 1624-1713 (New York, 1973), xv;
Bartholomew R. Carroll, Historical Collections of South
Carolina; Embracing Many Rare and Valuable Documents,
Relating to the History of that State from its First
Discovery to its Independence in the Year 1776, (New York,
1836), I, 86.
24 "Beyond the line" referred to the area in the
Atlantic Ocean west of the prime meridian and south of the
Tropic of Cancer in which European rivals were free, by
mutual agreement, to challenge one another's territorial
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benefited both as purveyors of provisions to the pirates and
as recipients, in turn, of desirable goods at low cost. 25
When the European colonial powers decided in the final
quarter of the seventeenth century that it was in their
collective and individual interests to suppress piracy in
the Caribbean, they undertook stern measures ·to effect its
eradication. 26

Many buccaneers who feared the hangman's

noose but were unprepared to abandon their profession
consequently gravitated toward the North American mainland
where they received favorable treatment from English
colonists.

When considering attitudes sympathetic toward

buccaneers in the Chesapeake in particular, it may be of
some significance that the vast majority of immigrants to
the region in the seventeenth century embarked from London

claims and rights of free passage without endangering
peaceful relations at home. The result, as one historian
has described it, was that the Caribbean became "the Wild
west of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (Dunn,
Sugar and Slaves, chapter 1, especially pp. 9-11; Carl and
Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line: The English
in the Caribbean 1624-1690 [New York, 1972], 169-70).
25 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 15. Pennsylvania proprietor
William Penn underscored the importance of Jamaica's role in
the proliferation of English New World piracy when he
identified the island as the "seminary, where pirates have
commenced Masters of Art, after having practised upon the
Spaniard and then launched for the Red and Arabian Seas"
(CSPC, XVIII, i366, p. 211).
26 John H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: The European
overseas Empires in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1971),
44.
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and the southwestern port of Bristol, two areas associated
with extensive popular support for piracy. 27

The documented history of illicit trade In England,
like that of piracy, dates back centuries before the
colonial era.2 8

Two salient insights derived from

research on this early contraband trade have implications of
special relevance for the greater Chesapeake.

The first,

that illegal trade was conducted primarily through the
outports rather than London because of the difficulty
associated with smuggling near a principal port and
administrative center, suggests that an area like the
greater Chesapeake, which lacked major commercial entrep8ts
and urban centers, would have been even more conducive to
such activity.29

The second, that the bulk of the

unlawful commerce was performed with the connivance and, in
many instances, the active participation of the same

27 James Horn, 11 Servant Immigration to the Chesapeake
in the Seventeenth Century 11 in The Chesapeake in the
Seventeenth Centur : Essa s on An lo-American Society and
Politics, Thad w. Tate and David Ammerman, eds. New York,
1979)' 66.
2 8 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, chapters 1-4 offers
the most comprehensive analysis of English smuggling in the
precolonial and colonial eras. For additional background
see Atton and Holland, King's Customs, I; Charles G. Harper,
The Smu lers: Pictures ue Cha ters in the Stor of an
Ancient Craft London, 1909); and Neville Williams, The
Maritime Trade of the East Anglian Ports, 1550-1590 (Oxford,
1988) •

29 Williams, East Anglian Ports, 25.
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government functionaries who were charged with detecting and
preventing it, indicates a long-standing precedent for
official corruption and collaboration at the local
leve1. 3 ~

Early customs violations in England generally involved
the unlicensed exportation of domestic wool, wine, and
foodstuffs. 31

Repeated government attempts to restrict

foreign imports through legislation like the Corn Laws
(dating from 1361) were openly derided and, in fact, only
served to encourage contraband trafficking. 32

Many of the

related institutional abuses, including bribery and
extortion, and certain contraband techniques such as the use
of counterfeit customs certificates that would play integral
parts in the illicit trade of the greater Chesapeake are
well documented in the precolonial history of the home
country. 33
While these offenses continued into the seventeenth
century, the founding of an overseas colony in Virginia led
to the delineation of a navigation system for the whole
empire.

Debates as early as 1619 over the Virginia

3~ Ibid.; Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 6~.
31 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 27-29; Oppenheim,
"Maritime History," 478; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 3;
Williams, East Anglian Ports, 27.
32 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 31.
33 Ibid., 19, 29, 31, 32; Williams, East Anglian Ports,
25-33; Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 6~.
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Company's tobacco contract with the crown resulted in the
formation of a policy by which colonial planters were
granted a monopoly of the English rnarket. 34

In return,

the colonists assumed obligations to export their produce
exclusively to the mother country, to conduct no trade with
foreigners nor ship their goods aboard foreign vessels, and
to pay duties on colonial imports into England.35
Virginia's compliance with the scheme was spotty, at best,
with frequent violations involving tobacco exports to
Holland and Dutch colonies and the importation of European
manufactured goods into Virginia aboard Dutch ships. 36
Back in the horne country the codification of this
commercial policy, beginning with Parliament's passage of
the first Navigation Act in 1651, appears to have inspired a
significant increase in smuggling in response to the
additional restrictions imposed on international
cornrnerce.3 7

To some degree, then, the development of

illicit trade in the American colonies (where the Navigation

34 Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1934-1938), IV, 13.
35 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
12-20.
36 Ibid., I, 158-59 n. 6; IV, 17. Also see, for
example, Jennings c. Wise, Ye Kingdorne of Accawrnacke or the
Eastern Shore of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century
(Richmond, 1911), 147-48 and Susie M. Ames, Studies of the
Virginia Eastern Shore in the Seventeenth Century (Richmond,
1940), 45-49, 95.
37 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 94, 116, 129-30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
Acts also introduced new regulations to tighten the
commercial system) paralleled, and was contemporary with,
comparable illegal activity in England. 38

As was the case

with other social, cultural, and economic institutions,
however, the nature of the central regulatory agencies which
eventually would evolve in England undoubtedly influenced
the character of their colonial derivatives and subsidiaries
to a significant degree.
So if, as scholars have alleged, the English customs
administration of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
truly was "riddled with abuses" and if smuggling actually
amounted, as some historians and contemporaries have
liberally estimated, to anywhere from a third to half of. all
English commerce, then it is not unreasonable to suppose
that similar problems may have plagued the trade of colonial

38 In one category of customs abuse, violence committed
against revenue officers, residents of the greater
Chesapeake actually may have played a leading role.
According to Neville Williams, attacks against customs
officers were fairly common in medieval England, but seem to
have dissipated considerably during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries (Contraband Cargoes, 12). The
greatest physical harm to customs collectors in any of the
American colonies before 1750 was perpetrated by Marylanders
and North Carolinians in the last quarter of the seventeenth
century, while most of the comparable documented instances
in England during the colonial era appear to have occurred
no earlier than the second decade of the eighteenth (Atton
and Holland, The King's Customs, 179, 181, 230-31, 255, 465;
Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 505; Harper, The Smugglers,
passim, especially chapters III-V).
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North America. 39

Practical innovations in smuggling

methods and the increased sophistication of contraband
networks during the period also contributed to the
development of illicit trade as a significant, though
basically immeasurable, element of the Anglo-American
colonial trade system.40
Not surprisingly, the generally tolerant attitude
toward smuggling (or, at least, the inability to control it
effectively) manifested itself in England's New World trade
activities as well.

Parliament's approval of an act

creating the South Sea Company in 1711 represented, in its
time, only the latest and least overtly hostile expression
of the long-standing British desire to penetrate illegally
the Spanish commercial monopoly in the West Indies and the
Central and South American mainland. 41

Historians usually

39 G. D. Ramsey, "The Smuggler's Trade: A Neglected
Aspect of English Commercial Development," Transactions of
the Royal Historical Society, ser. 5, vol. 2 (1952), 133,
135; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 28. Though such
calculations are clearly on the high side, historian Marcus
Rediker has deemed it "safe -- and conservative -- to
estimate that the trade of the empire exceeded customs
accounts by 15 to 20 percent," a significant figure by any
measure (Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant
Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World,
1700-1750 [Cambridge, 1987], 73 n. 144).
4 0 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 72; James F. Shepherd and
Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic
Development of Colonial North America (Cambridge, 1972),
205; Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 63, 71.
41 Barbour, "Privateers and Pirates," passim; John G.
Sperling, The South Sea Company: An Historical Essay and
Bibliographical Finding List (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 1,
8-11; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 140,
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identify the malfeasance of company directors most directly
with the defrauding of corporation shareholders in the
scandal known as the South Sea Bubble, but the "aura of
corruption," as one scholar has characterized prevailing
business attitudes within the company, filtered down to the
field agents as well.42
Since the parameters of the trade agreement that
England negotiated with Spain at the conclusion of Queen
Anne's War were so restrictive, the English project was
doomed to failure as a legitimate financial venture from the
start.

At the stockholders' expense, however, servants of

the government-sanctioned enterprise engaged in an extensive
illicit trade with the Spanish New World colonies, sharing
their profits with company directors and, frequently, Royal
Navy officers who provided protection for the smugglers. 43
Not only did the crown tacitly approve of the illicit
trading activity, but, during the War of Jenkins' Ear, it
also permitted the deployment of Royal Navy ships to protect
British contrabandists, prompting English contemporaries as

249, 354.
42 Sperling, South Sea Company, 23, 27; John Carswell,
The South Sea Bubble (Stanford, Calif., 1960).
43 Sperling, South Sea Company, 7-8, 23-24, 40, 44;
Vera L. Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade,"
American Historical Review, XXXI no. 4 (July 1926), 672,
676; Marcus Rediker, "Society and Culture among
Anglo-American Deep Sea Sailors, 1700-1750," Ph.D.
dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1983), 39;
Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 142.
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well as modern historians to suggest that the government
prosecuted the war principally to allow British smugglers to
continue to violate Spanish prohibitions against foreign
commerce. 44

Small wonder, then, in view of their own

rulers' disregard for the restrictive trade regulations of
other nations, that many Anglo-American colonists showed
little respect for, or inclination to comply with, the
mercantilist policies of their own government.
The home country not only promoted illegal trade in the
colonies incidentally by its example in the eighteenth
century, but directly as a result of its penal policies.

In

1719 Parliament decreed that the most dangerous
contrabandists of all, those convicted of armed smuggling,
would be transported to the colonies. 45

The government

dispatched so many of these criminals overseas, according to
one historian, that contemporary Englishmen believed that
the crown was nurturing its empire on the doctrine of
illicit trade. 46

The looting of wrecked and stranded vessels represents
another type of maritime illegality which had clear

44 Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade,"
667; Parry, Trade and Dominion, lle; Williams, Contraband
cargoes, 143; Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 42.
45 Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws: A
Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering (New
York, 1973), 217.
46 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 140.
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precedents in both the home country and the early New World
colonies.

According to an English statute of 1275,

disposition of the effects of vessels cast ashore was the
king's prerogative.

Owners of the cargo might sue for the

return of their goods and, upon presenting proof of
ownership within a year, their claim would be honored. 4 7
In the absence of such a claim, proceeds from the sale of
the effects would be distributed among the salvors with the
king, and possibly an

assig~ee,

receiving a share.

Notwithstanding these theoretical safeguards, numerous
destructive episodes in which the law was openly violated
have been documented in England from as early as the
mid-fourteenth century. 48

By 1526 an English judge had to

explain to the distressed owner of a plundered vessel which
had stranded on the Cornwall coast that no redress could be
expected since wrecking was simply "the custom of the
country," a custom, according to a modern scholar, which
remained "immutable through the centuries." 49

As late as

1771 a Scotsman incurred the wrath of his community for
rescuing some shipwrecked mariners and assisting in the

47 3 Ed. I. c. 4. Danby Pickering, ed., The Statutes
at Large • • • of Great Britain, continued as Statutes of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Cambridge
and London, 1762-1869), I, 79. Cited hereafter as
Pickering, English Statutes.
48 Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 478-79, 496, 499,
502.
49 Ibid., 486.
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recovery of their cargo.

Irate neighbors rewarded the good

samaritan by ransacking his house and attempting to burn it
down.

Eventually, they persuaded him to leave the region

altogether for daring to interfere with what they regarded,
according to historian Bernard Bailyn, as their "ancient
right of pillage."5B
For the most part, shipwrecks were considered
fortuitous occurrences which offered opportunities to
coastal inhabitants, and even shipwrecked sailors, to
"committ very great Ravage and Plunder" with little feir of
retribution. 51

English law provided that local residents

and seamen who recovered provisions and other goods from
shipwrecks were entitled to salvage fees under certain
conditions, one of which was that only an incapacitated
vessel having no survivors could be condemned legally, a
requirement which, it has been alleged, induced some
unscrupulous wreckers, particularly on the coast of
Cornwall, to see to it that those who managed to reach shore
alive did not remain so for long. 52

While there does not

appear to be any reliable evidence to substantiate the
50 Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in
the Peo~ling of America on the Eve of the Revolution (New
York, 1 86), SBB-502.
51 Cited in Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 14~.
Also see Birse Shepard, The Lore of the Wreckers (Boston,
1962), 34.
52 Arthur H. Norway, Highways and Byways in Devon and
Cornwall
(London, 1911), 279; Shepard, Lore of the
Wreckers, 35.
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charge of murder, many instances of local opposition to the
efforts of royal agents to secure wrecks for the benefit of
the crown or the shipowner have been documented. 5 3

such

resistance often was accompanied by threats of physical
violence against those who tried to interfere, causing
horrified English authorities to denounce "the cruelty and
inhumanity of the people inhabiting the coasts" after one
wrecking episode and the "dishonest and savage practices of
the common people" after another.54
When the English began colonizing the New World, royal
authorities had to take the potential for such abuses into
consideration.

In fact, historians have identified the need

to protect the lives and interests of shipwreck survivors as
a principal reason for establishing a vice-admiralty court
in Bermuda in the late seventeenth century. 55

The royal

government also customarily granted to certain favored
companies and individuals admiralty rights, or droits, which
included a percentage of the proceeds from sales of
condemned goods from shipwrecks.

As a colonizing enterprise

which enjoyed the protection of the other legal safeguards
related to wrecks, the Bermuda Company benefited from the

53 Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 496, 5~2~ Atton and
Holland, King's Customs, 255~ Norway, Devon and Cornwall,
294-96.
54 Cited in Oppenheim, "Maritime History," 5~2.
5 5 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 78-79, 117~
Harper, English Navigation Laws, 185.
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establishment of vice-admiralty jurisdiction in this respect
as well.

56

Along with the privilege, however, went the

responsibility of insuring that proper procedures would be
followed with respect to the rights of other legitimate
claimants. 57
In 1621 Spanish authorities complained to company
officials that local Bermudians had pillaged the wreck and
abused the passengers of a Spanish treasure ship that was
cast away on the English island.

In a similar situation two

decades later, officials in the home country demonstrated
that their primary concern was neither the safety of
surviving passengers nor the illegality of wrecking per se,
but rather securing the crown's share of the loot.
England's lord high admiral implied that the company's
failure to remand the royal allotment in this instance was
the result, moreover, of collusion between the wreckers and
colonial officials.

Bermuda's governor subsequently managed

to compel several individuals to give up their pillaged
goods, but they, in turn, had the temerity to sue the royal

5 6 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 78-79.
In
the greater Chesapeake similar droits are recorded as having
been claimed by Samuel Tilghman in Maryland in 1659, Robert
Brent in Virginia in 1693, and Robert Houlden on behalf of
the Carolina proprietors in 1679 (Md. A., XLI, 302-303;
Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 61; VMHB, XIV, 100;
CRNC, I, 240; David Stick, The Outer Banks of North
carolina, 1584-1958 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1958), 24.
57 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 84.
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official and, perhaps to no one's surprise, won their
case. 58
Shortly after mid-century the company and the colonial
government were still trying, without success, to recover
those effects from the Spanish ship that remained in the
islanders' possession.

Various attempts to chasten the

colonists in subsequent years through legal mechanisms and
official proclamations appear to have achieved negligible
results.

A series of looting incidents over the next two

decades involving stranded English merchant ships
demonstrates that the wreckers also were impartial as far as
the nationality of their prey was concerned.59
The same patterns of behavior -- the virtually
unrestricted plundering of wrecked vessels without regard to
ownership or origin, the reluctance to cooperate with
colonial authorities in safeguarding wrecks for the king and
distributing the proceeds from the sale of salvaged effects
in the lawfully prescribed manner, and the unwillingness of
general court juries to convict fellow colonists who
participated in the plunder -- all were repeated
periodically on the North American mainland along the
Eastern Shore and Outer Banks of the greater Chesapeake
during the colonial era.

58 Ibid., 83-84.
59

~., 84-85.
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Admittedly, the ability to demonstrate the existence
and especially the precise extent of lawlessness on the
maritime frontier is difficult.

Most of those who engaged

in illegitimate enterprises had no desire to publicize their
affairs and undoubtedly went to great pains to suppress any
evidence of such illicit activities, particularly their own
involvement.

Consequently, first-hand accounts of

participation in smuggling, customs fraud, aiding or trading
with pirates, wrecking, etc. are practically nonexistent.
Any attempt to quantify that which was never intended to be
discovered would almost certainly be futile.

That dearth of

hard evidence explains why estimates of the actual extent of
smuggling, for example, range from as little as five to as
much as fifty percent of all English overseas commerce for
the years in question. 60
most Virginia

cou~ty

Additionally, the destruction of

court records during the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries severely limits the amount of judicial
proceedings and trial testimony available to the researcher.
But documentary evidence of illicit activities is
available in a number of primary sources including official
records and reports of the home and colonial governments;
contemporary newspapers; official correspondence between
colonial governors, surveyors of the customs, the Board of
Trade, and the Treasury; and the private papers of various
60 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 72; Andrews, Colonial Period
of American History, IV, 241; Williams, Contraband Cargoes,
28.
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officials and colonists.

Since maritime lawbreakers usually

were extremely adept at concealing their activities from
public and official notice it sometimes becomes necessary,
as one researcher has remarked, "to focus attention mainly
upon the fumblings of the government" in its efforts to stem
the tide of lawlessness on the "sea frontiers." 61

In

addition to actual reports of maritime illegality,
inferences about the existence and extent of illicit affairs
and official corruption can be made on the basis of the
content and tone of government proclamations warning
colonists and governors about the consequences of various
illegal actions and the frequency with which these warnings
were issued.
Naturally, such official declarations must also be
viewed with a degree of skepticism.

Just as the

perpetrators went to considerable lengths to obscure their
activities, so too were some officials inclined to
exaggerate the extent of lawlessness in the greater
Chesapeake either to discredit proprietary rule or,
especially in the case of customs agents whose compensation
was tied to a percentage of seizures and condemnations, to
persuade crown authorities to commit greater resources to
the capture of maritime lawbreakers.

On the other hand, one

must also take into account, as the officials themselves
certainly must have done, that too much hyperbole about
6 1 Ramsey, "The Smuggler's Trade," 156.
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maritime lawlessness might produce the undesirable result of
suggesting that the enforcers simply were not doing their
jobs or, at the very least, not doing them well.
Although the extent to which Chesapeake inhabitants
actually engaged in or abetted maritime illegality cannot be
deduced with accuracy from official statements, still the
constant fretting of authorities is itself inherently
significant as a tacit admission that the government could
not effectively enforce the Navigation Acts or the laws
designed to prevent collaboration with freebooters.
Conversely, the almost complete absence of comment or
complaint by Chesapeake residents about the evils of illicit
trade, assisting pirates, or looting stranded vessels
implies that the colonists did not regard any of these
undertakings as serious transgressions, much less as the
heinous crimes against which royal officials continually
inveighed.
Colonists rarely denounced their neighbors for
participating in such activities, partly because, as one
deponent reported, anyone who informed ran the risk of being
ostracized or, worse, suffering bodily harm.

On the

infrequent occasions when Chesapeake inhabitants did
complain to royal authorities about the perpetration of
maritime illegalities, it was usually because the colonists
believed that their own safety or financial interests were
in jeopardy.

Apart from these instances, colonial
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Virginians, Marylanders, and North Carolinians generally
failed to support, and in many cases actively opposed,
government officials in the effort to execute the laws
against smuggling, piracy, and wrecking.

Such defiance not

only took the form of continued lawbreaking, but also
manifested itself in common-law courts where juries
consistently failed to convict alleged perpetrators, and in
colonial assemblies where legislators refused to enact
statutes to help implement crown policies.

And so, despite

the difficulty of discovering the full evidence and
interpreting that which is available, a pattern nevertheless
emerges from the documents that do survive of a widespread
and systematic violation of the Navigation Acts and other
maritime laws in the greater Chesapeake, one that employed
an impressive variety of methods of evasion and defiance.
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CHAPTER II
"Turbulent spirits, stubborn and disloyal hearts and
treacherous and wicked inclinations": The Political and
Economic Context of Illicit Trade in the Greater Chesapeake

In October

171~

the newly installed governor of

Virginia, Alexander Spotswood, sent the bishop of London a
glowing character appraisal of his colony's inhabitants:

"I

have observed here less swearing and Prophaneness, less
Drunkenness and Debauchery, less uncharitable feuds and
animositys, and less Knaverys and Villanys than in any other
part of the world where my Lot has been."

But the governor

also felt constrained to add, "Whether the natural cause of
this blessing be the people's living under less worldly
Temptations • • • or that they are more dextrous in
concealing from me their Vices, I will not as yet pretend to
decide • • • whether this be the real or my imaginary State
of Virginia." 1
What caused Spotswood to qualify his laudatory
assessment?

Perhaps it was simply the prudent caution of a

1 Alexander Spotswood, The Official Letters of
Alexander Spotswood, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of
Virginia, 171~-1722, Robert A. Brock, ed., 2 vols.
(Richmond, 1882-85), I, 28.
31
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political appointee and career military man who sought to
avoid being judged naive in light of subsequent,
unforeseeable developments.

There is reason to believe,

however, that the governor already had grounds for
s~spicion.

On the same day he wrote the bishop, Spotswood

also sent a report to the Council of Trade in which he was
obliged to admit that, despite his conscientious efforts, he
had failed to discover who was responsible for conducting
unlawful commerce between Virginia and the Dutch West
Indies.

In view of the meticulous investigation detailed in

the report, it is evident that the perpetrators had been
very "dextrous" indeed in concealing from the authorities "a
Trade so pernitious to her Majesty's Interest and
Service." 2

Like other forms of maritime lawlessness, illicit trade
originated in the greater Chesapeake well before Spotswood's
time and, like the others, continued long after.

A series

of navigation acts legislated by Parliament during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established the
restrictions which defined illicit commerce.

The first of

these, passed in 1651 and principally aimed at undermining
the Dutch carrying trade, specified that no European goods
could be imported into England or her colonies except on
English ships.

The Navigation Act of 166g reiterated the

2 Ibid., I, 19.
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previous legislation and also restricted the exportation of
certain enumerated commodities, including tobacco, from the
colonies exclusively to England or other English ports.
Already by 1662, however, the home government's
dissatisfaction with the level of compliance in Virginia was
evident in the royal instructions to Governor William
Berkeley: "we have certain knowledge that there is greater
endeavors used by the Ill arts of some and negligence of
others to defraud us of the freight and benefit which would
accrue by the act of Parliament concerning Navigation if the
same was carefully and faithfully executed and observed." 3
In 1673 Parliament passed the Plantation Duty Act which
established a penny per pound tax on the exportation of
enumerated goods from one English colony to another.
According to the Commissioners of the Customs, the duty was
imposed "less for revenue than to prevent exportation of
goods from Colony to Colony and so to foreign countries in
Europe, evading the English customs." 4

Nevertheless, the

attempt to collect the duty retroactively against a New
England merchant trading to North Carolina provided the
catalyst for Culpeper's Rebellion in 1677.

Efforts to

enforce the Navigation Acts continued to meet strong,
sometimes violent opposition from residents of the greater
3 VMHB, III, 18; Harold B. Gill, Jr., "The Naval Office
in Virginia, 1692-17gg," M.A. thesis (College of William and
Mary, 1959), 6.
4 CSPC, XIII, #23g6, p. 662.
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Chesapeake.

Political disturbances in Virginia and Maryland

in succeeding decades resulted in the death of royal customs
collectors in each colony.
For the remainder of the seventeenth century English
authorities continued to express their annoyance with the
failure to curtail illicit trade and customs fraud in the
greater Chesapeake.

The home government's concern extended

beyond the nefarious activities of the colonists to the
officials who had been appointed to enforce the trade laws,
but whose negligence or complicity had done little to
advance the crown's cause.

Nearing the century's end with

no appreciable improvement in trade law enforcement, the
Board of Trade (successor to the Lords of Trade, a committee
of the Privy Council) undertook a major legislative and
administrative initiative which resulted in passage of the
Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the
Plantation Trade in 1696.
The reforms mandated by the act succeeded in correcting
many of the most glaring abuses, but smuggling, official
corruption, and a more generalized opposition to the royal
authority embodied in the navigation laws and other
regulations in the maritime sphere continued well into the
next century.

Although the number of official complaints

about illicit commerce and related abuses in the Chesapeake
appear to have declined during the half century ending in
1750, evidence suggests that the reduction may have been due
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to the laxity of British imperial administration,
particularly after 1725, and to greater sophistication in
the smuggler's trade and among those who practiced customs
fraud.

And while the overtly hostile, sometimes violent

opposition that characterized the colonists' attitude toward
royal customs agents moderated considerably after the turn
of the century, the generally more comfortable relationship
that developed between customs officials and colonial
traders did not always necessarily redound to the benefit of
the imperial treasury.

In response to the imposition of the trade laws,
smugglers in the greater Chesapeake and the rest of colonial
America pursued several principal objectives: the evasion of
customs duties, the shipment of enumerated goods to
non-English ports, and the direct importation of foreign
goods into the colonies.

Technically, not all types of duty

evasion constituted violations of the Navigation Acts since
the colonial governments also assessed their own levies on
exports such as furs and skins (which were not enumerated
until 1721) and imports such as molasses (not enumerated
until 1704), distilled liquors, indentured servants, and
slaves. 5

Although the royal treasury did not suffer

directly from the perpetration of these particular forms of

5 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
98-101, 105.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
customs fraud, the revenue from the provincial duties often
provided a significant percentage of a colony's operating
expenses which the crown otherwise would have had to
subsidize.

The historical record attests to efforts by

Chesapeake merchants and shippers to circumvent all these
tariffs, but by far the greatest volume of contraband
traffic involved the smuggling of tobacco exports and
imports of foreign manufactured goods. 6
Predictably, most of the official correspondence
between England and the Chesapeake colonies regarding trade
during the 1650-1750 period reflects a paramount concern
with the economic priorities of commerce regulation and
revenue collection, but the historical documents also reveal
that the broader issue of illegal trade included a
significant political dimension as well.

The first

Navigation Act, for example, was designed not only to
subvert the Dutch carrying trade with the English
settlements, but also to punish colonies like Virginia for
supporting the crown during the English Civil War. 7

Apart

6 For examples of recorded attempts to smuggle skins,
liquor, and slaves see Md. A., XX, 284; XXIV, 8; XXVII, 240,
241; EJC, II, 42-43; NCHCR, 1702-1708, 470-71; CSPC, XVIII,
#152,-p7 80; George Reese, ed., Proceedings in ~Court of
Vice-Admiralty of Virginia 1698-1775 (Richmond, 1983), x, 20
n. 47; Margaret s. Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland,
1689-1715, Johns Hopkins University, Studies in Historical
and Political Science, 32, no. 3 (Baltimore, 1914), 129.
7 Leo F. Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the
British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1542-1754,
(Washington 1924-41), I, 218 n., 381; Andrews, Colonial
Period of American History, IV, 35-36.
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from the consequences to the regional economy of the
Chesapeake, the legislation also may have had profound
ramifications in terms of perceptions about the significance
of illicit trade in the relationship between England and the
colonies.

By creating hardship in the realm of maritime

commerce as a disciplinary measure for undesirable political
behavior, the Commonwealth government may have unwittingly
established a symbolic association between the two in the
minds of Chesapeake colonists.

Whether the 1651 Navigation

Act actually crystallized this notion is purely conjectural,
but it is clear that in time many of the region's
inhabitants came to regard the maritime trade sphere as a
principal arena for expressing opposition to the authority
of the home government, whether Protectorate or royal. 8
Some English officials viewed the colonists' disregard
for the navigation laws not only as evidence of colonial
defiance and intransigence, but also as an indication of
weak or incompetent local administration.

Although the home

government certainly did not appreciate such ineffectual
leadership, some crown officers nevertheless perceived in

8 Such an association already may have existed in the
minds of Englishmen involved in maritime commerce.
In a
landmark case in 1606 English judges ruled against a
merchant who had refused to pay a certain duty because
Parliament had not specifically authorized it, thereby
upholding the king's prerogative to levy duties at will.
"Henceforth," Neville Williams maintains, "the smuggler took
on the role of a guardian of English liberties against the
increasing despotism of the Crown" (Contraband Cargoes, 65).
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the situation an opportunity to strengthen and consolidate
imperial control in the recalcitrant regions as a remedy.
One of the major law enforcement problems that royal
authorities had to address, for example, was the almost
universal unwillingness of the general courts in the greater
Chesapeake to convict illicit traders, pirates, and their
collaborators regardless of the persuasiveness of the
evidence.

As a result, Virginia governor Francis Nicholson

predicted in

17~~

that maritime lawlessness would be "almost

impossible to prevent • • • in this part of the world,
except the Courts of Vice-Admiralty," that is, courts
without juries presided over by judges appointed by the
governors, "be well established." 9

Accordingly, a

principal provision of the Act of 1696 called for the
creation in the colonies of vice-admiralty courts whose
judges would be far less sympathetic to contraband trade and
piracy than the average denizens of the region. 1 ~

The

measure unquestionably provided a useful tool in the
campaign against illicit commerce, but it also conveniently
served another, perhaps larger, imperial purpose.

As

Governor Nicholson explained, "These parts, being trading

9 CSPC, XVIII, #523, p. 31~.
1~ See, for example, Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 313 and
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 251.
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Colonies, seem to want and require such a Court, in order to
keep them within their bounds of dependance."!!
Political considerations related to the Navigation Acts
in turn affected perceptions about the prevalence of illicit
trade and who was responsible for it.

Until North Carolina

became a royal colony in 1729, one of the refrains most
consistently voiced by royal officials was the difficulty,
if not impossibility, of effectively enforcing the trade
laws in the greater Chesapeake as long as one or more of the
colonies remained under proprietary contro1. 12

In 1721

the Board of Trade represented to the king that, although
North Carolina had the benefit of a full complement of
customs officials, "daily experience shows that illegal
Trade is not to be prevented in a Proprietary
Government." 13
As was the case with piracy, the alleged involvement of
colonists and officials in illicit trade in proprietary
Maryland and North Carolina provided a convenient pretext
for the advocates of charter nullification.

Several years

after the passage of the 1696 legislation, royal authorities
ll CSPC, XVIII, #523, p. 31~.
12 Edward Randolph, Edward Randolph 1676-17~3,
Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New
England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America, Robert N.
Tappan and Alfred T. Goodrick, eds., 7 vols. (New York,
1967), V: 135, 264-66, 27~-71; CRNC, I, 545-47; CSPC, XV,
#149 i, p. 72; XVI, #451, p. 21r:----lJ CRNC, II

,

42nv •
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complained to the Carolina proprietors that, despite many
previous laws and instructions for preventing fraud in the
plantation trade, "very great Abuses have been and continue
still to be practiced."

Any failure to enforce "strict and

punctual! observance" of the trade laws in Carolina in the
future, crown officials warned, would be regarded as an
"Infraction of those Laws tending to ye forfeiture of our
Letters Patent for ye Government of that • • •
Province." 14

While it is entirely possible that the

impulse to discredit the proprietary colonies may have
contribute~

to unfounded or exaggerated charges of

wrongdoing, it also seems likely that sensitivity to the
issue and fear of its negative repercussions may have
discouraged proprietary officials from accurately reporting
the volume of illicit trade and related instances of
official corruption in their colonies.
An additional consequence of the debate over the
proprietary colonies was that it tended to obscure similar
or worse transgressions that less suspect colonists and
officials were perpetrating in royal Virginia (and Maryland
during the period of direct crown control from 1691 to
1715), precisely the point that Pennsylvania proprietor
William Penn tried to impress on royal authorities when he
boldly and indignantly asserted in 1701, "If I cannot prove
proprietary Governments more Innocent and more Beneficial!
14 Ibid., I, 504.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
to the Crown than those that are called the Kings I will
resign my Pretensions." 15

The Quaker proprietor

specifically charged that royal Maryland was guilty of much
greater abuse of the trade laws than his own colony.l6
These allegations, coming as they did from the founder
of a proprietary colony, probably had only a limited impact.
But a 1698 memorial submitted to the Board of Trade by
Virginia attorney Benjamin Harrison must have been harder to
ignore.

"There is perhaps no place in the King's

dominions," Harrison maintained, "where the methods of
managing both the trade and the revenues are so exactly
calculated to defraud the public, abuse the subject and
prevent discovery thereof as the present constitutions
demonstrate Virginia to be." 1 7
Harrison's document is as remarkable for its source as
its candid revelations.

Testimonials by colonists detailing

the manner in which illicit trade and customs fraud were
perpetrated and identifying the participants were extremely
rare.

The reason, the Virginia attorney explained, was not

that the violations occurred infrequently, but, quite the
contrary, precisely because the wrongdoing was so pervasive.
So many colonists, including men of high station, were

15 Cited in Michael G. Hall, Edward Randolph and the
American Colonies, 1676-1703 (Chapel Hill, 1960), 211.
16 Ibid., 210-11.
l7 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 330.
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intimately involved that "those who would endeavour to make
any reformation" would "never fail to branded as persons of
turbulent spirits, stubborn and disloyal hearts, and
treacherous and wicked inclinations."

Worse yet, those who

dared to expose the abuses would be certain to encounter
"all imaginable opposition and perhaps be pursued with rage
and violence by those who think themselves likely to lose by
the alteration."l8
Harrison, it must be recognized, was not a totally
disinterested observer.

To a certain degree his views

reflect machinations related to another important aspect of
the political milieu, the arena of factional strife and
interpersonal rivalries within each of the colonies of the
greater Chesapeake.

Related by marriage to the powerful and

controversial cleric James Blair, Harrison not only shared
Blair's personal animosity toward several members of the
Council of Virginia but also had a financial interest in
supporting the commissary against other councilors in a
dispute over the disposition of lands which had been endowed
for the founding of a college in the colony. 19

These

factors undoubtedly influenced the attorney's negative
characterization of the executive body as a whole including
the alleged toleration of, and participation in, illicit
18 Ibid.
l9 warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad w. Tate,
Colonial Virginia: A History (White Plains, N.Y., 1986),
153, 155, 162, 166.
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trade and customs fraud by some of its members.

Similar

contention with comparable implications for accurately
assessing the extent of maritime lawlessness in the region
also must be taken into account in North Carolina,
especially in the Culpeper Rebellion and the Blackbeard
affair, and Maryland, in the conflicts between crown
loyalists and supporters of the various Lords Baltimore.
While the motives of individual deponents may not have
been entirely selfless, other informants and respected
government officials often provided corroborative testimony
of maritime wrongdoing.

Such evidence notwithstanding,

historians have demonstrated a peculiar predisposition to
portray the royal colonies of the Chesapeake as the obedient
children of empire in contrast to their unruly siblings,
particularly the charter colonies of New England, despite
substantial indications to the contrary.

Charles M.

Andrews, for example, concluded that a decrease in the
number of complaints about the Navigation Acts after 1673
demonstrated that Virginians had reconciled themselves to
the requirements of enumeration and the Plantation Duty and
that passage by the assembly of an act imposing a two
shilling per hogshead duty on tobacco exports should be
viewed as proof that there was no significant opposition to
the trade laws in genera1. 29

In describing an analogous

2° Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
138.
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situation in Jamaica, however, Andrews suggested that relief
obtained through smuggling, not resignation to or compliance
with the law, might account for a similar cessation of
documented objections to trade restrictions. 21

Nor did

Andrews accept the passage of laws in New England requiring
obedience to the Navigation Acts as an ipso facto indication
of intent to comply, as he did with Virginia, but dismissed
it rather as a mere smoke screen for the conduct of illicit
trade. 22
In a study of Maryland trade in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, Margaret

s.

Morriss

displayed a similar inclination to minimize the degree to
which illicit trade was practiced and to exonerate the
colonists of any culpability in that regard.

After

compiling an impressive list of ships reported to have
engaged in illicit trade but never seized, Morriss
inexplicably concluded, despite the obvious difficulty of
policing Chesapeake waters against smuggling, that not much
illicit trade could have gone undetected and doubted that
the colonists generally collaborated in violating the
Navigation Acts. 2 3

21 Ibid., 139-40.
22 Ibid., 140-42.
2 3 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 160,
127, 129.
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Almost any suggestion to the contrary, Morriss
contended, could be attributed to such "prejudiced sources"
as English customs authorities or colonial governors, and
therefore could not be trusted. 24

But what other sources

of information about illicit trade in the Chesapeake region
might researchers reasonably expect to discover?

Those who

participated in illegal activities were certainly not about
to volunteer self-incriminating testimony and, as far as
other colonists were concerned, Benjamin Harrison explicitly
set forth the reasons why they would have been reluctant to
provide information.

It could also be argued that colonial

governors had more to lose, from the standpoint of perceived
ineffectiveness, by reporting the full extent of maritime
lawlessness within their jurisdictions than they stood to
gain. 25
Since the perpetrators and collaborators carefully
concealed their involvement, it follows logically that the
bulk of information about illicit trade and customs fraud in
the greater Chesapeake would have been supplied by the royal
officials who were assigned to monitor and prevent such

24 Ibid., 127.
25 Even Lawrence Harper, who believed that illicit
trade constituted "only a small fraction of • • • legitimate
commerce" in the colonies, conceded that "governors
charged with enforcing the laws tended to find that they
were obeyed" (The English Navigation Laws: A
Seventeenth-Centur Ex eriment in Social En ineerin
[New
York, 1973, 248).
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abuses. 26

Most prominent among these agents was Edward

Randolph, surveyor general of the customs for the southern
colonies from 1691 to

17~3,

and, to a lesser extent, his

successor, Robert Quary, who held the post from 1703 to
1714.

Both men, especially Randolph, were extremely

unpopular during their tenures and most historians have
tended to be no less disparaging, characterizing each as
"overzealous" or a "notorious exaggerator," and even, in
Randolph's case, accusing him of fabricating false charges
in the absence of any real proof of criminal activity. 27
Conceding that Randolph often was obsessive in his pursuit
of trade law violators and that he was sometimes prone to
exaggeration, other scholars have noted, however, that the
testimony of contemporary royal governors like Francis
Nicholson, later ones like Spotswood, and various
independent sources frequently confirmed Randolph's charges
and demonstrated the continuity and persistence of illegal
trade in the greater Chesapeake. 28

26 Ian K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The
Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696-1720
(Oxford, 1968), 44; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213.
27 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia,
167-68; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 118, 131;
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 158;
Mattie E. E. Parker in NCHCR, 1697-1701, xxix.
28 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 59;
Hall, Edward Randolph, 15~; Thomas c. Barrow, Trade and
Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America
1660-1775 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 143-45.
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How extensive was illicit commerce and customs fraud in
the greater Chesapeake in actuality?

Many historians have

commented on the futility of trying to make any sort of
realistic quantitative assessment concerning a range of
activities which, by their very nature, demanded careful
concealment and discouraged documentation. 29

In the

absence of any consistently reliable or comprehensive body
of data, however, it is possible to gain an impression of
the scope of these activities from the accounts of royal and
colonial officials who periodically offered estimates on the
amount of revenue loss due to illicit trade within their
jurisdictions.

How the various functionaries arrived at

their conclusions is rarely specified, but it appears that
they drew their inferences from some combination of personal
experience, reports from subordinates and informers, and,
undoubtedly in some cases, the desire to influence
government policy in the direction of either stricter or

2 9 Leonidas Dodson, Alexander Spotswood: Governor of
Colonial Virginia, 1710-1722 (Philadelphia, 1932), 62;
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213; Rediker, "Anglo-American
Sailors," 39; Robert E. Moody, "Massachusetts Trade with
Carolina, 1689-1709," North Carolina Historical Review, XX
(January 1943), 46; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 143; Williams,
Contraband Cargoes, xi-xii.
Acknowledging the problems
intrinsic in any effort to quantify English smuggling in the
tobacco and other trades during the colonial era, two
historians nonetheless have made a serious attempt. See w.
A. Cole, "Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling," Economic
History Review, 2d Ser., X (1958), 395-410 and Robert c.
Nash, "The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Legal and Illegal
Trade," Economic History Review, 2d Ser., XXXV (1982), 35472.
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more lenient enforcement.

Recognizing the inherent

potential for bias, one may still glean useful information
from these accounts and derive from them a sense of the
extent of the problem, at least as the various officials
construed it.
In the 1662 royal instructions to Governor Berkeley,
English officials expressed their concern about not only the
existence of customs fraud in Virginia but also its
magnitude.

The manner in which they did so, asserting that

the amount of tobacco imported into England was simply "in
no proportion to the Quantity yearly transported out of that
our colony," suggests that while crown authorities were
convinced of the gravity of the problem, they were not
prepared to estimate, even roughly, the amount of revenue
lost to smuggling and duty evasion in the Chesapeake. 30
Other, somewhat less ambiguous assessments in subsequent
decades convey a sense of continuing frustration with a
problem which government administrators obviously regarded
as one of significant dimensions.
In 1692 and 1693 Edward Randolph estimated that the
crown was losing between L4,000 and L20,000 annually due to
customs fraud in Maryland and Virginia. 31

Since a modern

3° VMHB, III, 18; Gill, "The Naval Office in Virginia,"
6.

31 Randolph, Letters, VII, 383, 447. Randolph offered
no clear rationale for the wide disparity between the two
figures.
One possible explanation is that the larger
number, which the surveyor general vaguely attributed to
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analyst has determined that the net income to the government
from tobacco duties probably was about

Ll~~,0~~

during those

years, the low figure is not especially noteworthy, but the
larger one represents a significant percentage of net
tobacco revenues. 32

Even more exceptional was the

complaint registered by the Commissioners of the Customs,
also in 1693, that, because of negligence or collusion on
the part of customs officials in Maryland and Virginia, the
Plantation Duty "hath been frequently compounded at little
more than halfe Vallue." 33

Although such a sweeping

appraisal seems improbably high, it nonetheless serves as an
indication of how serious the home government believed the
problem to be.

Five years later, after the loss of the

royal guardship assigned to the bay region, Randolph warned
his superiors that unless they replaced the vessel quickly,
"the King will lose more in his customs than would support
five men-of-war at home."34
Some officials and interested private parties offered
more specific estimates of revenue losses.

In 1694 an

"want of good officers," refers to total revenue losses as a
result of all illicit trade in the two colonies while the
smaller estimate may concern only the amount of duties
evaded specifically through the use of forged certificates,
an abuse which Randolph had discussed in the previous
sentence of his letter to William Blathwayt.
32 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 45-46.
33 Md. A., XX, 125.
34 CSPC, XVI, #769, p. 4~2.
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English customs agent reckoned that the crown was being
cheated out of L50,000 a year as a result of illegal trade
between Scotland and the "sugar and tobacco-plantations" in
America. 35

The same year London merchant Micajah Perry

alleged that, by means of one tobacco smuggling method
alone, contrabandists operating between Virginia and
Scotland were defrauding the royal revenue of at least
L60,000 per year, a charge corroborated by other English
merchants. 36

Considering that the crown's total income

from tobacco duties amounted to about Ll30,000 in 1689,
these figures are staggering even if, as skeptics might
argue, they were somewhat exaggerated.3 7
A certain degree of overstatement may be expected from
individuals whose personal business profits were being
reduced by the activities of illicit traders, but the
motives of others who complained about customs fraud were
not always as self-serving.

Occasional reports concerning

the evasion of local tariffs in the greater Chesapeake are
particularly revealing in this context.

Because provincial

duties were enacted by colonial legislators, presumably with
local interests rather than those of the home government in
35 Stock, Debates, II, 111.
36 Ibid.
37 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 124; Margaret M. Morriss'
investigation of the crown's net tobacco duty receipts
suggests that Ll30,000 probably was a maximum estimate and
that the actual revenue likely was substantially less
(Colonial Trade of Maryland, 46 n. 156).
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mind, one would expect substantially greater success in the
collection of such revenues.
But the record suggests otherwise.

In 1736 the

Virginia assembly passed legislation designed to eliminate,
or at least reduce, "vast frauds" in the collection of the
slave duty perpetrated on a scale such that "hardly one half
of the said duties hath been paid into the treasury." 38
Almost two decades later, North Carolina governor Arthur
Dobbs asserted that, in a colony which raised only about
Ll2,000 in various taxes annually, the revenue from the duty
on wine and spirits alone could be increased by L2000 a year
"if duly collected" by "a proper Officer" stationed at a
location less susceptible to evasion by smugglers than the
checkpoints which the government currently employed.39
Such testimony implies that if the colonists indeed engaged
in customs fraud to a significant degree, at least they were
indiscriminate about whose duties they chose to evade.
Apart from direct calculations of monetary losses,
customs records reflecting the degree of compliance with, or
infringement of, the Navigation Acts offer further evidence
of the extent of contraband trade in the Chesapeake.

In

1697 Maryland governor Nicholson sent a letter to the Board
of Trade describing the resistance he had encountered in the
colonial courts and assembly to his efforts to restrict
38 Hening, Statutes, IV, 471.
39 CRNC, V, 640.
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illegal commerce.

Along with the letter he submitted

several enclosures including two lists, one of 60 trading
vessels that had embarked from Maryland and eventually
produced the necessary documentation to show that their
captains had completed the voyages in accordance with
requisite procedures for shipping enumerated goods under the
trade laws and another list of 115 craft that had failed to
do so, presumably because they had delivered their cargoes
to foreign ports. 40

The disparity between the number of

ships that failed to adhere to the customs laws and those
that did, a ratio of nearly two to one, is all the more
remarkable considering that this statistic does not even
take into account an array of evasive and deceptive
procedures (not to mention the bribing of customs officials)
that contraband traders regularly employed while maintaining
a "pro forma" compliance with official registration and
inspection procedures.
Some indirect evidence also suggests that contraband
trade and duty evasion were far more prevalent than the
surviving, documented instances of official seizures and
condemnations would seem to indicate.

In June 1699 the

collector for the Rappahannock River district reported the
seizure of the Providence of Dublin for the illegal
importation of goods from Ireland with no certificates or

40 Md. A., XXIII, 86, i6, i7.
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cocquets. 41

The arrest itself was rather unusual, but

what makes the case particularly noteworthy is the recorded
testimony of sailors and servant passengers indicating how
fortuitous such seizures were and, conversely, how little
risk of detection illicit traders normally assumed.

The

declarations of the deponents in the case make it clear that
the smuggled wares never would have been discovered had it
not been for the accidental staving in of one of the casks
which contained the contraband.

As an English man-of-war

approached, witnesses overheard the shipmaster and the
merchants deliberating about what should be done with the
goods, "whether they Should be thrown overboard or how
disposed off."

The smugglers finally decided to conceal the

merchandise elsewhere on board, although it is unclear
whether they did so because they doubted the ability of the
warship's personnel to discover the contraband or because
they feared that they might be spotted heaving the goods
into the bay.

In any event, navy and customs officidls knew

nothing of the deception until notified by informants after
the ship had landed.42
Accidental discoveries like this one combined with
other factors -- the testimony of informants, regulatory
officers, and governors; the relative ease with which
unlawful traders deceived, avoided, or secured the
41 Reese, ed., Virginia Vice-Admiralty Court, 12-13.
42 Ibid., 16-17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

cooperation of customs officials; and the failure of
contemporary authorities and modern historians to take into
account the cumulative effect of the many small vessels
which regularly conveyed contraband cargoes around the bay
and along the coasts -- imply that illicit commerce was
conducted throughout the greater Chesapeake to a greater
extent than scholars generally have acknowledged.

Given the imprecise, intermittent, and generally
problematic nature of contemporary efforts to ascertain the
magnitude of contraband trade in the region, it also may be
useful to approach the issue as one might in a court of law,
by establishing the motives and opportunities for engaging
in customs fraud.

Some historians have theorized that the

amount of illegal commerce in the colonies was a function of
two factors, the relative rate of customs duties and the
ease or difficulty of smuggling. 43

The absolute value of

any particular set of customs duties was not in itself
always a critical determinant since a two shilling per
hogshead duty on tobacco in a prosperous market, for
example, might have been regarded as considerably less
onerous than a duty half that amount when profit margins
were slim or nonexistent.
Obviously, then, the degree to which duties represented
impositions worthy of active avoidance depended on the
43 Shepherd and Walton, Maritime Trade, 295.
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perceptions and financial circumstances of those required to
pay them.

Colonists who experienced economic privation, who

felt that they were being exploited and discriminated
against, and who had occasion to mitigate the effects of
oppressive regulations by disobeying them without great risk
or effort would seem to be likely candidates for
participation in illicit trade.

And if it is true that

incentive and opportunity determined the volume of illegal
commerce, then there is additional reason to believe that
circumvention of the trade laws and evasion of customs
duties occurred more regularly and to a much greater extent
in the greater Chesapeake than historians traditionally have
recognized.
The most obvious inducement to illicit trade and the
evasion of customs duties was economic hardship, a condition
which afflicted residents of the greater Chesapeake with
considerable regularity.

The Navigation Act of 1660, which

listed tobacco as one of the enumerated goods that could not
be exported to European markets except through England,
might have been palatable to the Chesapeake planters if
England herself could have increased consumption, maintained
stable prices for the commodity, and kept customs rates at a
relatively low level.

But restricting the trade to an

English market which failed to increase consumption
substantially after the 1680s instead resulted in an
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oversupply that reduced prices. 44

Under the home

government's drawback system, tobacco could be shipped to
England and re-exported to continental Europe without, in
effect, having to pay any import duties, but the extra costs
involved in the process further reduced profit margins.45
And although Europe replaced England as the principal outlet
for Chesapeake tobacco after 1790, it was not until an
expansion of the continental market after about 1715 that
three decades of hardship in the colonial tobacco industry
came to an end.46
Periodically during those thirty years of adversity,
many planters found themselves in dire economic straits such
as those that produced the plant-cutting riots of 1682.
Fifteen years after the disturbances, Maryland governor
Francis Nicholson reported that "the low price of tobacco
has obliged many of the planters to try their fortune
elsewhere." 47

Carolina explorer and chronicler John

Lawson observed in 1709 that "tobacco is a Commodity

44 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy
of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985),
124; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 8889.
4 5 Andrews, Colonial period of American History, IV,
88-89.
4 6 McCusker and Menard, Economy of British America,
123-24.
4 7 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 546.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
oftentimes so low, as to bring nothing." 48

Two years

later Virginia merchants and planters complained that they
actually were having to sell thousands of hogsheads of
tobacco for less than the amount of the customs duties.49
Under such circumstances, any duties at all would have
seemed oppressive.

But rather than provide some relief by

lowering customs rates, the English government periodically
raised the impost on tobacco imported into England despite
the protests of those involved in the trade. 50

Scholars

disagree over the extent to which Chesapeake planters, as
opposed to English consumers, were made to bear the burden
of the increased costs of re-exportation and higher duties,
but the consensus among historians is that, regardless of
the reality of the situation, the colonists believed that
the commercial policy of the home government was responsible
for the hardships that the tobacco growers experienced. 51
48 John Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina, Hugh T.
Lefler, ed. (Chapel Hill, 1967), 167.
49 C05/1316, p. 69; CSPC, XXVI, wll7,
~
p. 111; Dodson,
Alexander Spotswood, 43-4~
50 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
89, 139; George L. Beer, The Old Colonial System 1660-1754
(New York, 1933), I, 160-63; Samuel M. Rosenblatt, "The
Significance of Credit in the Tobacco Consignment Trade: A
Study of John Norton and Sons, 1768-1775," WMQ, 3d Ser., XIX
(1962), 389-90.
51 Although English authorities stated their intention
that the tobacco impost of 1685 not be "laid on the Planter
or Merchant, but only on the [English] Retailer,
Consumptioner, or Shopkeeper," yet the Virginia burgesses
could not be dissuaded that the tax, "though designed to
fall on the retailer and consumer, would surely fall on the
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Contemporary accounts continued to reflect that
conviction.

Despite a generally positive trend after 1715,

the prosperity of the tobacco industry was chronically
subject to extreme fluctuations.

Describing the planters'

dilemma in 1724, Hugh Jones lamented that with "the Charges
and Duties far over-balancing the price of the Tobacco • • •
of late Years they sometimes get little or nothing by it,
but Trouble and Loss; because of the great Expence in making
and sending it Home to Market, and the great Duties which
are paid out of it, and the small Price it usually
bears." 52

Nearly a decade later, a Maryland agent

complained to British authorities about "the exceeding
poverty of the people • • • occasioned by" tobacco prices
planter" (cited in Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 162, 163).
Several months after the impost went into effect, the
colonists remained deeply skeptical. Virginia governor
Effingham could not help "but wonder at their cautious, or
rather, peevish temper" in having been "discouraged, either
from shiping their present Crops, or planting any for ye
future" (Henry R., Mcilwaine, ed., Legislative Journals of
the Council of Colonial Virginia [Richmond, 1918-1919], I,
67). Amplifying the colonial lawmakers' and planters' view,
Charles Andrews wrote that the tobacco impost in England was
"always the most serious incumbrance resting upon the
tobacco industry in the colonies" (Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 139). Beer (Old Colonial System, I,
166-67), and more recently Rosenblatt ("The Significance of
Credit," 391) and Nash ("Tobacco Trades," 369), however,
have indicated that the increased cost of the various
imposts most likely was passed on to English consumers.
Concerning Chesapeake tobacco growers blaming their problems
on English commercial policy more generally, see McCusker
and Menard, Economy of British America, 123.
5 2 Hugh Jones, The
Richard L. Morton, ed.,
Elizabeth E. Hoon,
The
Service, 1696-1786 (New

Present State of Virginia (1724),
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1956), 144;
Organization of the English Customs
York, 1938), 252 n. 2.
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"so low that the makers of it have been brought to the want
of many of the necessaries of life."53
And while the volatility of the tobacco exchange
constituted a paramount concern for colonial planters, it
was hardly the only one.

Virginia governor Edmond Andros

explained to his superiors in 1695 that tobacco shipments
were also "liable to the charge of clearing here, to the
hazard of the voyage, to payment of duty and to an uncertain
market, and, if all be well, the time will be long before
the proceeds can be applied to answer the intent." 54

As a

result, many Chesapeake planters and merchants considered
their responses to the succession of trade regulations not,
as the English authorities did, in terms of criminal
behavior versus compliance with the law, but rather as a
question of whether the British colonial system was
permitting them to earn even a modest living without undue
restraint.
Ironically, it was a royal official, Governor Berkeley,
who in 1651 articulated the views of Virginia planters when
he charged the Rump Parliament with tyranny in forbidding
colonists "to buy, or sell but with those they shall
5 3 CSPC, XL, #61 iv., v., p. 49.
For a detailed
analysis-or-the shifts in the tobacco market and their
effect on Virginia's planters and the colonial economy see
John M. Hemphill II, Virginia and the English Commercial
System, 1689-1733: Studies in the Development and
Fluctuations of a Colonial Economy under Imperial Control
(New York, 1985), especially chapters I and II.
5 4 CSPC, XIV, #1871, p. 497.
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Authorize with a few trifles to Coszen us of all for which
we toile and labour." 55

Disenchantment with the

Navigation Acts persisted when the Chesapeake economy
shifted from tobacco to grain production.

Colonists who

feared that the Molasses Act of 1733 would severely restrict
their foreign grain markets in the West Indies and limit
their supplies of rum and molasses widely ignored the
legislation. 56
Fueling the colonists' resentment was the suspicion
that, while they struggled and often failed to make ends
meet, fellow Englishmen in the home country were profiting
disproportionately at the planters' expense.

In 1673, after

reminding the Earl of Shaftesbury that, as far as crown
revenues were concerned, "Virginia is of as great importance
to his Majesty as the Spanish Indies to Spain," Sir John
Knight issued a grave warning.

So unhappy were the planters

with the adverse effects of English trade restrictions upon
their livelihood, "they saying openly that they are in the
nature of slaves," that "his Majesty's best, greatest, and
richest plantation is in danger, with the planters' consent,
to fall into the enemy's hands." 5 7

Chesapeake residents

continued to be reminded of the benefits that accrued to
55 VMHB, I, 76~ Andrews, Colonial Period of American
History,-yv; 28.
56 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 211~ Barrow, Trade and
Empire, 143.
57 CSPC, VII, #1159, p. 530.
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Englishmen as result of their labors in the eighteenth
century.

"Your hive of Virginia brings a great deal of Hony

to this Nation," a Virginia agent in London reported to the
colony in 1711, "and costs them nothing."sa
The planters' displeasure focused not only on the
English authorities who passed restrictive trade legislation
but also on the merchants, especially London traders, who,
many colonists concluded, were influencing the government to
do so. 59

In restating his objections to the Navigation

Acts in the 166es, Governor Berkeley expressed his
unwillingness to aggrandize a relatively small group of
English merchants at the expense of an entire colony. 60
Responding to imperial exhortations to enact a law
forbidding the colonial export of tobacco packaged in "bulk"
(that is, in loose parcels as opposed to hogsheads), a
committee of Virginia burgesses considered "by what means it
was Represented to his Matie That We

• resideing here

should desire such a prohibition" as the king evidently had
been led to believe.

After conducting a "strict Examination

& search to Informe themselves," the burgesses concluded
that the instigators were none other than "several!
Merchants • • • in London who conceiving such a law
58 VMHB, IV, 2e-21; Dodson, Alexander SEotswood, 113 n.
2.
59 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Marlland, 192.
Ge Andrews, Colonial Period of American Historl, IV,
137.
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would answer their Pticular Interest & profit • • • did
boldly and prsumptuously • • • petition his Majestie without
our privities knowledge & agreement • • • setting forth on
our behalfes that it would be much for the advancement &
good of this Country."61
English factors continued to be objects of colonial
antipathy in the eighteenth century.

In 1709 members of the

Maryland assembly complained to the king that the London
merchants, while assuming minimal risk themselves, charged
exorbitant freight rates on tobacco shipments from the
Chesapeake.

And though, as a result, the planters had

little to show for their efforts, the "Factors thereby with
little Hazard most certainly" gathered vast sums "by their
Commissions and other Perquisites." 62
The colonists also resented the English merchants•
opposition to measures intended to provide customs relief
and to stimulate the Chesapeake economy.

To encourage ship

ownership in Virginia, the colonial assembly enacted
legislation in the early eighteenth century exempting
Virginians who owned vessels from various provincial duties
and fees. 63

Within a decade, however, the home government

moved to disallow the acts as prejudicial to British

61 ~' 1659/60-1693, 317.
62 Md. A., XXVII, 4o5; Morriss, Colonial Trade o f
Maryland, 96.
63 Hening, Statutes, III, 230, 347, 494.
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shipowners, provoking the colonists' ire for succumbing so
thoroughly, the Anglo-Americans believed, to the wishes of
British merchants. 64
In 1734 the Board of Trade acted in a similar fashion
by instructing colonial governors not to permit the
enactment of "any laws, whereby the Inhabitants of the
Plantations may be put upon a more advantageous Footing than
those of Great Britain."

Specifically, provincial

legislators were forbidden "to pass any Law, by which
greater Duties • • • shall be laid on Ships or Goods
belonging to the Subjects of Great Britain, than on those of
the Inhabitants of the Plantations." 65

So irritated were

the colonists by these restraints that they even dared to
suggest a fundamental alteration of the Navigation Acts.
But their proposal, one designed to benefit colonial
planters by permitting the direct shipment of tobacco from
Virginia to France, stood little chance of approval probably
because, as the royal governor who supported the measure
surmised, it would "be disagreeable only to the gentlemen in
London, who will thereby lose the commissions upon the sales
of so much tobacco."66
64 CSPC, XXV, 47~9, p. 408; Middleton, Tobacco Coast,
Percy Scott Flippin, William Gooch: Successful Royal
Governor (Williamsburg, Va., 1924), 15.
28~-81;

65 C05/5, p. 44; C0324/12, pp. 65-66.
6 6 William Gooch to the Board of Trade, 5/15/1739,
C05/1324, pp. 333-34. Actually, the colonists' proposal was
not as farfetched as it might seem.
In 1707, during Queen
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Similar tensions had arisen in 1722 when Parliament
passed an act prohibiting the importation into England of
tobacco stripped from the stalk. 67

The crown's rationale

for such a policy had been expressed as early as 1695 when
Maryland governor Nicholson recommended that the tobacco
fleet be dispatched from England as early in the new year as
possible since "the winter being a time of much leisure, the
people have opportunity of stripping and cutting their
tobaccos, whereby the King loses near a quarter of his
customs." 68

For the planters, the requirement to send

their tobacco unstripped meant not only additional customs
charges, but increases in all the costs associated with
greater product weight and volume: additional packing,
inspection and lighterage fees; more hogsheads; and added
insurance and freight charges.

Although the colonists

eventually succeeded in persuading Parliament to rescind the
act, many British merchants opposed the repeal effort. 69
Anne's War, the Board of Trade itself recommended to the
king the direct importation of tobacco from the Chesapeake
to Europe "to Ease the Tobacco Trade," the rationale being
that "otherwise 'tis to be feared that those Northern
Countries formerly supplied by your Majesty's Subjects with
great quantities of Tobacco may in time be wholy furnished
from another Market" (C05/l362, p. 245). The Dutch were
particularly active at that time in growing tobacco and
selling it on the continent. See Middleton, Tobacco Coast,
pp. 141-43.
6 7 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 129.
6 8 CSPC, XIV, #1896, p. 509.
69 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 128-29; Hemphill, Virginia
and the English Commercial System, 74-75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
Colonial disaffection for London traders may have been
expressed most explicitly in 1732 when Robert Carter,
president of the Council of Virginia, complained to Micajah
Perry about the "Oppression of the merchants • • • and • • •
the many destructive articles that have of late years been
found to deprive us of the greatest part of the Profit of
our Labours." 7 ~

Carter was referring specifically to the

merchants' success in convincing Parliament to pass
legislation favoring their interests in the collection of
debts owed by the planters and the British traders' active
opposition to an excise scheme, proposed by Prime Minister
Robert Walpole, designed to shift the burden of tobacco
duties from the Chesapeake growers to the British
public. 71

The council president chose not to speculate on

what the consequences of these developments might be, but he
did advise Perry that the "general crye that hath bore down
all before it" in the colony recently had been that it was
"more elligible to relye on the mercy of our Prince than to
be subjected to the tyranny of the merchants who are daily
encreasing their Oppressions upon us."72

7

~ Cited in Hemphill, Virginia and the English
Commercial System, 228.
71 Ibid., chapter VI; Billings, Selby, and Tate,
Colonial-virginia, 242-44.
72 Cited in Hemphill, Virginia and the English
Commercial System, 228.
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An additional inducement to engage in proscribed trade
was the desire to obtain scarce and much coveted specie.73
In the early eighteenth century John Lawson reported that
North Carolina, otherwise poor and lacking in the natural
resources to produce significant wealth, was "more plentiful
in Money, than most, or indeed any of the Plantations on the
Continent."

The source of the coin, Lawson explained, was

the Dutch island of

Cura~ao

with which the Carolinians

carried on a thriving illicit trade. 74

By mid-century,

however, the North Carolinians appeared to be no better off
with regard to the availability of specie than the other
colonies.

Noting "the great scarcity of silver & gold," a

committee of assemblymen in 1746 complained about the "very
great grievance" of not being allowed to pay their quitrents
in the "produce of this Province." 75

Geography and

unsympathetic neighbors combined to create a further
rationale for Albermarle residents to resort to smuggling
since the colony's ports could not accommodate large ships
and Virginia, which offered the closest deep water harbors,

73 Ibid., 9-10; NCHCM, 1709-1723, xx.
74 Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 10. Lawson neglected to
mention another form of illicit commerce that contributed
significantly to the colony's accumulation of specie at that
time: trading with pirates.
See below, chapter VI.

____

75 CRNC , IV, 824.
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charged prohibitive fees on Carolina commerce and banned the
export of Carolina tobacco through Virginia ports.76
If Chesapeake colonists had ample incentive to conduct
illicit trade they had equal or greater opportunity to do
so.

Although customs collectors and naval officers

frequently connived with planters and shipmasters to breach
or circumvent the law, perhaps the greater percentage of
smuggling and duty evasion did not require the cooperation
of venal officials at all.

The vast stretches of shoreline

bordering the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries as well as
the Atlantic coast with its many banks and islands offered
innumerable possibilities for conducting illicit trade with
little fear of detection.

Even Charles Andrews, who did not

believe that illicit trade constituted a serious problem in
any of England's American colonies, conceded that customs
evasion was easiest in areas with long, indented shorelines
with many creeks, inlets, and rivers and few established
ports, precisely the conditions which prevailed throughout
much of the greater Chesapeake.77
Contemporary authorities were also well aware of the
difficulties that the geography of the region created.
Edward Randolph reported to British authorities in 1692 that

76 Ibid., II, 762-63; Hugh T. Lefler and Williams.
Powell, COIOnial North Carolina: A History (New York, 1973),
49; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 128.
77 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
238, 241; Moody, "Massachusetts Trade with Carolina," 45.
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"every vessel runs into a different bay, so that it is
endless work for a diligent officer to keep an eye on
them." 78

In many cases, no amount of diligence could

overcome the remoteness of customs officials from the areas
of greatest illicit trade activity.

"Clandestine trade is

easy," a deponent informed the Board of Trade about maritime
law enforcement in Maryland in 1691, "as the collectors live
far up country.n79
The situation seems to have improved little in almost
twenty years when another private individual complained to
the Board of Trade that Virginia had only four customs
houses, some of which were far from the principal trading
entrep8ts, and that many rivers had no customs officials at
all "to See what is Done by Shiping."

Even if the

government managed to station officers wherever vessels
normally unloaded and took on goods, the informant
contended,

"1~,~~~

Men Could not performe it. To Keep

Shiping from Landing And taking of Good by Stelth." 8 ~

The

problem that geography imposed on the policing of maritime
trade in the greater Chesapeake was never resolved
adequately.

In 1730 and again in 1743 Virginia governor

William Gooch had to admit that "after all it is impossible
altogether to prevent the running of •

prohibited goods,

78 CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 66~.
79 Ibid., 11951, p. 578.
8

~ Cited in Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62-63.
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when there are so many landing places remote from the
inspection of any officer."81
Geography, however, was only one of several major
impediments to effective trade law enforcement in the
greater Chesapeake.

Among the most intractable problems

crown officials had to contend with were those posed by
local populations which, in cooperation with foreign and
other Anglo-American confederates, displayed considerable
ingenuity and resolve in circumventing and deceiving royal
customs agents.

81 "William Gooch, Official Correspondence," 3 vols.
(Colonial Williamsburg Research Library typescript), vol. 1,
Gooch to the Board of Trade, July 23, 173g and vol. 3, Gooch
to the Board of Trade, August 22, 1743; VMHB, III, 118;
Flippin, William Gooch, 16.
----
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CHAPTER III
A "Customes Treasure • • • never more infatuated, cheated
and exhausted": The Ways and Means of Illicit Trade

The sheer variety of methods used to conduct illicit
trade in the greater Chesapeake offers a further indication
of the extensiveness of the practice and also testifies to
the resourcefulness and determination of those who engaged
in it.

Taking advantage of the venality of customs

officials, a popular option examined in a subsequent
chapter, was one way to beat the system, but it had certain
drawbacks.

Bribery, whether in the form of cash or

commodity payments or some kind of kickback, could be
expensive and, in districts with scrupulous customs
officers, risky.

Alternatively, those wishing to maximize

profits through illicit trade could choose from a wide range
of options which may be classified broadly under the
headings of misrepresentation and evasion.
The procedures for "clearing" and "entering" required
shipmasters to make sworn statements as to the nature and
volume of their cargoes and to take out a bond obligating
them to land their goods only at ports permitted by the
applicable navigation statutes.

Upon entering a given port,
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shipmasters were required to produce all the necessary
documentation to prove that they had cleared properly from
their port of embarkation.

Local customs officials could

then check the itemized cargo registers, or "cocquets," to
verify concordance with the actual shipment.

Assuming that

all was in order, the customs agent then authorized the
unloading of the incoming cargo before .certifying and
bonding the outgoing one.
The simplest method to avoid or reduce duty payments
when dealing with royal revenue officers was to underreport
the volume of the lading.

Maryland governor Nicholson

asserted in 1697 that the amount of tobacco that shipmasters
officially registered in clearing was "commonly less than
they have on board." 1

Alternatively, shipmasters might

purposely misrepresent the nature of the cargo, trusting in
either case to the cooperation of the customs inspector in
not attempting to verify the

declarat~on

official's inability to do so.

or to the

One reason why shippers

could get away with such deceptions was that ships' holds
were notoriously difficult places to examine under any
circumstances, but particularly so when filled, even
1 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 548.

A method of comparable or
perhaps even greater simplicity involved doing what Governor
Nicholson reported "Most Masters • • • of Ships doe," that
is, conduct their affairs however they pleased and then, if
caught, "to plead Ignorance to such Laws of this Province as
doe any wayes narrowly touch or concern them" (Md. A., XX,
278). Such lawbreakers no doubt anticipated, with good
reason, that a sympathetic jury of their peers would acquit
them summarily.
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partially, with quantities of goods stacked in rows of
barrel casks. 2

As a result, customs inspectors usually had

little choice but to rely on the sworn statements of ship
captains and masters.
These declarations, known as "custom house oaths,"
acquired such a reputation for unreliability throughout the
English empire that the term became practically synonymous
with a lie.

As an eighteenth-century merchant reported,

"many are tempted to Perjure themselves • • •

And to this

End 'tis observable, that in Places of Trade, a Poysonous
sort of doctrine is slily and artificially insinuated among
Masters of Ships, Common Saylors and Porters • • • that a
Custom-House Oath is nothing but a matter of Form." 3
Despite the flagrant and almost universal disregard for the
solemnity of such vows, for centuries English officials had
little alternative but to accept them, and customs agents
continued to do so in the colonial era. 4
The problem of having to rely on these statements was
exacerbated in the Chesapeake region by government

2 A Maryland collector, for example, complained in 1698
of the "great Difficulty in Searching of Ships," declaring
that it was "Morally Impossible to do his Duty thoroughly as
he Ought by reason of the Narowness & Darkness of the Ships
holds" (Md. A., XXIII, 4B2).
3 Cited in Hoon, English Customs Service, 246.
4 Williams noted that, despite hundreds of documented
cases of customs fraud in medieval England, there was no
evidence of even a single prosecution for perjury
(Contraband Cargoes, 15).
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officials' chronic inability to examine vessels in many
dispersed and distant locations, a situation which caused
Edward Randolph to bemoan the fact that, under the
circumstances, a customs officer had "nothing to satisfy him
that the master had been trading legally but his oath." 5
The dubious value of such pledges notwithstanding, in 1699
Virginia's attorney general, acting on the governor's
orders, prepared a new oath requiring shipmasters operating
in the colony to "give a true and exact accot" of not only
"all such Tobaccos and other good's and merchandizes as
shall be taken on board," but also the possessions of every
passenger.

"All this," mariners were admonished sternly,

"you shall swear without any Equivocation Mentall
Reservation or other Evasion So help you God." 6

Almost two

decades later, however, Alexander Spotswood reiterated
previous arguments for more stringent ship inspection
procedures "since it seems the Masters have so many
occasions to make their Oaths of no Effect," with many
regarding their declarations as nothing more than "so many
words of form to enter • • • hogsheads at half the weight
they contain." 7
In customs districts where shipping activities were
more centralized and collectors and naval officers were
5

~'

XIII, #2295, p.

66~.

6 EJC, II, 34.
7 Spotswood, Letters, I, 29, 76.
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located more conveniently to oversee them, contraband goods
ran a greater risk of discovery, particularly aboard smaller
vessels and in the uppermost cargo rows of larger ones where
conscientious customs officials could gain access more
readily.

Under the threat of actual inspection, smugglers

had to resort to more elaborate measures of concealment.
One method of disguising the contents of shipping
containers, described by secretary of Maryland Sir Thomas
Lawrence in 1695, was to pack tobacco in bread casks covered
with flour at each end. 8

The same year, the Maryland

governor received reports that "his Mats Duty for Importacon
of Liquors • • • have been much defrauded by concealing &
hiding • • • Brandy Rum & other Spirits, And wine wthin
Caske pretended to be filled with Bisket and ffloore." 9
Variations of this practice apparently continued well into
the next century.

In 1723 the president and masters of the

College of William and Mary instructed their agent, John
Randolph, to inform English treasury and customs officials
that the revenue from the penny per pound Plantation Duty
established for the benefit of the college was "very much
sunk," a principal reason being that shippers "carry out
Tobaccos in barrels, entered as beef or pork, or concealed

8 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 520.
9 Md. A., XX, 280; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland,
128-29 n. 216.
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under corn, and hogsheads of Tobaccos at weights much less
than they really weigh."l0
A clever tactic employed to deceive customs officials
about cargo weights was to load heavier hogsheads first so
that a 400 pound cask, for instance, when removed by the
collector from the top of the hold to be weighed as a
representative sample, would be used to calculate the total
tonnage of the lading.

Under this scheme, the lower cargo

rows actually would be composed of casks of similar size,
but packed tightly so as to weigh up tc twice as much.
Scottish merchants and shippers who used this artifice to
their advantage offered planters an additional two shillings
and sixpence for each hogshead over 500 pounds. 11

Since

some duties (as well as transportation and handling charges)
10 William Stevens Perry, ed., Papers Relating to the
History of the Church in Virginia, A.D. 1650-1776 (Hartford,
Connecticut, 1870), 549 (cited hereafter as Perry, Church
Papers). Some historians have viewed smuggling efforts on
such a relatively small scale as indicative of the pettiness
and comparative insignificance of illicit trade in the
colonies. According to Lawrence Harper, for example, "the
true significance of the tobacco hidden in the flour" lay
not in the deception itself, but "in the fact that the fraud
was measured in terms of casks and not by shiploads"
(English Navigation Laws, 258). Disguising tobacco as other
goods constituted only one of many forms of deception,
however. Others, such as loading after clearing and the
circumvention of customs authorities altogether, clearly did
amount to fraud by the shipload (see below, pp. 78-84).
11 Stock, Debates, III, 461, 462; Theodore c. Barker,
"Smuggling in the Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of the
Scottish Tobacco Trade," VMHB, LXII (1954), 387-99, 396. As
a result of the success of this scam, tobacco re-exports
from Glasgow in certain years exceeded registered imports,
according to Neville Williams, by 1,500,000 pounds
(Contraband Cargoes, 92).
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were computed according to the number of hogsheads rather
than their weight, planters and shippers also had a
considerable inducement to use larger casks.12

Despite

the passage of legislation in Maryland and Virginia
regulating the size of hogsheads, Maryland governor
Nicholson complained in 1695 that coopers continued to
produce casks "farr exceeding the Dimenssions in the said
Act • • • to the great prejudice and Lessening of his Mats
Revenue." 13
Besides deceiving customs officials about the weight,
volume, and nature of cargoes, smugglers also occasionally
sought to conceal the identity of the ships themselves.

In

1698 local customs officers notified the Commissioners of
the Customs in England that a certain vessel had departed
from the James River without clearing and was believed to be
headed for Scotland with a cargo of uncustomed tobacco.
Although Virginia officials identified the craft and its
owners by name, English authorities doubted that it would be
possible to distinguish the merchantman from other vessels
trading to Scotland as, they had learned, it had long been
"the practice to change ships' names and otherwise to
disguise them on such occasions." 14

12 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 129.
l3 Md. A., XX, 277 •
14 CSPC, XVI, i684, p. 349.
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Falsification of one or more of the official documents
used to enter and clear vessels was another popular form of
deceit. 15

Complaining about the use of forged papers in

Maryland and Virginia, Edward Randolph advised royal
authorities in 1692 that "at Glasgow they have false seals
of the Customs houses of Whitehaven, Beaumaris, etc., and
also blank certificates, some of which are so exactly filled
up with counterfeited hands that they deceive the
collectors." 16

Randolph and other officials frequently

cited examples of vessels which they had seized for
attempting to pass through customs with forged
documents. 17

Within days of enacting the 1696 navigation

law, the Lords of Trade issued a circular to colonial
governors instructing them to warn customs officials to be
on the lookout for counterfeit certificates. 18
Although Francis Nicholson indicated early in 1697 that
he had instituted effective measures to identify forged
papers, only two years later naval officers requested the
governor's assistance in dealing with a duty evasion scheme
"usually practised heretofore" involving the production of

15 Randolph, Letters, V, 117; Md. A., XX, 124, 346-47;
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 2~6.
16 CSPC, XIII, i2295, p. 660.
17 Ibid., pp. 6 56, 657, 659; Randolph, Letters, VII,
348-49; ~A., XX, 124.
l8 Md. A., XX, 567, 57~; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 175.
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false documents indicating that bond had been posted with
customs officials on the western side of the bay for tobacco
which was to be picked up on the Eastern Shore.l9

Similar

instances of attempts to pass off bogus documents continued
to be recorded well into the next century.20
An alternative to fooling customs officers directly
through forgery, false packing, and disingenuous oaths was
to defraud the system by avoiding the customs apparatus
entirely.

This option was most effectively exercised in

areas of the greater Chesapeake with relatively protected
anchorages closest to the ocean (the Atlantic coast of
Virginia's and Maryland's Eastern Shore and North Carolina's
Outer Banks, for example, as well as locations within the
bay close to the Virginia Capes) which afforded authorities
little opportunity for discovery between the time that
vessels discharged and reloaded illegal cargoes and made
their getaway to the open sea.
Edward Randolph described a very efficient and well
organized operation on the Eastern Shore of Maryland and
Virginia in which the practitioners purchased tobacco from
the mainland which they exchanged for goods from an incoming
ship, assisting "with Boats Sloops to get the Goods a Shear

19 EJC, II, 35; CSPC, XVII, #1078, p. 578.
2 0 Md. A., XXIII, 86; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no.
26; Marion L. Starkey, The First Plantation: A History of
Hampton and Elizabeth City County, Virginia, 1607-1887
(Hampton, va., 1936), 17.
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before the Vessel is Entred."

All this was accomplished

without the slightest knowledge of customs agents since "the
Vessel lying in some obscure Creek 40 or 50 Miles distant
from the Collectrs Office • • • in a short time is Loaded
and Sayles out of the Capes undiscovered." 21

A Maryland

official reported a similar scheme in 1696 executed by
locals in conjunction with other contrabandists who
navigated a sloop from Philadelphia into an inlet on the
ocean side of Somerset County and "having her loading of
Tob 0 Provision and other Goods ready provided for her, tooke
the same on board and went away therewith without Entring or
Clearing." 22

North Carolina governor George Burrington

described a comparably sophisticated operation in 1734 in
which a ship carrying prohibited goods landed in the harbor
of Ocracoke and had its cargo transferred to a local craft
(undoubtedly of shallower draft) which then navigated
through Pam1ico and Albermar1e Sounds across the colony's
northern border where the goods ultimately were delivered to
Virginia merchants.

The governor confessed that neither he

"nor any of the Custom House Officers knew anything of this
Stratagem" until well after the series of clandestine
transactions had taken place.23

21 Randolph, Letters,

v,

118.

22 Md. A., XX, 463.
2 3 CRNC, IV, 170-71.
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Another class of evasive maneuvers involved diverting
contraband export cargoes away from the main shipping
channels, where the possibility of discovery was greatest,
to regions even less effectively patrolled than the lower
bay and the Eastern Shore.

In 1679 officials of the Customs

House in England advised against approving a proposal to
allow North Carolina to export its tobacco duty free, one
reason being that Virginia planters, it was feared, would
exploit the situation by sending their produce south,
representing it "as Tobacco of the growth of Carolina," a
fraud which, officials concluded, "would be Impossible to
prevent." 24

Although the proposal was never adopted, some

Virginia planters evidently used the North Carolina route to
ship their tobacco duty free anyway. 25

In 1695 Edward

Randolph suggested that North Carolina be annexed to
Virginia specifically to "prevent the Shipping of the
Merchantable Tobacco growing in the Southern part of yt
Teritory by the Inlets of Corrituck and Roanoak." 26

Eight

years later Robert Quary, Randolph's successor as surveyor
general, described the isolated inlet at "Curatucke" as a
"small hole where much mischief is yearly done." 27

24 ~., I, 243.
2 5 Ibid., III, xvi; NCHCM, 1724-1730, xxv; Randolph,
Letters,-v;-156, 231.
26 Randolph, Letters, VII, 476.
27 CSPC, XXI, #1150 ii, p. 739.
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A similar type of illicit traffic also developed in the
northern Chesapeake.

In 1692 Edward Randolph reported the

complaints of shipmasters that their trade was being
destroyed by individuals who were transporting tobacco
overland from Maryland's Eastern Shore to Delaware to avoid
duty payments. 28

According to Randolph, however, the real

culprit as far as the illegal overland trade was concerned
was not Delaware per se, but Pennsylvania. 29

William Penn

angrily rejected the charge, arguing that "If Tobacco be
carried from Maryland to our side in fraud to the King, Edw.
Randall [sic] ought to answer for that • • •

The crime lies

on the side of Maryland, where he chiefly resides; and there
it is such practices should be stopped."

Penn went on to

list a number of cogent reasons why the alleged scam was
impractical in any case, citing, among other drawbacks, the
cost and difficulty of transporting heavy and bulky tobacco
hogsheads up to ten miles overland.3°
In the same year that Penn refuted Randolph's charges,
however, Maryland governor Nicholson reported that several
roads between his colony and Penn's were perfectly adequate
for conveying "Boats and Shalops of 10 or 12 Tuns upon
Sleys, or in great Carts" as part of an extensive smuggling

28 Randolph, Letters, VII, 361.
29 Ibid., V, 117-24.
30 Ibid., VII, 508-09.
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operation. 31

A proclamation issued by the governor in

1695 testifies to his conviction that such illegal
activities actually were being pursued and were having a
substantial adverse effect on the colony's economy: "it is •
apparent that the Trade of this Province is much impared
and Damnifyed by Sloops Shallops and Boats • • • of
Pensilvania

• which

over land •

are frequently known to transport in Carts •

•

•

• I

transporting their loading

• • large Sloopes, Shallops, and Boats wthout making any
report or Entrey therof."32
Naturally, the magnitude of illicit trade conducted
without officially entering or clearing is impossible to
calculate, but references to ship seizures and, less
frequently, condemnations for failure to produce the
requisite documents suggest that attempts to circumvent the
customs system entirely occurred fairly regularly throughout
the 165e-175e period and, under the right circumstances,
could occasionally be detected. 33

A variation on the

practice, loading an additional cargo of enumerated goods
after clearing legally, appears to have lessened the risk of
discovery considerably.

By employing this tactic, a ship

31 Md. A., XXIII, 87; Morriss, Colonial Trade of
Maryland, 128.
32 Md. A., XX, 279-Se; Morriss, Colonial Trade of
Maryland, 128-29 n. 216.
33 Md. A., XXIII, 88; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc.
nos. 8, 23, 25, 27; CCR 191, 1/27/1729, 1/28/1735,
9/23/1735, 11/3/1736, 7/7/1741, 11/19/1743, and le/24/175e.
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captain could produce official papers, if so required, to
indicate that he had indeed followed what would have
appeared to be the prescribed procedures for entering and
clearing.

Unless the searcher, usually a royal guardship

officer, was willing to make a thorough inspection of the
vessel and its contents, chances were that the ruse would
never be exposed as the rarity of such discoveries in the
documentary record would seem to indicate.
Although the infrequency with which such infractions
were prosecuted might be construed to mean that the offenses
simply did not occur often enough to constitute a serious
concern, royal and colonial officials clearly believed
otherwise.

In 1695 the governor of Maryland felt compelled

to issue a proclamation requiring each shipmaster to swear
(as if it would do any good) "that he neither will nor does
design by himself or any other procurement to take in any
more tobacco •

after Clearing other than what he has

given an Accot off upon Oath." 34

Fifteen years later

Governor Spotswood tried to ascertain how illicit trade was
being conducted between Virginia and the islands of

Cura~ao

and St. Thomas by comparing the figures for cargoes cleared
from points of embarkation with the records of cargoes
entered at the legal destinations of various vessels.
Finding no discrepancy between the two sets of numbers, the
governor eventually discovered that it had become common
34 Md. A., XX,

278.
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practice for ships leaving Virginia to "take in great
quantitys of tobacco after they had cleared with the
Officer, and by this means • • • easeing all that Tobacco at
either of those forreigne ports before they went to the
plantation to which they were cleared."3S
The following year Spotswood wrote to the Commissioners
of the Customs requesting additional resources in the battle
against smuggling since, he had determined, it was "so easy
for any Master of a Vessell to take in tobacco after he has
cleared, without giving the Collector any acco't of it." 36
Whatever remedial measures British authorities may have
implemented in response, however, achieved no more than
limited or temporary success.

Over a quarter century later,

former North Carolina governor Burrington wrote the
Commissioners that there still was "no knowing what
Quantities of Tobacco are carried because the Masters ship
it after they have cleared with the Collectors." 37
The strategy of taking on an additional cargo after
clearing was normally predicated on the assumption that the
unregistered goods would be disposed of, often in a
proscribed foreign port, before reaching the vessel's final,
approved destination either in England or another British
colony.

In some instances, however, illicit traders

35 Spotswood, Letters, I, le.
36 Ibid., 76.
37 CRNC, IV, 171.
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apparently succeeded in obviating the necessity for taking
even this basic precaution.

As governor of Maryland in

1697, Francis Nicholson alleged that colonial smugglers had
managed to secure the cooperation of customs agents in
England, some of whom were thought to "suffer the Masters
and merchants to enter with them more tobacco than they have
cleared from here • • • so that if they have a chance to run
it, either before or after the officer's visit, they gain
their object." 38
Periods of armed conflict between England and her
European rivals in America presented new challenges and
opportunities to the illicit traders of the greater
Chesapeake.

In time of war, trade normally prohibited with

foreign colonies acquired the additional stigma of a
treasonable offense.

But during such hostilities the

Chesapeake colonists seem to have been motivated less by a
sense of patriotic duty than one of economic potential.

The

greater risks associated with maritime commerce during
international conflict meant greater profits, prompting
smugglers to develop special techniques to turn the
situation to their own advantage.
One form of deception, described by Virginia governor
Edward Nott in 1705 as "Collusive, fraudulent, & Clandestine
Captures by privateers," exploited the wartime environment
to import cargoes of foreign goods which normally would be
38 ~' XV, #1178, p. 548.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
prohibited. 39

This ruse involved the staged "capture" of

a cooperating enemy merchant ship in order to have the
vessel condemned as a prize so that its cargo could then be
sold legally. 40

But in view of the very limited

involvement of Chesapeake-owned and manned privateers in the
wars between European powers before 1750, it seems unlikely
that this particular practice was used to circumvent the
Navigation Acts and wartime trade regulations to any
significant degree. 41
A scam which may have been perpetrated more often by
the owners and operators of Chesapeake vessels and their
foreign counterparts was to enter an enemy harbor with a
prohibited cargo under a "flag of truce" on the pretext of
exchanging prisoners of war.

Although Chesapeake colonists

certainly had engaged in illicit trade with foreign enemies
during the seventeenth century, English officials do not
appear to have issued any specific directives against the
practice until the later years of Queen Anne's War.

When

the home government did become exercised about Chesapeake
residents' commercial involvement with wartime adversaries,
it was specifically in connection with the flag of truce
issue.

Instructions to the governors of Virginia, Maryland,

and other colonies in May 1710 warned colonial officials not
3 9 C05/1315, p. 35

(viii); EJC, III, 558.

4 0 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 432 n. 62.
41 Ibid., 371.
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to permit flag of truce vessels to load any more provisions
than those absolutely necessary for the voyage and insisted
that the governors "not under any pretence whatsoever offer
or allow of any such traiterous and illegal practices as
have been heretofore used of sending to our

• enemys

• supplys of provisions • • • whereby they have been
assisted, comforted and relieved." 42
The British crown's concern over the more general
problem of its subjects aiding the enemy was spurred by
testimony earlier that year in which deponents specifically
identified Carolina as a participant in forbidden commerce
with the Dutch island of Cura9ao and the Danish island of
St. Thomas, "by which means the French Islands and their
privateers are furnished with goods and provisions." 43
The informants further asserted that there was "hardly any
Plantation in America that belongs to H.M. but has a
correspondence with Curacoa." 44

Although the other

Chesapeake colonies were not mentioned by name in that
memorial, a subsequent deposition by mariner Samuel Brise
provided an eyewitness account of ships having arrived at

42 CSPC, XXV, #213, p. 85.
4 3 Ibid., i47, pp. 13-17, 51. Governor Nott's 1705
proclamation against fraudulent seizures by privateers also
expressly forbade any correspondence with the French,
especially "Supplying them with warlike or other stores."
Those found guilty were to be "adjudged • • • traitors &
Suffer ye pains of Death" (COS/1315, p. 35 [viii]).
44 CSPC, XXV, #47, p. 15.
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Cura~ao

from Virginia laden with tobacco over a period of

several years during the war. 45

Two decades later, royal

authorities still felt obliged to remind North Carolina
governor Burrington that "in the late Wars the Merchants and
Planters in America did correspond & trade with our enemies"
and instructed him to employ "all possible methods to • • •
hinder all such trade •

in time of war."46

While trading with the enemy drew significant attention
in its own right, the phenomenon actually represented little
more than an extension of the illicit commerce that
Chesapeake colonists had been conducting routinely with
foreigners, frequently with the assistance of New England
mariners.

Not long after the establishment of the

Plantation Duty in 1673, Virginia merchants were complaining
about northern traders carrying "much tobacco" from the
Chesapeake to New England and from there to foreign
countries, but the prominent role played by New Englanders
in the illicit trade of the greater Chesapeake is most
dramatically illustrated by the events surrounding
Culpeper's Rebellion in North Carolina. 47
Long before the eruption of hostilities in 1677, New
Englanders had dominated the export trade of the Albermarle

45 JCTP, II, 114-15.
46 CRNC, III, 116.
47 CSPC, VII, il059, p. 475.
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region's principal cash crop, tobacco. 48

So great was the

influence of the northern traders that the North
Carolinians, under the threat of having the price of their
provisions doubled, persuaded their governor to remit three
quarters of the Plantation Duty that the New England
mariners were required to pay to ship enumerated commodities
out of the colony. 49

The Culpeper insurrection itself was

precipitated by another attempt to enforce the Navigation
Acts against New England commercial interests, specifically
the arrest of trader Zachariah Gilliam by provisional
governor Thomas Miller for the former's refusal to pay
duties allegedly owed from tobacco exported the previous
year. 50
In the aftermath of the conflict, reports solicited by
English authorities from colonial officials further
elucidated the part played by the New England men in the
disturbance.

Albermarle's new collector informed the

Commissioners of the Customs that about a half dozen traders
from New England customarily transported most of the tobacco
produced in Albermarle County and that they were the ones
largely responsible for setting up John Culpeper as
collector, "by which means they & he have played such
48 Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 42;
NCHCR, 1670-1696, xxxii.
49 CRNC, I, 292, 309; NCHCR, 1670-1696, xliii.
S0 NCHCR, 1670-1696, 1-li; Lefler and Powell, Colonial
North Carolina, 44.
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notorious pranks with the specious pretences of doing
justice and preserving the King's rights that a people and
Customes Treasure were never more infatuated, cheated and
exhausted." 51
In their account of the insurrection, the Carolina
proprietors acknowledged Thomas Miller's excesses and abuse
of power, but also concluded that the Culpeper faction and
the New England men "had a designe

to gitt ye trade of

this part of ye Country into their hands • • • And • • •
defraud the King of all his Customes." 52

Perhaps the most

telling manifestation of the prominence of the northern
traders in the illicit commercial affairs of North Carolina
is evident in Miller's fate at the hands of the rebels.

Not

only did the New England men help arrest the provisional
governor during the uprising for having seized hundreds of
hogsheads of tobacco which they were exporting illegally,
but at Miller's subsequent trial on what were probably
spurious charges of making seditious declarations against
the king and the Duke of York, the shipmasters even managed
to install "a New England traidr •

much indebted to his

Majty for Customes" as jury foreman. 5 3
Despite their flagrantly provocative influence and
behavior both preceding and during the rebellion, the New
51 CRNC,
I' 245.
52 Ibid., 288.
53 Ibid., 297.
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Englanders suffered no recriminations in the aftermath nor,
despite the claim that customs duties subsequently were
collected "without any disturbance from the people,'' did
their level of participation in the contraband trade of the
region appear to diminish appreciably in the long runo 54
Edward Randolph and the colonial governors continued to
complain about their activities not only in North Carolina
but throughout the greater Chesapeake for the rest of the
seventeenth centuryo55
A reduction in the number of protests about New England
involvement in the contraband trade of the region during the
early years of the eighteenth century suggests that the
administrative reforms of the 1699s may have succeeded in
curtailing the northern traders' participation in the
illicit commerce of the bay area for a brief period.

Even

so, Randolph's successor, Robert Quary, expressed "much
fear" in 1793 that most of the tobacco grown in North
Carolina was being "carryed to a wrong market o o o by New
Engldo men" who continued to conduct the greatest part of
that colony's tradeo 56

And during an investigation of

customs abuses in Connecticut five years later, the royal

5 4 Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 46.
55 Randolph, Letters, V, 118, 119, 135, 142-43, 216-17,
231, 279-71; VII, 367; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland,
117; CSPC, XIII, #2295, PPo 657, 659; XIV, #1897, ppo
511-1~

56 ~, XXI, #1159 ii, p. 738o
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agent discovered that "several! vessells that made a Trade
of running Tobacco from the Out Parts of Virginia without
entry or clearing came directly to this Government, and
landed their Tobacco" in New London.

There it was illegally

processed by the local collector whom Quary denigrated as a
"Pillar of their Church but a great rogue." 57
By 1710 Virginia officials indicated that New England
vessels again were foremost among those guilty of abusing
the customs system by "exporting greater quantities of
tobacco than they pay duty for • • • to the great prejudice
of her Majesty and a discouragement of all fair
Traders." 58

Over a decade later, the masters of the

College of William and Mary identified evasion of the penny
per pound duty on tobacco exports by New England shippers as
another reason for their greatly depleted revenues.

Not

only did the northerners habitually break the law, but they
apparently did so with a degree of impunity.

"The

New-England men are so bold in their transgressions of the
acts of trade," wrote the college directors, "that no
ordinary officer on the Eastern shore cares to meddle with
them." 59

In 1736, nearly six decades after Culpeper's

57 Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the
State of New York, Berthold Fernow and others, eds., (Albany
1877), v, 30. Cited hereafter as N.Y. St. Docs.
58 EJC, III, 253; Spotswood, Letters, I, 10, 114.
5 9 Perry, Church Papers, 549.
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Rebellion, George Burrington reported that New England
traders were exporting "great quantities" of North Carolina
tobacco annually without paying any duties.60
Besides the New Englanders, the Chesapeake colonists'
most consistent partners in the crime of illicit trade were
the Scots and the Dutch.

Although the Scots were anxious to

participate in the legal commerce of the English empire, the
Navigation Act of 1660 effectively prevented them from doing
so.

The legislation classified Scots as aliens which meant

that they were not permitted to trade with the colonies;
their sailors could not be considered English for the
purpose of fulfilling the requirement that the crew be
three-quarters English; and their ships could not be used to
convey goods to and from America. 61

Typical of the

scottish reaction to the enforcement of the acts was a
situation in Barbados in 1670 in which a vessel was seized
and condemned for not having the requisite percentage of
English sailors despite the presence of an ample number of
Scotsmen, men who had "hazarded their lives in the last wars
against the Dutch" and considered it "wondrous unkind to be
thus debarred the liberty of subjects." 62

60 CRNC, IV, 170.
61 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
124; Harper, English Navigation Laws, 65, 284-86, 387 n. 1,
389.
6 2 CSPC, VII, il63, p. 60.
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In defiance of the prohibitions, the Scots resolved to
participate in the colonial trade nevertheless and became
especially active in the illicit commerce of the
Chesapeake. 63

So effective were they in establishing

themselves in the trade that by 1689 English merchants were
protesting that their livelihood was being destroyed by
Scottish vessels sailing directly to Maryland, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania. 64

The following year English authorities

received a report that two ships from the Chesapeake had
unloaded tobacco in Glasgow without having cleared first in
England. 65

Two years later Edward Randolph informed his

superiors about the certificate counterfeiting operation in
Glasgow and reported the arrival in Maryland of several
trading vessels which had sailed directly from Scotland. 66
A significant aspect of the problem, according to
Randolph, was the considerable support that the Scottish
traders enjoyed among the local population.

The surveyor

general despaired of remedying the contraband commerce

63 One way in which the Scottish smugglers reportedly
secured a commercial foothold in the Chesapeake was by
consolidating ties with relatives who had been transported
to Virginia and Maryland by Oliver Cromwell after the
battles of Dunbar and Worcester following the English Civil
war (Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 91).
6 4 Stock, Debates II, 195; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 151.
65 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 160.
6 6 Randolph, Letters, VII, 371; CSPC, XIII, #2295, pp.
657-59.
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situation so long as one collector remained "a great
partisan of the Scotchmen in their cases" and a council
member and another customs agent continued to be "great
supporters of the Scotch trade." 67

Randolph found

Somerset County to be a particularly troublesome area, "a
place pestered by hundreds of Scotch and Irish families • •
• who support the interlopers, buy their cargoes and govern
the whole trade of the Eastern shore." 68
In 1694 Randolph submitted a list of traders who, he
charged, had cleared illegally from customs districts in
Virginia and Maryland.

Of the thirteen ships indicated,

nine were listed as bound for Scotland and Scotsmen were
identified as the principal merchants in all but two
instances. 69

English authorities received additional

reports of Scottish involvement in the illicit trade of the
Chesapeake from various quarters that year.

Patuxent River

district collector George Plater informed the Privy Council
that several vessels had embarked from Maryland with cargoes
bound directly for Scotland. 79

In England, the London

Customs House calculated a loss of L59,999 throughout the
empire as a result of illicit trade that year, drawing

67 CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 658.
68 Ibid., p. 659.
69 Randolph, Letters, VII, 472-73.
79 Md. A., XX, 65; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland,
119 n. 169.
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special attention to the adverse consequences to the royal
revenue of colonial tobacco ships unloading at Glasgow.71
Also in 1694, English merchants repeated their five-year-old
complaint about Scottish interlopers devastating their
trade.

Beseeching royal authorities to provide "some remedy

• • • against this groaning evil," they recommended that the
home government provide a small ship to cruise the
Chesapeake Bay against illicit traders. 72

This time

English authorities considered the matter serious enough to
order the Maryland and Virginia governors to hire vessels to
patrol the bay in search of ships arriving directly from
Scotland. 73
In late 1695 English officials became further alarmed
by the Scottish parliament's passage of an act establishing
a joint stock company to trade with Africa and the East
Indies.

Edward Randolph contemptuously derided the

initiative as a mere "pretence" by which the Scots hoped to
"engage themselves with great sums of money in an American
trade." 7 4

In England the Commissioners of the Customs

71 Stock, Debates, II 104, 106, 107-08, 110-12; Hall,
Edward Randolph, 156.
72 CTP, I, 354; Md. A., XX, 262, 340-41, XXIII, 87;
Stock, Debates, II, 111; CSPC, XIV, #1005 I, p. 279.
7 3 CSPC, XIV, ill39 I and II, p. 308; #1494, p. 396;
#1510, p:-399; Md. A., XX, 263; XXIII, 551; APCC, II, #558,
pp. 272-73; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,
IV, 153.
74 CSPC, XIV, #2187, p. 625.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
also confessed to being "apprehensive that this traffic may
be increased under colour" of the recent legislation and
begged the King in Council to take additional remedial
action. 75

Focusing directly on the Chesapeake, the

commissioners instructed Collector Plater to keep an
"Especial! Eye and Reguard to such ships and Vessels as may
be in any wayes suspected to Come from Scotl. or be bound
thither" and communicated to Governor Nicholson their
deepest fear that "a Vigorous Carrying on the Trade to and
from those parts" might ultimately do no less than "destroy
the Trade and Navigation of England and Carry it to
Scotland." 76
The crown's anxiety over mounting reports of illicit
trade in the Chesapeake and other parts of colonial America
(in which the activities of Scottish interlopers figured
prominently), provided the impetus to draft and secure
passage of the 1696 Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating
Abuses in the Plantation Trade.

The home government's

preoccupation with the perceived Scottish threat at this
time was reflected in the circular sent to all plantation
governors only days after the act's passage, inquiring as to

75 Ibid., #2237, pp. 638-39.
76 Md. A., XX, 345.
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whether any "Scotchmen" were employed in places of trust in
the colonial governments. 7 7
Enactment of the legislation appears to have had little
immediate impact, however, on the volume of contraband trade
conducted by Scotsmen in the bay region.

In 1698 a customs

officer and member of the Council of Virginia offered the
Board of Trade a subtle reminder about the persistence of
illegal commerce between Scotland and the Chesapeake. "I
need not acquaint you with the sweetness of that trade," he
wrote, "nor what a prodigious revenue the King may lose if
it be not well looked into." 78

In addition to accounts

over the next few years of Scottish ships arriving in the
Chesapeake with cargoes of European goods and departing with
shipments of tobacco, the Commissioners of the Customs
advised colonial officials about the reported construction
in Maryland and Virginia of ships intended for the Scottish
trade. 7 9

such a building program would have represented a

rather remarkable development in view of Maryland governor
John Hart's declaration, as late as

172~,

that his colony's

inhabitants owned very few ships and "are not inclin'd to

77 Ibid., 569; Andrews, Colonial Period of American
History,-yv; 175.
78 CSPC, XVI, #655, p. 33~.
79 Md. A., XX, 34~-41; XXIII, 11, 12, 328, 329; XXV,
73; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 119 n. 16~.
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navigation, but depend on British bottoms, for • • • the
bulk of their trade."80
One way to end Scottish smuggling was to make it legal.
Under the Act of Union in 1707 Scotland was formally
admitted to the British empire.

By virtue of the Scots' new

status as British citizens, many of the illicit trade
activities in which they had engaged previously were no
longer considered criminal and, as a result, the number of
recorded trade act violations by "Scotchmen" dropped
precipitously in succeeding years.

Since the Scots were now

officially British subjects, it is also reasonable to
suppose that, even when they were implicated in contraband
trade, they were no longer certain to be identified by
nationality, thus contributing to further anonymity in the
subsequent annals of illicit trade in the greater
Chesapeake.

Nevertheless, a Parliamentary committee

investigating the smuggling of tobacco from Virginia and
Maryland in 1723 concluded that "great and notorious frauds
have been committed, upon the importation of tobacco into
that part of Great Britain called Scotland, by not duly

°

8 CSPC, XXXII, i214 iv, p. 129. A quarter century
earlier Maryland Governor Nicholson had remarked that ship
handling and navigation were "so contrary to the genius of
the people" that he could find no local replacement for the
drowned commander of the sloop assigned to patrol the
colony's waters against smuggling (Ibid., XIV, 12303, p.
654)

0
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paying the customs thereon." 81

Moreover, historians have

remarked on the strong Scottish presence in Norfolk in the
eighteenth century and have speculated on the likely
connection between that demographic fact and the Virginia
port city's participation in illegal trade with foreign
colonies in the West Indies, specifically in violation of
the Molasses Act.82
While diminution of the royal revenue caused by
Scottish breaches of the trade laws may have been mitigated
considerably by incorporating the transgressors into the
British commercial system, no such simple solution could be
found for the problem of Dutch interlopers whose involvement
in the illicit trade of England dated back to the Middle
Ages. 83

In the colonial era, the inability of English

merchants to compete successfully against Dutch commercial
interests eventually induced Parliament to legislate the
first of the restrictive Navigation Acts in 1651. 84

The

phenomenon of Dutch collaboration in the illicit trade of
the Chesapeake, however, was based on a tradition of
81 Stock, Debates, III, 464. Robert c. Nash has
determined that between 1787 and 1722 Glasgow merchants
probably evaded duty payments on a third to a half of their
tobacco imports ("Tobacco Trades," 370).
82 Thomas Wertenbaker, Norfolk, Historic Southern Port
(Durham, N.C., 1931), 44, 49; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 209.
8 3 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 21.
84 c. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600-1800
(New York, 1965), 91; Andrews, Colonial Period of American
History, IV, chapter 2.
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amicable and mutually profitable relations which predated
the trade laws by several decades.
Despite the understanding reached between English
authorities and officials of Virginia Company in the

162~s,

colonial planters, including Governor George Yeardley,
customarily shipped their tobacco directly to Holland aboard
both Dutch and English ships. 85

By an act of assembly in

1642/3 Virginia legislators went so far as to codify the
encouragement of Dutch trade with their colony. 86

The

attempt by envoys from New Netherland in 1653 to negotiate a
commercial treaty with Virginia empowering Dutch merchants
to collect debts owed them by residents of the English
settlement further testifies to the prior existence of
extensive trade relations between the two New World
colonies. 87

In the same year, Eastern Shore planters

notified their business associates in Manhattan that they
would maintain the supply of tobacco, in direct defiance of
the 1651 Navigation Act, if the Dutchmen would send ships to
Smith's Island to make the exchange. 88

85 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
17; Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 294-95.
86 Hening, Statutes, I, 258.
87 E. B. O'Callaghan, History of New Netherland; or New
York Under the Dutch, (New York, 1848), II, 235-36; John R.
Brodhead, History of the State of New York, 2 vols. (New
York, 1874), I, 562.
88 Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 147.
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Except for a brief hiatus during the First Dutch War
(1652-54), Virginians continued to pursue commercial
relations with the Dutch throughout the Protectorate
period. 89

When the English monarchy was restored, New

Netherland dispatched ambassadors to Virginia once again "to
renew our former and ancient friendship, correspondence, and
neighborship" and to negotiate a treaty, which was
successfully concluded, establishing "free trade and
commerce" between the two colonies. 9 ~

Despite the English

prohibitions, Dutch merchants appear to have participated
fully in the economic life of the Chesapeake colony even to
the extent of joining, on at least one occasion, with
English and Anglo-American shiprnasters in openly defying
local customs authorities.

When, in 1658, two Virginia

collectors submitted a list of ship captains who had refused
to pay the two shilling per hogshead duty on tobacco, the
roster included the commander of the ship Dolphin, a
merchant vessel with a registered horne port of
Arnsterdarn. 91

89 N.Y. St. Docs., XII, 95 n. 8; Brodhead, History of
New York, 682; Ames, Virginia Eastern Shore, 45-46, 48-49,
95; Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 237.
9

~ Brodhead, History of New York, I, 683; Frances G.
Davenport, ed., European Treaties Bearing on the History of
the United States and its Dependencies (Washington, D.C.,
1917-1937), II, 55-56.
91 Hening, Statutes, I, 513.
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The intimacy of the relationship between the Virginians
and the Dutch traders exceeded that of simple trading
partners, at least as far as the Chesapeake planters were
concerned.

Governor Berkeley, himself a planter, cast the

foreigners in the role of economic saviors when, in
objecting to the Navigation Act of 1651, he complained about
"the Londoners who would faine bring us to the same poverty,
wherein the Dutch found and relieved us." 92

Almost twenty

years later, the Virginians' seemingly greater affinity for
the Hollanders than the government of their mother country
took a more ominous turn from the crown's perspective.

Sir

John Knight reported that the "desire of the planters for a
trade with the Dutch • • • and not to be singly bound to
England" had motivated them to permit the enemy to land
during an invasion the previous year.

So grave was Knight's

concern about the loyalty of the local population that he
advocated building forts near Virginia's harbors and coasts
partly to prevent the planters "from revolting to the Dutch,
as," he warned, "it is much to be feared they will." 9 3
Although the much feared rebellion never occurred,
residents of the greater Chesapeake continued to conduct

92 VMHB, I, 77; VIII, 147; Ames, Virginia Eastern
Shore, 46; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,
28.
9 3 CSPC, VII, #1159, p. 530.
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1~4

illicit trade with the Dutch. 94

A casual Dutch reference

to the acquisition of a full load of tobacco from Virginia
"in the name of an English skipper" indicates one method by
which the Dutchmen circumvented English customs regulations
and suggests that the ruse was employed rather commonly.95
English officials clearly expressed their conviction
concerning the prevalence and volume of this particular form
of contraband trade when they asserted, in the royal
instructions to Governor Berkeley in 1662, that "very much
Tobacco" was being shipped out of Virginia aboard "Dutch
Vessels wherein English mariners are entertained for that
purpose." 96

Virginians did not rely solely on Dutch

bottoms to conduct the trade, however.

In 1684 treasury

officials gave instructions to the English consul in
Rotterdam to seek the cooperation of local officials in
seizing any remaining tobacco ships

fro~

Virginia, six of

which were reported to have arrived during the previous four
weeks, and sending the vessels to England. 97
94 N.Y. St. Docs., III, 47; V,
Accawmacke, 238, 296-98.

3~;

For the rest

Wise, Kingdome of

95 N.Y. St. Docs., II, 253.
96 VMHB, III, 18.
97 CTB, VIII, pt. 2, p. 1119; Andrews, Colonial Period
of American History, IV, 118. Almost two centuries later,
English officials once again identified Rotterdam as a
principal center for smuggling tobacco into England.
Following up on reports of large-scale contraband shipments
from the Dutch city in 1881, London customs officers
confiscated a sizable cache of the weed that had been packed
by hydraulic pressure into two massive, mock marine boilers
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of the century English authorities continued to receive
reports of direct and indirect trade between the Chesapeake,
Holland, and the Dutch colonies in America and the West
Indies. 98
By the eighteenth century the Dutch West Indian island
of Curayao had begun to emerge as the primary shipping,
receiving, and distribution center for the Dutch contraband
trade with the Chesapeake.

In a 1695 letter to the Council

of Maryland the Commissioners of the Customs expressed
displeasure regarding the reported delivery of 6a hogsheads
of tobacco to "Carasoa" by a ship owned and operated by
residents of the Patuxent River customs district. 99

Had

the incident been isolated, it might not have elicited
serious concern, but within several months English

constructed especially for the purpose (Harper, The
Smugglers, 23a-31).
98 Randolph, Letters, VII, 351; V, 135, 216-17. One
report which probably did not come to the attention of
English authorities until considerably after the fact offers
a further indication of the regularity of contraband trade
between the Dutch and the greater Chesapeake.
The pirate
journal of Ambrose Cowley contains a 1683 entry concerning
the capture of "a Holland shipp bound for Virginia with
negroes" off the west coast of Africa. Recognizing the
vessel as "an Interloper," the freebooters explained to the
Dutch captain that "they might as well Rob him as He the
King, he being bound to Rob the King of his Dutyes" (William
Dampier, Dampier's Voyages: Consisting of A New Voyage Round
the World, a Supplement to the Voyage Round the World, Two
Vo a es to Cam each , a Discourse of Winds, a Vo a e to New
Holland • • • , John Masefield, ed. London, 1 a6 , I, 532;
Lionel Wafer, A New Vo a e & Descri tion of the Isthmus of
America, L. E. Elliott Joyce, ed., Oxford, 1934 , xxx).
99 Md. A., XX, 366-67.
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authorities were convinced that the "abuse of Conveying Tob 0
Sugars and Indico from his Mats Plantations to this Dutch
£factory" already had become established as "a general!
practice" and that the officials of the Caribbean island,
far from deterring such proscribed commerce, instead gave
"countenance and Encouragemt thereunto." 100

The same

year Edward Randolph reported that many English sailors
deserted Royal Navy ships in the Chesapeake in order to join
the crews of vessels trading illegally to "Carasaw." 101
In 1700 Robert Quary,

judge of Pennsylvania's

vice-admiralty court and soon to succeed Randolph as
surveyor general, undertook to expose and put a stop to
illicit trade with Curayao.

But in seeking the colonists'

cooperation Quary was dismayed to find "all persons so very
cold and unwilling to concern themselves" that he felt
constrained to pursue the matter entirely by himself or, he
was convinced, "nothing will be effected." 102

A special

agent dispatched to the colonies to assess the status of
piracy and illicit trade in America reported in 1701 that
the inhabitants of the proprietary colonies drove "a
constant trade to Surinnam and Curacoa • • • from whence
they bring back linnen and other European

100 Ibid., 523.
101 Randolph, Letters, V, 126.
102 CSPC, XVIII, #932 i, p. 653.
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commodities." 103

Two years later, Quary, now surveyor

general, identified "Curesawe and other places in ye West
Indies" as the destinations of tobacco exported illegally
from North Carolina aboard New England vessels.l 04
Apart from Quary, however, it appears that few royal or
colonial officials became sufficiently agitated about the
problem to take any concerted action until the beginning of
the next decade once new information about the trade had
been made available.

In 1709 John Lawson wrote about the

thriving commerce between North Carolina and

Cura~ao

and the

ships that the Carolinians had built to conduct that
lucrative trade. 105

The Curayao-Chesapeake connection

was revealed to officials of the home government in greater
detail early the following year through the memorials of
Peter Holt, Samuel Brise, and others. 106

In addition to

Brise's testimony about the presence of Virginia vessels in
Cura~ao,

the Council of Trade also learned that Carolina had

been supplying the island with pitch, tar, and even
ships.l07
The Commissioners for Trade and Plantations enjoined
the

gove~no~s

of all the colonies which had been implicated

Hn Ibid., XIX, fl:l054, p. 659.
H~4

Ibid., XXI, fl:ll50 i i, p. 738.

195 Lawson, Vo;tage to Carolina, 10.
196 CSPC, XXV, i47
I' pp. 14-17; JCTP, II, 114-15.
197 CSPC, XXV, fl:l38, p. 51.
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in the memorials "to make strict enquiry into the truth" of
the allegations. 1 ~ 8

Later that year, in an unsuccessful

attempt to discover the Anglo-American participants in the
illegal traffic between the lower James River and the Dutch
island, Governor Spotswood found information as difficult to
obtain as Colonel Quary had a decade earlier.

Despite the

governor's admission that his investigations had "not given
• • • the light • • • expected," the Council of Trade and
Plantations commended him for his "diligence in endeavouring
to detect illegal trade with Curacoa" and urged continued
vigilance to "discourage such illegal practises upon all

occasions." 1 ~ 9

There is no evidence, however, to suggest

that the perpetrators of the trade were ever apprehended.
At the same time, though, the number of specific
references to contraband trade with Cura9ao appearing in the
contemporary documents diminishes considerably in succeeding
years.

The relative absence of complaints may not reflect

the virtual elimination, or even reduction, of the trade,
however.

In response to a royal government query regarding

the extent of illicit trade in Virginia in 1739, Governor
William Gooch reported that such traffic no longer existed,
with the single exception of that which still was being

1~8 JCTP, II, 111.

1~9 Spotswood, Letters, I, 18, 87; CSPC, XXV, #437, p.
233; #449, p. 242.
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conducted with the Dutch colonies of Surinam and
"Curassoa." 110

Several years later Gooch reported that

even this trade had ceased, but it is worth noting that the
contraband cargo of foreign goods mentioned by North
Carolina governor Burrington as having been destined for
Virginia merchants arrived about the same time, in 1734,
thus casting doubt on Gooch's overall assessment. 111
In the 1730s and '40s prohibited goods continued to
enter the colonies of the greater Chesapeake, but the route
by which they arrived is often unspecified in the official
records and, in some instances, may have been unknown even
to law enforcement authorities at the time.

In 1741, for

example, a vessel was condemned in North Carolina for having
imported "forreign rum," Lisbon salt, gunpowder, and "sundry
other • • • merchandises."

The cargo was thought to have

been loaded in Virginia, but since it arrived "without any
Lawful! permitts, Cocketts, due Entrys or clearances •
or any Certificate of bond" it was impossible to determine
what the previous port or ports of embarkation had
been. 112

In an unusual case several years earlier, a

customs agent at Port Roanoke submitted a libel to the North

110 Flippin, William Gooch, 14.
111 Ibid.~ Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 44~ "Gooch
Correspondence," typescript mss. at The Colonial
Williamsburg Research Center, vol. 1, Gooch to the Board of
Trade, July 23, 1730.
112 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 191, 7/7 11741.
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Carolina vice-admiralty court concerning the seizure of
various contraband goods "of Merchants unknown • • • in
certain Ship • • • or Vessels • • • as yet unknown."

The

confiscated wares included Indian silks and muslin as well
as French wine and playing cards.ll3
The nature of the contraband goods in both cases may
offer a clue as to the source of the goods.

In 1710 the

Board of Trade listed "muslins, silks and •

great

quantities of • • • powder and shott" among the principal
commodities that traders from the English plantations
received from the merchants of Curayao in exchange for
tobacco, pitch, tar and other products of the American
continent. 114

Additionally, Cura~ao served as one of the

main exchange centers for residents of the Chesapeake and
other Anglo-American colonies seeking to acquire goods
(primarily sugar and molasses, but no doubt manufactured
items like playing cards as well) from the French West
Indies. 115
As if British authorities did not have a hard enough
time contending with New Englanders, Scots, and Dutchmen
113 Ibid., 2/2/1736.
114 CSPC, XXV, 1138, p. 51.
115 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 209, 211, 431 n. 46. The
Dutch island's commercial ties to Britain's colonial rivals
remained a source of concern for crown authorities for
decades to come.
In 1741 a Royal Navy admiral warned his
superiors that French and Spanish men-of-war would rely on
"Statia [St. Eustatius] and Curascoa" for their provisions
in any ensuing hostilities (EJC, V, 46).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

111
conspiring independently to violate trade laws and customs
regulations with the inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake,
additional evidence suggests that the three groups operated,
to a certain degree, in concert as well.

In 1696 Edward

Randolph described a "Combination" of New Englanders and
Scotsmen to carry on illegal trade between Maryland and
Scotland and "other places prohibited." 116

Randolph

further delineated the connections between various illicit
trading interests when he recommended that "fitt persons" be
appointed as governors of Carolina and Pennsylvania to
curtail the "illegal Trade carried on by Scotchmen & others
in vessells belonging to New Engd & Pensilvania, from those
provinces, to Scotland, Carasaw, & other unlawful
places." 117
Pennsylvania itself was frequently identified, most
often by Marylanders, as a cause of, and conduit for, much
of the illicit trade that plagued the northern Chesapeake.
Francis Nicholson and Sir Thomas Lawrence each advised the
Board of Trade in 1695 that the Pennsylvanians, besides
trading directly with Scotland, Holland, and

Cura~ao,

were

sending contraband goods into Maryland and removing

116 Randolph, Letters, V, 142-43.
ll7 Ibid., 135. Robert Quary subsequently noted the
illicit connection between North Carolina tobacco growers,
New England mariners, and Dutch buyers in Curayao in his
1703 report to English customs officials (CSPC, XXI, #1150
ii, p. 738).
--
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uncustomed tobacco in exchange. 118

Both officials were

equally concerned about their northern neighbors'
deleterious influence, the colonial secretary fearing that
"the people of Virginia and Maryland going there and
observing the advantages that they reap by their
illegal way of trading, are encouraged to do the same in
their own provinces." 119

Robert Quary agreed that such

apprehensions were justified, claiming in 1698 that
Pennsylvania's bad example had "already so far infected
Maryland that but for the vigilance • • • of Governor
Nicholson the consequence might have been fatal."l 2 0
Although outside groups undoubtedly played
indispensable roles in the contraband trade of the greater
Chesapeake, their participation should not be permitted to
obscure the centrality of resident populations in the
illicit commerce of their region, a phenomenon that
historians, for the most part, either have overlooked or
denied.

One reason why scholars generally have discounted

illegal trade as a significant factor in the history of the
greater Chesapeake may have been a tendency to correlate the
amount of shipping actually owned and personally conducted
by members of a given colony with the degree to which those
individuals participated in illicit trade.

But as was the

118 CSPC, XIV, #1897, p.510; #1916, p. 520.
119 Ibid., #1916, p. 520; Md. A., XXIII, 84.
120 CSPC, XVI, #796, p. 415.
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case with piracy, involvement in unlawful commerce was by no
means restricted to those who owned, operated, and manned
the ships.
Even when New England vessels transported much more
contraband cargo to and from the greater Chesapeake than did
local craft, smuggling and duty evasion required the active
and equal collaboration of colonial agents in the false
packing and marking of casks and hogsheads, arranging for
and assisting in the clandestine loading and unloading of
goods, and the bribing of customs officials.

It is also

apparent that, in the movement of contraband material
through inland waterways and around the bay itself, small,
locally owned vessels played a key role which frequently
escaped the attention of contemporary authorities and which
modern historians commonly have failed to take into account
as well.
In his 17e9 memorial to the Board of Trade, mariner
Peter Holt stated that it was easy to abscond from the bay
with a load of unregistered tobacco because authorities paid
little attention to the small boats which regularly plied
the waters of the Chesapeake. 121

Describing the volume

of cargoes seized from such vessels as petty, historian
Margaret

s.

Morriss doubted that such small craft could have

carried enough contraband to have had a significant adverse

121 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62-63.
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impact on either the royal or the colonial economy.122
Although the amount of goods confiscated as a result of any
particular seizure might seem insignificant, Morriss failed
to consider the cumulative effect that dozens of such
vessels operating simultaneously could produce.l23
Colonial officials frequently referred to the vital
role played by sloops, shallops, and other boats in the
transportation system, both legal and illicit, of the
greater Chesapeake.

Officials of the Customs House in

London reported in 1679 that, though the amount of tobacco
grown in North Carolina was considerable, most of it was
carried in "Sloopes and small fetches to Virginia & New
England." 124

Commenting on the loss of royal revenue due

to the evasion of tobacco duties, Edward Randolph informed
his superiors in 17ee that the North Carolinians and
southern Virginians who lived near Currituck Inlet
habitually employed small vessels to run their tobacco to
New England without paying any customs.1 25

Two decades

122 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 128-29 nn.
216, 217.
1 23 Small craft were so indispensable to smuggling
operations between England and continental Europe that crown
officials specifically excluded them from the cross-Channel
trade in the second half of the sixteenth century (Williams,
Contraband Cargoes, 3e}. Also, Harper noted that by using
such vessels in the colonies, contraband traders could
minimize their financial losses if apprehended (English
Navigation Laws, 256}.
124 CRNC, I, 243.
1 25 Ibid., III, xvii; Randolph, Letters, V, 231.
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later the Council of Trade and Plantations reaffirmed that
the commerce of North Carolina was still "carry'd on by very
small sloops." 126

Scottish interlopers, Randolph

asserted, regularly smuggled "Considerable quantities of
Goods which in a Peddling manner" which they disposed of by
"running in small boats from River and Creek to another"
throughout the greater Chesapeake. 127

And to the extent

that contraband traffic existed between Maryland and
Pennsylvania, it is clear that the "Sloops Shallops & Boates
• • • which keep runing and Trading up and down
several! Rivers and Creekes

• the

• of Maryland", some of

which were alleged to have been transported overland in the
movement of prohibited or enumerated goods, were integral to
the illicit trade of that region.l28
In addition to attending personally to their local
shipping needs, by the third decade of the eighteenth
century Chesapeake residents had assumed a significantly
greater role in their seagoing commerce "to such a Degree,"
Governor Spotswood reported, "as to carry in there own

l2 6 CSPC, XXXII, #656, p. 424.
127 Randolph, Letters, V, 118.
l28 Md. A., XX, 279; Morriss, Colonial Trade of
Maryland, 128-29 n. 216.
Responding to Board of Trade
queries concerning Virginia's commerce in 1730 and 1743,
Governor Gooch also commented on the "small Shallops which
are constantly employ'd in the Bay in transporting the
Country Commodities from one River to another" ("Gooch
Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board of Trade,
7/23/1730; vol. 3, Gooch to the Board of Trade, 8/22/1743).
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bottoms almost that whole Trade which used to be managed by
the People of New England, Bermuda, and other
Plantations." 129

A similar situation developed in North

Carolina where, according to John Lawson, local shipbuilders
had constructed ha considerable number of Vessels • • • with
which they trade to Cuirassau, and the West Indies."l3~
As significant as these developments were, the illegal
activities of local shippers, sailors, packers, and planters
represent -- to the extent that they are known -- only the
most direct manifestations of a much more universal
opposition to the imposition of trade restrictions and
customs duties on the inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake.
Illicit traders enjoyed a widespread support among the
general public which was demonstrated time and again in the
colonial courts and legislative assemblies and in popular,
sometimes violent, resistance to the efforts of crown
representatives to enforce the Navigation Acts.

Compounding

the degree of local complicity was the fact that most local
customs agents were sympathetic colonists, many of whom were
not only personally involved in the trade they were
empowered to regulate, but who also actively engaged in
bribery, extortion, and other questionable activities for
personal profit in flagrant violation of the laws they had
sworn to uphold.
129 Spotswood, Letters, II, 154.

13~ Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 1~-11.
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CHAPTER IV
"Their •
and

loose, and vitious way of living;
• their Darling, illegal trade":

Popular Opposition to Trade and Customs Regulations

In 1697 an exasperated Francis Nicholson wrote to the
Board of Trade, "I have endeavoured (according to my duty)
to hinder illegal trade, in doing of which, I have mett with
great difficultyes, especially in the Courts and
Assembly." 1

The reason for the persistent opposition by

the people and their representatives, the Maryland governor
believed, was that "the cursed thing called self-interest
too much governs them." 2

More specifically, Nicholson

charged in a subsequent letter to the Board, some colonists
were "not satisfied wth his Majestys Government •
because it curbs them in their former atheistical, loose,
and vitious way of living; and debars them of their Darling,
illegal trade." 3

Almost two decades later Virginia

governor Spotswood expressed similar sentiments when he
reported that members of the House of Burgesses recently had
1 Md. A., XXIII, 86.

2 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 546.
3 Md. A., XXIII, 491; CSPC, XVI, 1769, p. 386.
117
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accomplished nothing positive, but "on the contrary • • •
spent much of their time contriving to repeal the Laws
made to restrain dishonest and fraudulent practices in the
general dealings of the Country."

Such was "their humour

and principles," the governor added, "y't they would aim at
no other Acts than what invaded ye Prerogative or thwarted
the Government."4
Spotswood's difficulties with the burgesses encompassed
a broader spectrum of issues, of course, than just those
relating to maritime affairs.

Disputes over Indian policy,

defense expenditures, land distribution, tobacco inspection,
quitrent

collection, court and parish church appointments,

and the dispensation of patronage all contributed
significantly to the contentious atmosphere which
characterized much of the governor's administration and
eventually may have caused his dismissal. 5

Clearly though,

Spotswood found many Virginians' attitudes on matters of
trade, navigation, and piracy to be entirely consistent with
the obstinacy and selfishness that he believed they often
exhibited in their other affairs.

Regarding opposition to

his proposal to outlaw the export of inferior tobacco, he
cynically remarked, "a few Years' Observation has made me

4 Spotswood, Letters, I, 129-30; CSPC, XXVIII, #651, p.
315.
5 See, for example, Dodson, Alexander Spotswood,
passim, and Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia,
chapter a.
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perceive y't the Vulgar in these parts reckon him only the
Honest Man who inclines to favour their Interest • • •

who

always carrys Stilliards to weigh to the needy Planter's
advantage, and who never judges his Tobacco to be Trash." 6
Spotswood reacted similarly to the assembly's insistence on
exemptions from certain duties for Virginia-owned ships,
complaining that there was "no reasoning against Interest,
the Exemption

• is too beneficial a priviledge to be

parted with • • • while the humour of ye people is more
intent upon private benefit than ye public Safety, or hon'r
of the Governm't."7
Although the courts and assemblies constituted the
focal points of colonial resistance to the implementation
and enforcement of the Navigation Acts and related customs
regulations, inhabitants of the greater Chesapeake by no
means restricted their contention to those two arenas, at
times engaging in the sort of open and violent defiance of
imperial authority which no doubt inspired Governor
Nicholson's unflattering characterization of their "loose,
and vitious" life-style.

Other forms of subversion were not

as direct and were less calculated to convey disapproval of
imperial policy than to enrich individual offenders through
extortion, connivance, and other forms of corruption.
Additional factors such as negligence, incompetence,
6 Spotswood, Letters, II, 48.
7 Ibid., 137.
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administrative shortsightedness, and other bureaucratic
deficiencies all contributed to a furtherance of illicit
trade and customs fraud.
The two decades following the establishment of the
colonial customs service in English America in 1673 exacted
a frightful toll on the royal customs collection corps:
three agents killed, two imprisoned, and one tried for
treason. 8

All but one of the incidents (including the

three fatalities) occurred not, as one might expect, in
notoriously recalcitrant and rebellious New England, but in
the southern colonies, specifically in the greater
Chesapeake.

Nevertheless, most historians continue to

portray Virginia, Maryland, and to a lesser degree, North
Carolina as willing and submissive participants in the
British imperial system.

Rare indeed is the scholar who

discerns that while much circumvention of the trade laws in
the North was accomplished by tampering with the legal
apparatus, in the greater Chesapeake "violence and even
murder were resorted to for the same purpose." 9
How is it that such intense outbursts of animosity,
specifically directed at the executors of English imperial
trade policy, have not been recognized as manifestations of
a more deep-seated and generalized opposition to the
Navigation Acts and their enforcement in the greater
8 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 21.
9 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41.
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Chesapeake?

The answer, in all probability, lies in the

fact that much of the violence perpetrated against royal
customs agents in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake
occurred in conjunction with colonial upheavals that
historians have come to regard as essentially, if not
exclusively, political in nature.

Furthermore, scholars

have tended to characterize the political issues involved as
internal disputes between rival colonial factions, not as
contests of will between contending colonial and imperial
interests.

Another element that may have helped to obscure

the significance of trade law issues in the disturbances is
that the rebels in each instance cannot be identified
consistently with the anti-trade law faction.

Consequently,

the resentment of restrictive trade regulations and onerous
customs duties generally has been viewed not as a catalyst
or contributing factor but as an incidental or irrelevant
consideration in the colonial rebellions of Virginia,
Maryland, and North Carolina.
Of all the violence inflicted on royal customs agents
during the seventeenth-century disorders throughout the
greater Chesapeake, opposition to royal customs prerogatives
probably played the least prominent role in Virginia.
so, there is reason to suspect that resistance to the
Navigation Acts was a significant factor there.

In the

aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion, Governor Berkeley moved
quickly to execute the opposition ringleaders.
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Traditionally, little significance has been attached to the
fact that one of the unfortunates to receive the death
sentence, Giles Bland, was the royal collector of the
Plantation Duty. 1 ~

Although Bland's allegiance to Bacon

was undoubtedly the principal reason for his hanging,
Berkeley had other motives for wanting to rid himself of
this particular rebel.

The two men had been at odds for

some time over the manner in which the trade laws were being
enforced, the customs agent having complained that he had no
means to check the considerable amount of illegal commerce
that was being conducted and, striking closer to home,
having intimated that the governor himself was engaged in
illicit trade. 1 1
The centrality of trade law opposition in the North
Carolina disorders of the late
ambiguous.

167~s

is decidedly less

Despite Charles M. Andrews' conclusion that

imposition of the Plantation Duty could not have been a
causal factor in Culpeper's Rebellion since it had only
1

~ See, for example, Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 138 and Wilcomb E. Washburn, The
Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in
Virginia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957), 92-93, 1~8, 147.
11 British Museum, Egerton Papers (on microfilm at
Colonial Williamsburg Research Center) no. 2395, fo. 517;
Beer, Old Colonial System, I, 29~; Andrews, Colonial Period
of American History, IV, 137, n. 3; Barrow, Trade and
Empire, 22 nn. 5 and 6.
Ironically, Bland's father, John,
was a London merchant who advocated repeal of the Navigation
Acts and open trade with Holland and who also, by his own
admission, had been involved heavily in illicit tobacco
trade with the Dutch (Barrow, Trade and Empire, 17; Andrews,
Colonial Period of American History, IV, 137).
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recently gone into effect, the importance of anti-trade law
sentiment as a contributing element to the uprising is
readily apparent in the affidavits subsequently filed by
various eyewitnesses. 12

Shipwright Solomon Summers was

unequivocal in his assertion that, only two or three days
after the arrival of Albermarle collector and provisional
governor Thomas Miller, "there was great abuse & affronts
offered to him," not as a result of any provocation by
Miller, but "meerly • • • by reason he was his Majtys
Collectr & had power to accot for his Majtys dues wch in ye
yeare before • • • they had deposed." 13

Among the abuses

and indignities which the customs agent suffered was being
"violently assaulted" by a local resident who swore that "he
would never have the King's Customes settled there as long
as he lived." 14
While the behavior of the mob might appear impulsive
and arbitrary, there was clearly a method to its madness.
Not content with abusing Miller, the rebels also sought to
intimidate his subordinates (and anyone else who may have
considered coming to their aid), to destroy the symbols and
mechanisms of Miller's authority and, by extension, to send
an insolent and defiant message to his royal superiors as

12 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
138; Lefler and Powell, Colonial North Carolina, 42.
13 CRNC, I, 296.
14 Ibid., 296-97.
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well.

Timothy Biggs, a deputy to the collector,

corroborated Summers' testimony and further indicated that
the rebels entered his house "wth Muskets and swords & broke
open Chists & Locks, useing viallence to ye deponants family

& forceably took away • • • Millers Comissions &
Instructions • • • & all the Records." 15

Miller and other

officials were then "clapt in irons" whereupon the "Rabble •
• • Kept ym close prisoners often Threetening to try and
hang them," taking advantage of their confinement to reclaim
the contraband that Miller had confiscated, scratch out
official markings on tobacco hogsheads, and dispose of the
goods among themselves and the New England traders. 16

As

if to underscore the nature and source of their discontent,
the insurgents punctuated their seditious actions with "many
irreverend speeches agst his Majts Proclamations" concerning
adherence to the navigation laws, "some

saing if ye

Govr or Lds • • • were there they would serve them in like
mannr.ul7
During the turmoil that attended Culpeper's Rebellion,
one of the rebels E'··.:.:essed his desire to "freely run his
knife" through

Mille~,

a threat which, the potential

assassin indicated, he would have carried out "were itt not

15 I bid., 310.
16 Ibid., 297-98, 310-11.
17 I bid., 297.
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for feare of ye law." 18

Not even fear of the law

succeeded in preventing the killing of two customs
collectors in Maryland, however, and,

judging by the legal

consequences of the crimes, the perpetrators had little
cause for concern in any case.

During the absence of

colonial proprietor Lord Baltimore in 1684, the council
member left in charge, George Talbot, became intoxicated one
night whereupon he insulted and ridiculed customs collector
Christopher Rousby and stabbed the unarmed official to
death.

Although Talbot was tried and convicted, his death

sentence was commuted to five years' banishment from the
king's dominions, small justice, it would seem, for the
unprovoked murder of an officer of the crown.
For those who were ill-inclined toward the customs
service in Maryland, the reprimand administered to Talbot
apparently had little, if any, deterrent effect.

Less than

a year after the assailant's term of banishment expired,
another Maryland customs agent, John Payne, was mortally
wounded while attempting to board a vessel for inspection.
Most likely, the collector in this case was, to some extent,
a casualty of the revolutionary movement that swept through
Maryland under Protestant leader John Coode in 1689.
Although some believed that the agent was acting on orders
from Coode to seize members of the political opposition,
Coode himself maintained that Payne sought to board Nicholas
18 Ibid., 296-97.
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Sewall's yacht simply "to ask why they went to and fro
without entering and clearing, and was shot dead," the
explanation apparently accepted by the Lords of Trade who
concluded that the collector had been killed "in the
execution of his duty." 19

Modern analysts differ over the

question of the collector's intent but agree that,
regardless of his motives, as an officer of the customs
Payne was legally entitled to examine any vessel within his
jurisdiction. 29
In both the Rousby and Payne incidents, plausible
explanations for the commission of the crimes suggested by
the immediate circumstances surrounding the killings
personal animosity and drunkenness in one instance,
revolutionary turmoil in the other

have tended to

discourage the search for more complex and comprehensive
rationales.

Examination of the events that preceded each

incident, however, reveals that a history of contention and
ill will related to trade law enforcement served as a
prelude to both tragedies.
The bad blood between Rousby and colonial officials in
Maryland apparently began sometime before April 1681 when
the second Lord Baltimore sought to have the collector
removed from his post.

The charges submitted to royal

19 CSPC, XIII, #797, p. 294; 1787, p. 224.
29 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41;
Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28-29.
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authorities were for the most part vague, unsubstantiated,
and laced with personal invective.

Assailing Rousby as a

traitor and a devil, the proprietor disparaged the "insolent
and knavish" official as "the most lewd, debauched, swearing
and profane fellow in the whole Government."21

As far as

Rousby's performance on the job was concerned, Baltimore
alleged that the customs agent extorted the merchants and,
in so doing, had driven away a most desirable commerce
conducted with New England and West Country traders. 22
Ironically, it was Baltimore himself who had recommended
Rousby's appointment in the first place. 23

Although he

claimed to have been dissatisfied with the collector's
performance for two years, he never mentioned it to Rousby,
nor did he register any complaint with crown officials until
shortly after Rousby left the colony to go to England.
English authorities were singularly unimpressed by the
proprietor's arguments.

After reviewing the evidence, the

Commissioners of the Customs concluded that "it would be
much to the King's prejudice and to the discouragement of
the officers of the King's Customs in Maryland" if Rousby
were to be dismissed. 24

The Lords of Trade concurred,

noting that Baltimore had proceeded "in a very unusual
21 CSPC, XI, 1129, p. 66; 1151, pp. 78-79.
22 Ibid., XI, 1129, p. 67; #151, pp. 78-79.
23 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 27.
24 CSPC, XI, #328, p. 161.
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manner" and that he had "not sent sufficient proofs of his
charges to gain them credence." 25

Rousby's subsequent

reinstatement not only represented a personal vindication,
but also may be viewed as a validation by English
authorities of the countercharges that the collector
articulated in defending himself.

Admitting that some New

England ships had indeed left the province as a result of
his actions, Rousby explained that this had occurred not
because he had abused their masters, but because their
"trade was, in truth, to load tobacco and carry it whether
they pleased without paying any customs at all." 26

As to

the motives behind Baltimore's "importunate begging" for the
collector's removal, Rousby concluded that it was the
proprietor's design to rid the colony of all royal officials
and "to place all the offices of Collectors and Surveyors in
Maryland in the hands of his own creatures." 27

One such

creature was Baltimore's stepson, Nicholas Sewall, whom the
proprietor had already nominated to replace Rousby's
successor. 28

Another was Baltimore's nephew, Colonel

George Talbot.
Although Talbot never occupied a collector's or
surveyor's post, he did assume the office of deputy governor
25 Ibid., 1382, p. 187.
26 Ibid., 1328 ii, p. 164.
27 Ibid., p. 165.
28 Ibid., 1328 ix, p. 166.
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when the proprietor returned to England in May 1684.

In the

absence of documentation concerning the prior relationship
between Talbot and Christopher Rousby, one can only surmise
that the antipathy Talbot displayed toward the customs agent
on the night of October 31, 1684 derived from one or both of
two factors: the colonel's close association with Baltimore
and the resentment that the two probably shared over the
proprietor's humiliation in the failed attempt to remove
Rousby and, second, a more general and long-standing
irritation with the collector's insistence on enforcing the
Navigation Acts.
Talbot's bizarre behavior aboard H.M.S. Quaker that
October evening (which included a series of overt homosexual
advances toward guardship captain Thomas Allen) only serves
to cloud the question of the colonel's actual intent when he
boarded the vessel.

Reportedly "inflamed by drink" at the

time, Talbot later claimed that he had acted not "by malice
or premeditation, but in the height of passion" (presumably
anger rather than lust). 29

Some circumstantial evidence,

however, supports the contention that the crime was
premeditated, that the collector was "murther'd," as Edward
Randolph charged, "in Cool B1ood." 3

°

Communicating to

English authorities shortly after the killing, Virginia

2 9 Ibid., XII, 1629, p. 173; #671, p. 188; #773, p.
216.
30 Randolph, Letters, V, 265-66.
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governor Lord Howard of Effingham reported that Talbot had
instigated the quarrel intentionally and that the murder
weapon had been "newly prepared and sharpened, evidently for
some ill design." 31

Captain Allen's account included

Talbot's statement immediately after the stabbing to the
effect that nothing troubled the colonel so much "as that he
had not stabbed more, that he hoped to spill and drink a
thousand of our bloods."32
Talbot's remark serves to illustrate the point that
underlying any personal animus toward Rousby as an
individual was the aversion he experienced simply by virtue
of his position as a royal official charged with the
unenviable responsibility of preventing illicit trade in a
colony where it was practiced regularly.
understood this.

Rousby undoubtedly

All but the most naive customs officials

in the greater Chesapeake realized that a certain degree of
odium came with the territory.

Over the years Rousby had

been excoriated as "rogue, rascal, &c." so many times that
his habitual response to such insults was simply "to pass
them by as matter of course."33
Like the customs agent himself, Lord Howard believed
that what really lay at the heart of the colonists'
hostility toward Rousby and Baltimore's attempt to replace
31 CSPC, XI, 11963, p. 734.
32 Ibid., 11963 i, p. 736.
33 Ibid., 1328 i, p. 163.
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him was the collector's determination to enforce the laws
against contrabandists and customs duty evaders.

The

governor also surmised that Rousby's professional dedication
was what ultimately drove Talbot to eliminate the royal
agent in a way that working through official channels had
failed to accomplish. 34

Whatever actually motivated

Talbot to attack the customs collector, it is evident that
Rousby's contemporaries in service to the crown did not
regard the incident as an isolated or anomalous one.
Shortly after Rousby's murder, but well before Payne's
death, Captain Allen presciently observed that "noe officer
of the Custornes in Maryland can live without a good
guard." 35
Rousby's replacement, Nehemiah Blakiston, reported no
improvement in the level of trade law obedience as a
consequence of his predecessor's demise.

Quite the

contrary, he informed his superiors in England, he had been
"continually discountenanced and obstructed" in his efforts
to serve the crown and he begged English authorities "to put
and end to the growing and intolerable insolences under
which the King's officers have always suffered."

His chief

antagonists were colonial officials who, he lamented, "have
contemned and disowned my commission, torn and burnt my
certificates • • • and diverted masters from applying to me
34 Ibid., 11963, p. 735.
35 Cited in Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28.
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• • • by which means • • • my transgressors have escaped and
many frauds have been undetected." 36

The customs official

described a particularly disturbing situation in which an
agent of the Council of Maryland would preempt the collector
by pretending to arrest any vessel he believed Blakiston was
about to seize for illegal trading.

The council's man would

then strike a deal with the ship captain, condemn the vessel
at a sham legal proceeding, and auction off the craft, at a
ridiculously low price, to the very same skipper. 37
The alleged perpetrator of this series of deceptions
was none other than Nicholas Sewall, "his lady's son" with
whom Baltimore had hoped to replace Christopher Rousby.

But

the seriousness of the charges levelled against Sewall in
this context paled by comparison with the gravity of the
crime he would soon be accused of directing.

Having fled to

Virginia at the outbreak of Coode's rebellion in 1689,
Sewall sailed his pleasure boat back to Maryland the
following year and anchored in the Patuxent River just
before collector John Payne's attempt to board the yacht.
Although the proprietor's stepson evidently was ashore at
the time of the shooting, Coode maintained that Sewall had
threatened Payne with death before the incident and was
"proved to have given orders for his men to act as they did. n38

3 6 CSPC, XII, #136, pp. 39-31.
37 Ibid., #136, p. 31; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 28.
38 CSPC, XIII, #797, p. 294; #792, p. 238.
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The combined effects of the murder of a second royal
customs agent and the accession of the Protestant monarchs
William and Mary to the English throne ensured the success
of the revolutionary movement in Maryland and even
facilitated the installation of Blakiston, the royal
collector, as the colony's provisional chief executive. 39
But neither of these developments served to eliminate or, by
any reliable measure, significantly reduce opposition to
trade law enforcement in the colony.

If those who had

engaged in and supported illicit trade could not achieve
their objectives through violence and intimidation, they
successfully employed other means to do so.
Naturally, any effective campaign against illicit trade
required not only diligent law enforcement, but also a
judicial system sympathetic to the crown's interests.

No

matter how dedicated and capable customs collectors might be
in discovering and seizing vessels suspected of illicit
trade, failure to have the ships condemned in the colonial
courts would nullify their efforts.

With the establishment

of royal rule in Maryland in 1691 and the appointment of a
zealous surveyor general of the customs, Edward Randolph,
crown officials undoubtedly anticipated a significant
increase in the number of seizures and condemnations for
illicit trade.

Randolph's diligence insured the former, but

39 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 29; Aubrey C. Land,
Colonial Maryland: A History (Millwood, N.Y., 1981), 92.
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his attempts to successfully prosecute offenders were
thwarted by the anti-trade-law sentiments of Chesapeake
juries.
During his first year in Maryland, Randolph prosecuted
one vessel three times without success, a clear indication
of the opposition he would face for the rest of the
decade. 4 e

In 1698 the government prosecuted 59 cases

involving forfeited bonds in Maryland.
in convictions. 41

Only four resulted

Even in the rare instances where

common-law courts issued judgments in the crown's favor,
there was no guarantee that the penalty would be paid.

Some

colonists who had been convicted of failing to produce
certificates for their navigation bonds simply conveyed
their estates, "with intent to defraud his maty of such
Judgmts," to a friend or relative.

The offenders then could

claim insolvency and, technically, there would be no assets
for the authorities to confiscate. 42
The crown's cause fared no better in Virginia.

When

Governor Nicholson ordered the seizure of the ship William
and Mary because her captain, Thomas Meech, had been caught
40 Randolph, Letters, VII 386-87; Md. A., XIII, 320,
327; Hall, Edward Randolph, 140. Before his arrival in the
Chesapeake, Randolph had experienced similar obstruction in
Massachusetts where the governor had sent one jury out three
times in an unsuccessful effort to convict an alleged
smuggler (Randolph, Letters, III, 176; Hall, Edward
Randolph, 60).
41 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 125.
42 Md. A., XXIII, 4, 121-22.
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using counterfeit certificates to trade with Scotland, the
surveyor general reported that his assistance in prosecuting
the interloper was "all to no purpose for Court & Jury were
resolved to cleer the ship." 4 3

Only referral of the suit

to the Commissioners of the Customs in England saved the
government's case, eventually producing a plea bargained
confession by Meech. 44

Just over a year later, Randolph

appeared about ready to give up.

In debating whether or not

to litigate against the Scottish owner of a ship which had
departed the colony without clearing, the customs official
concluded that "No court or Jury will find against him so
that Its to no purpose to sue them." 45

Randolph struggled

gamely for two more years before finally admitting defeat.
In requesting leave to return to England for the purpose of
developing a more effective legal strategy with treasury and
customs officials, he confessed to Governor Nicholson that,
"by the partiality of juries and others" in the greater
Chesapeake, he could "obtain no cause for his Majesty upon
the most apparent evidences."46
As the most avid crusader against illicit trade in the
colonies Randolph was also, not surprisingly, the most vocal
critic of the Maryland and Virginia courts.

But others

43. Randolph, Letters, VII, 349.
44 Md. A., XX, 124.
45 Randolph, Letters, VII, 445.
4 6 Md. A., XX, 236-37; Hall, Edward Randolph, 153.
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shared his exasperation.

In 1695 Maryland secretary Sir

Thomas Lawrence asked English authorities how other colonies
managed to convict illicit traders, since his own experience
had been that "country juries •
them." 47

hardly ever find against

The same year another loyal servant of the

crown, Governor Francis Nicholson, complained that it was "a
difficult thing to get judges and juries to try and condemn
illegal traders." 48

Hoping to better understand the

phenomenon and reverse the trend, Nicholson consulted a
Maryland attorney who admitted in a rare, if somewhat
understated, display of candor that "some of our Judges &
some of our Juryes • • • do oftentimes Judge according to
the Affection or disaffection they have for the person
plaintiffe or Defendant, and not according to the merit of
the Cause or the Law that Arises upon the pleadings
thereof." 49
To counteract these sentimental inclinations, the
governor had to intervene directly in two instances to
overturn provincial court judgments in favor of shipmasters
accused of illegitimate trade practices. 50

Nicholson

maintained that Chesapeake colonists already had begun "to
pretend Custome" with regard to illicit trade and "claime it
47 ~' XIV, i1916, p. 520.
48 Ibid., 11896, p. 510.
49 Md. A., XX, 439-40.
S0 Ibid., 128-29, 180-81, 188, 384-85.
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as their Common Law."

Something would have to be done, he

warned, "for if they be allowed the benefit of their old
Customs, t'will be in vain for me to prosecute illegal
Traders." 51

By 1696 Nicholson had grown so frustrated

with the consistent failure of Maryland's general courts to
convict contraband traffickers and duty evaders that he
begged the Lords of Trade to instruct him as to how he might
punish recalcitrant juries.

"If there be no way of

attainting juries in these parts," the governor insisted,
"the King will not have justice done to him about illegal
trade." 52
Nicholson's idea of attainting juries presented obvious
practical difficulties in a colony where royal officials
recently had been killed for provoking the inhabitants to a
considerably lesser extent than would have been the case had
crown officers attempted to administer punishment simply
because of popular sympathy for illicit traders.

The

governor may have made the proposal in a fit of pique or
frustration and, in any event, there is no indication that
English authorities considered the recommendation seriously.
Instead, royal officials proposed another measure which,
with Nicholson's firm support, they managed to implement
with some success. 5 3
5l Ibid., XXIII, 88-89.
5 2 CSPC, XIV, #2303, p. 654.
53 Md. A., XX, 340; XXIII, 25.
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Rather than attempt to influence popular sentiment
regarding trade law enforcement, the strategy was to limit,
as much as possible, local participation in the judicial
process.

By establishing vice-admiralty courts, crown

authorities were able to control the legal machinery in
colonial maritime cases by eliminating juries altogether and
authorizing gubernatorial appointment, subject to English
Admiralty approval, of judges to the maritime court.

Under

the Act of 1696 which mandated such courts for all the
colonies, a vice-admiralty court with the power to appoint
judges in North Carolina and the Bahamas was established as
a permanent feature of Virginia's legal system by 1698. 54
Shortly thereafter Nicholson, now governor of Virginia,
advised his superiors in England of the "absolute necessity"
of maintaining such an institution in the colony. 55

As

governor of Maryland he had discovered that "it was almost
impossible to have the illegal traders condemned in any of
the Courts of Common Law, but in the Court of Admiralty His
Majesty had justice." 56

The Board of Trade soon came to

regard the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the
colonies as a qualified success, declaring in its annual

5 4 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 156;
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 366.
55 Cited in Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of
Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. (New York,
1919), I, 792.
56 ~' XVII, i579, p. 311.
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report to the House of Commons that "where they have not
been disputed," the courts had proved to be a "great
encouragement to legal trade." 5 7
The court's jurisdiction was not disputed, for the most
part, in Maryland and Virginia where, by the end of the
seventeenth century, royal authority had become established
firmly.

But North Carolina was another matter.

Both the

corporate colonies of New England and the southern
proprietary colonies generally opposed vice-admiralty courts
as a matter of principle, claiming that the establishment of
such institutions infringed upon the rights granted in their
charters. 58

Already by 1687, well before the creation of

vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, Albermarle county
court functionaries had asserted that they were not bound by
the provisions of the Navigation Acts and announced their
intention to throw out a case of alleged illegal trade,
claiming "the Benefit of their Charter" against the royal
collector who sought to prosecute the suspected
offender. 59

Ten years later North Carolina joined the

other proprietaries in unsuccessfully petitioning the House
of Lords against the installation of the courts under the

57 Stock, Debates, II, 367; Steele, Politics of
Colonial Policy, 47 n. 7.
58 NCHCR, 1697-17Bl, xxv; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 225-28, 255-58; Rediker, Deep Blue
Sea, 314-15.
59 Cited in Barrow, Trade and Empire, 27.
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admiralty seal, pledging instead to institute vice-admiralty
courts under their own charters. 6 "'
Under the new system, the governor of Virginia
considered that he had some authority over vice-admiralty
affairs in North Carolina, a situation which might have
caused considerable contention and resentment had it not
been for a certain benign neglect on the part of Virginia
officials.

Except for the trial of Blackbeard's crew in

1718-19, which took place despite the protests of North
Carolina officials, and another piracy case the following
decade, no North Carolina admiralty affairs appear to have
been litigated in a Virginia court. 61

The other exception

in 1727 involved several pirates apprehended in North
Carolina whom residents of the proprietary colony
surrendered to Virginia authorities for trial.

North

Carolina officials apparently realized that they had little
choice but to act in accordance with the clear precedent,
established in the Blackbeard proceedings, for Virginia's

6 1il CRNC, I, 471-72, 473, 49fil-91; NCHCR, 1697-17fill,
xxvi; Do~British Admiralty Board, 28-29.
If they
achieved nothing else, the petitions alerted royal officials
to the potential problem areas in implementing the new
system.
In a 1699 circular to colonial governors and
proprietors, England's Lords Justices wrote that
"notwithstanding the instructions which have been constantly
given," crown authorities continued to receive complaints,
"most particularly in the Proprieties and Charter
Governments, of great opposition to the establishment of • •
• Courts of Admiralty" (CSPC, XVII, #61ill, pp. 328-29).
6 1 NCHCR, 1697-1701, xxvi-xxvii.
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admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving piracy.62

Aside

from these instances, however, even such a likely candidate
for vice-admiralty adjudication as the looting and salvage
of a Royal Navy guardship which had grounded on the North
Carolina coast in 1698 was handled outside the admiralty
court system, seemingly without protest by Virginia viceadmiralty officials.63
Although North Carolina had the authority to convene
vice-admiralty courts in matters other than piracy,
inhabitants of the Albermarle region appear to have been
reluctant to do so.

During the first decade after 1698,

only one North Carolina case is recorded as having been
tried in a vice-admiralty court as such and, even in this
rare instance, three of the four presiding judges were
justices from the general court. 64

For the first quarter

of the eighteenth century North Carolina's preference for
settling its maritime judicial disputes in common-law rather
than vice-admiralty courts persisted and, with the notable
exception of the two piracy cases, the colony largely had
its way until the period of transition from proprietary to
royal control.
62
447-48.

f!!£,

II, 676-77; NCHCM, 1724-1730, liv, 203,

6 3 NCHCR, 1697-1701, lv-lvii; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188,
Letter of Thomas Harvey, 7/10/1698; CCR 192, Report of the
Commission Appointed to Survey the Wreck of H.M.S. Swift,
6/8/1698.
64 NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxxiv, 467-68.
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In 1728 the High Court of Admiralty in England directly
established a vice-admiralty court in North Carolina and
appointed Edmund Porter judge. 65

It was then that serious

opposition to vice-admiralty authority began to manifest
itself.

In rendering several decisions clearly intended to

demonstrate the primacy of vice-admiralty over common-law
jurisdiction, Porter succeeded in alienating much of the
populace as well as Governor Richard Everard who complained
to the Lords of Trade about "our Judge of the Admiralty
whose proceedings are so violent and arbitrary as to
occasion many complts against him." 66

In presenting his

grievances against Porter, the governor subtly intimated
that the more fundamental problem lay with the court's
disregard for individual liberties, pointedly appealing to
their Lordships' "tender regard for the preservation of the
Com:Laws and the rights and libertys of the Subject and the
Englishmans Privileges of Juries." 67
By early 1739 Porter and his vice-admiralty court had
antagonized a segment of the public to such an extent that
an angry mob prevented the court from sitting, threatened to
"murther the Judge of Admiralty," and set up in his place

65 NCHCM, 1724-1739, 1v.
66 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 11, 15-17; CRNC,
II, 762; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,-yv;
256-57, 257 n. 1.
67 CRNC, II, 762.
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mock justices "in dirission of the Admiralty.n68
Unquestionably, some of the hostility expressed toward
Porter was personal and was directed only incidentally
toward his office.

On the other hand, a climate of

opposition to vice-admiralty courts and royal authority had
been intensifying in the colony for some time.

The previous

year the marshal of the vice-admiralty court tried to
deliver a summons to the master of a sloop which had flown
the Union Jack (a practice forbidden to merchant vessels)
"several times in a very insulting manner" in Edenton
harbor. 69

After threatening to kill the marshal, the

belligerent shipmaster and some of his mates reportedly came
ashore with pistols and cutlasses, "swearing they valued ye
Govt no more then they did the Judge of AdtY."

Governor

Everard, obviously no partisan of Porter, described the
defiant actions as having been perpetrated specifically "wth
design of insulting the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty." 70
Suspended by a new royal governor in 1731, Porter was
eventually reinstated by the Board of Trade, but not before
North Carolina's general court successfully contested the
vice-admiralty court's jurisdiction, a tactic not
infrequently employed in the colonies to obtain acquittal
68 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 19; CRNC, II,
757-63; III 224-32, 511; Andrews, Colonial Per~of
American History, IV, 257 n. 1.
69 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 20, 3 1.
70 ~., doc. no. 31.
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for those involved in illicit maritime affairs.71

In a

case which initially concerned the importation of foreign
goods without proper clearance papers, Porter fined William
Little for his impudence and "unparalleled Aspursans" in
challenging the vice-admiralty court's authority. 72
Little was not intimidated.

But

When Porter attempted to bring

another charge against him the following year, the defendant
sought and received a writ of prohibition from the chief
justice of the general court preventing the vice-admiralty
court from prosecuting him. 7 3
Vice-admiralty court records for the very next day
reveal that an order to take Little into custody for
contempt of court was crossed out.

Instead, the text

indicates that Porter read the accused's answer to the
charge which "the Court knows to be falls" and yet,
remarkably, consented to accept the prohibition. 74
Registering a counterclaim with the governor against Porter
and the vice-admiralty court in 1731, Little articulated the
colonists' clear preference for trials by juries of their
peers.

Reiterating the point made by Everard several years

earlier, Little charged that Porter had "divested the

7 1 CRNC, IV, 224; Doty, British Admiralty Board, 34.
7 2 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 191, Vice-Admiralty Court
Papers, 1/27/1729 and 1/10/1730.
13 ~., CCR 142, doc. no. 38.
74 Ibid., doc. no. 39.
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Subjects of the Benifit of the common Law which is Every
Englishmans birth right."75

Popular opposition to the Navigation Acts and customs
regulations manifested itself in a variety of ways other
than outright lawlessness and judicial sympathy for accused
smugglers.

As Francis Nicholson indicated in 1697, the

Chesapeake governors not only experienced considerable
difficulty in their efforts to hinder illicit trade in the
common courts, but also in the colonial assemblies where the
people's representatives frequently thwarted measures
intended to foster compliance with the trade laws and duty
payment regulations.
In 1697, for example, both Nicholson and Virginia
governor Edmund Andros advocated the establishment of ports,
or at least "particular places for loading and unloading,"
as a "great means to prevent illegal Traders" and secure the
royal customs. 76

Eight years later Maryland governor John

Seymour was still calling for designated landing and
embarkation locations, but, he advised English authorities,
"ye Assembly will never consent to have it made a law by
them, and therefore have hitherto ever opposed it for ye
sake of clandestinly unshipping the Goods brought from
England, and Shipping their tobacco at their own Dores,
75 ~' III, 224.
76 CSPC, XV, i956 i., pp. 455-56; Md. A., XXIII, 86.
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which makes it impossible for all the Officers in the world
to know what is shipt or unshipt." 77

Virginia lawmakers

did pass several bills in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century authorizing the establishment of ports,
though not necessarily (as subsequent disapproval of the
acts by English authorities suggests) for the purpose of
preventing contraband trade.

Virginians were willing to

accept closer supervision of their shipping activities,
which they knew would curtail smuggling substantially, but
only in return for permission to develop manufactures, a
concession that British authorities were loath to make. 78
Moreover, the Maryland and Virginia assemblies declined
to cooperate in the passage of other legislation
specifically designed to impede unlawful commerce.

In 1695

London merchants complained to the king about the colonial
practice of shipping tobacco in bulk because it facilitated
illicit distribution which, in turn, lowered prices in the
legal market. 79

Although the king ordered the Maryland

and Virginia governors to enact legis!3tion in the late
168es prohibiting the procedure on the grounds that it was
"Detrimental & Ruinous to the Trade" of the two colonies,

77 CSPC, XXII, 112e1, p. 552; Morriss, Colonial Trade
of Maryland; 89.
78 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 133.
79 Stock, Debates, II, 111.
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both assemblies refused to comply. 8 ~
173~,

It was not until

with the passage of the comprehensive warehouse

inspection act (for which Governor Gooch had to campaign so
diligently and skillfully), that Virginians finally
consented to proscribe "that pernicious Practice of running
Tobacco without paying the Duty, which," the governor
asserted, had been "no less injurious to the fair Trader,
than prejudicial to his Majesty's Revenues." 81

Gooch was

able to persuade the colonists to abandon smuggling, as had
been the case with the town acts, only by offering a
sufficient financial incentive: higher prices for their
tobacco.
Colonial legislatures exhibited a similar reluctance to
initiate or endorse proposals aimed at improving trade law
enforcement in Chesapeake waters.

Having received orders to

hire a vessel to cruise the bay against smugglers, Virginia
governor Andros reported in 1695 that he had been "advised
not to enforce the charge thereof in the Assembly, as not

8

~ EJC I, 88; JHB, 1659/6~, 306, 317-18, 319, 322-23;
CSPC, XIII, 42300, p:-661; Md. A., VIII, 335; Md. A. XIX,
90-91: Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 97.
81 C05/1322, pp. 54-5. As early as 1713 Governor
Spotswood proposed and the Virginia assembly approved a
similar tobacco inspection act, but opponents of the law,
who objected to it for economic and political reasons,
persuaded the home government to disallow it in 1717
(Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial System, 4041; Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 178, 18082, 185).
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likely to be obtained." 82

Two years later, an irritated

Governor Nicholson observed that, although Marylanders were
quick to complain about the illegitimate maritime commercial
practices of neighboring Pennsylvanians, yet they could "by
no means be brought to address the King for a frigate to
cruise about this province," chiefly, he supposed, because
they feared that it might impede illicit trade. 8 3
In 1714 the naval officer for the Lower James River
district petitioned the Virginia assembly for an
appropriation of L24 a year out of the duty on liquors to
subsidize the cost of maintaining a small patrol boat, but
the burgesses declined to grant even this small request. 84
Several years later Governor Spotswood informed English
authorities of similar opposition by the assembly to his
efforts to suppress fraud in Virginia's tar and pitch trade.
"But as to getting a Law passed here for preventing the same
Trade," Spotswood lamented, "I must beg leave to inform Yo'r
Lord'ps of the difficultys of bringing this, or any other
Branch of the Trade of this Country, under a just
Regulation."

The governor implied that lawlessness had

become more or less institutionalized in Virginia when he
asserted that "the Liberty of doing wrong is none of ye

82 CSPC, XIV, #1871, p. 497.
8 3 Ibid., XV, #1178, p. 547.
84 Spotswood, Letters, II, 103-06, 108; JHB, 1712-26,
87; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 65.
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least contended for here." 85

Spotswood's sentiments

echoed those of Benjamin Harrison who, writing about the
prevalence of illegal trade and customs fraud twenty years
earlier, despaired that "the course of affairs • • • has run
so long in the same channel that it now looks like justice
for it to continue, and

• it is become almost criminal

to argue against it."86
During Spotswood's tenure resistance also took the form
of demagoguery on the part of colonists holding official
posts who exploited public antipathy toward royal authority
for their own purposes.

When the governor attempted to

institute reforms in 1712 to correct the deficiencies of the
colony's inscrutable accounting system (particularly with
regard to the two shilling per hogshead duty), he reported
the following: "I met with an opposition • • • little
expected from the King's Officers • • • not contented with
obstinately disputing whatever I proposed • • • they
endeavor'd to raise the Clamour of the Country against me by
unfairly insinuating into the minds of the People y't it was
their Cause they were defending against a Governor who aimed
at !novations that would oppress them." 87
Sometimes personal enemies and political opponents
agitated not simply to thwart the policies and initiatives

as Spotswood, Letters, II, 300.
8 6 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 330.
87 Spotswood, Letters, II, 179-80.
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of royal governors and customs authorities,
the officials themselves.

b~t

to discredit

An interesting corollary to the

issue of official venality concerns the fabrication of
charges, almost invariably by individuals who were under
suspicion themselves, alleging complicity in illicit trade
on the part of those government officers who sought to
enforce the Navigation Acts most aggressively.

The patent

absurdity of some of these allegations often represented a
desperate and, in some cases, fairly transparent attempt to
divert attention from the accusers' own misdeeds.
Sometimes the charges were simply blatant, but
generalized, attempts at character assassination, as when
Edward Randolph's enemies in Maryland accused him of "rude
and insolent behavior" and consorting "with none others but
Professed Papists and • • • their Majestys open and known
enemies."

In another instance, however, Lieutenant Governor

William Markham of Pennsylvania, long suspected by Randolph
and others of abetting pirates, contrived in 1692 to obtain
a deposition from a merchant stating that the surveyor
general had offered to discharge a forfeited bond in return
for a cash payment.88
The same allegation surfaced again in October 1694 when
two members of the Council of Maryland, hoping to prevent
the customs agent's appointment to their committee, accused
Randolph of actually accepting the bribe "of Twinty peices
88 Randolph, Letters, V, 86-87, 88-89.
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of Eight" in Pennsylvania.

The rest of the council,

however, "not seeing cause why their Majties Orders
relateing to Mr Randolphs Admittance ought not to be
Observed" peremptorily dismissed the charge and voted to
admit Randolph. 89

Although the identities of the

dissenting councilors are not recorded, one of them almost
certainly was Thomas Tench, a provincial (and, subsequently,
vice-admiralty) court judge and owner of a ship which had
been seized and was currently under litigation for trade law
violations. 90
A similar episode appears to have occurred in 1698 when
Council of Virginia member Daniel Parke engineered a
preemptive attack on the outspoken whistle blower, Benjamin
Harrison.

The same day Harrison was to present his

startling expose on illicit trade and customs fraud in
Virginia, Parke first submitted his own memorial which
amounted to little more than an attempt to disparage
Harrison (and, indirectly, James Blair as well) by
intimating that Harrison was involved in a contraband trade
to Scotland. 91

Aithough the councilor was supported in

his allegations by a local collector, it is also clear that
Parke knew that Harrison was about to deliver a searing

89 Md. A., XX, 155-56.
90 • Ibid., 106, 128-30, 243-44, 461-62; Randolph,
Letters, VII, 467.
91 CSPC, XVI, 1655, pp. 329-30.
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indictment of the council, a denunciation which included, as
it turned out, the specific charge that Parke, fearing "the
fatal consequences of a prosecution to himself," had opted
to "desist from giving any legal information" concerning the
venality of a fellow councilor and collector "though • • •
it was his duty as a magistrate and a councilor to do
so." 92

Despite a historian's recent intimation that both

Parke and Harrison probably were guilty of involvement in
illicit trade, Harrison's subsequent nomination to the
council and the crown's approval of his appointment suggests
that it was Harrison's charges, not Parke's, to which royal
authorities ultimately gave credence.93
In 1716 Alexander Spotswood bore the brunt of false
imputations of wrongdoing in the maritime trade sphere when
a group of anonymous complainants, hoping to oust the
governor, sent a letter to English authorities accusing him
of "directing and forcing the Officers of the Customs to
demand, Extort and take from the Masters or Commanders of
any Ship or Vessell • • • fees or pretended dues not
warranted by some Law."

Spotswood vehemently denied the

charges, citing instances in which he had reduced or
foregone his "undoubted Dues, either for the encouragement
of Trade or for the relief of unfortunate Masters and Owners

92 Ibid., 1656, p. 330.
93 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 155;
CSPC, XVI, 11038, p. 572.
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of Vessells."

Although there was some truth to the

allegations -- the governor conceded that he had accepted
one fee which had not been specifically authorized -- it is
nevertheless clear that the claims against him were greatly
exaggerated. 94

Despite their persistent, vigorous, and sometimes
violent opposition to the executors of English imperial
trade policy, the planters and shipmasters of the greater
Chesapeake realized that, ultimately, they would have to
reconcile their disinclination to obey the Navigation Acts
with the home government's insistence that they conform to
the trade laws through some form of compromise.

Over a

period of years a working arrangement appears to have
evolved in many customs districts whereby shipmasters would
pay a nominal duty on their freight and collectors would
receive their fees, but with the mutual understanding that
no one would bother to check too carefully on the actual
volume or nature of exported goods.

Having detected a

pronounced lack of diligence on the part of customs
officials in Maryland and Virginia, Edward Randolph
complained to his superiors in 1692, for example, that "not
one of the Collectors voutsafe to go a'board ships upon
their arrival • nor appoint persons to do it; but leave the

94 Spotswood, Letters, II, 191-92.
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honest Mrs to do as they please. their chief business is •
to secure ye 2d p Hoggd & their fees."95
The reluctance of the Chesapeake collectors to
institute strict inspection and condemnation procedures
frustrated most conscientious royal governors in Virginia
and Maryland and absolutely infuriated Randolph, but many
customs officers explained their behavior as the only
practical approach to the problem of customs inspection and
revenue collection.

When Randolph chastised Nehemiah

Blakiston in front of Governor Nicholson for clearing,
contrary to the surveyor general's direct orders, two ships
suspected of illicit trade, the collector and councilor
reportedly replied that governing officials "must admit of
wt security ye Country afforded or must take none." 96
Another collector cautioned Randolph that "t'was better to
be quiett & not disturb the trade of the country: for it
would be to no purpose." 97

The colonists had adopted this

attitude, the surveyor general was convinced, "to support
illegal trade & to tire me out." 98
Other officials also took the position that insistence
on following the letter of the law in the colonies might not
prove the wisest course.

In one of the many condemnation

95 Randolph, Letters, VII, 350.
96 I bid., 359; CSPC, XIII, 12295, p. 656.
97 Randolph, Letters, VII, 460.
98 Ibid.
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proceedings in which a seizure made by Randolph was
overturned by a court or jury, the presiding judge advised
the surveyor general not to be overly concerned with
observing the "nicetyes of the Acts of Trade." 99

What

these vignettes illustrate is the divergent perceptions of
zealous royal officials, on the one hand, and Chesapeake
colonists on the other.

What one group deemed to be

flagrant violations of the trade laws and customs
regulations, the other regarded as a necessary, even
desirable, flexibility in the system.

That which strict

crown authorities considered criminal, most bay area
residents viewed as merely practical.
The permissive attitude toward observance of the trade
laws was so prevalent among the colonists that even royal
governors felt the pressure to compromise.

Contemplating

the possibility of Lord Baltimore's return to power in
Maryland, Governor Nicholson advised the Board of Trade in
1698 that "his Lordp

wi~l

consider that the best, if not the

only way to promote his temporal Interest here, will be not
to disturb them in their illegal trade, or other ill
practices: for fear that if they can not injoy them under
his Lordps Government; they may assume it to them selves:
which will be no very difficult thing for them to do." 100
None of the colonial governors could have been any more
99 Ibid., 382.
100 Md. A., XXIII, 491.
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earnest in his commitment to safeguarding the king's
revenues than Alexander Spotswood, but even he found himself
siding with the colonists in arguing for a liberal
interpretation of royal instructions forbidding the
appointment of men deeply involved in colonial commerce to
customs collection and inspection posts.

Strict application

of the rules, the governor cautioned, would result in the
disqualification from office of all men of means and
ability, the same men, coincidentally, whose support
Spotswood needed in the council and the assembly in order to
govern effectively.l01
Toward the end of the governor's tenure, additional
pressure to compromise began to be exerted from what
Spotswood, and those who shared his commitment to
conscientious observance of imperial trade regulations, must
have considered a most unlikely source: the home government
itself.

From the early 1720s British authorities under the

direction of Prime Minister Robert Walpole embraced a policy
of "salutary neglect" with regard to the American colonies.
Designed to maintain the prosperity of Great Britain and the
attachment of overseas settlements through "accommodation
rather than confrontation," this strategy entailed a
relaxation in enforcement of the Navigation Acts. 102
101 Spotswood, Letters, I, 179.
102 Jack P. Greene, "An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis
of the Preconditions of the American Revolution" in Essays
in the American Revolution, Stephen G. Kurtz and James H.
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Other developments in the government lent themselves to
the pursuit of such a policy.

Beginning with the accession

of the first Hanoverian king in Britain in 1715, the Board
of Trade, the agency most directly concerned with colonial
commerce and trade law compliance, began to decline in
influence. 103

As part of an administration in which the

formulation and execution of policy was subordinated to the
quest for patronage, by the early 1740s the Board had been
reduced to a condition of "docile impotence." 104

During

the interim, at a time when many observers felt that the
American customs establishment was in desperate need of
reinforcement, the Commissioners of the Customs undertook a
major cost-cutting initiative in 1725 which resulted in the
elimination of twelve colonial duty collection and
contraband detection posts and salary reductions for many
others.

Eight of the twelve discontinued positions were in

Maryland and Virginia.l05
The practical consequences of these developments can
easily be imagined.

The departure of so many

custom~

agents

must have looked like a tactical retreat, if not an open
Hutson, eds. (New York, 1973), 64; Barrow, Trade and Empire,
115-16; James A. Henretta, "Salutar Ne lect:" Colonial
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle Princeton,
1972), 65-66.
103 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 111; Henretta, "Salutary
Neglect", 24-27.
104 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 165, 259.
1°5 Barrow Trade and Empire, 106-07.
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invitation, to Chesapeake smugglers.

The exigencies of the

patronage system also meant that, by the 1740s, colonial
governors no longer had the power to appoint provincial
naval officers.

The insistence of the Duke of Newcastle,

secretary of state for the southern department, on
controlling all such appointments himself not only undercut
the authority of the colonial chief executives, but insured
that, in at least some instances, less dedicated and
competent individuals would occupy the customs
offices. 106

Moreover, the government's policy of

"appeasement, not • • • coercion," coupled with the
intransigence of colonial courts and juries, induced some
customs officials to "compose," or settle out of court to
their own financial advantage, litigation arising from their
prosecution of trade law violations. 10 7
The attempt to resolve the dilemmas of illicit commerce
and trade law enforcement in the greater Chesapeake may be
viewed as an effort to narrow the gap between the competing
interests of the colonists and the royal government.

The

success of the colonial governors in this regard can be
gauged by evaluating the extent to which they managed to
reconcile or minimize these conflicts.

In that sense

Virginia governor Gooch's establishment of the tobacco
inspection system may be considered a virtual tour de force.
106 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 246-60.
107 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 116, 127-28.
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Whether the program itself was responsible for rescuing

~he

colony from the depression of the 1720s is debatable, but,
when the economy rebounded after a few difficult years, most
planters credited Gooch's plan and so became willing
participants. 108
The success of the scheme, whether actual or merely
perceived, significantly reduced the incentive to smuggle, a
phenomenon which the relatively few documented instances of,
or complaints about,

illicit tobacco trade in Virginia and

Maryland (which adopted the inspection system in 1747) in
subsequent years appears to bear out. 109

With the

economic resurgence of the 1730s, tobacco planters and
shippers not only complied with the new regulations for the
most part, but became, to a degree, active proponents and
defenders of the inspection system.

Unlike previous years,

when Virginia's burgesses resisted or sought to undermine
imperial directives designed to strengthen the overseas
customs service, the colonial assembly, after some initial

108 Janis M. Horne, "The Opposition to the Virginia
Tobacco Inspection Act of 1730," honors thesis, College of
William and Mary (Williamsburg, 1977), 118.
109 Another way in which the tobacco inspection act may
have reduced the incentive to smuggle was by alleviating the
chronic currency shortage through the use of warehouse
certificates (Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 107).
Previously, the opportunity to obtain scarce specie
constituted an inducement to Chesapeake colonists to engage
in illicit trade, sometimes with pirates.
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vacillation, beat back several attempts to repeal the
inspection act.110
But if adoption of a tobacco inspection system by
Virginians, Marylanders, and, eventually, North Carolinians
appeared to join Chesapeake colonists in partnership with
imperial authority, in reality it amounted to little more
than a marriage of convenience.

In 1734 the president and

masters of the College of William and Mary reported that the
revenue from the penny per pound duty had become "so sunk,
that it brings in nothing at all," the reason being that
smugglers, "by a quick Transportation" over the Potomac
River managed to avoid the payment of any duties
whatsoever. 111

It was concern over these and similar

violations (as well as, one might infer, the laxity or
connivance of government officials) that no doubt prompted
110 Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia,
244-45.
It could be argued that Virginians already were
moving in the direction of adopting an inspection system by
1726 when the assembly passed legislation aimed at thwarting
neighboring North Carolinians who, "being under no
regulation in the manner of making and packing their
tobacco, do not withstanding make and transport into this
colony, for traffic and sale, great quantities of tobacco,
deceitfully packed, and unfit for exportation, and yet pass
the same as tobacco of the growth and manufacture of
Virginia, to the great deceit of honest traders, and the
depreciating the staple commodity of this country" (Hening,
Statutes, IV, 175; CRNC, II, 683). The original tobacco
inspection scheme, for which Governor Spotswood took credit
in 1713, met with almost universal opposition in both the
colony and the home country (Billings, Selby, and Tate,
Colonial Virginia, 17&, 180-82, 185; Horne, "Tobacco
Inspection Act," 12-14; Hemphill, Virginia and the English
Commercial System, 40-41).
111 JHB, 1727-40, 211.
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Virginia legislators to pass a law in 1738 requiring
inspectors, sheriffs, and constables to vow to report all
instances of planters disposing of tobacco prior to
inspection or transporting the weed to Maryland or North
Carolina without a permit. 112

And, although abiding by

the regulations for tobacco export generally favored the
interests of the planters and shippers, nevertheless
repeated admissions by North Carolina lawmakers that
previous legislation against frauds in the tobacco trade had
been ineffectual indicate that local residents continued to
engage in the "clandestine running" of bulk tobacco well
past mid-century. 113

Despite considerable success in

reducing the incentive to engage in contraband activities,
even the successful innovator of the warehouse inspection
system, Governor Gooch, had to admit in 1743 that, in the
final analysis, when an opportunity to smuggle a cargo of
prohibited goods into the colony presented itself, "the
Country People are ready upon all Occasions to assist the
offenders in concealment thereof."ll 4

112 Hening, Statutes,

v,

13; Flippin, William Gooch,

23.
113 CRNC, XXIII, 728, 948.
11 4 "Gooch Correspondence," val. 3, Gooch to the Board
of Trade, 8/22/1743; Flippin, William Gooch, 16.
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CHAPTER V
"The Contrivance and Corruption of our Officers":
Fraud, Negligence, and Mismanagement
in the Customs Administration

As ineffectual as the colonial courts

m~y

have been in

meting out the king's justice to violators of the navigation
laws, there was at least a chance when a case was brought to
trial that illicit traders might be punished.

But a far

greater percentage of offenses never went to court, not only
because detection was difficult, but because customs
officials frequently were guilty of negligence and
corruption.

So if, in contrast to North Carolina, overt

opposition to and legal maneuvering against vice-admiralty
jurisdiction appear to be conspicuously absent in Virginia
and Maryland, the explanation may have less to do with
submissive compliance with the law than the fact that in
most cases there simply was no need to oppose the court
actively.
Through the dereliction or connivance of customs agents
and other government officials, many, perhaps most,
perpetrators of illicit trade and revenue fraud were never
apprehended, much less prosecuted.

As early as 1692 even

162
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the indefatigable Randolph despaired that "all help is too
little to stem the illegal trade which has

b~en

encouraged

by the ignorance of some and the countenance of others."!
And before the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the
greater Chesapeake, those alleged offenders who were brought
to trial usually could expect sympathetic judges who often
engaged, or had a personal interest, in some form of illicit
trade themselves.
The two most important local customs officials in the
colonies were the collector and the naval officer.

As the

agents specifically charged with the prevention and
discovery of illicit trade, these officials formed the first
line of defense against smuggling and revenue fraud on the
landward side of the colonial maritime frontier.

Naval

officers, though the term would seem to suggest otherwise,
performed clerical functions unrelated, in any direct sense,
either to the actual navigation of ships or to the command
hierarchy of England's Royal Navy.

Governors, as the

highest ranking officials in the colonies and the ones
principally responsible for insuring compliance with the
Navigation Acts, served as the first naval officers.

In the

1670s the governors began to depute others to assume the
duties of the naval office.

Because of the long, indented

shorelines and the absence of established ports in Maryland

l CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 660.
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and Virginia, governors eventually appointed naval officers
for six districts in each of those colonies. 2
In time another official, the collector, carne to
supersede the naval officer in importance and authority.3
In theory, the collector assumed primary responsibility for
the proper entering and clearing of cargoes and payment of
the requisite duties. 4

The naval officer, meanwhile, was

charged with the specific tasks of granting certificates,
administering shipmasters' oaths, taking bonds, and
examining all ships' documents for their accuracy and
authenticity. 5

Although crown authorities periodically

spelled out the duties of collectors and naval officers in
some detail, there was considerable confusion about their
respective functions in practice. 6

A 1736 list of fees in

North Carolina indicates that both officials were
accountable for "Entring inwards & clearing outwards every
2 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
180-82; Peter Bergstrom,
"Markets and Merchants: Economic
Diversifica~ion in Colonial Virginia, 1700-1775," Ph.D.
dissertation (University of New Hampshire, 1980), 68.
3 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76, 78; Neil Stout, The
Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775: A Study of Enforcement of
British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American
Revolution (Annapolis, 1973), 7.
4 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76; Andrews, Colonial
Period of American History, IV, 149 n. 1.
5 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 187
n. 2, 188-89; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76-78; Bergstrom,
"Merchants and Markets," 88-91.
6 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
148-49, 197, 205; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 76.
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vessell" within their districts. 7

To some degree, this

duplication of responsibility was intentional.

In 1698 the

Lords Justices of England, "having been informed that the
Navall Officers • • • generally neglected to comply with the
• • • Act of Parliament for preventing frauds & regulating
Abuses in ye Plantation Trade," required the concurrence of
a collector as a "controule upon ye action of every officer
imployed" in examining cocquets and certificates, taking
bond, and clearing ships. 8
Collectors and naval officers came from varied
backgrounds.

Some, like George Muschamp who served as a

collector in both North Carolina and Maryland, received
appointments because their fathers had worked for the
customs service in the home country. 9

Others were

transferred to the plantations from posts in England or
Ireland, but the large majority of customs agents in the
greater Chesapeake appear to have been selected from local

ranks. 1 ~

Some of these individuals undoubtedly were

chosen because of their associations with men of influence
in England, as was the case with Edward Hill and James
Bowles who made use of English connections to secure

7 CRNC, IV, 195-96.
8 Ibid., I, 492.
9 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 8~; Andrews, Colonial
Period of American History, IV, 197, 198 n. 1.
1

~ Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 6~-61, 77-78.
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positions as collectors in Virginia and Maryland,
respectively. 11

Others received appointments because

they, or one of their relatives, had gained favor with the
governor or the surveyor general.

In 1712, for example,

when Colonel Richard Lee's "advanced age would no longer
permit him to execute • • • the duty of Naval Officer" in
northern Virginia, Alexander Spotswood concluded that he
"could not better reward his [Lee's] meritt than by
bestowing that imployment on his son." 12

Over twenty

years later, Henry Lee was able to succeed his brother,
Thomas, in the same post.l3
While governors had the authority to appoint naval
officers (at least until the 1740s), they normally exercised
little influence over the selection of collectors, who owed
their appointments to the Commissioners of the Customs in
England. 14

Consequently, collectors answered directly to

the surveyors general and, ultimately, to the customs
commissioners in England.

Although the latter usually acted

favorably on the recommendations of surveyors general when
it came to filling vacancies among the collectors, men such
as Edward Randolph and Robert Quary had no official say in
11 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 79, 81; Andrews, Colonial
Period of American History, IV, 197.
12 Spotswood, Letters, I, 179.
l3 Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 72.
14 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
187-88; Bergstrom,
"Merchants and Markets," 73-74.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167
the choice of naval officers.

As a result, both governors

and surveyors general sometimes expressed dissatisfaction
with the performance of local customs officials whose
assignments they had not sanctioned.

Occasionally, though,

the difficulties that royal officials on the scene
experienced with local customs agents were of their own
making.
In 1692 Edward Randolph recommended Charles Scarborough
(or Scarburgh) to replace a corrupt collector on Virginia's
Eastern Shore.

Scarborough recently had gained the surveyor

general's confidence by informing against two illegal
traders and had impressed Randolph as a person "well
acquainted wth all ye Intreagues of Interlopers." 15
Evidently, though, familiarity with the smugglers' schemes
did not guarantee zeal in their apprehension.

Barely two

years later Randolph identified Scarborough as one of a half
dozen custom officials in Virginia and Maryland who had
permitted illicit traders to clear from their districts. 16
The distinction for the most dramatic and, no doubt,
embarrassing exercise in poor character judgment belonged to
Alexander Spotswood, however.

In 1715 Spotswood used his

prerogative to fill the vacant post of naval officer with
John Holloway, a distinguished Williamsburg attorney, and "a
person," the governor confidently asserted, "for whose
15 Randolph, Letters, VII, 37B.
16 Ibid., 472-73.
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Capacity and Integrity I can very readily answer."l7

By

the end of the decade, however, Spotswood reported that
Holloway had brought suit against the government in an
"unjust Action in behalf of a notorious pirat" and had
become the governor's "implacable Enemy" for his consistent
advocacy of maritime lawbreakers. 18
Randolph and Spotswood might have consoled themselves
in the knowledge that unsatisfactory performance on the part
of colonial customs officers long predated their tenures.
In fact, English authorities had been complaining about poor
enforcement of the Navigation Acts in Virginia and the other
Chesapeake colonies throughout the second half of the
seventeenth century.

Persuaded as early as 1662 that royal

customs revenues were in no way commensurate with the amount
of tobacco annually exported from the Chesapeake, English
officials repeatedly expressed to Virginia governors the
conviction that "such abuses cannot be committed without the
apparent negligence of the collectors or their connivance
with the • • • masters of ships." 19

When the

Commissioners of the Customs advised a Maryland collector in
1696 of the passage of the Scottish act establishing a
trading company to America, they pointedly remarked that the
1 7 Spotswood, Letters, II, 1~6.
18 Ibid., II, 319, 354.
19 Leonard w. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to the
British Colonial Governors, 167~-1776 (New York, 1935), II,
#924, p. 663.
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only way the Scots might gain an advantage over their
English competitors would be through the "Contrivance and
Corruption" of colonial customs agents.20
Ultimately, however, English authorit!es held the
colonial governors responsible for the performance of the
officers under their supervision in enforcing imperial trade
regulations.

In 1667 the Commissioners of the Treasury

described wholesale customs violations which, they reported,
"his Majesty cannot but in great measure impute to the
neglect of duty in his governors of the said Plantations who
have not been so careful as they ought in debarring all
trade with such ships as have come without certificate from
England, nor in taking bond from such as are permitted to
trade from other plantations, and returning the same to the
chief officers of the Customs in London as is particularly
directed." 21

The Privy Council in 1669 and the Lords of

Trade in 1675 issued stern orders to the governors of
Virginia and Maryland to obey their instructions and be more
conscientious about preventing illicit trade.2 2
In an effort to instill a greater sense of
responsibility at the highest level of colonial

2B Md. A., XX, 34 5 •
21 CTB, II, 2B2; Andrews, Colonial Period of American
History, IV, 144-45, n. 2.
2 2 APCC, I, #827-29, pp. 499-501; Md. A., V, 45-48;
CSPC, IX~75, p. 371; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 145-47.
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administration for the suppression of illegal trade
practices, Parliament insisted that the governors pledge to
support the provisions of the Act of 1696 against illicit
commerce.

Where warnings had failed in the past, royal

authorities hoped that the threat of sanctions might
succeed.

The act stipulated that failure to take the oath

or enforce the regulations would result in forfeiture of the
governorship and a Ll000 fine.

But the legislation seems

not to have had the desired effect, at least not in the
short run.

Two years later Edward Randolph cynically

remarked that the governors took their oaths "not in
obedience to the acts of trade but to avoid the paymt of
Ll000 forfeited upon their refusall." 2 3

Instructions to

the Virginia governor in 1697 and Carolina proprietors in
1699 clearly expressed the crown's unremitting frustration
with the level of trade law enforcement in the greater
Chesapeake, charging that "very great Abuses have been and
continue still to be practiced • • • wch abuses must needs
arise from • • • the remisness or conivance of such as have
been or are Governors." 24

In fairness to the governors, many of the abuses that
continued to plague the system lay effectively beyond their

23 Randolph, Letters, V, 189; CSPC, XVI, #769, p. 402;
Andrews, Colonial Period of American-History, IV, 162.
24 Md. A., XXIII, 91; CRNC, I, 504.
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control.

Geography, dispersed settlement patterns,

insufficient administrative resources, and local opposition
throughout the greater Chesapeake all conspired against
effective trade law enforcement, leading Virginia governor
William Gooch to conclude in 1739 that "For preventing
Illegal trade the only methods that are or can be used is
the diligence of the naval officers and collectors." 25
Due to a combination of ineptitude, indolence, neglect, and
purposeful malfeasance, however, such diligence was not
always practiced.
Some of the customs agents' shortcomings may be
attributed to simple carelessness, laziness, or
incompetence, deficiencies which royal officials on the
scene tended to regard as relatively innocuous compared with
the more venal behavior that some collectors and naval
officers displayed.

Commenting on a Maryland customs

agent's signing off on forged certificates, Edward Randolph
explained the oversight as a result of the man's being
"honest though ignorant." 26

In 1699 Virginia governor

Nicholson criticized the general laxity of customs officials
only mildly with the observation that "As for the management
of their offices I think they have not taken much pains in
going on board and visiting ships at their corning in and

25 "Gooch Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board
of Trade, July 23, 1739; Flippin, William Gooch, 14.
2 6 CSPC, XIII, 12295, pp. 657-58.
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clearing." 27

Robert Quary's investigation of the Maryland

customs service in

17~3

revealed "several! mistakes,

neglects and omissions" concerning which local officials
promised to be "more diligent and careful for ye
future." 28

And when Governor Spotswood proposed to the

Commissioners of the Customs in 1711 the appointment of an
additional customs agent he contended that "without such an
Officer, or a greater Diligence in the Collectors, I cannot
see how illegal Trade can be prevented • • • especially in
that Lower District of James River, where the weakness, as
well as the negligence of the Collector gives too great
encouragement to practise upon him." 29
Often the distinction between simple negligence and
active corruption is as difficult for modern analysts to
discern as it was for royal officials to establish.
for example, Thomas Miller alleged in

168~

When,

that the former

collector, a Mr. Birde, had "suffred many Vessells to goe
away wthout paieing ye Kings duty," it is impossible to
know, without further explanation, what role Birde actually
played in those instances of customs fraud. 3 ~

Clearly,

there were times when loyal crown agents could not determine
the extent to which local officials were responsible for
27 Ibid., XVII, #579, p. 312.
28 Ibid., XXI, #115~ ii, p. 737.
29 Spotswood, Letters, I, 76.
3

~ CRNC, I, 265.
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customs violations known to have occurred in their
districts.

Even Edward Randolph sometimes had trouble

distinguishing between "The Ignorance remissions or
Connivance of the Collectors" as the cause of their failing
to recognize counterfeit certificates; taking security from
"persons of Small or no Estates;" permitting ships "to load
in any River or Creek 50 or 100 Miles distant from their
Offices;" allowing Scottish and Irish vessels to trade in
the colonies; failing to prosecute shipmasters upon
forfeiture of their bonds; accepting bribes; and charging
inflated or unauthorized fees. 31

On other occasions royal

officials lacked the hard evidence to confirm what they
strongly suspected.

Unable to prove what he firmly believed

was a case of bribery involving a Virginia collector,
Governor Spotswood had to content himself with rhetorically
asking crown authorities "whether any interpretation" could
excuse the customs agent from, at the very least, "the
Accusation of Supine Negligence."3 2
One chronic subject of complaint in which the motives
of the perpetrators were frequently called into question
concerned the inability or unwillingness of collectors to
maintain adequate records or, in some cases, their refusal
to produce any accounts whatsoever.

Having requested to

review the books of Patuxent River district collector George
31 Randolph, Letters, V, 117-19.
32 Spotswood, Letters, II, 105.
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Plater in 1692, Edward Randolph was shown "a foul entry of
some vessels made with him • • • , but in no regular
method." 33

The same year Randolph encountered reluctance

on the part of collector Nehemiah Blakiston to allow the
surveyor general to examine the account books for the North
Potomac district. 34

When Randolph finally did gain access

to Blakiston's papers, he found them "all in as great
confusion as you can think of."

The collector had provided

"no account of any money due to their Maties nor," according
to Randolph, had he done so "for many years."3 5
Although Blakiston certainly had given the appearance
of doing his best to uphold the royal prerogative against
the intrigues of Lord Baltimore's supporters in the
aftermath of the Rousby affair, the collector's own
performance failed to withstand the scrutiny of other royal
watchdogs.

Further investigation revealed that Blakiston

had been in arrears to the king for all the Plantation
Duties he had collected for the previous seven years,
amounting to over Llaaa. 36

Ironically, it was Blakiston

who had taken it upon himself to inform crown officials in
1685 that the king was losing thousands of pounds of customs

3 3 CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 657.
34 Randolph, Letters, VII, 357.
35 Ibid., 397.
3 6 Ibid., 424, 448, 457, 466; CSPC, XIV, #1511, p. 399;
Hall, Edward Randolph, 149.
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revenue annually due to the "obstruction and confusion of
his affairs" in Maryland.37
By 1694 English merchants trading to Virginia and
Maryland had become so skeptical of the abilities and
integrity of Chesapeake collectors in general that they
convinced royal authorities to order colonial governors to
hire "skilful commanders" to inspect the books of local
collectors as well as cruise against contraband trade. 38
But even that initiative failed to solve the problem.

In

1699 the collector for the Lower James River district
reported that he had been unable to obtain the books and
papers belonging to his office from his predecessors. 39
And, in addition to the questionable performance of those
responsible for the collection of the two shilling per
hogshead duty, contemporary Virginia chroniclers Henry
Hartwell, James Blair, and Edward Chilton reported in 1697
that "The Collectors of the Penny per Pound likewise are
very remiss in laying their Accompts before the Governors of
the College • • • so that illegal Trade is carry'd on, and

3 7 CSPC, XIV, #lees I, p. 279, ill39 I, p. 3e8, #lSle,
p. 399.
38 Ibid., XII, #136, p. 31.
39 Ibid., XVII, #242, p. 293.
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some of these Gentlemen refuse to give any account upon
Oath." 40
Such difficulties were symptomatic of a problem which
appears to have been endemic to the colony's administration.
In 1698 Benjamin Harrison reported, with specific reference
to the collection of customs revenues, that "All the public
accounts • • • are kept very secret from the sight of
everybody but themselves, so that it must be an
extraordinary accident if any abuses are discovered." 41
Similar accounting irregularities continued to be a source
of consternation for royal officials in the next century.
When Governor Spotswood attempted to satisfy the Virginia
Assembly in 1712 that the revenues from the two shilling per
hogshead duty had fallen short of government expenditures,
he discovered that "no such Books had been kept thereof as
were proper to be delivered to the House of Burgesses for
their Inspection." 42

And when the governor tried to

institute measures to redress the inadequacy of the existing
record keeping system, he "perceived the officers of the
Revenue to be so utterly averse to alterations, and so
tenacious of their dark and idle method of keeping
Accompts," that he considered "any further Reform to be a
4 0 Henry Hartwell, James Blair, and Edward Chilton, The
Present State of Virginia, and the College, Hunter D.
Farish, ed. (Williamsburg, Virginia, 1940), 71-72.
41 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 331.
4 2 Spotswood, Letters, II, 176-77.
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Work too difficult" for him to undertake solely on the
strength of his own authority.43
Although royal officials did not always say so
explicitly, such instances of manifest incompetence and lack
of cooperation on the part of colonial customs agents
invariably raised suspicions of more intentional wrongdoing.
In 1693 customs agents in Barbados complained to the
Commissioners of the Customs that vessels arriving with
cargoes of tobacco from Maryland and Virginia were producing
certificates which recorded the number, but not the weight,
of hogsheads and parcels for which payment of the penny per
pound duty had been made, "thereby rendring the said
Officers incapable to Discover any fraud • • • in the short
payment of the said •

Duty."

In this instance, the

commissioners declined to speculate on the motives of the
collectors involved, opting instead to instruct the governor
of Maryland to insure that customs officials not certify any
greater quantity of tobacco than that for which the duty had
first been paid and to make certain that the certificates
indicated not only the number of hogsheads, but also "the
exact Weight thereof."44
Royal officials like Randolph, Nicholson, and Spotswood
understood that innocent bookkeeping errors might explain
critical omissions or discrepancies between two accounts of
43 Ibid., II, 179-80.
44 Md. A., XX, 125.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
the same transaction, but conscientious crown agents also
realized that such mistakes could be used to disguise, or
provide convenient alibis for, intentional customs fraud.

A

crown official's willingness to accept such miscues as
honest errors often depended on the past performance of the
customs agent in question.

A mistake considered in the

context of numerous other allegations of impropriety on the
part of the same collector or naval officer was certain to
raise suspicion.
Thus when Edward Randolph detected a discrepancy
between Nehemiah Blakiston's account indicating that he had
collected the king's duty on 18 hogsheads of tobacco and
another official's list showing that the duty had been paid
on

8~,

the surveyor general was not inclined to attribute

the disparity to a simple oversight. 45

Similarly,

Alexander Spotswood refused to accept lower James River
district collector Richard's Fitzwilliam's accounting of the
tobacco duty revenues in 1719 not just because it was "only
Gen'll as to the Quantity of Tobacco

Expor~ed

in each

Vessel, without Specifying the Marks, Numbers, and Contents
of each Cask, as is Customary w'th the other Officers," but
also because the governor had "some Intimation" that
Fitzwilliam might not provide him with a "true Acco't,
having made some former Discovery of other irregular

45 Randolph, Letters, V, 232.
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practices in the Execution of his Office."46
Acknowledging that bookkeeping inaccuracies did not always
signify "wilful Errors," Spotswood nevertheless insisted
that Fitzwilliam's behavior could be viewed as "no other
than a designed fraud." 4 7
Unfortunately, as far as English authorities and
sometimes even the colonists were concerned, colonial
customs officials did not confine their indiscretions to
manipulating account ledgers.

Investigations of charges of

impropriety not infrequently uncovered evidence of rampant
corruption and abuse of power as well.

In 168e twelve North

Carolinians gave depositions to the effect that Robert
Houlden, the crown-appointed collector sent to restore order
to the,king's customs in the aftermath of the Culpeper
Rebellion, had committed a variety of offenses related to
the embezzlement of government property.

The most serious

infraction from the standpoint of the colony's security (and
the one which appears to have given rise to many of the
others) was Houlden's conversion "to his owne use" of a
major portion of the colony's store of powder and shot with
the result "that when the Cuntrey was in feare of a warr
with the Indians there was noe ammunition • • • to be gott
out of the Magazine."48
46 Spotswood, Letters, II, 326.
47 Ibid., 328.
48 NCHCR, 1697-17el, 417.
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Houlden then took possession and authorized the
shipment of several hogsheads of tobacco containing "much
bryers grasse and weeds • • • and much Rottennesse," causing
one deponent to wonder "what a Devil! made Mr. Holden send
this rotten tobacco for • • • the King."49

The answer, of

course, was that the collector was trying to make up for the
deficiency of customs revenues that he was skimming and
repay the private supplier of the powder and shot.

In the

furtherance of these ends as well as the general fattening
of his own pocketbook, Houlden paid no customs at all on at
least one shipment of his own tobacco (amounting to over
8,000 pounds) while, at the same time, requiring other
planters and shippers to pay an exorbitant duty of two
pounds of tobacco for every pound shipped. 50
Those whom Houlden suspected of interfering with his
operation he imprisoned, without bail, in close quarters
where they were "forced to Eat drink lye and ease Nature"
until, according to one deponent, they "were almost poysoned
with the Noysom sent of our owne Excrements." 51

To keep

them in jail Houlden successfully intimidated members of the
grand jury into finding the defendants guilty despite a
complete absence of incriminating evidence. 52

When the

49 Ibid., 416, 418.
50 Ibid., 417-19.
51 Ibid., 420.
52 I bid., 421, 423.
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authorities finally caught up with the predatory collector
and took him into custody, Houlden, apparently fearing
further revelations of wrongdoing, instructed a confederate
to reinscribe with the British broad arrow six barrels of
salt pork that the revenue agent previously had appropriated
for himself. 53
Among cases of rapacity by customs officials Houlden's
is exceptional only in terms of the utterly brazen character
of his abuse of authority, the disastrous result of a
virtually unrestricted latitude in action which probably
could not have occurred under circumstances less chaotic
than those which prevailed in North Carolina in the late
167~s.

But customs officials in more settled times and

better regulated colonies still managed to make the most of
their more limited opportunities.

In 1688 fellow colonists

became so disaffected with the behavior of John Custis, the
collector for Virginia's Eastern Shore, that the House of
Burgesses' Committee of Propositions and Grievances charged
him with "extorting • • • unjust & unreasonable fees from
Masters Merchants and traders there to the great decay of
their trade & discouragmt of Navigation."

So injurious was

Custis' avarice to the commerce of the region that,
according to the committee's complaint, "Masters and

53 Ibid., 414.
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Merchants who formrly traded in those parts have wholly
deserted the place."54
What punitive measures the burgesses undertook, if any,
are not recorded, but they could not have been very severe
because by 1692 Custis not only retained the office of
collector, but also had become the naval officer for his
district. 55

At that time the Council of Virginia

reprimanded him for allowing a ship to conduct illegal
trade, disobeying the council's direct order not to clear
the vessel, and for "tampering with and Endeavouring to
discourage the Evidences" against the illicit trader. 56
Edward Randolph added that, far from being an atypical case,
the customs agent had abused his charge repeatedly,

54 JHB, 1659/60-1693, p. 314.
55 EJC, I, 223.
56 Ibid., 227; CSPC, XIII, i2199, p. 629. A peculiar
series of events preceded these latest allegations. On
April 15 the council considered Custis's petition to be
relieved from his various official duties on account of age
and infirmity. Responding to Governor Nicholson's
solicitation of advice in the matter, members of the council
offered their opinion, completely disregarding the custom
agent's tarnished performance record, that "the said Custis
had all along faithfully and diligently discharged his Duty
in the Several! • • • Offices he had been Honord with."
Council minutes for the following day indicate that a bond
was then prepared "to save the • • • Govr harmless from any
damage should accrue to him by reason of his appointing the
said Custis Naval! officer and Collectr of their Mas
Customes at the Eastern Shore" (EJC, I, 222-23). At the
next meeting of the executive body on April 26, governor and
council considered the tampering and collusion charges
which, despite the unqualified commendation of Custis barely
ten days earlier, the colonial officials seemed unanimously
inclined to believe (Ibid., 227).
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permitting anyone, "even pyrates," to trade in his district
provided that they paid his "Unreasonable fees." 57

When

Custis refused to appear before the council to answer the
charges against him, he was suspended from all his offices,
both "Civil and Military," but there is no indication that
he ever was required to serve jail time or pay any fines for
his transgressions. 5 8
Custis was hardly the only customs officer in the
region to abuse his authority in the waning years of the
seventeenth century.

In 1692 Edward Randolph sarcastically

referred to "upright Nehemiah Blackstone [Blakiston],"
collector for the North Potomac district in Maryland, who,
the surveyor general charged, was "used to squeeze what he
pleases out of the Masters." 59

Five years later the

Council of Maryland decreed that Major John Thompson, naval
officer of Cecil County, "be dismist from further Acting in
that Station, Complaints being made of Several!
Irregularities by him committed • • • to the great damage
and injury of Several! persons therein concerned." 6 ~
Typically, though Thompson was no longer permitted to enter
or clear ships, he still collected the ten percent duty on

57 CSPC, XIII, #2295, p. 656; Randolph, Letters, VII,
367-68.
58 EJC, I, 247-48; CSPC, XIII, #2284, p. 654.
5 9 Randolph, Letters, VII, 378.
6

~ Md. A., XXIII, 166, 255-56.
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European goods transported overland to Pennsylvania and was
allowed to retain his position as a provincial judge.61
In 1698 Benjamin Harrison identified the "exorbitant fees"
charged by customs officers as one of the principal
impediments to the profitable conduct of trade in
Virginia. 62

The following year the Virginia assembly,

responding to complaints that naval officers were exacting
fees up to two and a half times more than those permitted by
law, passed legislation requiring the customs officials to
post their legally authorized rates. 63
Similar infractions continued to be recorded from time
to time in the next century.

In 1705 a large group of

Eastern Shore residents and merchants submitted a petition
to Virginia authorities complaining about having to pay an
unwarranted fee due to "ye Avarice & Illegal, and Oppressive
Practices, of Some officers • • • who have Extorted Itt from
Sundry Inhabitants and Traders from Maryland." 64

Two

years earlier Robert Quary had reported disparagingly of
David Kennedy, "Collector of Potomock District" in Maryland,
that absence without leave was "the least part" of his

61 Ibid., 256, 257, 258.
6 2 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 332.
63 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of
Virginia, 34-35; Hening, Statutes, III, 195-97; Flippin,
Financial Administration of Virginia, 32; Gill, "The Naval
Office in Virginia," 22.
64 VMHB, XVI, 74.
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alleged misconduct, "for the crime laid to his charge is no
less than forgery and cheat." 65

In the same dispatch to

English customs authorities, the surveyor general portrayed
George Luke, collector for the lower James River district,
as having "lived so scandalously" in Virginia as to make
himself "ye scorn and contempt of ye meanest in this
country."

Luke was absent at the time, having "left ye

office in

confusion" when he departed for England

without Governor Nicholson's permission.

Quary's

examination of the district's account books led him to
declare that he "never saw anything more irregular and
confused." 66
Although Quary could hardly have condemned Luke in
stronger terms, whatever damage he caused to the local
agent's reputation evidently had little impact on his
career.

In 1711 Luke was still serving in the same capacity

when Governor Spotswood informed the Commissioners of the
Customs that he could not be held responsible for trade law
enforcement in the Lower James River district as long as
Luke continued to serve as collector there.

At first the

governor believed that "the many miscarriages" which had
occurred in the district, including Luke's allowing vessels
to clear without giving bond or paying customs, were simply
due to the collector's "incapacity and negligence."
65 CSPC, XXI, #1150 ii, p. 737.
66 Ibid., p. 738.
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Spotswood began to suspect that a more self-serving motive
was involved when Luke harassed a fair trader, insisting
"very sturdily to have the Ship brought to a Tryal" while,
at the same time, according to the shipmaster, having the
"cuning to propose ways and means to discharge the Ship
without it, if the Master had consented." 67
Five months later Spotswood informed the commissioners
that, although Luke had received more than L2BB of the penny
per pound duty over the course of the year, he could not pay
"one farthing when the College Receiver demanded it • • •
besides a considerable Arier in his former accounts, which
they are never like to receive." 68

The last straw for

Spotswood came in 1715 when Luke deliberately disregarded
the governor's orders strictly limiting the sale of cargo
from a French ship which had put into a Virginia port for
repairs.

Informing royal customs officials of Luke's

suspension, Spotswood intimated that the collector had been
paid off and that his refusal to take an oath in
vice-admiralty court in his own defense "must occasion
shrewd suspicions of his Integrity." 69
Unfortunately for the governor, his troubles with the
lower James district did not end with Luke's dismissal in

6 7 Spotswood, Letters, I, 77.
68 ~., I, 113.
6 9 Ibid., II, 195; CSPC, XXVIII, #329, p. 139; #483 i,
p. 211.
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1715.

Four years later Spotswood concluded that, much like

Luke, collector Richard Fitzwilliam was a "greater disturber
of fair Traders than a discourager of illegal ones."
Suspicious of Fitzwilliam's lack of precision in reporting
customs revenues and his refusal, upon request, to submit a
more detailed record, Spotswood alleged that on at least two
occasions the collector had, "according to his own Acco't,
sunk in his own pocket" duties paid on a combined total of
over 2400 pounds of tobacco.

The governor further charged

that, in the case of a naval officer's seizure of a vessel
for violating the trade laws, Fitzwilliam had opposed the
crown's interest out of sheer spite.

Upon learning that, as

collector, he would not be entitled to a percentage of the
proceeds of the condemnation, Fitzwilliam "took upon him the
Office of an Evidence against the King, and without being
called offered his testimony to clear that Vessel." 70
The catalog of alleged improprieties continued.
Spotswood additionally accused the customs agent of
underhanded dealings in granting the purser of the royal
warship Pearl a "Bill of Store," prohibited by the Acts of
Trade for enumerated commodities, to buy a shipment of
Fitzwilliam's own tobacco without paying any customs fees.
In exchange for the duty-free purchase, the purser agreed to
buy the tobacco, according to the governor, "at a higher

70 Spotswood, Letters, II, 327-28.
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price than was then commonly Sold." 71

If the allegation

was true, it would seem particularly ironic that
Fitzwilliam, who allegedly dealt with Blackbeard also, was
involved simultaneously in a contraband trade which used as
its vehicle the ship whose crew was responsible for the
pirate's destruction.

What is even more startling (and,

ultimately, revealing) about Fitzwilliam's case is that,
despite Spotswood's long list of charges and the governor's
claim that "all the Neighboring People in that District
murmur exceedingly at the unnecessary trouble and vexation
he gives them," the opportunistic collector not only
retained his post but went on to become surveyor general of
the customs for the southern colonies and eventually
governor of the Bahamas.7 2
Although Fitzwilliam's purported association with
freebooters does not appear to have affected his
professional standing, pirates, or at least the mishandling
of pirate loot, may have figured in the downfall of another
Virginia customs official.

Henry Irwin was a naval officer

for the lower James River district who "had at sundry times
received considerable sums of money" which represented the
confiscated booty of pirates captured in Virginia in 1719.
By 1721, according to Elizabeth City County records, Irwin

71 Ibid., 328.
72 Ibid.; Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,
IV, 202 n:-J.
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stood "indebted to the King in the sum of 450L • • • for so
much of the said piratical effects by him received & yet
unpaid & unsatisfied." 73

The naval officer did convey to

the king as payment the deed for several lots he owned in
Hampton, but his reputation for honesty, or at least prudent
fiscal management, appears to have suffered irreparable
damage.

At a council meeting in 1726 the governor announced

that Irwin had been discharged from his customs post because
"no man would be bound for him."74
Cupidity on the part of customs agents and other
government officials in the maritime sphere continued to
afflict the colonial administrative system of the region in
the succeeding decades.

Wartime privateering, which

traditionally had not been pursued in the greater Chesapeake
for lack of ships and ready capital, was further discouraged
during the War of Jenkins' Ear by prize commissioners who
sought to exploit the situation for their own economic
benefit.

In 1739 William Byrd II wrote to British minister

Robert Walpole that enterprising privateersmen from Virginia
had been "plagued with a vexatious attendance and most

73 VMHB, X, 216.
74 Ibid.; EJC, IV, 99.
Irwin was appointed nava 1
officer of the lower James district in 1716 to succeed John
Holloway (EJC, III, 428).
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exorbitant Fees to the Vultures which hovered for prey about
the Office." 75
While the phenomenon of greedy prize commissioners
might be dismissed as indicative of nothing more than the
predictable emergence of wartime profiteering, additional
reports of avidity on the part of customs and other
regulatory authorities suggest a continuing pattern of
official corruption in the maritime commercial sphere of the
greater Chesapeake.

In 1730 North Carolina advocate general

Richard Everard brought a series of suits against

Jot~

Lovick, former deputy secretary of the province, for
Lovick's alleged failure to account for proceeds from the
sales of four ships condemned for contraband trafficking and
other trade law violations.

Everard charged that Lovick,

who had acted in each case either as the presiding judge or
the agent in charge of the sale, could not produce the
missing revenues because he had "Appropriated, and
converted the same to his own Use & Benefit." 76

75 VMHB, XXXVI, 357; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 456, n.
16.
7 6 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 23, 24, 26, and
27.
The suits against Lovick are also noteworthy because
they appear to contain the only references to the trade law
violations that are mentioned therein. Had it not been for
Lovick's indiscretions, these cases may never have come to
light, suggesting that even in colonies and for periods
where records have been preserved, the actual number of
cases involving illicit trade may far exceed the number that
have been documented.
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Two years later the North Carolina vice-admiralty court
ordered collector and former vice-admiralty court judge
Samuel Swann to give an account of a piragua he had seized
for illegally exporting enumerated goods.77

Although

nearly a year had elapsed since the seizure, Swann had
failed to initiate any condemnation or prosecution
procedures and, on the contrary, the court charged, had
employed the vessel in his own service. 78

Despite the

issuance of several subpoenas, Swann refused to appear
before the tribunal.

Instead he attempted to transfer

jurisdiction in the case from the vice-admiralty court to
the general court where he undoubtedly expected a more
sympathetic hearing, apparently with more than the usual
good reason. 79

Vice-admiralty court records indicate that

the colony's advocate general, the man most likely to handle
any government proceedings against Swann in the general
court, not only was aware of the collector's misconduct, but
had purposely neglected it, and in fact had refused to
prosecute the case.80
Even before the specific allegations of Swann's
malfeasance surfaced, colonial authorities had grown uneasy

77 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 43; CRNC, II, 766;
Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, rv;-209 n. 1.
78 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 1 4 2, doc. no. 4 5 •
7 9 Ibid., doc. nos. 45, 50, 51.
80 Ibid., doc. no. 47.
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about reports of more widespread impropriety on the part of
customs officers.

In 1731 the North Carolina Lower House

resolved to ask the governor to issue a proclamation
"strictly forbidding all officers to take larger Fees than
is by Law appointed." 81

What prompted the request were

"Complaints made in most parts of this Province" that the
extortionate behavior of local customs officials had
resulted in "the great Discouragement of the Trade • • • and
the Oppression of the People."82
Specifically, the assemblymen charged that collectors
"in General do demand take and receive from the Inhabitants
and Masters of Vessells • • • Four times more than the Fees
appointed by the Laws of this Province." 83

Abuse of the

established fee structure was cited again in 1746 when the
North Carolina Committee of Propositions and Grievances
reported that customs officials "under the colour of their
Office," had exacted "new Fees not warranted by Law, & • • •
extorted greater Fees than allowed by Law."

As was the case

81 CRNC, III, vii-viii.
82 Ibid., vii-viii, 262, 267, 269. The alleged abuses
of a vice-admiralty judge in this regard also may have been
instrumental in persuading North Carolina legislators to
initiate some remedial action at this particular time. As
part of his running legal battle with Edmond Porter in 1731,
William Little complained that "altho the admiralty fees are
here stated by Law and verry high too," the vice-admiralty
judge nevertheless "Arbitrarily asumed to Impose what costs
he pleases and hath Constantly Done it in a very Exorbitant
manner" (CRNC, III, 231-32).
83 CRNC, III, vii-viii, 262.
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fifteen years earlier, the legislators' concern stemmed from
the conviction that such infractions were neither isolated
nor petty, but constituted a general "Oppression of the
subjects and a very great grievance." 8 4
Allegations of official misconduct in regulating the
maritime commerce of the Chesapeake were not restricted to
the British customs service per se.

The establishment of

the tobacco inspection system in Virginia in 1730 spawned
complaints about a new form of official corruption, namely,
discrimination in judging which or, more accurately, whose
tobacco was fit for export. 85

Several planters reportedly

were "ready to strike" Corotoman inspector Joseph Carter in
1732 for what they considered "very Partial and unjust"
conduct, the examiner allegedly having "passed very bad
Tobacco for some people" while condemning the good tobacco
of others to be destroyed. 86

Unhappy residents of

Caroline County raised similar objections in 1742 when they
accused inspector William Alcocke of being "guilty of
Partiality" in passing one man's tobacco "when he refused to
pass the same sort" for another. 87

84 Ibid., IV, 824.
85 EJC, IV, 305-43; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act,"
67, 103-04.
8 6 ~' I, 218-19.
8 7 Ibid., 236.
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The Council of Virginia, as it turned out, dismissed
the charges against Carter as groundless, a ruling which
could be construed to signify simply that the operation of
any inspection system involving a degree of subjective
judgment in maintaining a prescribed, but necessarily
inexact, standard was bound to result in unfounded
complaints of bias or poor discretion. 88

On the other

hand, the fact that eighteen inspectors were discharged for
"Misbehavior" and "Neglect of Duty" in less than two months
toward the end of 1733 (as well as others in succeeding
years) has been viewed as an indication that wealthy
planters were attempting to exercise an undue influence on
the inspectors at the expense of their poorer
counterparts.89

In an effort to discourage such behavior,

the Virginia assembly passed legislation in 1738 preventing
tobacco inspectors from serving as collectors of any public
levies and an additional statute in 1742 forbidding
inspectors to accept any gift or gratuity apart from their

salaries. 9 ~

The customs agents guilty of corruption in the
instances of official impropriety cited thus far all shared
88 EJC, IV, 287-88, 293.
89 Ibid., 307-08, 310-11, 315, 335, 338, 426, 431, 436,
437; Hor~"Tobacco Inspection Act," 67.

~ Hening, Statutes,
Gooch, 22.
9

v,

11, 151; Flippin, William
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two characteristics 1n common: a determination to exploit
the system, whether conceived in London or the Chesapeake,
and a willingness to extort or otherwise abuse merchants and
fellow colonists in the process.

In many cases they also

displayed an arrogant and blatant disregard for the ability
of local authorities to discipline them.

But not all the

corruption of colonial customs officials was practiced so
overtly or at other colonists' direct expense.

In fact,

most customs fraud in which collectors and naval officers
knowingly participated seems to have been conducted for the
mutual benefit of revenue officials and colonists or
shippers alike.

The fact that few specific instances of

cooperative, bilateral corruption were documented should be
viewed not as an indication that such collusion was
practiced less regularly, but rather that many more people
stood to gain than lose by its perpetuation and concealment.
Clearly, had it not been for the indiscretion of greedy,
exclusively self-indulgent customs agents in alienating
traders and local residents and openly defying lawful
authority, it is unlikely that most of these cases of
official corruption would ever have come to light.
Collusion with collectors and naval officers offered
colonists and shipmasters certain advantages over other
forms of smuggling and customs fraud.

Although forging

certificates and cocquets, loading vessels after clearing,
and complete evasion of customs authorities were all
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effective ways to beat or circumvent the system, they also
had certain drawbacks.

Counterfeit papers and contraband

cargo were liable to detection and there was always the
possibility, however remote, that clandestine loading might
be discovered by a royal guardship, either through direct
observation or by means of an informer.

Of equal or perhaps

greater concern was the inconvenience and expense associated
with the acquisition of false papers, the concealment of
smuggled goods, and having to load a vessel twice and in
secret.

How much simpler and less risky the operation could

be for potential trade law violators if they could gain the
cooperation of the local naval officer and collector
(particularly if those posts were held by the same
individual, as they often were before 1700) by means of a
suitable inducement.
In 1691 deponent John Twitt testified that Maryland
collectors had permitted the shipment of L3000 worth of
goods directly from Holland, presumably, according to local
speculation, as a result of having been suborned. 91

Seven

years later Benjamin Harrison charged that Rappahannock
district collector Ralph Wormeley had "used his interests"
as well as "ill language and menaces" to secure the release
of two vessels seized for lack of proper papers, arousing
popular suspicion that "the ships had been let go for

91 CSPC, XIII, #1951, p. 578.
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bribes." 92

Governor Spotswood levelled similar charges

against collector George Luke in 1714 in connection with the
disposition of goods from a disabled French ship. 9 3

In

1731 a North Carolina deponent reported that a local
collector had seized a cargo of imported goods for which the
ship's captain could produce no coquets, but "told the
master he would pass the matter by for a piece of
Calico." 94

These, however, represent practically the only

alleged instances of direct cash or commodity payments to
customs officials in exchange for extralegal services.
Proven, documented examples are even rarer.

And yet,

Virginia authorities considered the problem serious enough
to warrant the passage of legislation in 1726 and again in
1732 stipulating that collectors who accepted bribes and
shipmasters who offered them would be fined Ll00 each. 95
What concerned colonial authorities probably was not so
much the occasional unauthorized release of a seizure or the
even rarer occurrence of illicit cargo disposition from an
incapacitated foreign ship, but the practice of less
conspicuous collusion on a more regular basis.

One form

that such collusion commonly took, according to Edward

92 Ibid., XVI, #656, p. 332.
9 3 Spotswood, Letters, II, 105.
9 4 CRNC, III, 227.
95 Hening, Statutes, V, 146, 313-14; Flippin, Financial
Administration of Virginia, 46.
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Randolph, was that collectors who were also great planters
routinely offered shipmasters a sizable discount on tobacco
duties provided that the captains agreed to purchase their
entire lading from the customs agents. 96

The collectors

then could effect the transaction either by remitting part
of their share of the duties or by overlooking the shippers'
bookkeeping chicanery, "Sometymes," as Randolph indicated,
"Coniveing at their short Entryes." 97
Much of this type of customs fraud stemmed from the
fact that collectors and naval officers frequently had a
significant personal interest in the commerce that they were
supposed to be regulating, a situation which some crown
officials regarded as inherently and profoundly injurious to
the royal interest.

Maryland governor Nicholson, for

instance, considered customs officials "being great traders
• • • to be one of the great causes of illegal trade." 98
Although royal instructions to the governors from 17ee on
stipulated that "persons much concerned in trade" not be
permitted to serve as collectors, some venal customs agents
nonetheless sought to use their positions to gain a

96 ~' XVIII, t9e6, p. 634; Randolph, Letters,
232.
97 Randolph, Letters, V, 232.
98 CSPC, XV, ill78, p. 548.
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competitive commercial edge over fellow merchants and
planters. 99
In 1711 Governor Spotswood removed naval officer Gawin
Corbin from office for "no less an offence than forging the
• • • Queen's letter," a crown exemption from the
requirement to sail with an authorized convoy during
wartime, in order to clear a vessel of which he was a part
owner.lee

The advantage Corbin hoped to gain,

presumably, was to insure that his ship would reach the
English market before the rest of the Chesapeake tobacco
fleet and thereby be in a position to command a better price
than his competitors.

A similar situation developed in 1717

when eleven merchants complained to the Board of Trade that
"contrary to the regulations forbidding officers of the
Customs to trade, frieght or own ships," Daniel McCarty,
collector for the South Potomac district, was a "very great
Trader not only for his own Acct but also

• factor for •

• • others" much to the detriment of rival business
interests who were "sure • • • to be discourag'd harass'd
hinder'd & embarrassed by him whose Commission affords him a
pretext • • • for his many unwarrantable Practices." 1 ~ 1
99 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
197, 2~8 n. 3.
l~e CSPC, xxx, #S~e, p. 429; Spotswood, Letters, I, 78;
EJC, III, 269, 276; Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets,"
58-59; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 61 n. 87.

1~1 C05/1318, pp. 91, 92; CSPC, XXIX, #643, p. 341;
Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 61-n:-84.
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The obvious conflict of interest represented by customs
officials' personal involvement in the commercial affairs
that they were empowered to oversee was compounded by the
phenomenon of plural officeholding.

As Edward Randolph

reported in 1695, some collectors were also "Traders having
Offices of Trust and profit in the Government."l02
Virtually unrestricted for almost the entire seventeenth
century, the ability of privileged individuals to gain
additional wealth and power through the acquisition of
public offices fostered the creation of what one historian
has described as an "impregnable defense of
corruption." 103

Contemporary observer Benjamin Harrison

characterized the situation as one in which "the self same
men, who have been naval officers to enter and clear ships
and collectors to receive the public duties, have likewise
hitherto been the Council of State to pass their own

102 Randolph, Letters, V, 117.
10 3 Hall, Edward Randolph, 148. For an alternative
view see Bergstrom, "Markets and Merchants," chapter 3 and
pages 60-61 and 91 in particular, which portrays Virginia's
plural officeholding naval officers as models of official
behavior who performed their duties "conscientiously,
honestly and faithfully," and took "just rewards, but no
more" for their services. Bergstrom's assessment tends to
disregard the documented or alleged malfeasance of John
Custis, Gawin Corbin, and Ralph Wormeley; overlooks the many
complaints that Virginia's naval officers were charging
grossly excessive fees; and runs counter to the conviction
of England's Lord Justices in 1698 that naval officers had
"generally neglected to comply with the • • • Act • • • for
preventing frauds & regulating Abuses in ye Plantation
Trade."
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accounts and to advise the disposal of the money."l~4
Edward Randolph went so far as to charge that "the
Collectors places in virginnia" constituted little more than
"perquisites • • • intended to enrich ye members of ye
Council!" and functioned only secondarily "to secure their
Maties Revennue." 1 ~ 5
Toward the end of the century others began to criticize
the privileged status of the councilors under the existing
arrangement and a movement to reform the system gained
momentum.

In 1697 Maryland governor Nicholson suggested to

English authorities that "Collectors and Naval Officers be
distinct persons, so that they may be a check upon each
other, and that neither of them be public traders." 106
The following year the Board of Trade advised the Lords
Justices of England that "The Collectors and Naval Officers
have for years past been the same persons, and for the most
part Councillors, doing their business principally through
unsworn deputies and rendering their accounts to the
Council, which is to themselves.

The evils of this are

evident and complaints have not been wanting." 1 ~ 7
Finally, in 1699 royal instructions to the governors

1~ 4 CSPC, XVI, 1656, p. 33~.

1~5 Randolph, Letters, VII, 351.
1~6 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 548.
1

~ 7 Ibid., XVI, 1767, p. 4~1.
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expressly forbade councilors from holding the offices of
collector or naval officer.l08
The next year Miles Cary, register of the
vice-admiralty court, submitted what appears to have been an
unprecedented petition to the Council of Virginia.

Having

recently been appointed naval officer of the York River and
considering that it was not "suitable yt one and ye same
person should be obliged to seize Ships and Vessells for
Illegal traders and be a Party in ye tryall of them," Cary
requested that he be discharged from the office of
register. 109

Cary's offer to relinquish his office in

the vice-admiralty court (which the recent royal directives
did not require explicitly) points up the fact that customs
officials not only enjoyed positions in the executive and
legislative branches of colonial government, but in the
judiciary as well.

And while Cary's influence as register

probably was relatively insignificant, those privileged to
serve as judges not only decided the outcome of individual
cases, but essentially determined the course of trade law
enforcement in their colony.
The potential for abuse under such circumstances was
manifest.

As Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton observed, "The

multitude of Places held by the Council, occasions great
108 Ibid., XVII, #579, p. 312; JHB, 1698-99, p. 185;
Hartwel1,-aTair, and Chilton, Presen~tate of Virginia, 59.
109 EJC, II, 126; CSPC, XVIII, #1055, p. 766; Reese,
ed., Virginia Vice-Admiralty Court, 57.
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Confusion, especially in such things wherein the Places are
incompatible: As when their Collectors Office obliges them
to inform their Judges Office against an unfree Bottom; or
when their Honours, as Counsellors, sit upon and pass their
own Accounts, as Collectors." 110

Even that description

did not define the full extent of their influence, Benjamin
Harrison maintained, but "the same men also constitute the
Supreme Court of Judicature in all causes whatsoever, so
that there is no relief against any judgment they choose to
give."lll
Predictably, the decisions these men made as councilors
and jurists tended to favor their own interests,
individually and collectively.

bo~h

In 1694 Edward Randolph

accused four Virginia general court judges, who also were
collectors, of not aggressively and effectively prosecuting
the case of a ship seized for illegal trading because "the
truth of it is, their Brother collector Ralph Wormeleys
Honour lay at stake, for if the vessel were condemned
t'would argue either his Connivance at ye Mr or his
ignorance in the Acts of trade because he did not seize her
at the tyme of her Entry." 112

Several years later,

Benjamin Harrison indicated that such behavior was

110 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of
Virginia, 39.
111 CSPC, XVI, i656, p. 330.
112 Randolph, Letters, VII, 459.
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consistent with the posture that powerful plural
officeholders customarily assumed with regard to
disciplining one another.

"They will always look so

carefully to their own interest as to stand by each other in
opposition to all persons," Harrison asserted, "and if one
of them chances to speak a little freely of the miscarriages
of one of his brethren, • • • yet upon second thoughts they
think it their common interest to agree among themselves and
generally let such things sleep." 113

In 1701 the Board

of Trade acknowledged having received such complaints,
noting that members of the Council of Virginia "were not
subject to prosecution at law • • • and that •
inconveniencies had ensued, as well in relation to trade as
justice, by the methods settled, and ordinarily practised,
in the administration of that government."ll4
The problem of multiple officeholding was, to a
considerable degree, a systemic one.

If customs agents,

councilors, and judges took advantage of the system by
occupying positions which represented conflicting interests,
it was largely because the administrative framework of the
Chesapeake colonies permitted them to do so.

Few colonists

could be expected to surrender such perquisites voluntarily,
as Miles Cary did, for the sake of principle.

English

authorities eventually did attempt to take some
113 CSPC, XVI, #656, p. 330.
114 Stock, Debates, II, 396.
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comprehensive action in this regard by issuing directives
forbidding councilors to serve as customs agents,
prohibiting the same person from holding both the
collector's and naval officer's posts simultaneously, and
specifying that those appointed to either position should
not be too involved in trade personally.ll 5

But the

larger issue of plural officeholding never was resolved
satisfactorily.
Part of the problem was that there simply were not
enough qualified people in the colonies to assume all the
positions of responsibility without calling on some
individuals to perform more than one official
function. 116

The result, whether due to the consequent

ll 5 CSPC, XVII, #579, p. 312; XVIII, #523, pp. 310-11;
Spotswood;-Eetters, I, 8; Hening, Statutes, III, 195.
116 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
182. An important aspect of the problem concerned education
which reputedly had become "the sine gua non for holding
public office" in Europe long before the colonial era
(Martin H. Quitt, Virginia House of Burgesses 1660-1706: The
Social, Educational, and Economic Bases of Political Power
[New York, 1989], 104).
In the Chesapeake, though,
particularly during the seventeenth century, both literate
individuals and opportunities for instruction were in short
supply (Ibid., 106; John C. Rainbolt, From Prescription to
Persuasion: Mani ulation of Seventeenth Centur Vir inia
Economy Port Washington, N.Y., 1974 , 21-22 •
Nevertheless, the significance of some sort of scholastic
background as a qualification for public officeholding was
illustrated in Bacon's Rebellion when the chief insurgent
rhetorically asked whether the "extractions and Education"
of Governor Berkeley's ruling faction had not "bin vile,"
and questioned "by what pretence of learning and vertue they
could [enter] soe soon into Imployments of so great Trust
and consequence" (cited in Bernard Bailyn, "Politics and
Social Structure in Virginia," in James K. Martin, ed.,
Interpreting Colonial America, 2d edition [New York, 1978],
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conflicts of interest or the overburdening of public
officials with too much responsibility, was, according to
Edward Randolph, that "but few discharg one Office as they
ought to doe." 117

Another aspect of the dilemma which

proved particularly troublesome was the almost uniformly
insufficient salaries and commissions that customs agents
and other public officials received as compensation for
their efforts.

An eighteenth-century New England official

asserted that "the real cause of the illicit trade" in his
colony was that customs officials were "quartered upon for
more than their legal fees and that without bribery and
corruption they must starve." 118

The necessity for

customs officials in America to supplement their meager
incomes with emoluments from some other source has led
several historians to conclude that graft must have been
widespread and pervasive.ll9
By all accounts, the situation in the greater
Chesapeake conformed to the same pattern, a phenomenon which
illustrates why it was difficult to get honest, competent,

191) •
117 Randolph, Letters, VII, 379.
118 Thomas Hutchinson in Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, IV, 215 n. 1.
119 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
215; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 62; Hoon, English Customs
Service, 213.
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and conscientious individuals to serve as customs
agents. 120

The refusal of Virginia's first customs

collector to continue in his position after 1673, for
example, has been attributed to the decision to change his
form of compensation from a comfortable salary of L250 a
year to a percentage of the duties he collected.121

In

1699 a Carolina collector indicated his unwillingness to
serve in the same capacity any longer because of the large
expenses he had incurred in prosecuting a case for which he
had received no allowance or reimbursement. 122

The same

year Virginia governor Nicholson passed along to the Board
of Trade a representation made to him by eight council
members who were former collectors (including Benjamin
Harrison) stating that the income customs agents derived
from their offices was "unsuitable as compensations for
their time and trouble."l23
Over a decade later the council still maintained that
"the fees belonging to the Naval Officer alone would not be
a sufficient encouragement for anyone that's capable and
fitt to be in so great a trust" without a supplementary

l20 Bergstrom, "Merchants and Markets," 84-85.
121 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 21; Flippin, Financial
Administration of Virginia, 23.
122 Randolph, Letters, V, 221 ••
123 CSPC, XVII, #579 xxxi, p. 312.
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income producing office. 124

When Governor Spotswood

recommended to the Commissioners of the Customs the
appointment of an additional customs agent to help control
illicit trade in the Lower James River district, he
emphasized the need to pay the official a "Compatent
Sallary" so as not to be "tempted to supply his want
either by an unjust vexation of fair Traders, or a
fraudulent Connivance with the illegal ones."l2 5

The

quest for additional fees and commissions inevitably led to
competition between customs officials which, Edward Randolph
implied as early as 1692, also fostered collusion with
planters and shippers.

"In Maryland the Officers plye like

Watermen," the surveyor general observed, "for he that uses
the Mrs [shipmastersl best has most business." 126
The inadequate income that customs agents received from
their offices was also used to justify the establishment of
rates which planters and shippers considered exorbitant.

In

fact, it was as a result of complaints that collectors had
"exacted and taken greate and unreasonable fees for entring
and clearing ships" that the Virginia assembly enacted
legislation in 1679 stipulating, apparently for the first
time, what the charges for particular customs services
124 Ibid., XXV, #349, pp. 169-70. The council had
submitted-a-iimilar memorial in 1706 also (EJC, III,
117-18).
125 Spotswood, Letters, I, 75.
1 2 6 Randolph, Letters, VI, 43; VII, 379.
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should be. 127

But when the North Carolina Lower House

sent a resolution to Governor Burrington in 1731 condemning
customs officials for charging excessive fees and insisting
that these be regulated more strictly, the governor
responded that adopting the proposed measures would leave
collectors and naval officers no choice but to "Abandon
their Employments and depart this Province or starve here if
they take their Fees in the kind manner you prescribe or
desire." 128
The negative consequences associated with insufficient
salaries affected the highest level of colonial
administration as well.
many misdemeanors

Edward Randolph believed that "the
justly charged upon the several!

Governours in the Proprieties, arise chiefly from a very
127 Hening, Statutes, II, 443-44. The fee structure
for customs officials in the colonies does not appear to
have been established by any imperial decree or act of
Parliament; instead, the standard procedure, at least after
1679, evidently was for colonial assemblies to set the fees
subject to approval by the Privy Council (Barrow, Trade and
Empire, 155-56). Following the formal division of customs
responsibilities between collectors and naval officers, the
Virginia burgesses passed a law in 1699 detailing the fees
that each agent would receive and specifying that "no
collector or navall officer shall • • • after the
publication of this act charge, demand, exact and take any
more or greater fee • • • than what is hereafter
particularly enumerated" (Hening, Statutes, III, 195-97).
128 CRNC, III, 297-98, 309. North Carolina lawmakers
had passed legislation in 1715 delineating collectors' fees
and services (Ibid., XXIII, 83). A similar law was enacted
in 1731, after the Lower House's resolution, which
additionally detailed the functions and prescribed service
charges for naval officers (Ibid., III, 160-61). These were
subsequently amended for bot~ficials in 1736 (Ibid., IV,
195-96).
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great neglect in the Proprietrs not taking due care to
provide an Honorable Maintenance for support of their
Governors."

This, the royal customs agent was convinced,

was "the true reason why no honest Gentleman of good
reputation and abilities • • • will leave his Country to
live upon the Rapine and spoil in the Proprieties, as many
of them have done • • • For 'tis easy to believe that
Governors in such necessities will be soon tempted to do all
unlawful things." 129
Bureaucratic inefficiency paralleled and complicated
the problems of plural officeholding and inadequate
salaries.

Although crown authorities appeared to have

worked out the responsibilities of, and the division of
labor between, customs officers clearly and carefully in
theory, in practice the system was full of ambiguities and
contradictions.

An exchange of correspondence between

English officials and Francis Nicholson illustrates the
confusion that prevailed at the highest levels of colonial
administration where communication and mutual comprehension
should have been most lucid.

As governor of Maryland in

1697, Nicholson had been one of the foremost proponents of
making collectors and naval officers "distinct persons" who
would act as a check on one another.

Two years later,

though, Nicholson, now governor of Virginia, inexplicably

129 Ibid., I, 545; V, 157, 271; CSPC, XVI, #451, p.
211.
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reversed himself by recommending that the two positions be
combined "for the conveniency of trade and the proper reward
of the officer." 139
Flabbergasted members of the Board of Trade, who had
heeded the governor's advice in the first place, responded:
"We do not conceive how you came to appoint the same persons
to execute both the Naval Office and that of Collector of
the 2s. per hhd., that being directly contrary to your
Instructions and also to your own opinion, which you writ us
from Maryland." 131

Nicholson lamely tried to explain

that the position he had joined to that of naval officer was
not that "collector, but the Receiver of the 2s. per hhd.
and the Virginia duties,
collector. nl32

. . . sometimes

called

Perhaps ic an effort to deflect attention

from his own apparent confusion or inconsistency, the
governor pointed out another glaring administrative
oversight, that "few of the Collectors and Naval Officers"
had received "any body of Instructions" to guide them in the
performance of their duties. 1 33
Other deficiencies of the system, on both the imperial
policymaking and colonial administrative levels, produced
additional problems or exacerbated existing ones.

The

139 CSPC, XVII, #579, p. 312.
131 Ibid., XVI II, #8, p. 5.
132 Ibid., i523, p. 311.
133 Ibid., #523, p. 310.
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absence of designated shipping and receiving centers
combined with the innumerable bays, inlets, rivers and
creeks in the greater Chesapeake created a situation in
which complete, or even moderately effective, coverage of
the various customs districts would have been impossible in
any event.

But the relatively small number of customs

officials assigned to those areas only served to compound
the dilemma.
In

17~~

Edward Randolph complained about the ease with

which Virginians and North Carolinians ran their uncustomed
tobacco to New England from the Currituck Inlet area "where
there is no settled Officer of the Customes."l3 4

Three

and four decades later Virginia governor Gooch continued to
observe that illicit trade could not be prevented as long as
smugglers had virtually unlimited opportunities to collect
and dispose of contraband far from the prying eyes of royal
customs agents. 135

Even the establishment of port towns,

unless they were situated properly, did not improve trade
law enforcement necessarily.

In 1755 North Carolina

governor Arthur Dobbs requested that the Board of Trade
appoint a revenue officer for Ocracoke Inlet because "the
Sound within is so large with many numerous Navigable
Creeks" that smugglers were able to unload a "great part of
134 Randolph, Letters,

v,

231.

135 "Gooch Correspondence," vol. 1, Gooch to the Board
of Trade, July 23, 173~ and vol. 3, Gooch to the Board of
Trade, August 22, 1743; Flippin, William Gooch, 14.
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their Cargoes • • • and all prohibited Goods before they
come to the discharging Ports and by landing them •
Swear only to the remainder of their Cargoe." 136
The remoteness of many customs officials' residences
from the areas of greatest shipping activity within their
districts offered additional opportunities for illicit trade
and duty fraud.

In 1697 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton

suggested that customs revenues "would turn to better
Account if • • • the Collectors kept their Offices
convenient.

Many of them do now live at great Distance, and

trust to unsworn Deputies, and they to unsworn Masters of
Ships, and other Exporters." 137

A quarter century later the

president and masters of the College of William and Mary
lamented the loss of income to the institution as a result
of diminished Plantation Duty revenues which they attributed
in part to the fact that customs "offices are given to men
that live out of the country, and so never reside as to do
their duty, which has occasioned vast frauds in that
trade." 138

In 1736 former North Carolina governor

Burrington apprized the Commissioners of the Customs that he
"never knew one of the Collectors of Currituck [to] reside
within the Collection."

And since, Burrington noted, "there

136 CRNC, V, 333.
137 Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, Present State of
Virginia, 60.
138 Perry, Church Papers, 549.
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are many Islands and Rivers between

• where the

Collectors reside and the Inlets, •

the Masters have

Opportunitys to unload prohibited Goods, before they come to
the Collectors to enter, and also to take in Tobacco, after
they are cleared."l39
An additional administrative difficulty had to do with
the requirement that shipmasters give security before
clearing that they would deliver their cargoes only in the
manner and to the destinations prescribed by the Navigation
Acts.

Failure to meet the conditions of such a bond would

result in its forfeiture and subsequent prosecution by local
customs officials.

In 1684 English authorities issued

instructions to colonial governors warning them not to
accept securities from anyone other than "those who are
sufficient and responsible inhabitants." 140

In his 1695

memorial, "An Account of Several! Things Whereby Illegal
Trade is Encouraged in Virginia Maryland and Pennsilvania •
• • ," Edward Randolph reported, however, that naval officers
regularly accepted securities from "persons of Small or no
Estates" who then carried their tobacco to Scotland and
forged certificates in order to discharge their forfeited
bonds. 141

139 CRNC, IV, 170.
140 APCC, II, il62, p. 71; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American HIStory, IV, 147.
141 Randolph, Letters, V, 117.
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While royal officials argued that security demands were
too lenient, Chesapeake residents complained that literal
application of the bond provisions and the high security
requirements associated with them subjected the colonists to
extreme and unjustified hardship.

The Maryland

legislature's Committee of Grievances objected vigorously,
for example, to Governor Nicholson's effort in 1697 to
tighten up the system by preventing customs agents from
taking "such poor and common Securities as was formerly
used." 14 2

Not only did colonists have difficulty meeting

the security requirements, opponents of the governor's
initiative argued, but in 1704 the Maryland Council and
Assembly charged that "some familyes has been ruined"
financially and more were endangered by the prosecution of
forfeited bonds. 143

Besides afflicting the colonists,

College of William and Mary officials intimated in 1723 that
the royal government's insistence on demanding large
securities, instead of promoting compliance with the trade
laws, actually constituted an inducement to illicit trade.
and customs fraud.

Commenting on a recent act of Parliament

requiring a minimum security of Ll000 sterling, the college
men argued that small traders, "being perhaps utter
strangers or persons in low circumstances, can find no

142 Md. A., XXIII, 8 6 ; Andrews, Colonial Period o f
American History, IV, 206.
143 Md. A., XXIV, 39 4.
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bondsmen that will undertake for such high summs, and so are
obliged to let the exportations of tobacco alone, or to run
it without paying any duty."l44
The prevalence of collusion between customs officials
and colonists highlighted another conceptual defect in the
colonial customs system.

Since collectors and naval

officers normally resided within the districts over which
they had jurisdiction, it was only natural that their
affinities would lie, in most cases, with their friends and
neighbors. 145

Based in part on the advice of men like

Francis Nicholson, the Commissioners of the Customs
attempted to address this problem in 1697, having concluded
that it was "necessary to form a new establishment of
officers, to be settled in Virginia and other his Majesty's
Plantations" to execute the navigation laws more
effectively.

Local customs officials were to be replaced

with men "new and unexperienced in the Plantations" because,
the commissioners realized, "there could not be that
reasonable confidence in persons of interest and residence
upon the place as in persons disinterested in and unrelated
to the place." 146

144 Perry, Church Papers, 549.
145 Barrow, Trade and Empire, 144.
146 CSPC, XV, 11178, p. 548; Hall, Edward Randolph,
176.
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Inexplicably, though, the decision does not seem to
have been implemented, as collectors and naval officers in
the greater Chesapeake continued to be selected mainly from
the colonial ranks.

The reason cannot have been that the

commissioners changed their minds because in 1714 they
reiterated the same conviction in even more explicit and
compelling terms: "Can anyone believe that a Collr, or other
officer, unless he has more integrity than wt is usual in
this Age, will detect his Brother, Uncle, or other Relation
of any fraud committed to the prejudice of the Revenue • • •
On the contrary is it not rather to be apprehended that the
officer and his trading Relation will agree to share the
profitt of such fraudulent Trade?"l 47
The divided loyalties of local customs officials (to
the extent that they experienced conflicting sentiments at
all), bureaucratic mismanagement and inefficiency, the
pro-smuggling inclinations of the general courts, and the
sporadic outbursts of violence against customs officials ·all
posed formidable obstacles to the successful implementation
of English imperial trade policy in the greater Chesapeake.
As serious as these problems were, though, they could be
addressed and, to a certain extent, overcome by the
application of various administrative reform, preventive,
and punitive measures.

But the home government's adoption

of a "salutary neglect" strategy in the 1720s virtually
147 Cited in Hoon, English Customs Service, 207.
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ensured that no such corrective initiatives would be
undertaken until well after mid-century.
Even the successful resolution of these difficulties
probably would not have been sufficient to surmount the much
more fundamental and pervasive problem of which many of the
other troubles were merely symptomatic.

As long as

Chesapeake residents perceived royal economic policy as
inimical to their individual and collective interests, trade
law enforcement would always be hard.

Alexander Spotswood,

who only six years previously had communicated such a
glowing first impression of Virginia's inhabitants,
cynically defined this seemingly irreconcilable dilemma from
the royal point of view.

"Such is the temper of a Sett of

men here," the governor contended, "who look upon every
benefit that accrues to their Soveraign as so much taken
from themselves; who envy his Majestie the profits of his
own proper Estates and Revenues."l 4 8

Great as it was, Spotwood's disillusionment in 1716 was
far from complete, however.

Within the next few years, the

willingness of Chesapeake colonists and proprietary
officials to tolerate, support, and defend another form of
maritime lawlessness would bring the governor to a new
threshold of bitterness and frustration.

148 Spotswood, Letters, II, 153.
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CHAPTER VI
"An Unaccountable Inclination to Favour Pirates"

On a day in late December 1718 residents of the port of
Hampton, Virginia, who ventured down to the waterfront
beheld a gruesome sight.

Suspended from the bowsprit of a

local sloop hung the severed head of Edward Teach, better
known as the infamous pirate Blackbeard.

Fearsome in life,

the notorious buccaneer's head must have looked especially
hideous by the time the vessel returned to its home port.
It had been nearly a month since British navy sailors
reportedly slashed and punctured Blackbeard with 25 sword
and pistol shot wounds before finally subduing and
decapitating the outlaw.
Spurred to action by apprehensions about the mounting
pirate threat in the region and by the pleas of Carolina
traders who had suffered personally from the freebooter's
depredations, Alexander Spotswood had contracted the sloop
into the service of the Royal Navy and dispatched it on a
military expedition to the North Carolina sounds.

In the

desperate and momentous struggle that followed, a battle so
"closely and warmly engaged" that the surrounding waters
became "tinctur'd with Blood," naval forces under Lieutenant
219
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Robert Maynard sustained heavy casualties but routed the
pirates, killing many and taking the rest prisoner.!
Blackbeard's death represented more than just the
demise of a dangerous and intimidating sea brigand.

By

seeking out and destroying the marauder in North Carolina,
Virginia's royal governor served notice to the buccaneers
and their colonial supporters of the British government's
determination to extinguish the pirate threat in America.
Fifteen captives were taken to Williamsburg to be tried.
Thirteen were convicted and executed.

The victors' trophy,

Blackbeard's grisly head, was set up on a pole at the
entrance to Hampton's harbor where it constituted a warning
not only to other pirates, but to the inhabitants and

1 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 82.
Standard
secondary accounts of the Blackbeard affair and many of the
pirate episodes discussed in this chapter can be found in
Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy; Williams, Pirates of Colonial
Virginia; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake; and Bruce,
Institutional History of Virginia, I, 677-78, II, 203-26.
Lee, Blackbeard, offers an alternative view of the behavior
of the North Carolina and Virginia governments in response
to the Blackbeard menace.
Hughson, Carolina Pirates, and
Converse D. Clowse, Economic Be innin s in Colonial South
Carolina, 1670-1730 (Columbia, S.C., 1971 provide some
insight into the impact of buccaneers, both as trading
partners and marauders, on colonial economies. Two
excellent analyses of the social and political environments
in which pirates operated are Ritchie, Captain Kidd, an
examination of piracy and the English patronage system, and
Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, chapter 6, a study of the social
world of Anglo-American freebooters.
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officials of the greater Chesapeake as well, that piracy and
its abettors would no longer be tolerated.2

Piracy in one form or another plagued the Chesapeake
intermittently throughout the colonial period, but
threatened the region most seriously between the 1660s, when
Governor Berkeley described Virginia waters as being "full
of pirates," and the early 1720s when Governor Spotswood
declared the colony "secured against the attempts of pyrates
on its sea frontiers." 3

The problem became most

acute between periods of active warfare when buccaneers who
had been officially authorized to attack enemy shipping as
privateers were then officially condemned for conducting
similar activities during peacetime.

When the British

government initiated a crackdown on piracy in the Caribbean
after Queen Anne's War, many freebooters gravitated to the
Atlantic coast of North America where they could prey upon
English colonial shipping or foreign commerce sailing the
Gulf Stream back to Europe. 4

By the second decade of the

2 Tyler, History of Hampton, 31-32; Jane E. Davis,
Round About Jamestown: Historical Sketches of the Lower
Virginia Peninsula (Hampton, Va., c. 1907), 49.
3 CSPC, XXXIII, #175, p. 85.
4 In October 1699 Micajah Perry advised the Board of
Trade that the coasts of Virginia, Maryland, and Carolina
were "infested with pirates (CSPC, XVII, #905, p. 502). The
following June Virginia authorities reported that the colony
was in "a continual state of war" with the sea brigands
(CSPC, XVIII, #501, p. 302; #523, p. 308).
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eighteenth century, American colonists and officials had
become keenly aware of the war/privateering, peace/piracy
dynamic.

Having suffered from an upsurge in piracy between

1697 and 1701 after King William's War, Chesapeake merchants
petitioned the admiralty for the additional protection that
they anticipated would be required after the conclusion of
hostilities in 1713.5
Colonial officials committed to eradicating piracy from
the Chesapeake in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
faced a formidable challenge.

Freebooting had long

benefitted from a tradition of popular and official
sanction, collaboration and active participation which, in
the colonial era, dated back to the earliest English
settlements in the region.

Among the charges that Sir

Samuel Argall, deputy governor and admiral of Virginia, was
recalled to England to answer was one that in 1618 he had
assumed the leading role in outfitting the ship "Treasurer"
for "Roving on ye Spanish Dominions in the West Indies" and
committing "sundry Actes of Hostilitie" against the
Spaniards. 6

Argall's partner in the venture was Robert

Rich, later Earl of warwick, who, already notorious as an
investor in piratical enterprises, took an interest in the

5 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 75.
6 Susan M. Kingsbury, ed., Records of the Virginia
Company of London (Washington, 1906), II, 402; Crump,
Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 59; Andrews, Colonial
Period of American History, I, 47, 122, 166.
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Virginia Company because he considered Jamestown a useful
staging ground for raids on Spanish New World shipping. 7
Warwick's influence continued to be felt when, in 1643,
Parliament designated him Lord High Admiral of the
plantations in America and chief of all resident colonial
governors. 8

How news of this appointment was received in

the Chesapeake can only be guessed, but it seems unlikely to
have had any sort of chastening effect on colonial attitudes
sympathetic toward piracy.
Predictably, the hard evidence linking colonials and
pirates is difficult to find.

Accessories to crime then as

now had little interest in publicizing or documenting their
activities.

And yet, the sum total of the available

evidence -- the repeated complaints by the home government
about colonies offering refuge to pirates, colonial
governors' proclamations against citizens harboring the
outlaws, the favorable treatment pirates received in the
colonial courts, and the testimony and actions of the
pirates themselves -- suggests a degree of sympathy for and
interaction with pirates which historians generally have
failed to recognize.

7 wesley F. Craven, "The Earl of Warwick: Speculator in
Piracy," Hispanic American Historical Review, X (1930), 46365~ Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 13~ Andrews, Colonial Period of
American History, I, 120.
8 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV, 33.
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Most scholars have maintained that the association
between Chesapeake colonists and pirates was very limited.9
But such a conclusion fails to address the simple
observation made in 1699 by Surveyor General of the Customs
Robert Quary that "if the pirates have not supplies and a
market for the goods that they plunder and rob, they would
never continue in these parts of the world."le

Few

officials anywhere could claim to have a better
understanding of the nexus between pirates and colonists
than Quary, who in 1686 had been removed from the office of
secretary in South Carolina as a result of his own collusion
with freebooters.ll
There can be little doubt that many colonists viewed
interaction with pirates favorably.

Some may have envied

the buccaneer's life of adventure and hedonistic pursuits,
free from the constraints of lawful authority.

Others, like

coastal residents reported to have visited Captain Kidd's
ship in 1699, probably sought nothing more than to glimpse
the vast booty rumored to be aboard and to rub shoulders
9 See, for example, Bruce, Institutional History of
Virginia, II, 209, Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 132,
133.
10 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 2e9;
Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88.
11 Bartholomew R. Carroll, Historical Collections of
South Carolina; Embracing Many Rare and Valuable Documents,
Relating to the History of that State from its First
Discovery to its Independence in the Year 1776 (New York,
1836), I, 86; Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88; Hughson,
Carolina Pirates, 23.
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with individuals who had attained a degree of roguish
celebrity in their own time. 12

A few colonists actually

became buccaneers themselves, but it appears that most of
those who became actively involved with freebooters did so
for economic reasons.

As Virginia governor Spotswood

cynically remarked in 1719, "People are easily led to favor
these Pests of Mankind when they have hopes of sharing in
their ill-gotten Wealth."l3
Pirates became preferred trading partners, especially
in areas where European manufactured goods were in short
supply, because, like the Dutch, the freebooters could
provide these goods at or below market price. 14

The

Navigation Acts, which raised the cost of European goods by
restricting their flow to the colonies and adding import
duties, encouraged colonists to seek alternative suppliers
to such an extent that the legislation has been identified
as the principal contributor to piracy in the western
world. 15

Chesapeake colonists also looked to pirates to

supply them with gold and silver specie, another commodity
in great demand.

For many years after the founding of

Carolina, sea brigands were responsible for furnishing most
1 2 Thomas Wellburn to Edmund Jennings, C05/1411, fo.
321, 6/29/1699.
13 Spotswood, Letters, II, 319.
14 Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 87-88.
15 Hughson, Carolina Pirates, 15; Davis, Round About
Jamestown, 45.
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of the currency which circulated in that colony.l6

once

again English authorities unwittingly drove colonists into
the pirates' arms, in this case by generally refusing to
accept commodity payments for quitrents in North
Carolina. 17
In return for buccaneer loot and specie, the colonists
rendered that which the home government generally did not
require but which the pirates regularly sought: provisions
of food, naval stores, and occasionally, arms.

While the

majority of Chesapeake inhabitants probably had little or no
connection with sea brigands at all, those who did developed
and maintained mutually advantageous relationships based on
an unwritten, and perhaps unspoken, understanding: that the
freebooters would continue to view the colonists as
partners, not prey.

As long as the sea robbers respected

this agreement, there is little to indicate that the
colonists assisted in their capture and conviction.

But

when their lives and property were threatened, most, though
certainly not all, Chesapeake residents supported government
efforts to remove the pirate menace from their midst.
Unfortunately, the historical record offers little
insight into the nature of these business relationships,
particularly in the Chesapeake.

It is possible, however, to

l6 Hughson, Carolina Pirates, 14; Clowse, Economic
Beginnings, 187 n. 3; Carroll, Historical Collections, I,
172.
17 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, xx.
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extrapolate from similar liaisons elsewhere information
which probably applied to the Chesapeake as well.

A woman

who sold goods to Blackbeard in Philadelphia, for example,
recalled that "he bought freely and paid well

• was too

politic to bring his vessel or crew within immediate reach;
and at the same time was careful to give no direct offense
to any of the settlements where they wished to be regarded
as visiters and purchasers." 18

Blackbeard, or Teach (also

represented variously in the literature as Thack, Tach,
Thach, or Thatch), appears to have behaved in a similarly
inoffensive manner when he first arrived at Ocracoke Inlet,
North Carolina.

There "he often diverted himself with going

ashore among the Planters where he revell'd Night and Day"
and socialized with the colonists by whom "he was well
received." 19

But unlike Philadelphia, where Blackbeard

never actually resided and where a more concerted resistance
to his presence might have been mounted, in North Carolina
the pirate began to abuse his hosts, sometimes taking
liberties with the planters' wives and daughters, but, more

18 Cited in John F. Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, and
Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time, 3 vols. (Philadelphia,
1884), II, 216-17, 219, 223; Lee, Blackbeard, 79.
19 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77; [Charles Ellms],
The Pirates Own Book, or Authentic Narratives of the Lives,
Exploits, and Executions of the Most Celebrated Sea Robbers
(1837; reprint Salem, Mass., 1924), 340.
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significantly in terms of his ultimate denouement, by
pillaging the sloops of local traders. 2 0
A variety of sources, including accounts by the
buccaneers themselves, attests not only to the pirates'
affinity for the Carolina sounds and Virginia's Eastern
Shore as places to victual and refit their ships but also to
the local colonists' willingness to accommodate them.
Writing to the Board of Trade in 1699 "On behalf of those
trading to Virginia and Maryland," Micajah Perry and other
merchants complained of recent buccaneer depredations near
the Chesapeake and requested the deployment of several
guardships to cruise the Atlantic coast of America "where
the pirates do the greatest mischief and is to be feared
find encouragement."21
More specifically, the pirate William Dampier, who
arrived at Accomack on the Eastern Shore in 1682 with 20 men
and spent a year preparing for a famous piratical expedition
to Africa and the South Seas, identified Virginia as a good
place to do business because of the colony's insufficient
supply of European goods and ample food reserves. 22

The

following year another pirate crew joined Dampier's company
and traded its cargo of wines to local inhabitants in
2 0 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 77; [Ellms], Pirates
Own Book, 340; Spotswood, Letters, II, 273.
2 1 CSPC, XVII, #989, p. 539.
2 2 Williams, Pirates of Colonial Virginia, 37-42;
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 206.
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exchange for "such Provisions as they wanted," including
foodstuffs, naval stores, "and every thing necessary for so
long a Voyage." 23

In 1691 the naval officer for the

Eastern Shore reported that the islands of his district had
become a favorite resort of the freebooters; the same man
testified again, this time as commander of the local
militia, to the same effect in 1699. 2 4
Virginia seems to have been an especially popular
destination for buccaneers who had just completed successful
freebooting forays and for escaped pirates seeking safe
haven.

In 1688 the royal guardship Dunbarton overtook

several sea brigands and a black slave who were making their
way in a shallop across the bay to Virginia where, one of
the group later reported, they hoped to retire peacefully
with their booty. 25

The three buccaneers, Edward Davis,

John Hinson (or Hincent), and Lionel Wafer (or Delawafer),
were all members of the crew of some seventy marauders
(including Dampier) that had embarked from the Eastern Shore

23 Dampier, Voyages, I, 98; Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren of
the Coast, 85.
24 John Custis to Francis Nicholson, COS/1411,
10/16/1699; Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II,
207; Williams, Pirates of Colonial Virginia, 40; Middleton,
Tobacco Coast, 206.
25 Wafer, Isthmus of America, 131.
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five years earlier on their well-documented freebooting
voyage. 26
Just over a decade later, sea robbers seemed to be
heading for the colony in droves.

In 1699 the captain of a

ship owned by New York and London merchants informed one of
his principal employers, prominent New Yorker Stephen De
Lancey, that he had just returned from Madagascar with a
rich cargo and about fifty Red Sea pirates as passengers,
most of whom, he indicated, "design for Virginia and
Horekills" in Delaware. 27

The same year colonial

officials grew apprehensive over reports that close to
seventy pirates who recently had escaped from jails in New

2 6 This particular case has received considerable
attention since both Dampier and Wafer mentioned it in their
popular accounts and also because its resolution was partly
responsible for the founding of the College of William and
Mary. Although the pirates initially fabricated an
altogether different story for the arresting guardship
captain in order to conceal their true identities, they
later claimed that they were returning to Virginia in
response to King James's proclamation of 1687 which offered
a general amnesty to freebooters who surrendered to royal
authorities. Since they professed not to be "on the
account" any longer they argued that they were entitled to
keep their loot. The buccaneers were sent back to England
where they apparently had some influence in high places.
The final settlement, believed to have been crafted largely
through the intercession of James Blair, permitted Wafer,
Hinson, and Davis to gain their freedom and keep their
plunder except for L300 which was to be consigned to the
college's endowment fund (CSPC, XIII, #2059, p. 599~ #2119,
p. 610~ Wafer, Isthmus of America, xii, xiii, xxix, xlii-1~
Dampier, Voyages, I, 533-34, 537-38~ EJC, I, 107-09~ VMHB,
XX, 5-7; CTB, IX, pt. 3, 1027-30; pt. 4, 1561; WMQ, 1st
ser., VII~65.
--27 CSPC, XVII, #512 ii, p. 281~ Karraker, Piracy was a

Business~-82.
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England and the Middle Colonies were believed to be headed
for the Chesapeake in general or Virginia in particular.28
Even after Blackbeard's depredations and defeat, some
Virginians apparently had no compunction about offering
pirates a friendly reception.

Four members of a pirate crew

who put ashore in York County in 1720 "met with good
Entertainment among the Planters," reveled at a tavern, and
bought several female indentured servants. 29

Before their

capture, the pirates managed to lodge much of their booty
with amicable locals who surrendered the effects only after
"a great deal of Search and trouble." 3 0
Besides the colony's allure as a place in which to
linger and perhaps reside, Virginia continued to attract
more transient freebooters bent on further marauding
adventures.

In 1699 the pirate John James visited the

colony to procure various supplies including naval stores
and ammunition. 31

The following year Governor Nicholson

advised the commander of the royal guardship on station in
the Chesapeake that a pirate named Breholt, recently
acquitted by a general court in South Carolina, "designed
either to sail for Smith's Island in Virginia, to get more

28 Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 116-17.
29 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 207; EJC, III, 522.
30 Spotswood, Letters, II, 338, 342.
31 John Martin to Francis Nicholson, COS/1411,
7/29/1699; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 104.
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provisions, or else to Cape de Verd." 32

As late as 1720

Governor Spotswood lamented the fact that pirates still
visited the Virginia coast "where they frequently resort to
furnish themselves w'th provisions."33
Notwithstanding Virginia's distinction as a preferred
pirate haunt, North Carolina developed an even more
widespread and unenviable reputation as a sea robber's
haven.

In 1683 the Lords of Trade complained about the

"harboring and encouraging of pirates in Carolina •

to

the great damage that does arise in his Majesty's service,"
a charge repeated the following year by the governor of
Jamaica. 34

A 1707 act designed to encourage settlement in

North Carolina deplored the fact that the colony constituted
the only tract of land in English North America in which
"the Enemy in time of Warr and Pyrates in time of Peace have
hitherto made use of the Harbours therein to careen and fitt
their vessells as also to Wood and Water to the great

32 CSPC, XVIII, #523 XV (11), p. 315.
3 3 Spotswood, Letters, II 350; CSPC, XXXII, #523, p.
328.
3 4 CRNC, I, 347.
In 1701 a Jamaica governor again
complainea;-with Carolina no doubt prominent in his
thinking, that "the insinuations continually made, by the
proprietary colonies on the continent, of the great
liberties and exemptions they enjoy under those governments,
and of the advantages they make by receiving pirates, have
enticed away much people from Jamaica" (Stock, Debates, 396;
Hall, Edward Randolph, 212).
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annoyance of her Majties Subjects trading along the
Coast." 35
In 1697 New Jersey governor Jeremiah Basse informed
royal authorities that a vessel outfitted for a "piratical
voyage" had "put in to Carolina, sold all her lading at
under rates, taken in men and provisions and gone
privateering." 36

About two decades later, a freebooter

named Lewis cleaned his sloop on the coast of North Carolina
where, Daniel Defoe reported, "the Natives traded with him
for Rum and Sugar, and brought him all he wanted, without
the Government's having any Knowledge of him." 37

In 1722

pirate captain George Lowther and his crew spent an entire
winter in a secluded North Carolina inlet. 38

As late as

1729 the Lords of Trade expressed the view that "North
Carolina

(ever since t'was a separate Government) has

only been a Receptacle for Pyrates Thieves and Vagabonds of

35 CRNC, I, 674.
3 6 CSPC, XV, il203, p. 568.
37 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 595; [Ellms], Pirates
Own Book, 310. Neither Defoe nor Charles El1ms provide any
dates for Lewis's career. Both authors describe an indirect
encounter between Lewis and Woodes Rogers, however, which
appears to have taken place after Rogers had given up
buccaneering and taken charge of the royal government's
effort to suppress piracy in the Caribbean. Rogers accepted
the official post in 1717 ([Ellms], Pirates Own Book, 311;
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 595; Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren
of the Coast, 182).
38 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 315.
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all sorts." 39

Pirates, it appears, had become so well

integrated into the fabric of North Carolina society that a
citizen could casually remark, in reference to the shortage
of clergymen in the colony around

173~,

that "they that are

Religiously Inclin'd getts a Tayler or Some old Pirate or
Some Idle Fellow to Read the Service • • • and then He Hacks
out a Sermon."4~
As is the case with illicit trade, evaluating North
Carolina's role as a sanctuary and staging ground for
pirates is complicated somewhat by the issue of royal versus
proprietary control.

Proponents of the extension of

imperial authority who favored charter nullification had an
obvious interest in tarring the private governments with the
brush of pirate collaboration.

Edward Randolph went so far

as to declare that piracy in America would never be
suppressed as long as Carolina and other proprietary
colonies remained separate from the crown. 41

In 1697 the

Council of Trade informed the Carolina proprietors that the
king had received complaints about "entertainment given to
Pyrates in • • • the proprieties" with particular reference

39 CRNC, III, 49.
4

~ Edmund and Dorothy s. Berkeley, eds., "'The Manner
of Living of the North Carolinians,' by Francis Veale,
December 19, 173~," North Carolina Historical Review, XLI,
242; NCHCR, VI, xxxii n. 65.
4 1 Randolph, Letters, V, 179; CSPC, XVI, #451, p. 211.
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to "Carolina as too ordinary a Receptacle of Pyrats." 42
In a

172~

memorial colonial agents John Barnwell and Joseph

Boone maintained that the North Carolinians "for their
entertaining Pirates • • • are justly contemned by their
neighbors, for which reason and that they may be under good
Government

• it would be useful to joyn the same again

to Virginia." 43
The extent to which such disparaging views of North
Carolina were influenced or motivated by a desire to
discredit proprietary government is difficult to assess; but
if the debate over charter resumption was responsible for
exaggerating the level of complicity between private
colonies and pirates, it may also have had the opposite
effect.

In view of the pressure brought to bear through the

threat of charter revocation, it is quite conceivable that
officials in the proprietary colonies felt constrained to
underreport the level of pirate activity in their
jurisdictions. 44
Of the three greater Chesapeake colonies, Maryland
alone generally seems to have avoided the designation of
pirate resort or sanctuary, a circumstance which may be
attributed partly to geography and partly to effective
public relations.

Maryland lay further from both the sea

42 CRNC, I, 475.

43 Ibid., II, 396.
44 Clowse, Economic Beginnings, 88, 92.
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marauders' Caribbean bases and their favorite Atlantic coast
hunting grounds in the Gulf Stream (especially near the
entrance to the Chesapeake bay) than either Virginia or
North Carolina, and freebooters attending to business
farther north usually bypassed Maryland in favor of larger
maritime entrep6ts like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.
Additionally, Maryland legislators did their best to quash
any notion that their colony connived at or abetted any form
of maritime lawlessness.

In response to a 1701 inquiry from

the Lords of Trade concerning the conduct of the proprietary
governments and, specifically, the charge that "those
proprietary Collonys are the Ordinary refuge and retreate of
Pyrats and illegal traders," the Maryland House of Delegates
unequivocally declared that "as to Pyrates and illegal
Traders &c. This House say they never knew of any to be
harboured or favoured within this Province." 45
Such an emphatic assertion suggests that the delegates
either were extremely ignorant of their own recent history
or that they were engaging in a bit of self-serving
dissimulation.

Marylanders, as we have seen, not only had

countenanced and conducted illicit trade widely during the
preceding decades, but continued to do so in the eighteenth
century.

"As for piracy," William Penn contended in defense

of his own colony (which royal officials so frequently
denigrated as a buccaneer's haven), if Indian Ocean and Red

45 Md. A., XXIV, 212, 242 -43 •
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Sea freebooters had not "found a yearly supply of flower and
ammunition from some of our neighbouring Colonies

. . . and

then have returned these fellows upon us and our coasts
• we had never a spot upon our garrnent." 4 6

Although the

Pennsylvania proprietor neglected to specify the neighboring
provinces to which he was referring in this instance, he had
made particular reference earlier in the same 1700 memorial
to those "pirates, whose carnerades have long sown
themselves" in a number of colonies including his own,
Virginia, Carolina, and Maryland. 47

Several years

earlier, in response to a horne government inquiry concerning
"which of the Colonies have been more blameable in their
conduct towards pirates," New Jersey governor Basse
identified Maryland as one of four colonies (including
Virginia) where "persons suspected of being concerned in
these ill-designs have been entertained and settled." 48

Since Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland did not
boast large seafaring populations, particularly during the
piracy era, it is not surprising that none of these colonies
produced many pirates.

At one point during Queen Anne's

War, for example, Virginia officials reported that no
privateers had been fitted out in the colony to cruise
4 6 CSPC, XVIII, #366, p. 211.
47 Ibid., 209.
4 8 CSPC, XV, #1203, p. 568.
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against the enemy and they did not anticipate that any
would. 49

Nonetheless, a number of colonists did join

existing pirate bands, including those of Blackbeard and
Stede Bonnet, and a handful actually organized pirate crews
of their own. 50

In fact, each of the three greater

Chesapeake colonies had the distinction of producing at
least one practitioner of this "home-bred villany," as
Maryland governor John Seymour termed it in 1707.51
One of the earliest native Chesapeake pirates was Roger
Makeele (McKeel, or Meekeele), "a person of not onely evill
fame, but certainly of very bad life and conversation" who
in 1685, according to Maryland authorities, was operating
out of Watts Island in the bay near Accomack County.
Identified as a Virginia resident, Makeele conducted
depredations on both sides of the colonial border, but
perhaps to a greater extent in Maryland where he and his
accomplices were said to "frequently infest this Province as
Pirates and Robbers, violently assaulting plundering and
robbing the good people of this Province and others passing
to and fro." 52

Though Makeele's waterborne crew was

49 Howard Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The
First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725
(Toulon, France, 1926), 221.
5 0 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 104; Hugh Rankin, The
Pirates of Colonial North Carolina (Raleigh, 1988), 66,
70-71.
51 CRNC, I, 667.
52 Md. A., XVII, 351.
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thought to consist of only four men, he was aided by three
land-based allies on Watts Island and Maryland officials
suspected that he had additional "Confederates on the
adjacent Islands."

Despite the outlaw's many "villainies

insolencies and robberies" and a colony-wide call to all
sheriffs and other provincial officers for his apprehension,
Makeele apparently managed to avoid capture, possibly by
seeking sanctuary in North Carolina. 53
Among the last of the home-grown freebooters in the
greater Chesapeake during the colonial era was John Vidal,
whose failed career illustrates and was synchronous with the
decline of piracy in the region.

A former Bath, North

Carolina merchant who evidently grew impatient with the
lawful pursuit of wealth, Vidal attempted to seize several
ships entering Ocracoke Inlet in 1727.

After the Blackbeard

affair, the local population was hardly inclined to support
or ignore such brazen thievery with the result that Vidal
and two companions were quickly apprehended. 54

The

outlaws were sent to Virginia for trial where they were
convicted and sentenced to death, but a successful petition
to the governor saved Vidal's life. 55
53 Ibid., 35e-51; EJC, I, 68.
54 CRNC, II, 676-77; NCHCM, 1724-173e, liv, 2e3,
447-48; CSPC, XXXV, #69a, p. 347.
55 VMHB, XXXII, 242; CSPC, XXXV, #7a7, p. 353; NCHCM,
1724-173~iv.
Among those-responsible for initiating the
pardon appeal was Richard Fitzwilliam, former customs
collector for the lower James River district who had been
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The Chesapeake pirate who caused the greatest alarm in
the region, though, was Richard Clarke of Anne Arundel
County, Maryland.

Although Clarke first gained notoriety in

1704, several years after the House of Delegates denied that
the inhabitants of their colony ever aided or abetted
pirates, various aspects of his case suggest both a local
and a regional predisposition to offer sympathy and succor
to such maritime outlaws.

Official anxiety over this

support, as well as the perceived threat to the colony's
welfare, may explain the inordinate amount of time and
energy that Maryland authorities devoted to Clarke's capture
and the investigation of his activities and
associations. 56
Despite the provincial government's virtual obsession
with Clarke, it was mainly the prospect of his freebooting
and the contrivances related to it, as opposed to anything
he actually accomplished on the high seas, that excited such
great consternation in the highest administrative levels.
accused of corruption and countenancing pirates in 172~ by
Governor Spotswood and Captain Brand (Spotswood, Letters,
II, 326-38). By 1727 Fitzwilliam had been promoted to the
position of surveyor general of the king's customs for the
southern colonies (Andrews, Colonial Period of American
History, IV, 200).
5 6 Md. A., XXV-XXVII, passim.
In July 1705 Governor
Seymour complained to the Board of Trade that Clarke's
"treachery and villany" had been "no common misfortunes,
having allow'd me little ease since my tedious long voyage
hither" (CSPC, XXII, #1210, p. 550). The governor had no
way of knowing, of course, that he would continue to be
preoccupied with the elusive outlaw for almost three more
years.
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The only documented, successful case of piracy in which
Clarke was directly involved apparently occurred sometime
before September 17B5 when he and his cohorts, "suspected to
be going on a Pyratical design," commandeered the sloop
Little Hannah from Maryland's West River. 57

But by the

time that Governor Seymour issued the latest of several
calls for assistance in Clarke's capture to the Virginia and
North Carolina governments in 17B7, Maryland authorities had
discovered that the outlaw's larger "Pyratical design" was
far more ambitious, sinister, and threatening than anything
they had imagined.
In June 17B7 Seymour reported to the Board of Trade "a
new discovered peice of Villany that Richard Clarke with his
Gang of Runaway Rogues had concerted to Seize on our
Magazine, and burne this Towne and Port of Annapolis, & then
Steale a Vessell and turne pyrates." 58

A select committee

of the House of Delegates recently had determined that
Clarke's intention in setting part of the capital ablaze was
to create a diversion so that "whilst that Consternation
continued" the cutthroats might "seize the Magazine and
Powder House to furnish themselves with Arms and Ammunition"
for a freebooting expedition which would take them first to
North Carolina to outfit their vessel and eventually to

57 EJC, III, 28-29.
58 Md. A., XXV, 2 6 2.
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Madagascar to prey on Indian Ocean shipping. 59

Maryland

officials charged that, in the course of putting this
complex, "Cursed and wicked Design" into execution, Clarke
not only had engaged in piracy, but forgery, tobacco fraud,
and counterfeiting, and had conspired with hostile forces to
attack and destroy the colony. 6 ~
The search for Clarke and his accomplices is
significant in several respects.
were caught

First, some of the outlaws

which was unusual in itself -- and two were

taken, of all places, in that infamous pirate haven, North
Carolina.

Seymour's own astonishment is evident in a letter

to the Lords of Trade in which he describes how the
Carolinians "exprest their utmost Resentment against those
Villains • • • by endeavouring to take Clarke and actually
surrendering • • • two of his associates." 6 1

Why the

notoriously recalcitrant North Carolinians were so
cooperative in this instance is not clearly indicated, but
it may have had something to do with the colony's history of
Indian troubles and a perception that Clarke and his cohorts
represented a real danger in this regard.

Among the crimes

for which Maryland authorities sought Clarke was plotting
with the "heathen Indians • • • to Cutt off and Extirpate
S9 Ibid., XXVII, 134-35; EJC, III, 142.

~ Md. A., XXV, 185, 188; XXVI, 379, 45~-51, 453;
XXVII, 23, 26, 31, 33, 134; EJC, III, 28-29; VMHB, XVI,
75-76.
-6

6l CRNC, I, 666.
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the Inhabitants of this Province," and threatening to bring
3~,~~0

French Indians (not to mention a French naval force)

to attack the settlement.62
The most noteworthy aspect of the manhunt and the
government investigation was the extensive network of
support for Clarke and his accomplices that they revealed.
Indeed, according to Governor Seymour in 1707, it was
Clarke's having been "concealed and harboured by many of his
Friends" and relations in Maryland and Virginia that had
prevented his apprehension for nearly three years. 63

And,

despite the assistance that North Carolinians rendered in
apprehending Clarke's accomplices, it is clear from various
depositions that the outlaws felt confident enough in their
ability to operate safely out of Carolina to select it as
the staging ground for future freebooting enterprises. 64
How Clarke managed to garner support throughout the
greater Chesapeake is something of an enigma.

Early notices

of the malefactor, which portrayed him as an armed bandit
who had been riding about the province "threatning the Death
of Several! • • • Subjects • • • and putting the inhabitants
in Terrour of their Lifes & Robing their houses," hardly

XXII,

62 Md. A., XXVI,
#121~, p. 55~.

45~-51,

487, 513: CRNC, I, 66 6 ; CSPC,

63 CRNC, I, 666; ~' XVI, 76.
64 Md. A., XXVII, 13~-32, 135-36, 139.
In March 17~7
one deponent reported having been informed that Clarke was
living in North Carolina where he had purchased 6~~ acres of
land (Ibid., 131).
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seemed likely to endear him to his neighbors. 65

Nor did

Clarke's image, at least as it was reflected in official
documents, improve over time.

And yet, segments of

Maryland's population seemed remarkably unperturbed about
the presence of such an allegedly dangerous felon at large
in their midst.
Worse yet, from the royal governor's perspective, a
widespread sympathy for Clarke and his companions manifested
itself in the reluctance of Maryland legislators either to
seek the outlaws aggressively or, once apprehended, to
punish them harshly, and in the active support that many
colonists professed and demonstrated for the fugitives both
before and during their incarceration.

Within the colonial

government, differences of opinion over how to deal with
Clarke and his accomplices, in terms of both capture and
sentencing, reflect deeper philosophical divisions between
the various levels of Maryland's social and political
hierarchy over the broader issue of what sorts of behavior
actually constituted lawlessness in, or a serious threat to,
the colony.
When, for instance, the Council of Maryland initially
proposed that the assembly pass an act outlawing Richard
Clarke for "divers heinous offenses" said to include "riding
armed to the Terrour of the

• • • People in Contempt of the

Law and breach of his Matys Peace," the members of the House
65 Ibid., XXV, 185.
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of Delegates demurred, citing a lack of compelling evidence
that Clarke truly represented a clear and present
danger. 66

Conversely, the assemblymen acted with singular

decisiveness when, after having suggested to Governor
Seymour that he consider another option besides execution
for Benjamin Celie, one of Clarke's captured cohorts, the
chief executive responded that unless the House proposed a
specific alternative he was inclined to impose the death
sentence.

Quickly taking the matter "into their serious

Consideration," the assemblymen recommended banishing Celie
"or any other Thing which may save his Life •
very desirous that his Life may be saved." 67

we being
The idea of

transporting Celie out of the colony actually had been
proposed initially by the council (which had expressed a
similar desire to save the condemned man's life).

In view

of their previous advocacy of swift measures to outlaw and
capture the criminals, it appears that the councilors were
treading a middle ground between the conflicting sentiments
of the English royal governor and the largely native-born
Marylanders of the lower house. 6 8
Perhaps even more disconcerting to high government
officials were the results of an official investigation
which indicated that quite a few colonists had been
66 Ibid., XXV, 185.
67 Ibid., 51i}l.
68 Ibid., 459.
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supporting the malefactor and his "prodigal! Companions" not
simply in word, but in deed as we11. 69

In April 1705 the

council examined several suspects under "Violent
Presumption" of having assisted Benjamin Celie in breaking
out of jail. 7

°

Further inquiries revealed that Clarke's

mother had persuaded the local smith to slip the prisoner a
file, promising as a reward the termination of his
"Slavery," since Celie and Clarke were said to "know all the
Country over." 71

The council also chastised the commander

of the colony's rangers for not pursuing Clarke "with any
Sort of Discipline or Sence" and decided not to prosecute
one Edward Mariarte for providing the fugitive with a horse
and boat. 72
If one aim of the government hearings was to discourage
other colonists from abetting the outlaws in the future,
they clearly failed in this purpose.

By April 1707 a

frustrated governor and council complained that, although
grand juries had issued four bills of indictment against
Clarke over the past several years, "Yet divers evil Persons
have presumed to Receive Comfort and aide him whereby he has
been able to avoid Justice • • • Sculking within Tenn miles
of •

the Seate of Government and practiceing and
69 Ibid., XXV, 265.
70 Ibid., 188.

71 Ibid., XXVI, 463.
72 Ibid., XXV, 186, 187, 190.
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carrying on his Trayterous and wicked designs." 73

(The

authorities actually seem to have had Clarke in their grasp
on a number of occasions, but, according to Governor
Seymour, the felon had "made many Escapes from the
Sherriffs, and others who • • • had him in Custody.")74
Meanwhile, the government's continuing investigation
produced new and even more disquieting revelations about
Clarke's support network.

Deponents testified that Captain

Sylvester Welch, whom government officials had engaged to
lure Clarke into a trap, not only informed the outlaw of the
plan, but sold three pounds of the colony's gunpowder to one
of Clarke's accomplices. 75

Another man confessed to

"harbouring Entertaining and Concealing Richard Clarke in
his house" and Welch tacitly admitted that he had done the
same. 76

Perhaps most disturbing of all were the "Oaths of

two good Sufficient Evidences" that a member of the
assembly, Joseph Hill, had "Aided Abetted & Corresponded
with Richard Clarke." 77

Although Hill denied the charge,

73 Ibid., XXVII, 38.
74 VMHB, XVI, 76. Since none of these episodes is
detailed-rn-the documentary record, it is not known whether
Clarke contrived his own getaways or whether, like his
accomplice Benjamin Celie, he had assistance from friends or
relatives.
In any event, Governor Seymour advised his
Virginia counterpart to "give particular Charge for" the
fugitive's "being well Secured if apprehended" (Ibid.).
75 Md. A., XXV, 218-19, 220, 222; XXVII, 134.
76 Ibid., XXV, 221-22.

•

77 Ibid., XXVII, 41.
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the colony's attorney general considered the evidence
persuasive enough to pronounce him guilty of "high
misprision," after which the colony's legislators had little
choice but to expel their peer from the assembly.78
By July a dejected Governor Seymour seemed to despair
of ever apprehending the wanted man.

Striking at what he

believed to be the heart of the matter, Seymour lamented to
the Board of Trade that, although Clarke was "one of the
Greatest of Villains, Yet

• out of a foolish Conceipt of

his being a Stout Fellow, and Country borne, the Natives
being now growne up, and most of them in Offices, are very
backward, if not altogether unwilling to bring him in." 79
Within a year, though, Maryland authorities had Clarke in

78 Ibid., XXV, 43, 46-47, 51, 55, 118.
79 Ibid., 262-63. The governor's characterization of
the natives as being "growne up" with many holding office
refers to the emergence in Maryland at the turn of the
eighteenth century of a social and political elite composed
of native-born inhabitants as opposed to English immigrants.
The tension between Seymour and the colonists over the
latter's alleged complacency in bringing Clarke to justice
represents one manifestation of the diverging interests of
the colony and the home government that marked this pivotal
period in the colony's social and political evolution. That
the council alternately adopted positions in the Clarke
affair which seemed closer to those of the governor or the
assembly reflects the political reality that the councilors,
though residents of the colony (and, by this time, many of
them native born), were appointed by the royal governor.
For a detailed analysis of the demographic factors which led
to the development of a native-born elite as well as the
political ramifications of the phenomenon see David w.
Jordan, "Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native
Elite in Maryland" in The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth
Century, Tate and Ammerman, eds., 243-73, especially pp.
254, 260-61, 270-71.
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their hands.

How he came to be in custody is unclear since

there appears to be no documentary evidence relating to his
capture.

A letter from Clarke, dated January 30 and read at

an April 1708 council meeting, expressing "a deep sence of
the Horrour and detestation of his Crimes" and offering to
"Submitt himself to his Excys Mercy" suggests that the
fugitive may have given himself up. 80

Even with Clarke in

prison, though, the governor and his supporters could hardly
rest easily.

In fact, the stability of the colony seemed to

grow even more precarious.
At one council meeting a deponent testified to having
heard "some very wicked Expressions come out of the Mouth"
of one William Chew to the effect that if the authorities
hanged Clarke "they had best do it in private." 81

What

Chew meant by his remark was clarified by another informant
who reported a threat by one John Gay that "there would be
bloody noses before Clarke should be hanged." 82

The same

witness testified to the devotion of another Clarke admirer,
a Mr. Stokes, who declared that, though he had never met the
outlaw, yet "rather Than he should be hang'd he would give
fifty pounds if he had no more money in the World." 83

The

concern of some colonists for Clarke's well-being apparently
80 Md. A.

I

XXV, 236.

81 Ibid., 237.
82

~.,

241.

83 Ibid.
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extended to his abettors as well.

Regarding the prospect

that the government might further trouble former assemblyman
Joseph Hill, William Chew reportedly warned that those who
had a "Care for the Country will never Suffer it for there
was three hundred men in Baltemore County •

that would

stand by him," men who were "so intent upon the matter" that
they were currently "a scouring up their rusty pistolls" to
come to Hill's defense if necessary. 84
Apart from those in authority, practically the only
Chesapeake colonists to disavow Clarke publicly were
Maryland's Quakers who took pains to "utterly disowne and
deny" any relationship with a "wicked and ungodly man" who
had been guilty of such "Villainous abusive and Rebellious"
behavior against the provincial government.

It is apparent,

however, that another consideration equalled, and probably
superseded, the Quakers' concern about the morality of
Clarke's actions.

Someone, most likely Clarke himself, had

sent several letters to the governor "under a Quaker stile"
in an attempt, adherents of Maryland's Society of Friends
feared, to render them "obnoxious to this Civil! and
Moderate Government." 85

As members of a small and

vulnerable religious minority which had suffered severe
persecution in England and the colonies, the Quakers were
understandably sensitive to any aspersions on their loyalty
84 Ibid., 237-38.
85 Ibid., 260-61; CRNC, I, 666.
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as British subjects.

In the absence of such a threat it

seems doubtful that even they would have gone on record as
opposing Clarke and his confederates (whom the Friends also
professed to "detest and abominate"), a position which may
not have been popular with many of their fellow colonists in
the bay region who clearly sympathized with the outlaws.
In view of the continued grassroots support for the
desperado and his history of successful escapes from
custody, government officials wasted no time in sealing
Clarke's fate and precluding any public participation in
that decision.

At the same meeting in which witnesses

related Gay's and Stokes's remarks the governor and council
resolved that not only would Clarke have no trial by jury,
but he would have no trial at all.

Instead, they condemned

him to be executed within the week. 86

As Richard Clarke's case demonstrates, colonial
governors resorted to various expedients to suppress piracy
in the region, many of which suggest the colonists'
disinclination to assist in the capture of pirates or worse,
their willingness to shelter or actively collaborate with
the outlaws.

During periods of heightened pirate activity

in 1684, 17BB, and 17BS Maryland and Virginia governors
issued proclamations which not only requested the citizens'
assistance in apprehending pirates, but warned colonists of
86 Md. A., XXV, 24B.
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the dire consequences for those who offered succor to the
sea robbers. 87

Late in 1699 the governor of Virginia

offered a reward for the arrest of pirates who, he feared,
"may endeavor to

• conceal themselves by • • • coming on

shore • • • in hopes of being harbored by wicked & ill
disposed persons." 88

Parliament reflected the concern of

colonial officials when, in passing the 1699 act for the
suppression of piracy, it prescribed penalties not only for
convicted freebooters but also for those who aided and
abetted thern. 89
After local colonists entertained two groups of pirates
and helped them secrete their booty in 1720, Alexander
Spotswood employed a combination of incentives and penalties
to discourage such behavior in the future.

First, he

proposed instituting a system to reward those who turned
piratical effects over to the government. 90

On the

punitive side, Spotswood saw to it that six of eight pirates
who were apprehended at that time were executed; and, to
reinforce a message of warning to would-be pirates and their
collaborators, he considered it "necessary for the greater
Terrour to hang up four of them in Chains," two at Tindall's
8 7 EJC, I, 62-63; II, 69-70; III, 69; CSPC, XVIII,
#234, p.-r28.
88 EJC, II, 29-30.
89 Hening, Statutes, III, 178-79; Hughson, Carolina
Pirates, 42-43.
90 Spotswood, Letters, II, 340.
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Point on the York River and the other pair at Urbanna on the
Rappahannock. 91
Some of the tension between Chesapeake residents and
royal authorities specifically concerned the colonists'
alleged willingness to shelter not only established
freebooters, but also sailors who deserted from merchant
ships in order to join pirate crews.

In 1697 Maryland

Governor Nicholson expressed to the Board of Trade his "fear
that if some course not be taken to prevent • • • Pyrats
being harboured and entertained in these parts of the World,
as also run away seamen; That when please God, the next
Virginia and Maryland Fleet shall arrive they will be much
retarded in their loading, if some not be forced to stay in
the Countrey, by reason of the seamens running away." 92
Two years earlier Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence had
informed English authorities that the pirates' "sharing of
such large sums tempts the people of these parts to go along
with them, and they are a great hindrance to trade, for the
seamen run from the merchant ships to go with them." 93
Shortly thereafter, Governor Nicholson apprised the duke of
Shrewsbury that at least a hundred sailors, enticed by the

91 Ibid., 338; EJC, III, 522.
92 Md. A., XXIII 85.
9 3 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 519.
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sight of pirate booty, had deserted the Chesapeake tobacco
fleet and cast their lot with the sea brigands.94
Official anxiety regarding pirate activity and
influence in the region intensified once again in the years
following Queen Anne's War.

In 1718 Virginia governor

Spotswood reported to the Board of Trade that a former
quartermaster in Blackbeard's crew, William Howard, and some
other members of "that same gang" had arrived in the colony
and, "assembling in great numbers with their arms," had
attempted to "debauch some sailors out of the merchant ships
to join them."

The presence and demeanor of the buccaneers

were disturbing enough, but what Spotswood found
particularly disconcerting was that the "Officers of the
Government could find none to assist in the disarming and
suppressing that gang."

Stung by what he regarded as an

unconscionable failure to support the rule of law, the
exasperated governor could offer no explanation for the
colonists' behavior except as a further indication of their
"unaccountable inclination to favour pyrates." 95
Underlying the apprehensions of governors such as
Spotswood concerning the menace that sea marauders posed to
shipping and trade was the fear, articulated by Governor
Nicholson in 1692, that "these • • • pirates when they have
94 Ibid., i1897, p. 511.
9 5 Ibid., XXX, i8~B, p. 432; "William Howard, the
Pirate,"~er's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical
Magazine, I (1919), 36.
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spent lavishly what they have got, then they are ready, if
not before, to make disturbance in the government." 96
Nicholson's anxiety clearly had not abated by

17~~

when he

issued a proclamation ordering all colonial officials and
inhabitants to seize any "such horrid & hainous offenders"
who might come ashore "as Spies to discover the State of the
Country." 97

The threat of an internal pirate insurrection

obviously worried Maryland officials in

17~5

when, in

enacting the statute outlawing Richard Clarke, they drew
attention first and foremost to the accused criminal's "very
wicked and treasonable conspiracy • • • to Seize upon the
Magazine •

and overturn her Majesties Government." 9 8

After the pirate infestation of Chesapeake waters
toward the end of the second decade of the eighteenth
century, Daniel Defoe expressed his conviction that official
fears of a pirate uprising were fully justified.

"The

Pyrates had obtained such an Acquisition of Strength," he
asserted, "that they were in no Concern about preserving
themselves from the Justice of Laws, but of advancing their
Power, and maintaining their Sovereignty, not over the Seas
only, but to stretch their Dominions to the Plantations
themselves." 99

Indeed, the factor which may have been

96 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 2~8.
97 EJC, II, 85.
98 Md. A., XXVI, 513.

99 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 87.
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most instrumental in motivating Governor Spotswood to mount
the expedition against Blackbeard was the pirate's
rendezvous with another notorious sea robber, Charles Vane,
at Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina; there, the governor
feared, the buccaneers were seeking to establish a permanent
base of operations to replace the ones they could no longer
occupy safely in the Caribbean. 1 ~~

Unfortunately, as

usual, the pirates themselves generally remained mute on the
subject.

But the hint of a subversive or, at least,

anarchistic impulse is evident in the contemptuous and
defiant last words of one buccaneer captured and condemned
during Spotswood's administration who proclaimed, as he
stood upon the gallows, "Damnation to the Gov. & Confusion
to the Colony." 1 ~ 1
In view of the public's general toleration of,
willingness to deal with, and, in some instances, active
collaboration with the freebooters, royal officials in the
1 ~~

Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 138; (EllmsJ,
Pirates Own Book, 352. Writing to the Board of Trade a
month after Blackbeard's defeat, Spotswood prided himself on
having "prevented a design of the most pernicious
consequence to the trade of these Plantations • • • that of
the pyrats fortifying an Island at Ouacock Inlett and making
that a general rendezvouze of such robbers" (CSPC, XXX,
#8~~, p. 431).
In a subsequent letter to one-or-the
Carolina proprietors explaining his actions in the
Blackbeard affair, the governor reiterated his point,
emphasizing the "necessity of preventing the Growth of so
dangerous a Nest of Pyrates in the very road of the Trade of
Virginia and Maryland, as well as of your Lords'p's
Province" (Spotswood, Letters, II, 275).
1~1 Cited in Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 224
and Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 274.
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greater Chesapeake must have wondered to whom the colonists
might offer their allegiance in the event that pirates grew
so bold as to attempt to wrest actual control of a colonial
government.

The deeper suspicion that the sympathies of

some segments of the populace lay more with the pirates than
with ruling authorities is evident in official
communications expressing reluctance to release information
about plans to capture pirates.

When Captain Kidd was

reported to be in the vicinity of the Eastern Shore in 1699,
the Council of Virginia ordered colonial officials to do
their utmost to seize him, but advised against publicizing
the order "lest intimacon be given, to the said pirates, and
they thereby Enabled to Escape." 1 ~ 2

In the aftermath of

the expedition against Blackbeard in 1718 Governor Spotswood
confessed that he had exercised similar discretion in
preparing for the attack because of "the many favourers of
Pyrates we have in these Parts some of [whom] might send
Intelligence to Tach."l03
The most revealing aspect of Spotswood's declaration,
however, concerns his apprehension about announcing the plan
to anyone, even the highest officials in the governments of
his own and neighboring colonies.

Responding to criticism

that he had failed to notify the governor of North Carolina
of the intended attack, Spotswood explained that "the

1~2 EJC, I, 422-23: ~' VIII, 192.
103 Spotswood, Letters, II, 276.
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business required such Secresy, that I did not so much as
communicate to His Maj'ty's Council here, nor to any other
Person but those who were necessarily to be employed in the
Execution." 104
The Virginia governor may have distrusted North
Carolina officials because of a history of suspected
collusion with pirates dating back to the previous century.
In 1691 the Carolina proprietors instructed North Carolina
governor Philip Ludwell to investigate charges that the man
whom he had replaced in office, Seth Sothel, accepted
payment from pirates in exchange for privateering
commissions. 105

Edward Randolph alleged that about a

year later both Ludwell and Sothel "inriched themselves" in
a scheme involving pirate booty. 106

The surveyor general

even accused one of the Carolina proprietors of sheltering
pirates "for which favour he was well paid by them." 107
By the turn of the century, the predilection of Carolina
residents and their political leaders for welcoming
freebooters was accepted universally.

"As to Carolina," the

Commissioners of Trade concluded in a 1701 report to the
House of Lords, "the misbehavior and ill conduct of the

104 Ibid.
105 CRNC, I, 383.
106 Randolph, Letters, V, 180.
107 ~., 264i CRNC, I, 545.
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governors and inhabitants • • • in harbouring and protecting
• pirates, is notorious."l~8
In the Blackbeard affair, Spotswood's concern focused
primarily on North Carolina governor Charles Eden and his
secretary of state, chief justice, and customs collector,
Tobias Knight.

The extent to which Eden and Knight actually

collaborated with Blackbeard as accessories to piracy is a
matter of considerable debate.

In the immediate aftermath

of Blackbeard's defeat Spotswood was careful not to offend
Eden's

superio~s

directly. 1 ~ 9

by implicating the suspect governor

Nevertheless, he advised the Carolina

proprietors that the "Governm't of No. Carolina admitted
Thach and his Crew to make Oath" that a French ship which
the pirate almost certainly seized unlawfully (after
accepting the king's pardon) had been recovered as an
abandoned wreck at sea and that the freebooters subsequently
"went out again on the same piratical design, not without
the privity of some in principal Stations in that

Gov't." 11 ~
Spotswood's insinuations gained support from other
quarters.

Daniel Defoe reported that, as a result of

officially condemning the French ship, the governor received
"sixty Hogsheads of Sugar for his Dividend, and • • • Mr.
108 Stock, Debates, II, 4~~.
109 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, XXXV.

l1~ Spotswood, Letters, II, 318-19.
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Knight, twenty," while the rest "was shared among the other
Pyrates." 111

Public criticism of the proprietary

government also emerged from within the colony itself when a
group led by prominent citizens and renowned Indian fighters
Edward Moseley and Maurice Moore sought to discover tangible
evidence of the government's collusion with pirates.
Refused permission to. examine the colony's records, the
company broke into the home of John Lovick, the province's
deputy secretary (who would later be charged with embezzling
the proceeds from the sales of ships condemned for illicit
trade), where many of the documents were kept.

Colonial

officials arrested the group for unlawful entry and further
charged that "Moseley did Malitiously openly Contemptuously
and Opprobriously

• Speak Publish utter and Declare • •

• false Malitious Scandalous Opprobrious and seditious words
and speeches" against government officials.

The specific

accusation levelled by Moseley which seems to have struck a
particularly raw nerve among the colony's top officials was
that the "Governor Cheif Justice and others with him • • •
could easily procure Armed men to come and Disturb Quiett
and honest men •

but could not (tho' such a number would

have done) raise them to Destroy Thach" who instead "was
Suffered to go on in his Vilanies."ll2
111 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 76.
ll 2 NCHCM, 17~9-1723, 199-2~1, 2~8-~9; CRNC, II, 359.
If, as the actions of Moseley and company imply, Lovick and
Eden were partners in collusion with Blackbeard, subsequent
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Alternatively, a legal scholar has argued in Eden's
defense that the North Carolina governor's actions in
granting Blackbeard the king's pardon, performing a marriage
ceremony for him, condemning the French ship as a prize, and
accepting a sizable reward in connection with that seizure
all constituted justifiable and even, in some instances,
requisite conduct for a man in Eden's official
position. 113

But most contemporary accounts and

events demonstrate that there was little honor between these
alleged thieves.
In 1724, several years after Eden's death,
the former governor's relatives petitioned North Carolina
authorities for redress against Lovick (whom Eden had
designated as sole executor of his will) for having
"Illegally Possest himself of the said Governor Eden Estate"
and having "fraudulently obtained the same" (CRNC, II, 536).
Six years later, the colony's attorney general took up the
cause and sued Lovick for failing to convey or account for
the money due to Eden's family and for "Intending to defraud
not only them but his Majesty likewise" (N.C. St. Arch., CCR
142, doc. 24).

113 Lee, Blackbeard, 74-84. Lee's argument rests on
several points: that Eden's performance of the marriage
ceremony, particularly in view of the dearth of ministers in
the colony, was in "strict accord" with North Carolina law
which empowered the governor or any council member to
conduct such services; that, in the absence of proof that
the French ship was not a derelict, as Blackbeard insisted
it was, Eden was obliged to condemn the vessel; and that
Eden's acceptance of the 60 hogsheads of sugar after the
condemnation proceeding was simply the governor's lawful due
as admiral of the colony. Blackbeard's claim of having
discovered the French ship, undamaged, simply abandoned on
the high seas must be considered highly dubious, though.
In
defense of Eden's actions, however, Lee contends that it was
only after Teach's death that any evidence of wrongdoing
regarding the French vessel came to light and that the
pirate's story was believable because of similar occurrences
over the years in the treacherous waters off the North
Carolina coast (also see NCHCM, 1709-1723, xxxv-xxxvi and
Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 92-94).
In particular, Lee cites the cases of H.M.S. Swift
(1698, see below, chapter 7), the Patriot (1813), and the
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subsequent analyses tend to agree with the assertion of an
early nineteenth-century source that "the gold of Black
Beard rendered him comely in the governor's eyes.nll4
Whether or not Eden actively sought to profit from piratical
depredations, it appears that he maintained a cordial
relationship with Blackbeard and that Spotswood had reason
to suspect that his North Carolina counterpart might not
cooperate in the planned attack.

Daniel Defoe went so far

as to assert that, despite Lieutenant Robert Maynard's
caution in intercepting all the boats he met en route to
Ocracoke Inlet to prevent Blackbeard from receiving advance
notice of the foray, the pirate nevertheless "had
Information of the Design" from none other than "his
Excellency of the Province," Governor Eden. 115

Whether

Carroll A. Deering (1921) in which vessels were found washed
ashore with no one aboard. Although the last case remains a
complete mystery, Lee curiously neglects to mention evidence
suggesting that the crew and passengers of the Patriot
(including Theodosia Alston, daughter of former vicepresident Aaron Burr) may have been captured, murdered, and
disposed of by pirates (Stick, Graveyard of the Atlantic, 58).
In any event, one would think that the rarity of such
incidents and Blackbeard's past behavior should have led
North Carolina officials to suspect foul play in the seizure
of the French ship.
ll4 [Ellms], Pirates Own Book, 338; Watson, 222.
William Saunders, editor of the first series of the Colonial
Records of North Carolina, wrote that Eden's reputation as
governor had been tarnished "by the not groundless suspicion
of having been the protector and partner of pirates" (CRNC,
II, viii).
---llS Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 79.
In an appendix
to A General History of the Pyrates Defoe subsequently
reversed himself on the matter of the governor's complicity
and instead became an apologist for Eden, citing the
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or not this particular charge was true, it is clear that
when Blackbeard proceeded to victimize North Carolina
traders, it was Spotswood, not their own governor, to whom
the merchants turned for help.ll6
Knight's complicity is considerably less ambiguous than
Eden's.

A 1717 letter from the church wardens and vestrymen

of Pasquotank Precinct to the Secretary of the Society for
the Propagation of the Gospel indicates that Knight's
integrity as a colonial official was suspect even before the
Blackbeard incident.

Money that had been donated to the

precinct for the building of a church was then in the hands
of "Knight who by one artifice or other," the churchmen
feared, would "in all probability deprive the Parish of that
money." 117

The suspicion that Knight had colluded with

Blackbeard in condemning the French ship in order to share
in the spoils apparently was confirmed when Royal Navy
guardship captain Ellis Brand questioned the Carolina
official after Blackbeard's defeat.

According to Brand's

sworn deposition, the secretary initially denied any
proprietary official's weakness in the face of Blackbeard's
force of men and arms and arguing that he had proceeded
according to the law in condemning the French ship. Manuel
Schonhorn, editor of the most recent ·edition of the pirate
history, has suggested that Defoe's sympathetic
re-evaluation of the governor may have been influenced by
Carolina merchants in London who had employed the author to
write several tracts for them (Defoe, History of the
Pyrates, 669).
116 Spotswood, Letters, II, 273.
117 ~, II, 292.
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knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the French goods,
but when Brand advised him "of the proofs he

co~ld

bring • •

• Knight owned the whole matter and the piratical Goods • •
• were found in his Barn covered over with fodder." 1 1 8

A

second piece of incriminating evidence concerned a letter
dated November 17, only days before Maynard's attack, which
was found in Blackbeard's cabin addressed to the pirate and
signed "your real ffriend. And Servant

T. Knight."

Although the letter is vague in its details (probably
intentionally so), Knight did convey a sense of urgency
about the need to meet as soon as possible in order to
discuss "something more • • • than at present I can
write." 119

The instances in which colonists responded to official
requests for assistance in the capture of pirates stand in
stark contrast to the complicity of North Carolina
authorities in the Blackbeard affair and previous piratical
episodes.

But the public support that was so conspicuous

and indispensable in the capture of Clarke's accomplices and
Vidal and his companions represents an anomaly in the
history of maritime law enforcement in the Chesapeake.
rarely did the many promises of reward and more frequent
threats of punishment succeed in persuading colonists to
llS Ibid, 344.
119 Ibid, 343-44; Lee, Blackbeard, 146.
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stop dealing with pirates and surrender them to the
authorities.

Throughout the seven decades or so that piracy

seriously threatened the region, the only consistently
effective and dependable strategy against sea marauders was
a concerted show of force initiated by a determined governor
and executed by a stalwart commander aboard a seaworthy and
well-armed fighting ship.

Such decisive action enabled

Governors Nicholson and Spotswood to fashion stunning
victories over menacing pirates in
respectively.

17~0

and 1718,

But as zealous as some colonial officials

were in pursuing pirates, and as successful as they might be
in capturing them, all their efforts could lead to naught if
provincial courts failed to convict the outlaws.
The judicial system in the colonies had already
developed a reputation for leniency towards sea robbers by
1688 when English authorities prohibited the trial of
pirates in the colonies without special permission.l 20
The previous year the colonial proprietors felt compelled to
order the suppression of certain legal procedures which had
been utilized to exonerate freebooters in Carolina.l2l
In

169~

British officials complained to Virginia governor

Lord Howard that pirates were being brought to trial in the
colony too quickly to mount effective prosecutions, thereby
120 EJC, I 1~7-~8; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake,

83.
121 Carroll, Historical Collections, I, 1~6; Hughson,
Carolina Pirates, 26.
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facilitating the acquittal of guilty freebooters by already
sympathetic juries. 122

Frustration with the reluctance

of the general courts to convict pirates induced the home
government to mandate in the Navigation Act of 1696 the
establishment of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, a
measure intended to eradicate complicity between pirates and
their colonial partners and sympathizers.l 2 3
The provisions of the 1696 act took some time to
implement, however, and even when applied did not always
guarantee that pirates would be tried in vice-admiralty
courts.

In 1700 the French pirate Lewis Guittar and 90

members of his captured crew were sent back to England,
according to the terms of their surrender, for trial and
eventual execution. 124

But because of a technicality

concerning the manner of their arrest, three of the pirates
were tried by jury in the Elizabeth City County
courthouse. 125

The jury found two of the defendants

guilty, but acquitted the third, Francois Delaunee, because
of kindnesses performed on behalf of innocent captives
aboard the pirate vessel.l 26

When the shocked

122 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, I, 678.
12 3 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 313-14.
124 EJC, II, 76-94.
125 Trials of John Houghling, Cornelius Franc, and
Francois Delaunee, C05/1411, fos. 362-415.
126 Ibid., fos. 391, 392, 394, 395.
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prosecutor, Attorney General Edmund Jennings, demanded that
the jurors reconsider the evidence, the colonists insisted
that they had acted according to their consciences and
refused to reverse their verdict.

Jennings then had to

arraign Delaunee on a second charge and find another group
of jurors to indict, try, and condemn him to death.l27
Similar considerations motivated Maryland authorities
to take summary legal action in dispatching Richard Clarke.
Before Clarke's final incarceration, Governor Seymour
despaired that, even if could bring the outlaw to justice,
no provincial court would convict him.

"Wee shall allways

want Iurys to do her Matye comon Iustice on the Countrye
borne," he lamented to the Board of Trade in 17~7.1 2 8
The following year, with Clarke in custody, he and the
Maryland council acted on that conviction.

Deliberating

over the question of whether Clarke "being attainted of high
Treason and Fellony ought to have any day in Court given
him," the council and provincial court judges decided in the
negative and unanimously recommended the convicted felon's
speedy execution.l29
Similarly, Governor Spotswood managed to avoid any
potential difficulties with provincial juries in 1718 when a
vice-admiralty court in Williamsburg convicted and condemned
1 27 Ibid., fos. 395, 396, 4~4.
128 Md. A., XXV, 263.
129 Ibid., 24~.
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thirteen captured members of Blackbeard's crew to death by
hanging.

But the governor was distressed by other legal

developments related to the case.

In the expectation that

Tobias Knight would be indicted for his alleged complicity
with Blackbeard, Spotswood sent Governor Eden depositions
from the trial which implicated Knight as a pirate
collaborator.

Considering the evidence at a hearing held

during a meeting of the North Carolina council in May 1719,
the councilors found Knight not guilty on the grounds that
four of the witnesses were "no other than foure Negroe
Slaves • • • and that the other Evidences," which included
Captain Brand's testimony, were simply "false and

malitious." 13 ~

Spotswood made no attempt to conceal his

indignation when he wrote to the Carolina proprietors about
the behavior of their colonial officials:
there are some in y't Government y't endeavor to
justify Thach and his crew as very honest men, and
to condemn the Officers and Men belonging to the
King's Ships as Murderers for attacking and
subduing them • • • And tho' I am Credibly
inform'd that Affidavits are taken in No. Carolina
to contradict what has plainly been proved here
upon the Tryal of the pirats • • • I hope the
Lords Proprietors themselves w'll give little
Credit to such Clandestine Testimonials when they
shall know how dark apart some of their Officers
have acted, particularly one who enjoyed the post
of secretary Chief Justice, one of theif rord'p's
Deputy's and Collectors of the Customs. 3

13~ CRNC, II, 345-46.

131 Spotswood, Letters, II, 318-19.
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Spotswood grew equally irritated with the conduct of
some officials in his own colony.

Prior to the November

attack in North Carolina, two guardship officers -Lieutenant Maynard (leader of the Blackbeard expedition) and
his commander, Captain George Gordon -- had arrested William
Howard, Blackbeard's former quartermaster, for conspiring to
commit piracy. 132

Howard retained John Holloway, a

distinguished Williamsburg attorney, former naval officer
for the lower James River district, and Speaker of the House
of Burgesses for many years, to represent him.

In 1719

Holloway initiated a suit against Maynard and Gordon on the
grounds that they had falsely imprisoned Howard.

Spotswood

was eager to prosecute the accused pirate in a
vice-admiralty court and eventually succeeded in doing so,
but not before encountering "a strong opposition from some
of the Council agt • • • that manner of trial." 133
The governor ran afoul of Holloway and popular
sentiment again in 1721 when a Virginia vice-admiralty court
ordered the arrest of three English shipmasters suspected of
having traded with pirates in Madagascar. 134

Once more,

Holloway represented the defendants and was castigated by
Spotswood, as he had been previously, for being "a constant

132 Ibid., 353; CSPC, XXX, #8~~, p. 43~; "William
Howard," 'ifY'ler's Quart:e'rly, I, 36.
133 CSPC, XXX, #8~~, p. 43~; EJC, IV, 384.
134 Spotswood, Letters, II, 351; EJC, III, 55~.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270

patron and Advocate for Pirates" and for seeking profit
indiscriminately "from what vile means soever it
comes." 135

Two of the defendants, Richard Herbert and

Chalonce Williams, were dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence but the third, Joseph Stratton, was sent to England
to stand trial as an accessory to piracy.
The guardship that transported Stratton to England
departed so quickly that Spotswood was unable to deliver the
indictment detailing Stratton's alleged offenses.

But in a

peculiar reversal of the situation that so disturbed British
authorities in 1690, the accelerated pace of justice in this
case was perceived by angry colonists as a deceitful ploy by
the authorities to insure the defendant's conviction.

As

the somewhat perplexed governor confessed, "tho' I • • • am
not entirely satisfied w'th Williams being discharged, yet
so great is the Clamour here on Acc't of the Carrying off
Stratton, without allowing him the liberty of taking w'th
him ye Evidences he had for his Justification, that I durse
not Venture upon a Re-examination into Williams'
conduct." 136

Although Spotswood continued to anguish over the pirate
threat for several years, hesitating to cross the ocean for
fear of the vengeance that some buccaneers had sworn to
135 Spotswood, Letters, II, 319, 354.
136 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271
wreak upon him, the impact on piracy in the colonies as a
result of Blackbeard's defeat was much more profound than
almost anyone realized at the time. 1 3 7

William Byrd

still lamented in 1719 that sea "Rogues swarm in this part
of the World," and Hugh Jones reported five years later that
the Chesapeake required nothing so much as strong guardships
to protect the colony from "pyrates who abominably infest
their seas and coasts." 1 3 8

But after 1718 the region was

never seriously menaced by piracy again.

By the mid-1720s

piracy in the Chesapeake area had degenerated into a petty,
sporadic, and essentially local affair.
Blackbeard's defeat not only disheartened the pirates
themselves, but marked the beginning of a gradual, though
perceptible, change in the relationship between colonists
and pirates.

A mid-nineteenth-century historian concluded

that "The death of Blackbeard and his immediate companions •
doubtless broke the connexion with us on shore." 139
The larger connection between English pirates and the
British empire had already been under strain for some time.
Various political and economic factors -- the decisions of
the European powers to seek advantage through trade rather
than plunder, the collective realization that piracy was

137 Ibid., 352.
138 VMHB, XXXII, 25; CSPC, XXXIV, #210, p. 112;
Middleton;-TObacco Coast, 356.
1 3 9 Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, II, 225.
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damaging the commerce of all nations, the failure of English
pirates to restrict their depredations to the shipping of
foreign nations, and the ability to reduce the size of
shipping crews and expand cargo areas once the threat of
piracy was removed -- already had precipitated a general
decline in piracy in the New world.l40
More localized phenomena also may have contributed to
an erosion of support for piracy in the Chesapeake itself.
In the 1670s both Maryland and Virginia passed legislation
prohibiting the further importation of convicts from England
because of growing fears that such traffic constituted a
threat to the peace of the two colonies.

In 1718 the

English government, which during peacetime could no longer
absorb convicts into the army, enacted a law nullifying the
colonial statutes and sanctioning the transportation of
felons to the Chesapeake. 141

The perception of an

increased incidence of serious crimes, particularly where
the convict population was most concentrated, was such that
after only four years historian Robert Beverley reported
that "the Country • • • has already suffer'd many Murthers
and Robberies, the Effects of that new Law of

140 Shepherd and Walton, Maritime Trade, 81; Ritchie,
Captain Kidd, 236-37; Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 74-75.
141 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 165-67.
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England." 142

With the apprehension created by so many

potentially dangerous criminals having been planted so
recently in their midst, it seems likely that the colonists
would have hesitated to encourage the presence of other
outlaws whose motives could not always be trusted.l43
The prospect that convicts and pirates might support
and cooperate with each another at the colonists' expense
also must have caused some local anxiety.

An equally

alarming possibility, that the dangers normally posed by
pirates and convicts as distinct entities might manifest
themselves in combination in the same individuals, appears
to have actually occurred in at least one documented
instance.

In 1716 British Secretary of State Peter Metheun

forwarded to Governor Spotswood several lists of "rebel
prisoners ordered to be transported to Virginia," one of
which included the name of ''Wm. Howard," almost certainly

1 42 Robert Beverley, The History of Virginia, in Four
Parts (London, 1722), book IV, chapter 15, section 67;
Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 165-69; Frederick H. Schmidt,
"British Convict Servant Labor in Colonial Virginia" (Ph.D.
diss., College of William and Mary, 1976), 272.
For similar
testimony by Governor Gooch and others, see A. Roger Ekirch,
Bound for America: The Transportation of British Convicts to
the Colonies 1718-1775 (Oxford, 1987), 167-68.
14 3 A. Roger Ekirch has argued persuasively that,
despite the apprehensions of local inhabitants, transported
convicts were not responsible for a high proportion of the
crime committed in the Chesapeake. Nevertheless, what is
significant in this context is the colonists' belief,
regardless of its accuracy, that the presence of English
felons constituted a serious menace to the safety of the bay
region (Ekirch, Bound for America, chapter 6, especially pp.
167-77).
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the same William Howard who later served as Blackbeard's
quartermaster and so agitated Spotswood with his alleged
threats to the peace and security of the colony (not to
mention his lawsuits against the Royal Navy officers who
arrested him). 144
Local economic factors also may have played a part in
the pirates' diminished popularity in the region.

It has

been suggested, for example, that well before Blackbeard's
time smuggling had already begun to supersede commerce with
pirates as the preferred means of acquiring European and
West Indian goods at below-market prices.l4S

And

although specie continued to remain scarce, the
establishment in 1730 of the tobacco inspection system, in
which transfer notes functioned as an additional and more
accessible medium of exchange, probably lessened the
incentive for colonists to deal with pirates in order to
obtain foreign coin.l46
Chesapeake residents also had to re-evaluate their
personal relationships with pirates, associations which had
always been based on the assumption that the colonists would

144 CSPC, XXIX, i310 ii, p. 168. Dated August 1716,
Metheun•s-reiter also indicates that the home government had
resumed the practice of transporting felons to the
Chesapeake well before passage of the 1718 legislation which
officially authorized it.
145 Rediker, "Anglo-American Sailors," 54.
146 Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 107~ Middleton,
Tobacco Coast, 140.
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be among the beneficiaries, not the victims, of the
freebooters' depredations.

Blackbeard, who had been so

careful not to offend his provisioners in Philadelphia or,
at first, his hosts in North Carolina, violated the terms of
that unspoken agreement when he plundered local traders in
Ocracoke Inlet.

By doing so, he sowed the seeds of his own

destruction and, more broadly, the demise of piracy in the
greater Chesapeake.

Only when the Blackbeard case

demonstrated that pirates could no longer be depended on to
work with the colonists and exempt them from predatory
assaults does it appear that Chesapeake residents began to
realize that supporting piracy might no longer serve their
interests.
This change in attitude did not take hold immediately.
Two years after the death of Blackbeard and his captured
cohorts, members of a pirate crew who came ashore in York
County and Hampton received a friendly reception from
resident planters and local tavern-goers.

Yet, despite

their apparently non-threatening demeanor, the pirates were
reported to local authorities, arrested, and executed.
Several years later there is evidence to indicate that
piracy -- which in the past had been winked at, aided and
abetted, and even actively pursued by the Chesapeake
colonists and their government officials -- had by then
become anathema in the region, even in North Carolina.
After the arrest of John Vidal for piracy in 1727 an unusual
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case was brought before the North Carolina general court.
Roger Kenyon sued Andrew Frazier for alleging that the
former had refused to assist in apprehending Vidal and for
"insinuating that the sayd Roger Kenyon was ayding advising
and abetting the sayd Pyrates By all which • • • The
plaintiff" claimed to have been "highly injured and
damnifyed."

Kenyon's sensitivity to the "false scandalous

bass detractions and aspersions" and Frazier's attempt "to
defame and injure • • • his good name" by linking the
plaintiff with maritime outlaws suggests that the popularity
of pirates in the Chesapeake had declined to an
unprecedented level.l47

And indeed it had.

By 1730 pirates and their

collaborators in the region had become, for all practical
purposes, relics of a bygone era. 148

But although piracy

147 NCHCM, 1724-1730, 448.
14 8 Ibid. Piracy nonetheless continued to maintain a
strange hold on the public imagination, a fascination which
transcended economic motives and reflected a certain empathy
with and sympathy for the pirates' cause, just as the
colonists' propensity to acquit pirates in the colonial
courts had indicated in the past. This peculiar mystique
manifested itself in odd ways in the popular culture of the
Chesapeake. When Blackbeard's severed head was brought to
Hampton along with the surviving members of his crew, it was
set on a pole as a warning. According to legend, it
remained there for many years until it was taken down,
fashioned into a large drinking vessel and long used at
Williamsburg's Raleigh Tavern (Watson, Annals of
Philadelphia, II, 221). There, we might imagine,
eighteenth-century pirate aficionados imbibed from the
venerable icon, recounting Blackbeard's career, and
recalling his prodigious drinking feats, perhaps
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had lost its allure for many of the region's inhabitants,
other forms of maritime lawlessness clearly had not.
Chesapeake residents continued to seize opportunities, not
only as Governor Gooch observed, to engage in clandestine
trade, but also to benefit illegally from the misfortunes of
those whose vessels carne to grief along their shores.

simultaneously emulating them. A strong sense of
identification with the pirate persisted into the early
twentieth century when a Virginia genealogist took pride in
claiming Blackbeard as a native son (despite convincing
evidence to the contrary), a spiritual descendant of what
Governor Spotswood disdainfully referred to in 1718 as "the
many favourers of Pyrates we have in these Parts" (Thomas T.
Upshur, "Eastern Shore History," VMHB, IX, 95; Spotswood,
Letters, II, 274).
----
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CHAPTER VII
"Having not the fear of God • • • and • • • alegiance
to • • • the King not regarding": Wrecking

Contraband trading, customs fraud, and, before the
172~s,

even collaborating with pirates represented illegal

activities which were subject to human control and normally
involved a degree of forethought, planning, and
coordination.

But another type of lawlessness on the

maritime frontier of the greater Chesapeake differed
distinctly in these respects.

The looting of stranded

vessels, or "wrecking," was based on serendipitous
occurrences (at least from the wreckers' point of view)
which generally did not result from the active efforts of
the beneficiaries.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the

spontaneous, irregular, and infrequent nature of these
episodes, the phenomenon of wrecking offers an opportunity
to examine how Chesapeake residents reacted when a chance
for sudden, illegal aggrandizement presented itself,
particularly in remote areas far from the immediate reach of
law enforcement officials.
and

175~,

Four such incidents between 1698

two involving English royal guardships and two

involving Spanish treasure fleets, provide insight into not
278
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only the behavioral tendencies of the colonists who
exploited those accidents, but also the attitudes and
capacities of the governing authorities charged with
safeguarding royal prerogatives, maintaining order, and
punishing the lawbreakers.

By September 1698 Edward Randolph had finished
administering an oath to uphold the 1696 Act for Preventing
Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade to the
governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

For the

surveyor general the occasion represented something of a
personal triumph.

Having been scorned for years by many

Chesapeake colonists because of his reports detailing the
methods and extent of illicit trade in their region, he had
finally convinced royal authorities of the need for more
aggressive and responsible law enforcement.

Next he planned

to administer the oath in North Carolina, a colony he had
often criticized for being soft on pirates and illegal
trade.

"I am at last going to Carolina," the customs

officer declared, "from whence (if it please God I live &
escape the pyrates) I shall send an Account of the present
State thereof to their LordsPPS.nl
Given Carolina's widespread and unenviable reputation
as a refuge of freebooters and other lawbreakers, an even
more detailed and scathing account of improprieties might
1 Randolph, Letters, V, 192.
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have been anticipated from Randolph's first visit to the
province.

But such a report would never be composed.

Ironically, it was not piracy, but another form of maritime
illegality that prevented Randolph from performing his duty.
In late January H.M.S. Swift, the royal guardship that was
to have transported the surveyor general, was driven out of
the James River by a storm, abandoned by her crew, and
stranded on North Carolina's Outer Banks where she
eventually became a total loss.
The wreck of the Swift must have been profoundly
disturbing to crown officials for several reasons.

Not only

had a royal guardship been lost due, according to Randolph,
to the incompetence of her commander, but the coast now lay
open to depredations by pirates and foreign privateers, not
to mention exploitation by illicit traders.

Perhaps most

disconcerting of all, those apparently responsible for the
destruction of the vessel -- or, at least, the failure to
save it -- were English subjects, local residents of the
Outer Banks and their colonial officials.

Reports from

various sources suggest that the ship might have been
rescued had it not been for the rapacity of the local
population and the alleged failure of the provincial
government to respond effectively and expeditiously to the
calamity.
Foremost among the critics of colonial officials was
the captain of the grounded vessel, Nathaniel Bostock, who
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complained that, despite having "used every effort to get
the ship off," he had "not the assistance that might have
been procured, and the Government of Carolina protested
their inability, though not so good as their promise at
first." 2

Acknowledging that Bostock initially "seemed not

to doubt of saving her," North Carolina governor Thomas
Harvey insisted, contrary to the captain's assertion, that
his administration had been "very willing if it were
possible to save the Kings Ship," and had responded to
Bostock's every request for assistance. 3

By late spring

the question of who was responsible for aborting the attempt
to refloat the ship had become academic.

A survey of the

wreck in June noted that the vessel was "Buried in Sand
Seaven foot" and concluded that she was "irrecoverable." 4
Besides the critical delay in initiating salvage
operations and the allegation of inadequate support provided
by Carolina officials, the other major complication in
saving the ship concerned local inhabitants who viewed the
wreck not as one of their own nation's military vessels in
need of assistance, but rather as a providential windfall
ripe for plunder.

On this point, at least, both governor

2 CSPC, XVI, t76~ iii, p. 393.
3 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/10/1698; EJC, I, 378.

4 Ibid., CCR 192, survey of the Swift, 6/8/1698; CCR
188, letter of Thomas Harvey, 7/1~/1698; Records of the
Executive Council, 1664-1734, 376, 377.
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and naval commander agreed.

Harvey's description of what

took place after the guardship grounded as a "Riot" in which
"every one endeavoured to gett something for themselves out
of the spoil" essentially corroborated Bostock's report that
the colonists had robbed the Swift of all her stores and
provisions. 5

Some individuals, the governor added, had

been "great Rogues and opportunity made others little
better." 6
The willingness of local inhabitants, known to their
contemporaries as Bankers, to waste little time in availing
themselves of whatever riches the Swift had to offer
suggests an occupational predisposition.

In a treatise on

North Carolina published in 1709, contemporary chronicler
John Lawson indicated that "those that inhabit the Banks,
and Sea-side" dwelled there for the express purposes of
finding dead whales and "for the Benefit of Wrecks, which
sometimes fall in upon that Shoar," information which helps
to explain the Bankers' predatory behavior in the Swift
affair and subsequent wrecking incidents. 7
5 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/10, 1698; Records of the Executive Council, 1664-1734,
375; CSPC, XVI, #518 viii, p. 253.

6 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/10/1698.
7 Lawson, Voyage to Carolina, 157. According to North
Carolina folklore, the Outer Banks town of Nags Head is so
named because local residents habitually lured ships at sea
to their ruin by leading horses, with lanterns dangling from
their necks, up and down the beach at night, creating the
illusion of a ship's light aboard a vessel sailing safely
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By itself, the looting probably would not have damaged
the Swift sufficiently to prevent her from being refloated,
but the plunderers chose not to confine their actions to
mere thievery.

Subsequent court proceedings indicate that

some of the wreckers "did • • • Maliciously advisedly and
Wickedly contrive consult plot and conspire the said ship
utterly to demolish burne and distroy." 8

This objective

they accomplished by cutting into the vessel's bottom and
firing into her hull with one of the Swift's own "Great
Gunns." 9
Was it pure malevolence that motivated the wreckers to
vandalize the ship?
that "amongst

Perhaps, but it may be worth noting
the Mischeife done," the pillagers took

pains to incinerate official correspondence which they
discovered aboard the vessel including, Governor Harvey was
informed, "Some Pacquetts from Whitehall to ye Covernmt in

closer to shore. Despite its diabolical appeal, the legend
has no demonstrable basis in fact (Gary s. Dunbar,
Historical Geography of the North Carolina Outer Banks
[Baton Rouge, 1958), 122, n. 8; David Stick, The Outer Banks
of North Carolina [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1958], 271-72). The
persistence and plausibility of the tale, however, may
derive from dimly recalled depredations of the Bankers who,
if their indiscriminate attempts to plunder Royal Navy and
foreign ships alike offer any indication, might have been
morally capable of conceiving such an invidious and
self-serving scheme.
8 NCHCR, 1697-17el, 217.
9 Ibid.; Randolph, Letters, V, 265.
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America." 1 ~

Harvey's intelligence was confirmed by

Captain Bostock who wrote to Francis Nicholson advising him
of the burning of the Maryland governor's papers "by those
barbarous people." 11

Why local inhabitants would feel

compelled to subject the documents to what Governor
Nicholson referred to as "the fiery trial" remains unclear,
but some historians have speculated that they did so for
fear that the papers contained information alleging or
documenting their complicity with pirates.12
The wrecking episode took place during the first few
days of February after which, according to Governor Harvey,
Captain Bostock "continually pressed for despatch" in
arresting the offenders until the jail became "full and very
burdensome." 13

In late March a grand jury convened

especially for the purpose indicted nine individuals, eight
men and a woman, tried them in the general court, and issued
a warrant for the apprehension of another man, Richard
Sanderson, Jr., suspected of complicity.

Most of the

alleged infractions were relatively petty, as in the case of
Patrick Maccoon who was accused of pilfering "one Rug one

1

~ N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,

7/l~/1698.

ll CSPC, XVI, i76~ iii, p. 393.
12 Ibid., i76e, p. 387; Rankin, Golden age of Piracy,
58; Shomette, Pirates on the Chesapeake, 96.
13 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/10/1698; Records of the Executive Council, 1664-1734, 377.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285
pair of Drawers two pair of Wollen Briches etc. to the value
of threescore shillings." 14

The very detailed accounting

of the goods taken by each defendant seems to leave little
doubt, however, as to their participation in the pillaging.
Nevertheless, the juries found six of the nine defendants
not guilty. 15
Curiously, the critical factor in the jury's
determination of guilt or innocence apparently was not proof
of having despoiled the wreck, but rather the value of the
goods taken.

One person who had stolen

L1~

worth of plunder

and four others who had helped themselves to items appraised
at less than a single pound were all cleared of their
charges.l 6
worth

5~

Henry Hamond's cache of goods, deemed to be

pounds sterling and

4~

shillings, had the highest

estimated value among those exonerated. 17

The disparity

between Hamond's verdict and sentence and those issued to
two other men, Thomas Young and Roger Snell, is quite
striking.

Although Young and Snell were accused of removing

provisions valued at less than

Ll~

more than Hamond had

taken, they were not only convicted of a felony, but

14 NCHCR,

1697-17~1,

193.

15 Ibid., 191-97.
16 Ibid., 193, 195-97.
17 Ibid., 191-92.
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sentenced to "be burnt in the brawn of the Left Thumb with a
hott Iron having on it the Letter T."l8
The harshest sentence of all was reserved for Captain
Anthony Dawson who, "having not the fear of God before his
eyes and his alegiance to •

the King not regarding," was

accused of masterminding the effort to disable the Swift and
"Imbezell purloyne and convey away" all of her "sailes
Rigging apparel! furniture and stores into his
possession." 19

Despite Governor Harvey's subsequent claim

that Dawson had acted only with the honorable intention of
securing the vessel "as a Wreck for the proprietors use,"
the jury evidently disagreed, finding the defendant guilty
as charged and ordering that Dawson "be carryed • • • to the
place of Execution and there be hanged by the neck till he
be dead." 2 e
The severity of the sentences meted out to Dawson,
Snell, and Young appears to sustain Governor Harvey's
contention that the offenders received "judgmt • • • to the
very utmost of their demerit," but further developments and
a more impartial review of the proceedings suggest
otherwise. 21

Not only had six of the looters been let off

18 Ibid., 192-93, 195.
19 Ibid., 197.
20 Ibid.; N.C. st. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas
Harvey, 7/1e/1698.
21 N.C. st. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/10/1698.
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scot-free, but, of those convicted, Roger Snell was granted
a twenty-year suspension of his sentence "upon
Consideration" of his being a "very aged and poor man" -- in
effect, a lifetime reprieve -- and Anthony Dawson's death
penalty was commuted to exile from the colony, a display of
clemency which prompted Edward Randolph to complain bitterly
that "The Chief Offender was Banished onely." 22

Moreover,

Richard Sanderson "the Younger," who had been "detained in
prison on suspicion of being confederate with

Dawson

and others in Riffling" the warship, was discharged without
penalty or trial. 23

Sanderson may have been innocent, of

course, but being the son of a council member (who was also
one of the more influential men in the province) and Dawson
having formerly served both on the council and as the
colony's attorney general probably did not hurt their
respective cases.24
Having adjudicated the looting indictments and not
wanting to appear derelict in their duty, the members of the
grand jury convened again in May and arraigned Henry Hamond,
Thomas Young, and "One Negro of • • • Capt. Anthony Dawson"
on the separate charge that they "did spoil and deface" the

v,

22 NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 195, 197, 319; Randolph, Letters,

265.
23 NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 191, 2~3-~4, 218.

24 Ibid., lvi, 199; Records of the Executive Council,
John L. Cheney, ed., North Carolina
Government 1585-1979 (Raleigh, 1981), 13.
1664-173~68;
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Swift's hull by cutting into it and that they "did
with one Great Gun shoote through etc." 25

Not

surprisingly in view of the previous proceedings, the
general court jury found Hamond and Young not guilty, but,
perhaps in an effort to compensate for the lenient sentences
ultimately administered to all other defendants, they did
find the black man "guilty of firing the Gun."

Disregarding

the obvious fact that no individual could have removed and
fired the gun by himself and overlooking the mitigating
circumstance that the slave almost certainly was acting on
his master's orders in any event, the court ordered that the
Negro "be punished by receiving thirty one stripes on his
bare Back during the Courts Sitting." 2 6
Although the appearance of wrecks on the Carolina coast
was sporadic and essentially unpredictable, it was not
unanticipated.

As early as 1679 the Carolina proprietors

had appointed a "receiver of wrecks," in this case the venal
customs collector Robert Houlden, to secure for their
benefit derelicts in which their charter entitled them to an
interest.

The proclamation announcing Houlden's appointment

explicitly warned potential salvors against usurping his
prerogative, taking pains to "strictly Injoine all persons
whatsoever from Intermedling" therein. 27

The English

25 NCHCR, 1697-1701, 216-17.
26 Ibid., 217.
27 CRNC, I, 240.
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crown also had a pecuniary interest, normally one-tenth the
value of all salvaged goods, in wrecks and other "ejections
of the sea" recovered within the empire.28

The only

relevant English statute at the time appears to have been
the thirteenth-century act entitled "What shall be adjudged
Wreck of the Sea, and what not," which basically asserted
the crown's right to wrecked effects for which there was no
legitimate claim of ownership. 29
The extent to which the Bankers were aware of royal or
proprietary restrictions on their freedom to salvage wrecks
is uncertain.

However, it may be worth noting that, in

pleading not guilty to charges which clearly had some
validity, none of the defendants is recorded as having
claimed ignorance of the law as an excuse for their

conduct. 3 ~

There is no doubt, however, that North

Carolina authorities were cognizant of the relevant laws and
edicts and, if the charges against the Swift's looters offer
any indication, they expected the colonists to be as well.
The indictments issued in each case clearly defined the

28 Ibid.; Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 156;
Stick, Graveyard of the Atlantic, 3.
Inspired by New
England entrepreneur William Phipps's successful salvage of
a sunken Spanish treasure ship off the Caribbean island of
Hispaniola, the English crown under James II increased its
percentage from one-tenth to one half in order to raise
additional revenues (Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction,
156) •
29 Pickering, English Statutes, I, 79.
3~

NCHCR, 1697-17~1, 192-94, 196-97.
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behavior of the accused as having been contrary to

11

the

forme of the statute."31
Moreover, the severity of the original sentences handed
down with the four convictions (i.e., those issued before
commutation) unmistakably signifies that those responsible
for administering justice in the colony understood the
gravity that English custom attached to the alleged
offenses.

So serious was Anthony Dawson's crime considered,

in fact, that the records of North Carolina's higher court
from 1697 to 1708 contain only one other comparable
condemnation, a death sentence issued to a black slave found
guilty of murder. 32

The punishment of branding was

prescribed with almost equal rarity, only two such sentences
having been meted out between 1697 and 1723, both for
manslaughter. 33
Besides its impact within the colony itself, the Swift
affair also had repercussions in the realms of intercolonial
and imperial politics.

Part of the "great trouble charge &

vexation" to which Thomas Harvey complained about having
been subjected as a result of the episode was an attempt by
Virginia governor Andros to appoint a judge who would have
jurisdiction over admiralty matters in North Carolina.
31 Ibid., 192-97.
32 NCHCR, 1697-1791 and NCHCR, 1792-1798, passim;
NCHCR, 1697-1701, 262, 276.
33 NCHCR, 1697-1701, and NCHCR, 1702-1708, passim;
NCHCR, 1702-1708, 34; NCHCM, 1709-1723, 283-84.
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Harvey managed to avoid having to comply with Andros' wishes
(which the proprietary official regarded as a "great
incroachment upon the powers Granted to the proprietors in
their Charter")

in this instance, but expressed concern

(justifiably, as subsequent developments would demonstrate)
about the ability of North Carolina officials to resist such
initiatives in the future. 34
While proprietary officials temporarily succeeded in
fending off the attempt to impose admiralty jurisdiction
from without, they could not avoid criticism and adverse
consequences in their relationship with the home government
as a result of their handling of the prosecution of the
royal warship's plunderers.

In his 17el memorial "High

Crimes & Encreasing Misdemeanors in the Proprietary
Colonies" Edward Randolph used the Swift episode as a
convenient club with which to batter North Carolina on the
charter resumption issue, pointedly reminding crown
officials that it was during a proprietary administration
that Outer Banks inhabitants had pillaged a royal guardship,
"Fired Great Gunns into her and Disabled her from Getting
off."

Randolph cleverly exploited the incident to support

his longstanding contention that the North Carolinians had
"no Settled Governmt amongst Them" and that royal
authorities therefore ought to assume control over what the

34 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 188, letter of Thomas Harvey,
7/le/1698.
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surveyor general now could portray more easily as a lawless
and chaotic colony which offered sanctuary to "Pirates,
runaways, and illegal Traders."35
If the punitive actions, such as they were, taken by
North Carolina authorities against the wreckers had any sort
of deterrent influence on the population of the Outer Banks
in the aftermath of the Swift's destruction, it was barely
discernible a decade later.

In an episode remarkably

similar to the Swift affair, another Royal Navy ship, H.M.S.
Garland, ran aground on a sand bank just south of Currituck
Inlet in late November

17~9

upon her return to the Virginia

capes from cruising along the coast. 36

The government's

normal instinct to save its vessels was heightened by the
chronic shortage of guardships on the Virginia Station,
particularly in view of the danger of imminent attack by
foreign privateers during Queen Anne's war. 37
Virginia authorities responded quickly to the request
for aid from the Garland's commander, Captain Isaac Cook.
Acting governor Edmund Jennings dispatched two manned sloops
to the scene along with a letter of credit to ensure Cook's
ability to obtain assistance from North Carolina
officials.3 8

Jennings later reported, however, that it

35 ~' I, 547; Randolph, Letters, V, 265.
3 6 C05/1363, pp. 173-74; CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5.
37 ~' III, 229.
38 Ibid., 228.
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had been too late in the season to initiate recovery
operations and that further attempts at salvage would have
to be postponed until spring. 39

Meanwhile, Virginia

officials nervously awaited the arrival of the Garland's
replacement, H.M.S. Enterprise. 4 ~
The interlude between the grounding of the Garland and
the appearance of the Enterprise proved to be difficult and
costly, not only from the standpoint of defending against
ship seizures by foreign privateers, but also in terms of
saving the Garland from destructive natural and human
agents. 41

Virginia's newly appointed royal governor,

Alexander Spotswood, reported to the British admiralty in
September

171~

that before the Enterprise could reach North

Carolina to rescue the Garland, "the Weather and the Country
People had broke her to pieces, and the latter had carryed
away whatever was portable." 42

Several years later

Spotswood modified his account somewhat to reflect the fact
that some local residents actually had been instrumental in
recovering most of the stores that were salvaged, but this
effort the governor attributed less to the selfless
motivation of loyal crown subjects than the anticipation of

39

~,

XXV, #21, p. 5.

4fa Ibid. and #154, p. 57.
41 Ibid., #349, p. 171.
42 Spotswood, Letters,
I' 34-35.
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"great rewards" that the guardship commander had
promised. 4 3
Like Edward Randolph a decade earlier, Spotswood and
his immediate predecessor, council president Jennings, were
highly critical of the North Carolina government's handling
of the salvage operations.

Virginia officials grew

particularly irritated with the behavior of one of their
southern neighbor's customs collectors, William Swann, who
had the responsibility of safeguarding the salvaged effects
until they could be delivered to admiralty
representatives.44
An unsigned letter to Swann, dated April 1719 and most
likely written by acting governor Jennings, not only charged
that the collector had "sold and converted" to his own use
many recovered "Stores of a considble value," but that he
"likewise pretended to detain all the rest • • • of a far
greater Value" as a salvage fee. 45

Swann was reminded

43 Ibid., II, 23.
44 The Virginia correspondence concerning Swann refers
to him by last name only, but a signed accounting of "sundry
Expences Disbursements and wages Expended on ye Salvage of •
• • her Majesties Ship Garland" in the North Carolina State
Archives identifies "Wm Swann" as the colonial official in
charge of the operation. (N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142,
"Vice-admiralty Papers," I, 9, 11/28/1799).
45 CVSP, I, 139. Though not quite as damning as the
Virginia allegations, Swann's own record of the expenses
incurred during the salvage operation nonetheless confirms
that he was the principal beneficiary of payments made to
those who contributed goods and services to the effort. Out
of a total disbursement of slightly over Ll99, the collector
listed himself as the direct recipient of more than L44,
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that the stolen provisions were "absolutely necessary for •
refitting" the recently arrived replacement guardship
"to enable her to go agst ye Enemy's Privateers" and the
letter demanded that the customs officer return the goods as
soon as possible, threatening "Condign punishment" should he
fail to do so.46
The author expressed absolute certainty regarding
Swann's guilt and suggested that, if a sense of duty and
conscience would not impel him to "Do her Majty that right
which is due to the meanest person on such unfortunate
occasions, surely ye Consideration of yr own safety will be
of some force to engage you." 47

But it was not.

Half a

year later, Governor Spotswood complained to the admiralty
that, although a considerable quantity of provisions from
the wrecked ship had been salvaged, there was "no doubt but
many more of the Stores were saved, and some of them of the
best value putt into the hands of one Swan, a Collector in
Carolina, but there's no account to be had of them now.n48
which he charged mainly for his "trouble Care & attendance"
at the wreck site and for his "own Salvage" of a length of
ship's cable (N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, "Vice-admiralty
Papers," I, 9).
46 CVSP, I, 139.
47 Ibid.
48 Spotswood, Letters, I, 34-5. Although Virginia
authorities roundly castigated Swann for his venal behavior,
the collector's reputation does not seem to have suffered
among fellow North Carolinians. Listed as a representative
for the precinct of Currituck in the colonial assembly of
17~9, he was elevated by fellow delegates to the post of
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Strangely, neither the Colonial Records of North
Carolina nor the North Carolina higher-court registers
contain any reference to the Garland incident, which
suggests that the proprietary government undertook no
prosecutions against either the wreckers or Swann.

Why this

would have been the case can only be conjectured, but the
absence of any mention of the event in the colony's official
documents implies either that provincial officials were
powerless to take any punitive action, or worse, that they
may have collaborated actively in a cover-up.
Virginia governor Spotswood's correspondence makes it
clear that he, for one, regarded Swann's behavior in
connection with the salvage operation not simply as the
petty machinations of a corrupt customs collector, but as a
manifestation of the pervasive venality and lawlessness that
characterized North Carolina's legal and political
administration in general.

Following Edward Randolph's

example once again, Spotswood took advantage of the
opportunity to castigate the proprietary colony in
communications with crown authorities.

Not only had Swann

made off with valuable property saved from the Garland, the
Virginia governor lamented, but there was nothing that
conscientious royal officials could do about it.

Spotswood

Speaker within two years (Williams. Powell, ed., Dictionary
of North Carolina Biography, vol. VI [University of North
Carolina Press, publication pending]; Cheney, Carolina
Government, 29, 31).
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complained that it was neither in his power "nor in the
power of any body else • • • in these parts to recover any
part of what has been so embazzled in a Country where
there's scarce any form of Government." 49
In fairness to the Carolinians, it appears that
residents of the proprietary colony were not the only ones
to cast a covetous eye on the guardship's salvaged effects.
In December 1711 Virginia's House of Burgesses denied the
claim of George Luke, the dissolute collector of the lower
James River district, to be reimbursed for "old Iron
furnished for the Use of ye Battery at point Comfort."

In

rejecting the petition, the burgesses hastened to remind
Luke that the iron did not belong to him, but had been
"saved out of her Majestys Shipp the Garland" and that the
Lords of Admiralty would "certainly demand the price of it
according to the valuation."50

In 1713 English authorities undertook the first major
updating and elaboration of the laws pertaining to wrecks
since the thirteenth century.

The extent to which the Swift

and Garland episodes inspired the revision is difficult, if
not impossible, to assess.

Certainly other, similar

incidents had occurred throughout the empire in the
preceding years.

But the similarity of the criminal acts

49 Spotswood, Letters, I, 34-35.
50 ~, 1702/03-1712, p. 341.
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described in the statute and the applicability of specific
prohibitions and penalties to the behavior of the North
Carolinians in 1698 and 1709-10 is remarkable nonetheless.
The preamble to the law explains that its creation had been
occasioned by "great complaints

that many ships •

have unfortunately • • • run on shore, or been stranded on
the coasts thereof; and that such ships have been
barbarously plundered by her Majesty's subjects, and their
cargoes embezilled, and when any part thereof has been
saved, it has been swallowed up by exorbitant demands for
salvage." 51
The legislation itself stipulated that anyone
attempting to board a wrecked ship or remove any goods
without the consent of the commander or the local customs
officer would be required to make "double satisfaction to
the party grieved." 52

Any person caught with provisions

stolen from the vessel who refused to deliver them
immediately to the owner would be required to pay triple the
value of the goods.

Whoever made, or assisted in making,

"any hole in the bottom, side, or any other part of any ship
or vessel so in distress" would be considered guilty of a
felony without benefit of clergy.

The statute further

decreed that if, in connection with a wrecking incident,

51 12 Anne Stat. 2. c. 18, Pickering, English Statutes,
XIII, 121.
52 Ibid., 123-24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

299

"any officer of the customs • • • shall, by fraud or wilful
neglect, abuse the trust • • • reposed in him," such an
offender would pay triple damages to the injured party, lose
his job, and never be eligible for employment in the customs
service again.S3

Like the Swift and Garland affairs, the circumstances
surrounding two subsequent wrecking incidents, one in 1715
and one in 1750, offer striking parallels with one another.
Both involved the stranding or sinking of vessels from
Spanish treasure fleets as a result of violent storms.

Both

occurred two years after the formal conclusion of
hostilities between England and Spain.

As a result, each

episode tested the will of English authorities to maintain
the peace -- even at the expense of antagonizing British
subjects

by restraining the colonists, through the threat

of force or otherwise, from plundering the foreign vessels.
The contrasts between the two incidents are also
noteworthy.

The first episode did not occur in the

Chesapeake region at all, but on the coast of Florida, and
the potential lawbreakers of greatest concern to British
officials were not local residents, but Caribbean pirates.
The ships and wrecks of the 1750 fleet, on the other hand,
were strewn along the shores of all three Chesapeake
colonies, requiring the provincial governments to prevent
53 Ibid., 124-25.
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their own and, in some cases, neighboring seaside
inhabitants not only from plundering the foreign vessels,
but, where there were survivors, from attacking their crews
and passengers as well.

The events of 1715 and 1750 serve

to demonstrate that, while the rapacious impulses of
Chesapeake colonists toward shipwrecks on their shores
persisted, apparently

unabat~p,

from the 1690s, by the

mid-eighteenth century the willingness and ability of
colonial governments to control wreckers and potential
pillagers had improved significantly.
In October 1715 Governor Spotswood included, as a
postscript in a letter to English authorities, "advice of a
considerable event in these parts, that the Spanish Plate
Fleet richly laden, consisting of eleven sail, are, except
one, lately cast away in the Gulph of Florida to the
southward of St. Augustin." 54

Since the incident occurred

so far to the south, it might appear that its impact on the
Chesapeake would have been marginal, but Virginia governor
Spotswood had legitimate reasons for concern.

English

opportunists from Jamaica, including pirates, soon descended
on both the wrecks and the Spaniards who had been dispatched
by their government to salvage the treasure.
An emissary from the governor of Cuba levelled charges,
later supported by a Royal Navy guardship captain, a

S4 CSPC
132.

-----'

XXVIII, #651, p. 317; Spotswood, Letters, II,
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colonial secretary, and several merchants, that the crews of
two British sloops landed on the coast of Florida and, at
gunpoint, stole more than 120,000 pieces of eight from the
Spanish salvage camp, allegedly "proceeding so far in their
tyrannical covetousness that they put those they met to • •
• punishment and torment, for to know where they had hid
their treasure." 55

worse yet, in terms of Anglo-Spanish

diplomacy, the predators apparently had been sanctioned by
the governor of Jamaica who had issued commissions to "fish"
the wrecks, under the pretext of cruising against pirates in
the area, in return for a share of the Spanish booty. 56
Spotswood clearly was less concerned about the
depredations committed against the Spaniards, however, than
the threat posed by the presence of so many pirates in a
highly strategic area not too far from his own colony. 57
In July 1716, the same month he jailed one of several
English pirates who had attacked the Spaniards and then made
their way north to Virginia, the governor begged the Lords
of Admiralty to "consider the dangerous Consequences of
suffering such a Nest of Rogues to settle in the very mouth
of the Gulph of Florida where • • • the whole trade of this
Continent may be endangered." 5 8
55 CSPC, XXIX, il58, #158 i-vii, pp. 78-82.
56 Ibid., #308, pp. 163-64.
57 Ibid., #240, p. 139; #408 i i
58 I bid.

I

1

iii 1 p. 210.

#240, p. 140; Spotswood, Letters, II, 168-69.
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Some historians have claimed that Spotswood was
motivated, at least in part, by a concern that the
activities of the wreckers would threaten British relations
with Spain, the two nations only recently having concluded a
peace treaty to end Queen Anne's War. 59

That may have

been true, but, on the other hand, the governor was not so
worried about relations with the Spanish that he was
unwilling to risk them by exploring the possibility of
recovering some of the treasure for the British crown.
Besides informing his superiors about the wreck of the 1715
fleet, Spotswood also suggested that the incident might "be
improved to the Advantage of his Maj't's Subjects if
encouragement be given to attempt ye recovery of some of
that Imense Treasury."60
Acting on his own initiative in July 1716, the governor
instructed Harry Beverley, the master of a Virginia sloop
bound from the Chesapeake to the Caribbean, to gather
information on pirates and Spanish salvage operations in the
Gulf of Florida and to recover any treasure that he could,
provided that it lay within or near British possessions. 61
At the end of May the following year, Spotswood reported

5 9 Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy, 86; Shomette, Pirates
on the Chesapeake, 179-80.
6 0 Spotswood, Letters, II, 132; ~' XXVIII, #650, p.
317.
6 1 Spotswood, Letters, II, 170; CSPC, XXIX, #240 iii,
p. 142; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, ~
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that Beverley had the misfortune to encounter a Spanish
warship whose crew boarded the sloop, "beat and stript all
the men

• plundered and carry'd off all the cargo, and

brought the men prisoners on board the man of war, where
they were forced naked as they were to work as the Spaniards
ordered them."

The governor implored crown authorities to

seek the release of Beverley and his crew and begged them to
consider "on how precarious a footing all the Trade of the
British • • • to the Plantations must be, if they are thus
to ly at the mercy of the Spaniards, liable to be seized • •
• insulted and imprisoned."62

In conversation with William Byrd fifteen years later,
Spotswood once again held forth on the "Insolences of the
Spaniards" and expressed his disappointment with the British
government which, he believed, had endured the insults "so
tamely."

The former governor also displayed a continuing

and active interest in Spanish treasure, informing Byrd that
"both the Galleons and Fleta," the two annual treasure
fleets, "being confin'd to Sail thro' the gulph, might be
intercepted by • • • Stationing a Squadron of Men of War" at
a strategic point near the Florida Channe1. 6 3

6 2 CSPC, XXIX, #595 iv, pp. 319, 320.
6 3 John s. Bassett, ed., The Writings of Colonel
William Byrd of Westover in Virginia Esquire (New York,
1901), 368.
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When war between England and Spain broke out again
later that decade, British naval authorities appear to have
heeded Spotswood's advice.

So seriously did the Royal Navy

manage to interrupt the yearly sailing of the flotas during
the wars of Jenkins' Ear and the Austrian Succession that
only three such convoys, under the protective escort of
heavily armed vessels of Spain's Havana squadron, reached
the Iberian Peninsula between the outbreak of war in 1739
and its conclusion in 1748. 64

That the English continued

to covet the fabulously wealthy ships throughout the war is
attested to by a captain in Britain's Caribbean squadron
who, eager to intercept the 1748 treasure fleet, regretted
the capture of an "advice-boat from Old Spain, which damp'd
our spirits with the unwelcome news of a peace." 65
While the cessation of hostilities may have been
unpopular with British naval officers, it was welcomed
heartily in Spain where the chronically ailing economy
depended heavily on the revenues which the arrival of the
flota provided.

So precarious was Spain's economic plight

and so indispensable were the treasure fleets to relieve the
financial strain that in 1753 the mere delay of the flota
occasioned nine bankruptcies in Madrid, Cadiz, and

64 J.C.M. Ogelsby, "Spain's Havana Squadron and the
Preservation of the Balance of Power in the Caribbean,
174e-1748," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX, 481.
65 Gentleman's Magazine, XVIII, 523.
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Seville. 66

Not surprisingly, then, even after the

fighting ended in 1748, the Spaniards cautiously refused to
entrust the command of the precious treasure convoys in 1749
and early 1750 to anyone but a rear and vice-admiral.6 7
It may be a significant indication of the benign state of
Anglo-Spanish relations by mid-1750 that the responsibility
for the safe arrival of the fleet was given not to a
top-ranking naval officer, but to an expatriated Irishman in
the Spanish service, Don Daniel Huony. 68
Accounts of the size of Huony's 1750 fleet range from
as few as six vessels to as many as thirteen, but the actual
number probably was eight: La Mariana, Nuestra Senora de los
Godos, Nuestra Senora de Soledad, Nuestra Senora de
Guadalupe, El Salvador, St. Peter (San Pedro), a brigantine
not identified by name, and Huony's 50-gun flagship, La

66 Ibid., XXIII, 387-88.
67 Ibid., XX, 283.
68 Md. A., XXVIII, 482. The commander's name is
represented variously as Huony, Huoni, Huonij, Mahoney,
Ohoney, Otlony, and Onness.
The most reliable references,
that is those found in official Spanish documents, identify
the commander as either "Huony" or "Huoni" (Archive General
de Indias, Seville [hereafter cited as AGI], "Consulados,"
legajo 856, legajo 861, fos. 79, 81). The former spelling
is used most often and this is how the captain's name
appears as the signatory of one letter to Captain Juan
Manuel de Bonilla (also of the 1750 fleet) as well as
another to English colonial authorities transcribed and
printed in the Archives of Maryland (AGI, "Consulados,"
legajo 861, fo. 170; Md. A., XXVIII, 494).
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Galga. 69

As usual, the cargoes consisted of a great

quantity and variety of American riches including gold and
silver bullion, minted silver coins, cochineal, indigo, and,
aboard the Galga, "some thousands of pounds worth of
Mahogany •

for • • • the King of Spains pallace Doors &

Windows &c." 70
The man-of-war also carried another cargo, not nearly
so valuable from a commercial standpoint, but extremely
volatile from a political one: English prisoners, 30
according to the most reliable account, who, along with
their vessels, had been seized by Spanish "guarda costas"
(literally, coast guards, but, in reality, Spanish
privateers and their crews) and brought to Havana for
alleged contraband trafficking. 71

In addition to these

involuntary travelers, one of the vessels, probably the
Godos, carried "several Passengers •

of Distinction"

including the governor of Havana and his family, as reported

69 AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fo. 81; S.C. Gaz.
10/29-11/5/1750; Md. Gaz., 9/5/1750; C05/1338, reports of
Nathaniel Walthoe, 9/28/1750, and Governor Thomas Lee,
10/3/1750. Numerous accounts contain the names and identify
the captains of these vessels; Walthoe's is the only English
report which lists all the ships enumerated here and no
others. The St. Peter was one of two Portuguese "annual
ships" permitted to trade with the Spanish American colonies
and the only foreign-owned vessel in the fleet.
70 AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fos. 37-38; Md. A.,
XXVIII, 482.
71 Va. Gaz., 9/5/1751.
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by one source, and/or the "viceroy out of Chili and his
lady" according to another. 72
The fleet departed from Havana bound for Cadiz on
August 18.

About a week out, a violent storm, described by

some as a hurricane, struck the vessels and raged for six or
seven days.

The fury of the tempest tore away masts,

rigging, and tillers, strained ships' timbers, and caused
the vessels, whose decks were constantly awash, to leak from
below as well.

Guns and merchandise were heaved overboard

to lighten the load and decks were breached so that the
water on board could drain into the pumps.

As the holds

began to fill up, sailors frantically manned the pumps in a
desperate effort to save the ships and themselves. 73
When sea and sky finally calmed, the three ships still
afloat -- the Mariana, St. Peter, and Godos -- managed to
reach a safe haven at Norfolk, Virginia.

The governor's

appointed inspectors found the last two in such a battered
condition that they condemned the vessels as unfit to put to

7 2 Pa. Gaz., 9/6/1750; Md. Gaz., 9/5/1750; PRO
C05/1338, 8/30/1750.
73 Pedro Pumareyo characterized the storm as "un
furioso Uracan" (AGI, "Consulados," legajo 861, fo. 81).
The most detailed descriptions of the tempest are the
Spanish accounts of Captains Pumareyo and Bonilla and
English versions attributed to Thomas Wright and Captain
Pumareyo (Pumaryo), both of the Godos (AGI, "Consulados,"
legajo 861, fos. 79, 81-82, 93-94; S.C. Gaz.
10/29-11/5/1750; EJC, V, 333-34).
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sea again. 74

Three other ships ended up near, on, or

under the shores of North Carolina.

Despite having

sustained considerable damage, the Guadalupe succeeded in
anchoring safely within Ocracoke Inlet.75
driven ashore twelve leagues to the south.

The Soledad was
All the people

and cargo were saved but the ship, apparently in no
condition to sail, was abandoned. 76

The Salvador's

passengers and crew were considerably less fortunate.

Only

three men and a boy survived the violent grounding either at
Cape Lookout or near Topsail Inlet.

Less than a month

later, little evidence of the tragedy remained.

The ship

reportedly was "stove to pieces and • • • covered with 7 or
8 feet sand." 77
The last two members of the fleet stranded well over a
hundred miles north of Ocracoke Inlet along the Eastern
Shore of Virginia and Maryland.

The unidentified

brigantine, commanded by Don Antonio Barroso, ran aground
some six leagues to the north of Cape Charles on or near one
of the barrier islands in Northampton County, Virginia. 78

74 Colonial Williamsburg Research Center, Microfilm
Collection "Virginia: Colonial Papers," #M.ll80.3, Folder
43, nos. 4 and 5.
75 S.C. Gaz., 10/29-11/5/1750; CRNC, IV, 130v.
n
76 S.C. Gaz., 10/29-11/5/1750 and£!!£, IV, 1305.
77 ~' IV, 1305.
78 C05/1338 9/28, 1750; "Virginia: Colonial Papers,"
microfilm #M.ll80.3, Folder 43, #7a.
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Farthest north of all, the powerful Galga lay helpless,
having lost her rudder on the Chincoteague Shoals and
grounded, with seven feet of water in her hold, off
Assateague Island near the Maryland/Virginia border. 7 9
Not long after the warship came to rest, Captain Huony
set about the tasks of removing the most valuable and
accessible part of the cargo and transporting it to the
relative safety of dry land.

Two men drowned in this effort

as did two others who, "attempting to swim ashore,"
obviously with more personal objectives in mind, "had tied
so much Money round their Waists, that they sunk with
it." 80

The rest of the Spaniards succeeded in

transferring themselves and several heavy chests of silver
safely to shore and from there to Snow Hill, Maryland, where
they hired two sloops to convey them and their goods to
Norfolk. 81
Not all of the Galga's passengers lamented her fate.
The Spaniards' tragedy proved to be a blessing for the
English prisoners, all of whom, with the exception of one
who drowned in the attempt to reach shore, gained their
freedom when the vessel wrecked. 82

Like the English

captives, residents of the Eastern shore and the Outer Banks
79 Md. A., XXVIII, 493.

80 Md. Gaz., 9/12/1750.
81 ~.; Md. A., XXVIII, 481.
82 Md. Gaz., 9/12/1750; Pa. Gaz., 9/6/1750.
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shed no tears over the Spaniards' misfortunes.

On the

contrary, they quickly availed themselves of the opportunity
to profit from the mishap just as many of their ancestors
had done in similar situations in the past.

Inhabitants of

the vicinity where the Galga came to grief soon began
"fishing" the wreck, within which they reportedly "found a
considerable booty."83
As usual, colonial authorities had to decide who was
entitled to salvage the wrecks, how to dispose of the
effects, and what rights and assistance to accord the
Spaniards.

The statute most relevant to the disposition of

goods salvaged from the wrecks seems to have been 12 Anne
Stat. 2. c. 18., the act of 1713 which had been made
perpetual by another law passed three years later. 84

As

recently as 1749, the North Carolina statutes listed 12 Anne
Stat. 2. c. 18 and its predecessor, 3 Edward I c. 4, as the
canons of English law pertaining to wrecks that had been
adopted by the colony.8 5
In addition to the English statutes, several clauses
from the 1678 Treaty of Madrid between Spain and England
83 Md. Gaz., 9/12/175~.
84 4 Geo. II Stat. 1. c. 12; Pickering, English
Statutes, XIII, 121-25, 475-76.
85 CRNC, XXIII, 318, 326. Oddly enough, though, North
Carolina-a9ent James Abercromby later argued, in defense of
Governor Gabriel Johnston (see below), that "this statute,"
12 Anne Stat. 2. c. 8, "do~s not extend to the Plantations"
(James Abercromby to "Rich Nev: Aldworth Esqr," C05/384,
fo. 91, 2/17/1758/1, N.C. St. Arch.).
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were particularly applicable. 86

In fact, colonial agent

James Abercromby would later cite the tenth article of this
accord in defense of North Carolina governor Gabriel
Johnston's actions regarding the Guadalupe.87

The

bilateral agreement specifically provided that

11

if the

subjects of • • • either confederate shall be driven by
storm or forced •

into the rivers, bays, estuaries, or

stations of the other confederate, or to land upon any
coasts in America, they shall be received there kindly and
with entire humanity • • • and shall be treated with
benevolence ... 88
treated that way.

Certainly Daniel Huony expected to be
Pleading for justice in the recovery of

goods pillaged from the Galga, Huony pointed out to Maryland
authorities that his appeal was

11

Just and Conformable to the

Amity and treaties Subsisting between Our Royal
Masters ... 89

Officials in all three colonies of the

greater Chesapeake seemed to

agr~e.

Virginia's acting

governor, Thomas Lee, for example, considered that the
11

indulgences 11 he granted the Spaniards

11

Were due to their

86 Royal instructions to North Carolina governor Arthur
Dobbs in 1754 indicate that a Treaty of Peace and Neutrality
in America concluded between England and France in 1686
contained very similar provisions (CRNC, v, 1139-40).
87 James Abercromby to Richard Nev: Aldworth,
2/17/1751, C05/304 fo. 91.
88 Davenport, European Treaties, II, 195.
89 Md. A., XXVIII, 493.
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Subjects of a King in amity with His Majesty my Royall
Master." 90
Treaties and legalities notwithstanding, residents of
Northampton County began helping themselves to the effects
of Barroso's brigantine shortly after the crew abandoned the
wreck, the Spaniards having salvaged what they could before
their evacuation to an unspecified destination, presumably
Norfolk. 91

The citizens of Accomack County, Virginia and

Worcester County, Maryland displayed even greater zeal and
initiative.

Not content to pilfer simply that which was

readily accessible, they proceeded, after Huony and
company's departure, to tear up the Galga's decks in order
to plunder the goods stored below.

So efficient were the

looters, in fact, that, according to Huony, "all She had in
her (worth taking) was Plundered and Carried away."

In

doing so, the Virginia looters exploited the uncertainty
over where the wreck actually lay relative to the colonial
border.

When the sheriff of Worcester County urged the

wreckers to refrain from any further recovery activities
until his governor could be consulted on matters of
possession and salvage rights, they curtly replied, as they
continued to pillage the wreck, that, since the vessel lay

9° "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3,
folder 43, no. 7a; COS/1338, p. 88.
9l"Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3,
folder 43, no. 3.
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in Virginia, Maryland officials had no jurisdiction in the
affair. 92
Shortly thereafter, the Maryland sheriff established to
his satisfaction that the remains of the Galga did indeed
lie within the bounds of his authority.

Once he apprised

his superiors of the situation, it is remarkable how quickly
and resolutely the leaders of each colony acted, both
individually and in concert, to prevent any further
unauthorized tampering with the vessels.

The two governors,

Samuel Ogle of Maryland and Thomas Lee of Virginia, issued
identical orders to the sheriffs of the respective counties,
instructing them to gather and safeguard the remaining
effects of the vessels and to ascertain the identities of
those "Evil Minded Persons" who had taken into their
possession, "contrary to all Law and Justice •
of the • • • Materials •

Several

Parcells of Money and other

goods and Effects" of the Spanish ships. 93

The speed and

coordination of the gubernatorial responses is all the more
extraordinary in view of Edward Randolph's observation from
Maryland in 1692 that there was "no setled communication
betwixt this place and virginnia."9 4

92 Md. A., XXVIII, 482, 493.
93 Ibid., 483; "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm
#M.ll80.~older 43, no. 7a.
9 4Randolph, Letters, VII, 355.
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Acting on his governor's orders, the Northampton County
sheriff seems to have experienced little difficulty
recovering the stolen effects and identifying the looters of
the brigantine. 95

Likewise, the sheriff of Accomack

assigned an agent who successfully employed members of the
local population in the retrieval and storage of goods
pilfered from the Galga. 96

Worcester County officials had

a somewhat more difficult time, however, encountering as
they did opposition from not only local citizens but even
provincial magistrates who "Acted in a most Outrageous
manner • • • in Contempt of all Law and Government."
Several offenders had "even dared to Insult and abuse" the
law enforcement officials.

An appalled Governor Ogle

expressed dismay that "any Body would have presumed to have
resisted the Sheriffs in the Execution of their duty" and
commanded all "his Lordships Officers and

his

Majesty's Subjects" to assist in the enforcement of his
previous orders.97
Meanwhile, farther south in the sounds of North
Carolina's Outer Banks, the captain of the Guadalupe, Juan
Manuel de Bonilla, found himself in an even more precarious
position than either Huony or Barroso.

Although he had

9S "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll80.3,
folder 43, no. 7a.
96 Ibid., no. 13.
97 Md. A., XXVIII, 489-90.
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managed to reach Ocracoke Inlet safely, Bonilla soon
discovered that it was his misfortune to anchor amongst a
population which only three years before had been pillaged
by Spanish raiders.

Whether the local inhabitants' feelings

of resentment over this incident actually constituted a more
powerful incentive than the allure of Spanish treasure is
uncertain, but, in any case, the colonists soon began to arm
themselves with the intention of assaulting the ship, citing
the earlier Spanish raid and one which had occurred in the
province more recently as justifiable pretexts. 98
The decision by colonial officials to take seriously
the threat posed by the armed colonists suggests that the
Bankers' reputation had not improved substantially in the
half century since Captain Bostock of the Swift referred to
them as "those barbarous people." 99

In support of his

contention that the local population might very well "come
in a Body and pillage the Ships," North Carolina governor
Johnston portrayed the Bankers as "a set of People • • • who
are very Wild and ungovernable, so that it is seldom
possible to Execute any Civil or Criminal Writs among
them." 100

Johnston considered that his only hope to

98 CRNC, IV, 13~1, 1306.
99 CSPC, XVI,

176~

iii, p. 393.

10

~ CRNC, IV, 1306. James Abercromby depicted local
residents-as-"outlaws of that Province, who had on many
Occasions sworn Revenge against the Spaniards for
Depredations committed, not only during the War, but after
the Cessation of Hostilities" (Abercromby to Richard Nev:
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protect the imperiled Spaniards from the Bankers'
"Villanious Confederacy" lay in sending an immediate and
urgent plea for assistance to the captain of the nearest
guardship on station, H.M.S. scorpion.101
The menacing demeanor of local Carolinians was ominous
enough, but the shipwrecked mariners aggravated their
predicament by becoming, as colonial agent Abercromby put
it, "accessary to their own loss." 102

Inexplicably,

Bonilla failed to make any application to colonial
authorities for assistance or protection for over a month.
Moreover, the foreigners, "contrary to all Treaties and
Usuages and without any permission whatever broke Bulk" and
twice unloaded and reloaded their ship. 103

By bringing

cargo ashore and having "likewise trafficked • • • a good
deal of it •

for Things that are not necessarys," the

Spaniards violated that part of the Treaty of Madrid which
stipulated that the crews of foreign vessels in distress
might furnish themselves "with victuals and • • • supplies
necessary for the support of life, the repair of ships, and
the continuation of their voyage" provided that "they always
refrain from unloading any cargo • • • goods or packs and

Aldworth, 2/17/1751, COS/304, fo. 93).
101 ~., 1300, 1301, 1306.
10 2 James Abercromby to Richard Nev: A1dworth,
2/17/1751, COS/304, fo. 93.
103 Ibid., 1301.
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exposing them for sale, and from receiving any merchandise
from the other party on board their ships." 1 0 4
Internal squabbling caused the Spaniards additional
problems.

The Guadalupe's boatswain staged a mutiny and

forced Bonilla to unload over a hundred chests of silver and
thirty of cochineal onto two New England sloops which had
sailed into the inlet.

Luckily for the Spanish captain, one

of the sloops ran aground and was overtaken.

But the other,

"tho she was a dull Sailer and had not Ten men on Board
while the Boatswain had • • • fifty," made a clean
getaway. 105

Bonilla managed to regain control of the

Guadalupe, but his troubles were far from over.
When the Scorpion arrived, he petitioned Governor
Johnston for permission to transfer the remaining cargo to
the warship for eventual shipment back to Spain.

Johnston

was amenable, but suggested that the Spanish captain pay an
"adjustment" fee of 4 l/2 percent on the value of the cargo
to cover expenses incurred by the colonial government.

Of

that amount, which totalled 11,444 1/2 dollars (excluding
the freight charge), the governor retained 5500 dollars,
"trifling Gratification," according to North Carolina
Attorney General Thomas Child, for the benefit of Johnston's
"generous, important, good Offices."

Whether or not Bonilla

104 Davenport, European Treaties, II, 195; CRNC, IV,
1304. For the equivalent provisions in the 1686 AngloFrench Treaty see CRNC, v, 1140.
105

£!!£,

IV, 1306, 1307.
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considered the commission trifling and regardless of how he
himself might have characterized Johnston's services, the
Iberian mariner obviously was in no position to argue.

He

agreed to pay the fee which neither the Maryland nor the
Virginia governor had attempted to exact from the foreign
commanders stranded in their colonies.l 0 6
In terms of the handling of wrecking incidents by the
colonial governments overall, the 1750 affair represents a
significant departure from the irresolute and often
irresponsible behavior that had characterized official
reactions in the past.

The speed and determination with

which the Maryland and Virginia (and even, to a lesser
extent, North Carolina) authorities acted to prevent the
wanton plundering and destruction of the stranded vessels
demonstrates how successful royal authorities had been in
establishing the rule of law and obedience to crown policies
since the early years of the century.

This success was

particularly dramatic in view of the fact that, whereas
colonial officials had failed to prevent the colonists from
destroying their own (i.e., English) royal guardships in
1698 and 1709-10, Chesapeake authorities managed in 1750 to
overcome both avarice and national hostility in protecting a
rich treasure as well as the inveterate and despised foreign
adversaries to whom it belonged.

106 Ibid., 1302, 1303.
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As the various wrecking episodes demonstrate, Outer
Banks and Eastern Shore residents required little
encouragement or provocation to prey upon the stranded
vessels of any nation, including their own, that happened to
wash up on their shores.

But if the coast dwelling

colonists of the region needed a rationale for such
behavior, the circumstances surrounding the wreck of the
175~

fleet certainly might have provided one.

Besides the

English people's traditional hatred of Spaniards as the
cruel Papists of Black Legend infamy, Chesapeake residents
had more immediate reasons to resent the Iberians. 1 ~ 7
Spanish privateers had taken many vessels bound to and from
the Chesapeake in the recent war and some Bankers had been
victimized personally by a Spanish raid on their town.
On the Eastern Shore, local Marylanders and Virginians
surely must have been affected by the sight of desperate
Englishmen struggling ashore to escape their foreign captors
aboard the wrecked Galga.

Moreover, some of the newly

emancipated prisoners took advantage of their freedom to
tell not only the story of the wrecked fleet, but also tales
of cruelty suffered at the hands of their Spanish guards.
Literate Virginians undoubtedly were horrified by an account
of the tortures to which the guarda costas had subjected
Andrew Connel, former captain of the sloop Mosguito, and his
1

~ 7 Harold w. Temperley, "The Causes of the war of

Jenkins' Ear," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
3d ser., III (London 19~9), 199.
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crew prior to their fateful voyage on the Galga.

A Virginia

Gazette article entitled "Spanish Injustice and Barbarity"
described how the guarda costas, after seizing the Mosquito
in the Caribbean on the pretext of illicit trade,
"immediately began to plunder, strip his people, and beat
them cruelly, and torment • • • them with Thum-Screws to
make them confess that they were Contraband Dealers."l08
In the absence of direct editorial comments by area
writers on the Galga situation per se, it is difficult to
assess how the colonists might have reconciled their
countrymen's experience at the hands of the Spaniards with
the colonial governments' orders to treat the shipwrecked
foreigners with civility and forbearance.

Certainly there

is no indication that the Iberians were mistreated
physically in any way or, in Maryland and Virginia, even
threatened.

On the contrary, Governor Lee wrote that the

Spaniards had been furnished "with every thing that was
Necessary as Friends." 109

But an impassioned commentary

on the wreck of the 1750 fleet from faraway Boston suggests
how individuals closer to the scene might have reacted under
the circumstances:
It should seem a little strange that there were
upwards of 50 English Prisoners on board those
Ships when they were cast away • • • and the Men
obliged to work for nothing, as Prisoners and
108 va. Gaz., 9/5/1751, p. 1.
109 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #Mll80.3,
folder 43, no. 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

321
Servants, to Old Spain • • • and these Prisoners
have no Notice taken of them by the English, into
whose Hands their unjust Captors have fell.
Might
it not be queried whether the Spaniards ought not
to have all been seized, till every Capture they
have made on the English since the Peace were
restored? • • • Must not all indifferent Persons
think we are indeed the Dupes of those People?
And can any Man who ever suck'd one Drop of
British milk, or have one Drop of British Blood in
his_Vein~, hear t~f~ without the utmost
Ind1gnat1on • • •
It might be argued that New England merchants and
shippers, having suffered greater losses due to Spanish ship
seizures than their counterparts in the Chesapeake, were
motivated by commercial, rather than patriotic, impulses in
calling for retribution against the Spaniards.ll1

But

the traditional English anti-Spanish bias should not be
discounted as a factor and, in any event, such latent
hostility certainly was compatible with more immediate
British anger over ship confiscations.

Accordingly, South

Carolina governor James Glen proposed a course of action
only slightly different from the one favored by the Boston
essayist: appropriate the effects of the wrecked vessels,
rather than detain the mariners, as partial compensation for
Spanish ship seizures since the official cessation of
hostilities between England and Spain. 112

Similar

110 Pa. Gaz., 11/22/1750, p. 1.
11 1 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies
(London, 1982), 273-74.
11 2 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 294. Glen's proposal
elicited a sharp rebuke from the Duke of Bedford who warned
the governor that the king was apt to dismiss from office
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sentiments, both nationalistic and economic, also must have
surfaced in the Chesapeake.

It seems significant, for

example, that the Virginia Gazette inaccurately
characterized Governor Johnston's justification for exacting
the 4 112 percent salvage and handling fee on Captain
Bonilla's cargo as a reprisal for guarda costa seizures of
English ships. 113
The Gazette's rationale probably would have been no
less palatable to the British ministers than the one offered
by the governor himself -- that his salary was badly in
arrears -- and may have been calculated to elevate an act of
questionable morality to one of exemplary patriotism in
response to past Spanish affronts and abuses. 1 1 4

The

motivation attributed to Johnston certainly was plausible in
anyone "indiscreet enough, to say no worse, to advise such a
measure which may, nay must, throw the Nations, now so
happily united, again into Confusion" (cited in Ibid., 295).
Bedford's reprimand illustrates the significance that
British authorities attached to the establishment of
friendly relations with Spain at this time. For more on the
development of what has come to be known as the "Seven
Years' Peace" (1750-1757) between these traditional enemies,
see Lawrence H. Gipson, "British Diplomacy in the Light of
Anglo-Spanish New World Issues, 1750-1757," American
Historical Review, LI (1946), 627-48, and Jean o. McLachlan,
Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1666-1750: The Influence of
Commerce on An lo-S anish Di lomac in the First Half of the
Eighteenth Century Cambridge, 1940).
113 va. Gaz., 5 I 24 I 1751.
ll4 CRNC, IV, 1308. Johnston's salary actually was in
considerable arrears. The British Treasury owed him Ll2,000
at the time of his death and, despite subsequent payments to
his family, still owed over L2000 by the time of the
Revolution (Andrews, Colonial Period of American History,
IV, 193 n. 2).
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view of the prevailing sentiment on the Outer Banks.

After

all, the armed party that threatened the Guadalupe had
attracted "great Numbers under a Persuasion that •

their

Attempt would be • • • founded on Justice and well warranted
by the great losses and injuries which their Country had
• lately received from the • • • Spanish Privateers." 115
In the face of such righteous indignation, the
determination and ability of all three colonial governments
to safeguard the Spaniards and their goods are quite
remarkable and represent a substantial improvement in the
efficacy of colonial administration over the earlier period.
All three governors expressed their intention, in one form
or another, to act in a manner "Conformable to the Treaties
of Peace and friendship that happily Subsist between the two
Crowns." 116

A letter from Governor Lee's successor

attests to the home government's approval of that
policy. 117
British officials were not so pleased, however, with
Governor Johnston's management of the Guadalupe cargo
shipment.

In response to a complaint registered by the

Spanish ambassador, British legal authorities determined
that the "Governor ought not to have Demanded any Duty or

115 CRNC, IV, 1391.
llG Md. A., XXVIII, 494; CRNC, IV, 1391-92; COS/1338,
p. 88.
117 COS/1338, p. 104.
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Gratification whatsoever" in arranging for transportation of
the Guadalupe's effects back to Spain. 1 18

Despite

Johnston's protest that any governor who was "Ll2ggg in
arrear in his Salary would not have behaved so
abstemiously," the disgruntled official was ordered to make
full restitution of the funds he had "illegally exacted"
from the Spaniards.119
Although by the mid-eighteenth century North Carolina
had long since become a royal colony, Johnston's behavior
serves as an indication that his province still lagged
behind the others in the greater Chesapeake in terms of its
determination and ability to execute crown policy faithfully
and expeditiously.

Some of these shortcomings may be

attributed to what Attorney General Child described as "the
Weakness of Civil Power" in a colony "composed • • • chiefly
• • • of a set of indigent desperate Outlaws or
Vagabonds." 12 g

Obviously, though, part of the problem

lay, as it had in previous administrations, with the
governing officials themselves, particularly Johnston in
this case, who, alone among the governors, was officially
chastised for his conduct in the 175g episode.

Consistent

with tradition once again, Virginia officials sought to
distance themselves from the activities of their southern
118 CRNC, IV, 13g9-11.
119 Ibid., 13g4, 1311.
12g Ibid., 13gg, 13g3.
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neighbors.

Stung by news of a rumor circulating in London

that they, like their Carolina counterparts, had extorted
"exorbitant Sums of the Spaniards in their Distress," a
Virginia official expressed the hope that the home
government would "never believe the Contagion extended
itself to this Colony.nl21
Apart from the moral issue of exploiting the imperiled
Spaniards' vulnerability, the Virginia and Maryland
governors also acted more professionally and effectively
than their Carolina counterpart in other aspects of the
case, such as the unauthorized trading of goods from the
wrecked ships for local provisions.

Governor Johnston's

complaint about Captain Bonilla's having broken bulk to
barter for nonessential supplies calls to mind Alexander
Spotswood's intervention when Collector George Luke was
about to permit a French ship to trade in Virginia under
similar circumstances in 1715.

Unlike Johnston, who did not

see fit to become involved until well after the fact,
Virginia authorities in

175~

maintained a vigilance

comparable to that of their predecessors earlier in the
century.

Only days after three ships of the battered

Spanish fleet hobbled into the Chesapeake, and before any of
the Spanish ship captains made formal application to him,
Governor Lee acted decisively to prevent any illegal
exchanges, ordering an officer to board the vessels, examine
121 COS/1338, pp. 1~4-eS.
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their papers, and take an inventory of their cargoes.

Lee

further instructed the officer to treat the Spaniards "with
civility, but not to suffer them to carry on, under the
Cloak of necessity any illicit trade whatsoever."l22
Virginia officials appeared poised to exercise the same
sort of firm authority in prosecuting those who had
plundered the Galga and Barroso's brigantine.

Shortly after

the governor took decisive action to prevent further looting
of the wrecks, the Council of Virginia considered Captain
Huony's complaint that "Effects to the value of some Hundred
Pounds" had been removed from the warship and that four
Virginians -- Ralph Justice, William Gore, Thomas Crippen,
and Thomas Bonnewell (or Bonnewall) -- "were principally
concern'd in it." 123

Although the council enjoined the

alleged perpetrators to appear before the executive body
about two weeks later, there is no indication that the
suspects attended the subsequent meeting. 124

Over half a

year later, in July 1751, the council ordered the delivery
of a blank summons to the sheriffs of Northampton and
Accomack "to be fill'd up with the names of and served on

122 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll8B.3,
Folder 43; COS/1338, p. 86.
123 EJC, V, 337.
124 Ibid.
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all Persons who have any Effects belonging to the Spanish
Ships." 125
This time, the "Several Persons" who had been served
summonses by the sheriffs did appear before the council,
although their number and identities are not specified in
the council journal.

Mysteriously, the alleged offenders

had undergone a remarkable transformation in the eyes of the
council during the preceding months.

Initially branded as

"Evil Minded Persons" for having plundered the Spanish ships
"contrary to all Law and Justice," they had since been
elevated to the status of salvors who, far from being liable
to prosecution, were to be rewarded for having "saved" the
Spanish effects by receiving "Ten per Cent for their
Trouble." 126

A subsequent accounting by the Accomack

sheriff indicates that among those compensated for their
"ferridges & exspenses" were William Gore, Ralph Justice,
and Thomas Bonnewell, three of the four main perpetrators
identified by Huony.l27
As a practical matter, granting salvor's fees to the
wreckers probably represented a judicious compromise.

Since

Maryland authorities already had encountered resistance to
their efforts to recover the stolen effects, Virginia

125 Ibid., 347.
126 Ibid., 36g-61.
1 2 7 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm #M.ll8g.3,
folder 43, no. 13.
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officials must have carefully considered the consequences of
any attempt to indict and convict what may have been a not
insignificant percentage of the population of the sparsely
inhabited Eastern Shore.

North Carolina Governor Johnston

had faced a similar dilemma when confronted with an armed
mob threatening to attack the Guadalupe.

Realizing that it

would have been "absurd and fruitless" to rely on the
militia for help since it was composed of the very same
people he was trying to restrain, the governor was forced to
call on a royal guardship to protect the Spaniards and their
treasure. 128

Under the circumstances, the Council of

Virginia probably decided that, by offering the looters a
salvage fee,

it could avoid a potentially violent

confrontation and, at the same time, achieve the objective
of recovering the plundered goods.

By pretending that the

looters simply had acted as agents of the government in
saving and safeguarding the effects of the wrecked ships,
colonial officials could also give the appearance of not
having countenanced any wrongdoing.
Maryland authorities eventually may have decided on a
similar course of action.

Although, as he had done with

regard to Virginia offenders, Huony specifically identified
the Marylanders principally responsible for looting the
Galga in a report to Governor Ogle, the colony's records
give no indication that the perpetrators ever were called to

!28

f!!£,

IV, 13B0-01.
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account for their actions. 129

It appears, then, that

none of the wreckers in either colony were prosecuted or
even indicted, much less punished, for their roles in the
affair.

The only litigation arising from the plundering of

the Spanish vessels seems to have been a successful suit
initiated by a Northampton County landowner against three of
the wreckers/salvors for trespassing on his property.l30
To help pay off the judgment, the defendants, Abell and
George Powell and Michael Nottingham, may have used the
money they received from a Virginia agent as compensation
for "assisting to bring ashore the sails & rigging" from the
Spanish brigantine.l31
Apart from the willingness and ability of the
Chesapeake governors to protect the Spaniards and assist in
the recovery of their goods, other aspects of the 1750
episode suggest that prevailing attitudes about wrecking had
not changed that much since the Swift and Garland eras.
Seaside inhabitants of all three colonies seem to have felt
few constraints in attempting to help themselves to the
Spanish effects and, as in previous incidents, a venal (or
in this case, perhaps simply a discontented) official, also
sought to profit from the shipwrecked mariners' misfortune.
129 Md. A., XXVIII, 493.
130 Northampton County Order Book, vol. 22, pp. 292,
310, 314.
131 "Virginia: Colonial Papers," microfilm iM.ll80.3,
folder 43, no. 14.
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Justice, strictly speaking, actually may have regressed.
While discipline in the Swift affair amounted to little more
than token punishment (except for the slave), in 1750 no
one, despite clear evidence of wrongdoing in situations
where legal precedent had been well established, was even
prosecuted.
The creative solution apparently devised by Virginia
authorities whereby looted goods were handed over in
exchange for a salvage fee and some assurance of legal
immunity calls to mind the sort of practical concession to
reality that typified the relationships between customs
collectors, shippers, and the provincial courts.

The same

spirit of pragmatic compromise which dictated that colonial
officials either "admit of wt security ye Country afforded
or • • • take none" also applied to those rugged outposts of
the maritime frontier where ships randomly stranded and
wrecked.
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CHAPTER VIII
"There is no depending upon the men of warr":
The Guardships

In a 1683 memorial to the Lords of Trade Virginia
governor Lord Howard of Effingham cogently explained why it
was "absolutely necessary" that the English admiralty
station a royal frigate in the Chesapeake.

"All the reasons

that apply to the despatch of men-of-war to other colonies,"
he asserted, "prevail with double force here."

Pointing out

that "the revenue of Virginia exceeds that of all the other
plantations put together," Effingham maintained that the
presence of such a vessel would prevent "all such troubles
as the late insurrection [Bacon's Rebellion], which cost the
King's customs dear."

Moreover, a ship cruising between the

Virginia Capes would "check illegal traders and advance the
King's revenue" not only in the governor's own colony, but
in Maryland as well.

"Finally," he declared, a guardship

would serve to "put down pirates and be an awe to all
plantations north of the tropic, especially New England." 1
Royal Navy and colonial guardships represented the
first, and sometimes the only, line of defense against
l CSPC, XI, 11273, p. 5~5.
331
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pirates and foreign invaders and the principal means of
apprehending illicit traders who had managed to fool, bribe,
or evade local customs officials.

But the record of these

vessels, and the officers and sailors who manned them, was
hardly an exemplary one, particularly before 1700.

Owing to

a combination of factors -- timid, inept, and corrupt
commanders; unskilled, unwilling, and undisciplined crewmen;
unseaworthy, insufficiently manned, and poorly equipped
ships -- the Chesapeake guardships of the seventeenth
century were often regarded more as liabilities than assets
by the colonists and their governors.

And when one takes

into account the absence of a coherent policy on the part of
the home government concerning the deployment and assignment
of these vessels, often resulting in intervals during which
no guardships were on station in the bay at all, then the
relative ineffectiveness against pirates and illicit traders
comes as no surprise.
From 1667, when the first royal guardship cruised on
the Virginia Station (as the Chesapeake came to be known
until the end of the colonial period), until the last decade
of the century the colonies as a whole suffered as a result
of the diminished status accorded America by English
imperial policy makers.

The home government's conviction

that the navy's best officers should be sent elsewhere in
the empire fostered the perception that a post in the
colonies, taking candidates out of the line of promotion by
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relegating them to obscurity, represented a professional
dead end. 2

The admiralty's periodic unwillingness or

refusal to assign Royal Navy ships and commanders to the
Chesapeake and other colonial regions did little to
discourage such thinking.

Consequently, Royal Navy

commanders resisted colonial assignments and those who were
sent constituted what one historian has described as a "bad
class of officers which the Government of the day thought
good enough for American waters." 3

During those periods

when no royal guardship was assigned to the region, English
authorities sometimes instructed colonial governors to hire
local vessels and captains.

In the absence of such

authorization, the colonies occasionally made do with no
guardships at all.
The performance of several guardship captains assigned
to the Chesapeake appeared to confirm whatever misgivings
the English admiralty may have had about sending them to
more prestigious stations in the first place.
Crofts, commander of

H.M.s.

Captain John

Deptford in the mid-16Bes,

provided the most extreme example of unprofessional conduct.
Members of the Deptford's crew reported that Crofts was
chronically drunk, abused the men physically, withheld their
rations, and fought constantly with his wife.

During one

such altercation, Crofts' wife hurled burning embers from
2 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 63.
3 Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

334
the hearth across the deck with apparent disregard for the
danger of fire and the proximity of the powder magazine.
When the ship's gunner complained, Crofts, who had
"repeatedly beaten and abused" the man in the past, now
threatened to "break his head."

Unwilli~g

to confine such

rash actions to the mistreatment of his own ship and crew,
Crofts was also accused of unlawfully detaining merchant
ships until he had extorted a suitable payment of
merchandise.

Called to Jamestown to account for his

behavior by Effingham, Crofts threatened the bearers of the
summons with bodily harm and returned the warrant with an
impertinent message for the county sheriff. 4
Where insolence and deplorable conduct were concerned,
Crofts probably had no peer, but poor judgment and bad
seamanship appear to have been traits more commonly shared
by the guardship captains as a group.

Their record in the

Chesapeake attests to a high number of vessel losses,
groundings, and other shipboard mishaps.

In what might be

considered a logical conclusion to the excesses and
indiscretions of her commander, the Deptford's career ended
abruptly when she capsized in a squall and sank in the
Potomac River in 1688, drowning her captain and eight of her
crew.

The sources conflict, however, as to whether Crofts

4 CSPC, XII, 11264, 11264 I-IV, VIII, XI-XV, pp. 37274; Bruce;-Institutiona1 History of Virginia, II, 182-83.
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or another officer, Captain Thomas Berry (or Barry), was in
command of the Deptford at the time of her sinking.5
In 1691 a successor to the Deptford, H.M.S.

~'

grounded on a shallow bar in the bay between the mouths of
the York and Rappahannock Rivers and was saved only through
the strenuous exertions of local colonists. 6

Several years

later, Thomas Meech, the former smuggler who turned state's
evidence and then was given command of a small guardship
sent to assist the Wolf on station in Maryland, drowned in
an unexplained accident.

When Meech's sloop, which had been

reported missing for several weeks, was discovered, those
who boarded the craft found one man dead and another near
death. 7

The next guardship to serve the bay, H.M.S. Swift,

wrecked on the coast of North Carolina in 1698. 8

Caught in

a storm and fearing that the ship would be lost, Captain
Nathaniel Bostock abandoned the vessel which later washed
ashore, intact, on a beach near Currituck Inlet.

Edward

Randolph, who had expected the Swift to transport him to
North Carolina, attributed the mishap to Bostock's

5 CSPC, XIII, #595, pp. 162-63; Bruce, Institutional
History-or-virginia, II, 183; Rankin, Golden Age of Piracy,
46.
6 CSPC, XIII, #1349, p. 394; Bruce, Institutional
History-or-virginia, II, 183-84.
7 Md. A., XX, 367; CSPC, XIV, #2393, p. 654; Stock,
Debates, II, 111 n. 31; Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland,
126.
8 See above, chapter 7, pp. 289-92.
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carelessness. 9

Two years later the ship sent to replace

the Swift in Maryland was lost at sea. 10

In the 1709

incident peculiarly reminiscent of the loss of the Swift,
another royal guardship, H.M.S. Garland, grounded on the
Outer Banks near Currituck Inlet where she, too, became a
total loss. 11
Royal and colonial officials not only complained about
the alleged incompetence of guardship captains but of their
lack of diligence and cooperation as well.

In 1690 the

president of the Council of Virginia informed the Lords of
Trade of the new guardship commander's progress in
recovering the sunken Deptford.

"In spite of his promises

to attempt to raise H.M.S. Deptford," the councilor reported
with thinly disguised disdain, "Captain Rowe writes to me
that he was sick and the weather cold and anchors and cables
insufficient, so that it was impossible to weigh the
ship." 12

In 1699 Virginia governor Nicholson ordered

Captain John Aldred of H.M.S. Essex Prize to remain confined
aboard his ship for refusing to allow a local collector,

9 Randolph, Letters, V, 204; CSPC, XVII, #202, p. 113.

°

1 C05/726, pp. 138-39; Morriss, Colonial Trade of
Maryland, 126.
11 CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5; William Popple to Josiah
Burchett 4/21/1710, C05/1363, pp. 173-74, 180. See above,
chapter 7, pp. 290-95.
12 CSPC, XIII, #787, p. 224.
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acting on the governor's specific instructions, to board the
vessel and muster its crew. 1 3
The reputations of the Chesapeake station commanders in
the seventeenth century also suffered from a perceived
reluctance to pursue maritime lawbreakers aggressively.
Roger Jones, captain of the guardship Katherine, was accused
of having "struck the King's colours" to pirates without a
fight in 1683. 14

In 1692 the Council of Virginia charged

Captain Richard Finch with gross insubordination for his
failure to comply with orders to cruise diligently against
pirates who reportedly had been active on the Eastern
Shore. 15

That same year Edward Randolph complained to the

Commissioners of the Customs that, within the previous eight
months, 20 ships had sailed out of the Virginia Capes
carrying illicit cargoes bound for Holland and Scotland "&
ye man of warr had not discover'd one." 16

Three years

later Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence proposed to English
authorities the appointment of a "muster-master and clerk of
the check to see that the men-of-war ordered on the service

l3 C05/1411, fo. 294, 9/4/1699.
14 CSPC, XIII, *2318, p. 665; Middleton, Tobacco Coast,
453 n. 1~
15 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 185.
16 Randolph, Letters, VII, 365.
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of these governments • • • keep cruising and not lying in
harbour." 17
Lawrence's recommendation conveyed a common criticism,
articulated in 1698 by Virginia's Benjamin Harrison, that
although a guardship normally was assigned to the Chesapeake
by the late seventeenth century, "its journals will shew how
much time it has spent at anchor in one particular place,"
an idleness which rendered the craft "of little use and
sometimes prejudicial." 18

Dissatisfaction with a naval

commander's apparent unwillingness to patrol regularly and
oppose pirates forcefully surfaced again in 1699 when the
Council of Virginia chided Captain John Aldred for making
repeated excuses to lie at anchor rather than cruise the
bay. 19

In reply to Aldred's request for a local pilot to

assist in navigating his vessel, the governor and council
responded with obvious irritation, "You have been in these
parts long enough to be acquainted with the coast,
especially if you cruised according to orders in the Bay
last summer •

Laying aside all excuses and delays you

17 CSPC, XIV, #1916, p. 519.
1 8 Ibid., XVI, #656, p. 331.
19 C05/1411, fo. 388, 18/25/1699; CSPC, XVII, #871, p.
467; i891, p. 495; Bruce, Institutional~tory of Virginia,
II, 187.
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are to sail with all possible speed to Chisapeake Bay and
there cruize." 2 ~
Perhaps more damning than the council's intimations of
incompetent seamanship and lack of initiative in matters of
defense and law enforcement was the charge that Aldred, who
maintained stores in various parts of the colony, was too
preoccupied with his own business affairs to attend to his
responsibilities as a Royal Navy commander. 21
suggested that he was vulnerable to bribery. 22

It was even
Virginia

authorities may have been particularly sensitive in this
regard because of the conduct of previous guardship captains
whose proven or alleged improprieties made Aldred's pale by
comparison.
In 1692 Virginia officials received a report that
Captain George Purvis of H.M.S. Wolf had loaded a ship for
England without entering her and that the vessel had then
been cleared "contrary to law" by collector and councilor
Ralph Wormeley. 23

That same year Virginia's governor and

council charged that Roger Jones, commander of the Katherine
2
~ COS/1411, fos. 3~3-~5, 11/11/1699; CSPC, XVII, #947,
p. 516; Bruce, Institutional History of Virgrnia, II, 187.

21 COS/1411, fo. 3~~, 1~/25/1699; CSPC, XVII, #891, p.
495.
22 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 187.
2 3 CSPC, XIII, i2~12, p. 59~; #2SB7, p. 713. Wormeley
tried to lay the blame entirely on Purvis, although he
generously allowed that the captain had "acted through
ignorance" rather than with deliberate intent to defraud the
customs (Ibid., #172B, p. 527).
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during the previous decade, ''having early learnt to cheat,"
had defrauded the government by drawing wages for twelve men
when he only had a crew of eight.

Worse yet, the council

accused Jones of not simply having surrendered timidly to
pirates, but also of having been "one of themselves,"
conniving with freebooters and shipmasters to disobey the
Acts of Trade in exchange for handsome payoffs which
supposedly constituted "the foundation of his great
estate." 24

One of Jones' successors, the outrageous

Captain Crofts, was once heard to boast of his intention to
secure an estate for himself before he left the country. 25
Toward that end, Crofts used his position to extort money
and merchandise from innocent shipmasters on at least two
occasions, boarding their vessels and not allowing them to
proceed until he had seized quantities of goods or received
a sufficient bribe.26
It was undoubtedly as a result of such escapades that
the Maryland Council, when issuing a commission to Thomas
Meech in 1695 to cruise against smugglers, explicitly
stipulated that he should "in no wise molest or trouble fair
traders but • • • apply himself wholy to the detecting

24 CSPC, XIII, 12318, p. 665; Middleton, Tobacco Coast,
453 n. 19; Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II,
180.
2 5 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 182.
26 ~.; CSPC, XII, 11264, #1264 V, XI-XV, pp. 372-74.
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unfair and illegal Traders." 27

Two years later, Edward

Randolph almost certainly had Jones, Crofts, and other
Virginia Station officers in mind when he recommended that
the Commissioners of Trade take care in the choice of future
guardship commanders assigned to the Chesapeake who may "be
projecting to enrich themselves by indirect ways: some by
taking money of the Scotch Traders, and others to connive at
their frauds • • • or sometimes by oppression and exactions
upon honest Traders, as has not long since been commonly
practiced by the Commanders of his Majesty's Frigats in
Virginia, as several! of the Masters of Shipps • • • have
just cause to complaine." 2 8
As bad as the local situation may have appeared, the
improprieties committed by guardship captains in the
Chesapeake were merely symptomatic of a more universal
profligacy on the part of officers in the naval service of
England and the colonies.

A 1692 complaint issued by the

Commissioners of the Customs to the Lords of the Treasury
concerning the illegal importation of goods from Holland
into England aboard Royal Navy ships is instructive in this
regard.

Such activity, the commissioners reported, "gives

us occasion againe to reflect (as frequently we have been
constrained to doe), upon the unwarrantable proceedings of

27 Md. A., XX, 249.

28 Randolph, Letters, VII, 526.
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the men-of-war, and their ungovernable carriage in relation
to the customs." 2 9
Partly as a result of the allegations against Crofts,
Purvis, Aldred, and others suspected of involvement in
illicit trade or other malfeasance on the bay station, the
Navigation Act of 1696 specified that all ships, "whether
the same be his Majesty's ships of war, or merchant ships,
would be subject to the "same rules, visitations, searches,
penalties, and forfeitures." 30

Also in 1696, the Lords of

Trade informed colonial governors that the king had "been
pleased upon Complaints tht have been laid before him of the
irregular conduct of Some of the Comanders of his Ships of
Warr in the Plantations" to order that all guardship
captains in America be under the direction of the governor
of the respective colony "during their Continuance
there." 31

In an effort to suppress smuggling by Royal

Navy officers the following year, the House of Commons
considered legislation which specifically forbade captains
of the king's ships to import into England any goods or
merchandise regardless of how it was acquired. 32

29 CTP, I, 233-34.
30 7 & 8 Wm. III c. 22, VI, Pickering, English
Statutes, IX, 431.
31 Md. A., XXIII, 2 6 •
32 Stock, Debates, II, 220
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In view of such a blemished record of lackluster
performance and questionable integrity, government officials
tended to hold the guardship officers in patently low
esteem.

Lord Effingham reportedly disparaged Captains

Crofts and Thomas Allen by publicly remarking "My footmen
would make as good captains as they." 33

Edward Randolph

expressed similar disdain for Captain Finch and his crew
whom the surveyor general considered "more fitt to be guards
at Chatham then sent heither to secure the trade." 34
Francis Nicholson chided John Aldred for his "willful
neglect of his Majestys Service" and characterized the
captain's response to the governor's confinement order as
too "silly, impertinent, and full of pride and vain glory"
to warrant a reply. 35

Assessing the reliability of the

guardships on the whole, Randolph concluded that there was
simply "no depending upon the men of warr."36

In fairness to the guardship captains, however, the
responsibility for this unimpressive record cannot be
ascribed entirely to the officers' personal shortcomings.
Apart from the corruption and the failure of too many Royal
Navy commanders to pursue pirates and illicit traders
33 Bruce, Institutional His tor~ of Vir9inia, II, 181.
34 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381.
35 C05/1411, fo. 295, 9/12/1699; fo. 298, 9/22/1699.
36 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381.
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diligently, it is also clear that the guardships often
operated under handicaps that severely reduced their
potential effectiveness.

Chief among these were

deficiencies related to both ships and seamen.
Chronically short of manpower, the naval vessels
assigned to the Chesapeake often carried crews composed of
poorly trained, inexperienced sailors, many of whom had been
drafted involuntarily into the king's service.
encounter with pirates in

17~9

After an

Virginia governor Nicholson

(who witnessed the engagement from the deck of the
guardship) remarked that "the Shoreham was very weakly
manned, several of her men appearing raw and unskilful, and
there being many boys amongst them." 37

Nicholson's

assessment of the quality of seamen aboard the royal
guardship not only had implications for the navy's ability
to beat off pirates, but also to defend against foreign
enemies and interdict illicit traders.

Two historians have

commented in this last regard that smugglers were "the best
sailors and watermen in the world -- better far than the men
of the Navy, many of whom had been pressed from various
sedentary occupations."38
The guardships themselves were equally problematic.
Just as the English admiralty was reluctant to assign its
best officers to the Chesapeake station so, too, was it
37 ~' XVIII, #493, p. 239; i591, p. 3~2.
3 8 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, I, 183.
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unwilling to send its better ships to patrol the bay or to
maintain them properly once they arrived.

Colonial

governors and councils often dismissed persistent complaints
by Royal Navy commanders about unseaworthy and ill equipped
ships simply as excuses for inactivity, but the documentary
record indicates that many of the vessels assigned to the
bay station actually were in poor condition and lacked
essential gear and supplies.
In 1667 the first guardship assigned to the Virginia
Station, the Elizabeth, required extensive refitting shortly
after her arrival in the Chesapeake. 39

In 1691 local

inspectors determined that the timbers of H.M.S. Dunbarton
had rotted to the point that the hull was no longer
serviceable.

Unable to comply with admiralty orders to

return the man-of-war to England, the captain had no choice
but to have the vessel broken up at Tindall's Point on the
York River. 4 ~

When the replacement guardship, Henry

Prize, arrived later that year Captain Finch asserted that
she was an unseaworthy and dangerous vesse1. 41

Two years

later Edward Randolph reported that "the Man of Warr lyes up

3 9 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 337.
4

#13~4,

~ CSPC, XIII, #1132, p. 335; #1164, p. 34~-41; #13~2,
p:-382; #13~8 I, p. 383; #14~3, p. 411; #1583, p.

473.
41 EJC, I, 231, 232; CSPC, XIII, #2167, p. 62~, #26~~,
p. 734; XIV, #21, p. 14.
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in the freshes of James River unfitt for service.n42

In

1699 Captain Aldred expressed grave concerns about the
"great leakiness" of the Essex Prize which, he contended,
contributed to the vessel's "very weak and defenceless
Condition" overall.43
In addition to the unsatisfactory condition of many
guardships, it also appears that some were unsuited or ill
equipped for the functions they were required to perform.
The arrival in late 1699 of the advice boat Messenger as the
bay region's new royal guardship, for instance, inspired
negative comment throughout the Chesapeake.

Maryland

governor Nathaniel Blakiston was particularly outspoken,
declaring that "it was a miracle of Providence she ever got
within the Capes, she is so small and low" and explaining
that, since there was "not a moneth or two at most in the
year that she can go out of the Capes to have the prospect
of coming in again," she could provide virtually no defense
for the coast. 44

The Council of Virginia resolved not

even to issue any orders to the vessel's captain until the
following spring, "the Messenger not being big enough to

42 Randolph, Letters, VII, 445.
4 3 C05/1411, fos. 297-299, 10/20/1699; EJC, II, 9.
44 CSPC, XVIII, #85, p. 55; #459, p. 263; #523 xv (3),
p. 315.
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cruize in Chisapeake Bay, and therefore of no use to this
Government." 45
Nor were size and condition the only problems
associated with the Chesapeake guardships.

The fair traders

of Maryland and Virginia complained in 1694 that the draft
of most guardships was too deep to cruise against
smugglers. 46

Captain Finch described the Henry Prize as a

"heavy sailer and ill roader" which, if true, would have
constituted a serious disadvantage for a vessel required to
chase maritime outlaws and also lay at anchor for extended
periods in open waterways. 47

Even so consistent a critic

of the guardship commanders as Edward Randolph conceded lhat
"the Alburrow Ketch • • • sayles like a dung boat" and
warned that "the lords of the Admiralty by sending such
ships put their Maties to a great charg." 48

In

recommending to the king the appointment of one man-of-war
each to Virginia and Maryland in 1699 to pursue pirates and
prevent illicit commerce, the Lords of Trade urged that
"especial care • • • be taken that they be good sailers,
• because the strong currents in them seas do render any bad

45 Ibid., XVII, 11~70, p. 576.
46 Ibid., XIV, il005 I, p. 279.
47 EJC, I, 231. John Aldred experienced a similar
problem,-aitributing the leakiness of the Essex Prize partly
to having "strained ye Bows of his Ship in riding at Anchr"
(COS/1411, fo. 283, 3/8/1699).
48 Randolph, Letters, VII, 381.
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sailers altogether useless for the forementioned
services." 49
Occasionally, as was the case with attacks by Dutch
fleets in 1667 and 1673 and Captain Aldred's encounter with
pirates in 1699, guardship commanders found that their
vessels were simply outgunned and outmanned, rendering them
powerless, or nearly so, to prevent the depredations of
freebooters and foreign enemies. 50

After avoiding a

confrontation with buccaneer John James in 1699, Aldred made
a point of certifying to Governor Nicholson that the sea
robbers had 26 guns and 130 men while the Essex Prize
carried only sixteen cannon and a crew of 60 and was "but
ordinarily provided to make a close fight." 51

The

officer's portrayal of his vessel as too small and weak for
service in Virginia prompted the colonial council to
petition the king for a ship of sufficient force to defend
the region against pirates.52

4 9 CSPC, XVII, #29, p. 16. The well travelled pirate
William Dampier also drew particular attention to the
"Channel between the 2 Capes of Virginia" as a maritime
thoroughfare through which "the Tides do run very swift"
(Dampier, Voyages, II, 307).
5

°

CSPC, V, 11545, pp. 490-91; XVII, #693, p. 382;
#719, p.~; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 338-39.
5 1 C05/1411, fo. 290, 291, 7/29 and 7/30/1699. The
clerk who transcribed the captain's disclaimer referred to
it in the margin notes as Aldred's "Certificat of • • •
Weakness" (John Aldred to Francis Nicholson, C05/1411,
7/26/1699).
5 2 CSPC, XVII, #693, p. 382.
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Many of these shortcomings reflected a more fundamental
problem on the policy-making level: the failure to define
precisely the objectives that the guardships were expected
to pursue.

Were they to serve primarily as warships to

defend the region against pirates and foreign invaders or
were they to operate principally as revenue cutters to
detect and apprehend illegal traders?
could hardly accomplish both.

In practice, they

The exigencies of coastal

defense called for large, well-armed vessels to repulse the
incursions of powerful enemies.

Patrolling against

smugglers, on the other hand, required the use of small,
maneuverable craft with the ability to chase lawbreakers
into the shallows, creeks, and small inlets where they
sought sanctuary and conducted illegal business
transactions. 53
What was really needed, as Virginia governor Alexander
Spotswood explained in a letter to the Board of Trade in the
early 1720s, was two vessels, "a 40 or 50 Gun Ship • • • to
Convoy our Merch't Ships out to Sea and a smaller Vessel,
such as a Sloop or Brigantine, to pursue little puckaroons
in Shoal Water where a great ship cannot come at

them"~

these, he indicated, "would be very serviceable towards the
Security of our Trade and driving the Pirats from this
Coast." 54

The home government apparently had come to

5 3 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 341.
54 Spotswood, Letters, II, 350.
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appreciate the need for two different types of guardships in
the bay by 1694 when it authorized both the Maryland and
Virginia governors to supplement the existing force,
consisting of the large and well-armed Dover Prize, by
employing one or more ships of 40 tons or less to cruise
against illicit traders.55
The presence of these two types of vessels might have
succeeded in deterring much of the illicit maritime activity
conducted in and around the bay, had it not been for the
difficulties encountered in consistently maintaining two
guardships, or even one, on the Virginia Station for any
length of time.

Although the first guardship assigned to

the Chesapeake arrived in 1667, it was not until 1684 that
the admiralty assigned Royal Navy vessels to the bay station
on a regular basis. 56

Even then, however, a chronic

shortage of large ships in the English navy and, on the
Virginia Station, unexpected losses due to navigational
errors and the physical deterioration of ships resulted in
periods during which the bay lacked a sufficiently powerful
vessel for its protection, much less for the prevention of
illicit trade.

During some intervals, such as those that

55 CSPC, XIV, il511, p. 399.
In 1702 Maryland governor
Blakiston added his voice to those who supported deployment
of smaller vessels against illicit trade, arguing that "a
sloop will be of more use than a Man of Warr, by reason she
is small and can runn into any of those Creeks and Coves
where Sculking Traders have frequented" (C05/726, p. 138).
56 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 340.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

351
followed the condemnation of the Dunbarton and the wreck of
the Swift, it appears that the bay lay completely
unprotected.
The late seventeenth-century administrative
reorganization that resulted in the establishment of the
Board of Trade and passage of the Act for Preventing Frauds
and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade appears to
have ushered in an era of substantial improvement in the
guardship service.

After 1700 the Virginia Station

generally benefited from better ships, more competent
commanders, and a stronger and more consistent naval
presence.

Dramatic victories such as that achieved by

Captain William Passenger of the Shoreham over French
marauder Lewis Guittar in 1700 and Lieutenant Robert
Maynard's momentous defeat of Blackbeard in 1718 symbolized
the royal government's determination to rid colonial waters
of the pirate scourge and demonstrated an enhanced
capability to do so.
Despite these improvements, however, some of the
problems of the previous century persisted.

The bay station

continued to suffer periodically from an insufficient number
or, less frequently, a total absence of guardships to
provide military protection and trade act enforcement.

In

June 1707 Maryland governor John Seymour indicated that the
Chesapeake had been without the protection of any guardship
for the previous year.

Praying for the timely arrival of
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the "Man of Warr which this Country has long uneasily
expected," Seymour complained that, in the meantime, both
Maryland and Virginia had been rendered "obnoxious to the
Insult of any Rascally Pyrate or Privateer who may come and
go & burne what Shipping happe[ns] to be in the Countrye at
pleasure." 57
The Virginia Station was left unprotected for much of
1708 and 1709, when H.M.S. Garland was ordered to convoy the
tobacco fleet to England, and for several months in late
1709 and early 1710 after the Garland wrecked on the
Carolina coast, causing the Council of Virginia to lament
that "by the fatal loss of her Majesty's Ship •

this

Country is again left naked and defenseless against the
insults of the Enemys Privateers." 58

The replacement

guardship, H.M.S. Enterprise, arrived shortly thereafter but
had to sail to New York to refit and was then called away to
the Bahamas before returning to the bay. 59
Naval demands elsewhere during Queen Anne's War
deprived the Chesapeake of her two guardships in the winter
of 1711-12 and the bay was left similarly devoid of
protection in 1716 and 1717 when the Royal Navy vessel then
on station was assigned to track down pirates in South
57 CRNC, I, 667; CSPC, XXIII, #975, p. 472; Md. A.,
XXV, 267-.-----58 EJC, III, 229, 231; CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 5; il54, p.
57; Middleton, Tobacco Coast~7-48.
59 CSPC, XXV, #21, p. 4; #208, p. 84.
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Carolina. 60

Although public safety was undoubtedly their

foremost concern, colonial officials were also aware of the
opportunities that the absence of guardships offered for the
proliferation of illicit trade.

As Virginia governor

Spotswood reported in reference to contraband trafficking
with the Dutch West Indies in 1710, "It is very apparent
that the want of guardships here so frequently, has given
great encouragements to the carrying on of this Trade." 61
Colonial authorities also continued to complain
occasionally about the inadequacy of the guardships on
station for certain tasks.

Just as large vessels had proved

ineffective in the pursuit of illicit traders who retreated
to the safety of shoal waters in small craft, so too, as
Colonel Jennings of Virginia reported to the Board of Trade
in 1709, were sizable guardships unable to apprehend enemy
privateers that resorted to the same evasive tactic. 62

It

was for this reason as well as to impede smuggling that
Governor Spotswood recommended in 1710, and again a decade
later, that the home government maintain a man of war on
station constantly and that they also supply "a sloop or

6 0 Ibid., XXIX, 1239 i, p. 138; 1595, p. 317; EJC, III,
443, 444; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 216; Middleton,
Tobacco Coast, 351.
6 1 Spotswood, Letters, I, 10.
6 2 ~' XXIV, 1765, p. 480; Middleton, Tobacco Coast,
348-49.
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other small Vessell well fitted and manned • • • to attend
the Guard-ship."63
In 1716, with the increase of pirate activity after
Queen Anne's War and in response to reports that Caribbean
freebooters were gravitating toward Florida to "fish" the
Spanish treasure ships recently wrecked there, Spotswood
also recommended that the admiralty send another warship to
protect the merchant trade and "to attack those pyrates in
their Quarters before they grow too formidable." 64

When

his plea went unheeded Spotswood repeated the request the
following year, citing the sea brigands' greatly increased
strength and the damage that the colony's trade had suffered
as a result.

The guardship then on station, he reported,

was in no condition to pursue the buccaneers and, even if
she had been, would still require additional support. 65
As the_pirate threat grew more acute toward the end of the
decade, the Council of Virginia, the House of Burgesses, and
Captain Whorwood, commander of the guardship Rye,

joined the

governor in appealing to the admiralty for more powerful
ships and support vessels. 66

6 3 Spotswood, Letters, I, 10; II, 350.
64 Ibid., II, 168-69.
6 5 Ibid., 246, 249.
66 JHB, 1712-26, pp. 310-11; EJC, III, 550; Dodson,
A1exander-8potswood, 219-20.
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With the decline of piracy in the

172~s

and the decade

of unprecedented peace that followed between England and her
national rivals in America, the Chesapeake did not require a
guardship for military protection.

The renewal of

hostilities with Spain and France in the 1740s, however,
called for a continual naval presence in the bay which the
admiralty, much to the distress of the colonists, was unable
to provide on a regular basis.6 7
Colonial governors also complained from time to time
that naval commanders were inattentive to the needs of the
colonies whose waters they patrolled.

The eighteenth

century began rather inauspiciously for the guardship
officers as Virginia governor Nicholson admonished Captain
Aldred in 17~~ to "make ye Kings Service your Principal
Case, & not absent yor Self from yt to follow other private
concerns."

Exasperated by Aldred's persistent failure to

cruise despite repeated pleas and threats, Nicholson
insisted that the commander either set sail within ten days
or come to Jamestown so that Aldred and his men could be
discharged "and his Majesty no longer put to an unnecessary
expense." 68

Several years later, following a

comprehensive examination of maritime law enforcement in the
Chesapeake, newly appointed surveyor general of the customs
for the southern colonies Robert Quary recapitulated several
6 7 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 357.
68 COS/1411, fo. 3~6, l/4/1799.
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of the complaints that had dogged the guardship service in
the previous century: "ye Capts. are above all command and
do find one pretence or another always to be at anchor; when
she should be cruising, she is out of order, her men
wanting, ye Capt. sick etc."69
In

171~,

by contrast, council president Edmund Jennings

commended the captain of the Royal Navy vessel on station
for his diligence in patrolling the bay and coast against
enemy privateers. 7 ~

But when Governor Spotswood asked the

Board of Trade to assign an additional guardship to the
Virginia Station later that year, his specific request for a
"diligent Commander, or one that had some suitable
encouragement offered to quicken him in his duty" suggests a
continuing skepticism regarding the caliber and dedication
of officers normally assigned to the post. 71
The governor's doubts hardly were allayed the following
year when the captain of the Chesapeake guardship declined
to provide an armed naval force to suppress insurgents in
the Cary Rebellion in North Carolina.

"Because Mr. Cary's

chief strength consisted in his Brigantine and other
Vessells w'ch he had filled with armed men," Spotswood
explained in a letter to Lord Dartmouth, "I endeavoured to
obtain some help • • • from her Majesty's Ship of War here,
69 CSPC, XXI, illS~ ii, p. 739.
7~

COS/1363, p. 33.

71 spotswood, Letters, I, 15.
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but the Comodore of the homeward bound Fleet judging it the
least part of his duty to do any service to this Country,
refused to afford me any such assistance."72

Also irked

about the guardship captain's refusal to help transport
provisions to New York for use in a military expedition to
Canada, the governor added that "this is not the only
Disappointment the obstinacy of the Commodore has occasioned
to her Majesty's service."73
The conclusive defeats inflicted by Royal Navy
personnel on the pirate crews of Guittar and Blackbeard
probably offset such criticism to a considerable degree.
Though these episodes suggest an elevated degree of resolve
and proficiency among guardship officers in the eighteenth
century, the stunning victory over Blackbeard also,
ironically, served to highlight a number of shortcomings in
the naval service of the Chesapeake.
Acknowledging the bravery exhibited by Lieutenant
Maynard and his crew in defeating the pirates in bloody
hand-to-hand combat, contemporary author Daniel Defoe
nevertheless wondered why it had taken the Royal Navy so
72 Ibid., 84.
73 Ibid., 86. Spotswood was not alone in believing
that the guardship commanders cared little for the well
being of the colonies to which they were assigned.
In 1718
Philadelphian James Logan wrote to the governor of New York
concerning the pirate threat, "We are in manifest danger
here, unless the king's ships (which seem careless of the
matter) take some notice of us~ they probably think a
proprietary government no part of their charge" (Watson,
Annals of Philadelphia, II, 218).
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long to engage the sea brigands in the first place.
Reminiscent of earlier complaints about the reluctance of
guardship personnel to pursue pirates aggressively, Defoe
reproachfully mused, "'tis strange that a few Pyrates should
ravage the Seas for Years, without ever being light upon, by
any of our Ships of War; when in the mean Time, they (the
Pyrates) shall take Fleets of Ships; it looks as if one was
much more diligent in their Affairs than the other." 74
The author also cryptically suggested that the reason the
"Men of War had lain up these ten Months whilst the Pyrates
infested the Coast, and did great Mischief" was that the
guardship captains and Governor Spotswood had "their Secret
Views" in the affair. 75

Defoe evidently was intimating

that these royal officials knowingly permitted Blackbeard to
accumulate a hoard of booty, intending all along to profit
personally from its eventual seizure and confiscation.
The insinuation was probably unfounded as far as
Spotswood was concerned, but contained elements of truth
with regard to the guardship commanders. 76

Contrary to

74 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 5.
75 Ibid., 93.
76 Though the rumors about Spotswood appear to have had
no basis in fact, the governor's political adversaries in
the Virginia assembly nevertheless did not hesitate to
exploit the accusations. A 1719 paper prepared by the House
of Burgesses charged that Spotswood, "understanding that
there was a good deale of money and a great many Negroes in
the case, • • • persuades the King's Men of War to Surprise
and Kill the men within the Country of Carolina, and to
Seize the goods and to bring them away to Virginia, where he
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Captain Brand's orders, Maynard distributed some gold
discovered aboard Blackbeard's ship as a prize of war to the
victorious crew.

Given the risks these men had taken and

the hardships they had endured, Maynard's action is
understandable, if not, from the point of view of strict
naval discipline, entirely excusable.

Brand and George

Gordon, captain of the other Royal Navy ship from which the
crew for the Blackbeard expedition was recruited,
subsequently reprimanded Maynard and ordered that all the
seized effects be distributed according to rank amongst the
entire companies of the Pearl and Lyme without distinction
to actual participation in the battle.

Naturally, Brand and

Gordon would have been the primary beneficiaries of such an
allotment. 77
Critics of the Blackbeard action also pointed out a
serious miscalculation or oversight on the part of the
officers who planned the attack.

According to Defoe,

had them condemned as Pyrats goods, tho' taken within the
time limitted in the King's Pardon, and the Money not put
into the hands of the King's officers as it ought to be but,
immediately into his own hands, in hopes grants will be more
easily obtained of it, than if it were to come thro' the
Treasury" (VMHB, XXII, 410 n., 414-15).
77 George Gordon to the Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1826,
9/14/1721; Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 87.
In a letter
to the admiralty Gordon claimed that, far from seeking to
enrich himself, he, at least, had distributed "every
farthing" of his share among the actual expedition members.
Unconvinced of Gordon's sincerity, however, Maynard
petitioned the king regarding the "unreasonable and unjust
Method" employed by his superior officers in "disposeing the
bounty monney" (George Gordon to the Board of Admiralty, Adm
l/1826, 9/14/1721).
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Blackbeard's destruction "was entirely owing to the Conduct
and Bravery of Lieutenant Maynard and his Men, who might
have destroy'd him with much less Loss, had they had a
Vessel with great Guns." 78

Maynard's own account of the

battle is said to confirm that Blackbeard's heavier
firepower put his ship at a serious disadvantage.

A modern

analyst has pointed out that Captains Brand and Gordon
should have obtained intelligence regarding the pirate's
arsenal and armed Maynard's expedition accordingly.

That

they failed to do so represented "another instance of brave
seamen losing their lives because of the ignorance or
oversight of their superior officers."79
The documentary record does not suggest, however, that
such tactical blunders were a common feature of the
guardship service in the Chesapeake after 1700.

But other

indiscretions continued to tarnish the reputations of
guardship commanders.

Although no Virginia Station captain

emerged to rival John Crofts in egregious and unscrupulous
behavior, colonists and royal officials continued to
criticize guardship officers and crews on both sides of the
78 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 82.
79 Arthur L. Cooke, "British Newspaper Accounts of
Blackbeard's Death," VMHB, LXI, 307. Perhaps it was as a
result of this oversight that when Micajah Perry and others
trading to Virginia petitioned the admiralty to outfit some
vessels to attack pirates the following spring, the
merchants specifically requested that the ships be armed
with "Pataroras" (patareros), or anti-personnel guns, "for
the Said Service" (Admiralty Board Minutes, Adm 3/32,
6/10/1710).
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Atlantic for pursuing their own financial interests to the
detriment of colonial security, crown revenues, or the
livelihoods of those engaged in legal trade.
In fact, one of the most blatant abuses was perpetrated
by none other than Captain Ellis Brand upon his return to
England from the Chesapeake in 1719.

In clear defiance of

the act of 1696 which made Royal Navy ships subject to the
same rules of search and visitation as English merchant
vessels, Brand refused entry below decks to British customs
officials, cursing them as "a Parcel of scoundrel villains"
for attempting to fulfill their legal obligations. 80
Whether the captain was concealing pirate plunder or
commercial contraband (or perhaps both} is unclear, but, in
either case, his conduct would not have been unusual.

In

1727 Robert Byng, official Solicitor of the Droits of
Admiralty, reported that "the accounting for the goods of
pirates has been most shamefully neglected.

The Governors

of Plantations and commanders of the ships of war have
seized the goods and kept them for their own private
benefit.

When the Captains of H.M. ships of war seize goods

of pirates they refuse to account for them at home, or to
agents, and the greatest part is not accounted for." 81

8 0 Williams, Contraband Cargoes, 131.
81 ~' VI, 476; Karraker, Piracy was a Business,
118-19.
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The extent to which guardship captains in the
Chesapeake actually engaged in illicit trade in the
eighteenth century is uncertain, but by the end of the
second decade colonists and merchants were complaining that
some navy officers had neglected the defense of the coast in
order to seek profit in personal trading ventures.8 2

The

Virginia burgesses specifically charged that the "Commanders
of his Majesties Ships have frequently deserted the Station
which they were sent on purpose to protect, and under
pretence of Stress of Weather have Sailed to Barbadoes New
York or Some of the other Plantations upon their own private
Business." 83

In a letter to the Earl of Orrery in 1719,

William Byrd succinctly articulated the injustice and irony
of a situation in which the home government, in effect, was
subsidizing guardship captains to undermine the colonial
merchant trade:
our Captains of Men of Warr are so intent on Trade
that they neglect their Stations, and contrive to
be blown away to the Country whither their
Traffick calls them.
This is so great an Abuse
that the Nation is at the Expence of building and
maintaining Ships of War, for the enabling the
Commanders of them to ruin the fair Traders in the
Country where they come. For these Gentlemen pay
neither freight nnor Custome, nor run any risque,

82 JCTP, 1718-22, p. 238; Dodson, Alexander Spotswood,
211; Doty, British Admiralty Board, 77.
83 JHB, 1712-26, 261, 311. Also in 1714, the Council
of Barbados complained about a contraband trade being
conducted by the commander of H.M.S. Sorlings with the
French island of Martinique for wine and brandy (CSPC,
XXVIII, #31, p. 14).
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by which Iniquity they ~re in condition to
undersell all that do. 8
Byrd's analysis underscores a problem that originated
in the seventeenth century but worsened in the eighteenth.
Perceiving the guardship commanders as unfair business
rivals was certain to lead to resentment, but tension in the
relationship between colonists and the Royal Navy was, by
Byrd's time, neither new nor restricted to those involved in
the merchant trade.

Obviously, the excesses of captains

like Jones and Crofts did little to endear them to the
colonists whose interests, at least to some degree, they
were supposed to serve.

Instead, the actions of such men

may have helped to create an impression in the minds of
Chesapeake inhabitants that guardship personnel were less
their protectors than their nemeses and, conversely, that
maritime lawbreakers were less to be shunned than to be
collaborated with and abetted.
Besides Jones and Crofts, a number of Royal Navy
commanders contributed to a legacy of bad faith with the
colonists.

On at least two occasions guardship captains

enlisted the help of local inhabitants during emergencies
using false or exaggerated promises of rewards as
inducements.

In 1691, after the vigorous efforts of local

Virginians saved the grounded guardship Wolf, Captain George
Purvis failed to make good on the assurances of financial

84 VMHB, XXXII I 25 o
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remuneration he had offered so freely when the vessel was in
danger of becoming a total loss.

Purvis' duplicity caused

an uproar that threatened the peace of the colony, requiring
government officials to resort to extreme measures
attempts to garnish Purvis' wages and place a lien on his
personal property -- in order to force the captain to
pay. 85

A similar situation developed in 1710 after the

loss of the Garland when Governor Spotswood was compelled to
pay some North Carolina salvors "who were necessitous and
consequently most Clamourous, finding themselves
disappointed of the great rewards promis'd them by Capt.
Cook."
saved •

Spotswood further indicated "that all the stores
were entirely owning to the care and labour of

the Country people, and that none of the Sailors would give
the least Assistance therein."8 6
Inadequate discipline on the guardships, evident in the
conduct of sailors ashore and shipboard, provided another
source of friction between the colonists and the navy.
Among the many criticisms of Captain Aldred was one that, on
the pretense of victualling, he lodged the crew of the Essex
Prize on shore more often than aboard ship.

This practice

8 5 Admiralty Board MinuteD, Adm 3/6, 1/20/1691/92;
CSPC, XIII, #1680, p. 516. Purvis' behavior apparently did
nor-improve after his departure from the Chesapeake. By
1695 English officials had issued orders to court-martial
the guardship captain on charges of irregular conduct and
embezzlement in the West Indies (Stock, Debates, II, 84 n.
3) •

86 Spotswood, Letters, II, 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

365
led to "great Complaints by ye Inhabitants of thefts
committed by ye Seamen" and charges that the mariners were
responsible for creating disturbances to the peace at
night. 87

Royal Navy sailors made comparable nuisances of

themselves in late 1709 when William Wilson, naval officer
of the Lower James River district, reported that "diverse of
the Seamen" who had been brought to Hampton from the wrecked
guardship Garland had been "very rude to the Inhabitants
forceing from them Victuals and entertainment."
Anticipating the possibility of further trouble, the Council
of Virginia ordered Wilson and the justices of Elizabeth
City County to imprison the offenders should they "offer any
Violence" to local citizens. 88
Fortunately for the colonists, Royal Navy officers did
not make a habit of allowing sailors to roam ashore freely
for extended periods.

Apart from the incidents noted and a

time in 1744 when large numbers of seamen and Negroes were
blamed for many of the "Sundry Robberys, Insults and
Disturbances" that had occurred in Norfolk, residents of the
Chesapeake generally were spared the worst behavior of Royal
Navy personnel.89

87 C05/l411, fo. 300, 10/25/1699; EJC, II, 15-16.
88

~' I, 230.

89 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 8-9; Brent Tarter, ed., The
Order Book and Related Papers of the Common Hall of NorfOlk,
Virginia 1736-1798 (Richmond, 1979), 63 n. 7.
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One fatal exception to this rule occurred in 1692 when
the boatswain and a sailor from the frigate Assurance
committed the "barbarous Murther" of Captain William
Marshall, a Hampton resident and Elizabeth City justice of
the peace. 90

Having administered a severe beating to

Marshall on shore, the seamen brought him back to their ship
where the surgeon dressed his wounds and the captain saw to
it that he was given a comfortable berth.

The next morning

Marshall could not be found, presumably having been thrown
overboard during the night.

News of the incident so enraged

the colonists, according to Edward Randolph, "that they
would have fallen upon all the saylers of that frigott" had
they been given the opportunity. 91

Although it appears

that the captain was not an accomplice to the brutality, the
incident nevertheless demonstrates the poor discipline that
characterized many of the Royal Navy ships on the bay
station and elsewhere in the English empire. 92
90 Randolph, Letters, VII, 389; Marvin w. Schlegel,
"The Shire or County of Elizabeth City, 1634-1700" in The
History of Lower Tidewater Virginia, Rogers D. Whichar~
ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1959), I, 129.
91 Randolph, Letters, VII, 389.
92 Ibid., n. 416.
In the immediate aftermath of the
event the guardship captain hypothesized that Marshall,
"being strange to the ship, • • • must have fallen
overboard" during the night on his way to the "head," but
Randolph's belief that the colonist's disappearance was the
result of foul play was corroborated by a subsequent
investigation. Two crew members of the Assurance were
convicted of Marshall's murder and sentenced to death, but
ultimately reprieved (EJC, I, 296; CSPC, XIII, #2331, p.
668; #2593, p. 731). --
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Apart from the animosity engendered by the periodic
abuses and indiscretions of captains and sailors, the most
consistent source of conflict between guardship personnel
and colonists involved the inseparable dilemmas of
undermanning, desertion, and impressment.

The problem of

undermanning had become acute as early as 1692 when Edward
Randolph reported that "the ship Henry Capt £finch Commander
has not 30 able men aboard" out of a normal complement of

7e. 9 3

Much of the Henry Prize's crew had deserted to

North Carolina, a situation which Finch hoped to remedy by
soliciting the Council of Virginia's help in apprehending
the runaway sailors. 94

When Captain Aldred came under

fire in 1699 for his failure to take aggressive action
against pirates, he complained that the Essex Prize was not
sufficiently manned to attack the invaders because his
seamen were continually abandoning the ship. 95

Although

H.M.S. Shoreham managed to prevail in its battle with the
pirate vessel La Paix the following year, Governor Nicholson
observed that the guardship lacked sufficient manpower

93 Randolph, Letters, VII, 396.
94 CSPC, XII I, #2177, p. 623; #2388, p. 683; EJC,
I'
231-32.
95 CSPC, XVII, #265, p. 149.
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during the engagement to handle the sails and man the guns
simultaneously.96
The high desertion rate was undoubtedly due, in large
measure, to factors which traditionally have been cited as
characteristic of service in the Royal Navy during this
period: poor living conditions; low pay; and unevenly
applied, often harsh, and sometimes lethal discipline. 97
According to Maryland secretary Thomas Lawrence, pirates
arriving in the Chesapeake with "large sums" of Red Sea
treasure induced not only local colonists, but "also many of
the men from the King's ships" to join them. 98

Edward

Randolph reported that many young Englishmen specifically
enlisted aboard English convoy ships to the Chesapeake "to
avoid being press'd into His Mats Service at home" and that
they did so with the intention of deserting once they
reached the bay.

Most of these sailors then shipped

themselves aboard other vessels, but some came ashore where
they were "harbour'd and concealed by the Planters in the
Country." 99

96 Ibid., XVIII, i403, p. 239; i501, p. 302.
97 See, for example, Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 295,
304; Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 32-33, 126, 259; and Stout,
Royal Navy, 138.
98 CSPC, XIV, il916, p. 519.
99 Randolph, Letters,

v,

126; Middleton, Tobacco Coast,

295.
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Desertion continued to be a problem in the eighteenth
century.

In early 1710 Virginia officials reported that the

survivors of the Garland wreck had "with drawn them Selves
into other parts of this Colony" in order to avoid serving
aboard the recently arrived replacement guardship, H.M.S.
Diamond. 10 0

Council President Edmund Jennings and,

later, Governor Spotswood issued proclamations forbidding
the harboring of runaway seamen and in October 1710 the
Virginia assembly passed a bill establishing rewards for
capturing deserters and penalties for sheltering them. 101
After the bill's two-year term elapsed it was reconsidered
and made perpetua1.1~2
The guardship captains were not satisfied with the
observance of the law's provisions, however.

As a result of

their complaints the governor issued another proclamation in
1717 insisting that the officers of the colony make certain
to enforce the statute. 1 ~ 3

Despite the legislation and

public notices, the following year Captain Gordon of the

1~~ EJC, III, 574-55.

l~l Hening, Statutes, III, 486-89; Spotswood, Letters,

I, 56.
1

~2 Hening, Statutes, IV, 46; JHB, 1712-26, 51 ff.;
Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 212.
1

~ 3 EJC, III, 458.
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Lyme reported having lost "a great many" of his men on the
Virginia Station through desertion.l~4
Perhaps it was the naval commanders' annoyance with
colonists who harbored deserters or, as Randolph alleged,
conspired to "allure or entice any Sailor [&c] from his
service abord ship" that enabled the officers to justify the
impressment of men from the colonial ranks.l~5

More

likely, the navy men felt they needed no justification
beyond the imperative to man their vessels adequately.
Whichever was the case, there can be no doubt that
impressment and the harboring of deserters fostered a mutual
resentment between colonists and guardship officers that
escalated in the eighteenth century.
Impressment was causing problems on the Virginia
Station as early as the last decade of the seventeenth
century.

In 1695 Edward Randolph observed that shipmasters

"mett with Great Difficulties in loding their tobacco either
by their Saylers deserting their Service, or by ye Comanders
of his Maties Shipps of Warr pressing them."

Many of the

104 George Gordon to the Lords of Admiralty, Adm
1/1826, 3/1~/1718.
Besides attracting pirates to the North
American continent, the lure of treasure from the Spanish
plate fleet wrecks off the Florida coast also precipitated
wholesale desertions from a royal guardship in the spring of
1716. Having lost ten men in two days to salvage crews, the
captain of H.M.S. Diamond reported that had he remained in
the area a week longer, he would have lacked enough men to
sail the vessel home, his sailors "being all mad to go a
wrecking" (~,XXIX, 1158 iv, p. 80).
105 Randolph, Letters, V, 127.
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merchant sailors were being impressed for service aboard the
guardships that escorted the tobacco fleet to England during
King William's War.

But the shortage of manpower induced by

the press meant that some merchant ships were unable to load
the tobacco in time to weigh anchor with the fleet "so
that," as Randolph reported, "the Convoy left 25 Sayle of
vessells last yer.re exposed to ye Danger of
Privateers." 106

How bitterly ironic it must have seemed

to the shipmasters that the guardship captains sent to
provide a safe escort for their vessels were the same ones
responsible for depleting the crews of the tobacco ships,
thereby effectively preventing the merchant vessels from
participating in the convoy.l 07
Four years after Randolph made his observation, Captain
Aldred of the Essex Prize provoked the ire of Virginians by
impressing several colonists, contrary to Admiralty orders,
on his own authority. 108

Mary Rickets objected to the

106 Ibid., 124-25; CSPC, XIV, #2261, p. 643.
1° 7 Impressment, of course, was greatly resented (and
sometimes vehemently opposed) in other English colonies as
well.
In 1696 the Council of Barbados complained to the
governor that "the decay of the Island's trade proceeds from
the pressing and ill-using of the seamen, and other great
abuses of the press, that the King's ships never come out
fully manned" (CSPC, XIV, #2251, p. 641).
l08 Early in 1697 the Lords of Admiralty informed
Francis Nicholson that naval commanders in the Chesapeake
were no longer permitted to press local seamen on their own
authority.
In case of manpower shortages they were to apply
to the colonial governor for assistance (Admiralty to
Francis Nicholson, C05/1411, 1/26/ 1696/7). Aldred's
Admiralty instructions, issued prior to his departure from
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abduction of her fiancee, "one Sykes," and two local
business operators complained that Aldred had impressed men
under their employ because of a personal grudge. 1 ~ 9
Shipper John Minson stated that the master of one of his
sloops had been drafted because of "Aldred having some
difference with him." 11 ~

Ordinary keeper William Smolt

was more specific, claiming that Aldred had pressed a
carpenter who was working for him because the proprietor
would not entertain Aldred's seamen in his tavern. 111
The Council of Virginia ordered Aldred to discharge the
men and instructed him in the future not to impress any
sailors from inward bound ships; the councilors did permit
him, however, to take one seaman from each outward bound
vessel with a crew larger than twelve. 112

When Captain

Passenger arrived in the Shoreham later the same year he was
ordered not to impress men on his own authority but to

England for the Virginia Station, included a specific
warning not to impress colonists himself, but to seek the
help of "our Vice admiral," the governor of Virginia, should
he require additional sailors (Ibid., Admiralty instructions
to Captain Aldred, 9/14/1697). ----

1~9 C05/1411, fo. 296, 9/15-19/1699.
ll~ The dispute may have involved "pilotage" services
rendered over seven months earlier for which, Minson
charged, Aldred had failed to pay (Ibid.).
lll Ibid.
112 EJC, II, 43; ~' XVIII, 1152, pp. 8~-81.
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petition the governor for any conscripts he might
require. 113
Passenger deferred to the wishes of council only to
have his own and the governor's authority challenged by an
irreverent young merchant ship captain.

The naval commander

gave Nicholson an account of "the many threats of the law
and other scurrilous language I met with by executing your
warrant • • • by one Tregenny, master, who said he valued
not your order, there was no law for pressing, and if the
ship came to damage he would lay it to my charge."
Passenger described the merchant craft skipper as nothing
more than a "young uppish spark, fitter for a school than a
master of a ship."

But the navy officer was sufficiently

alarmed by the young man's threat to express anxiety that
Tregenny might "wilfully or through ignorance" run the
merchant vessel aground with the result that Passenger would
be "liable to be laid in jail for it" when he returned to
England.

Indeed, the guardship commander's apprehension

impelled him to cite a precedent, a case in Barbados where
locals reportedly prosecuted the captain of H.M.S. Deptford
for impressing men despite his having received "express
orders from the Admiralty" for doing so.l 14
113 Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, II, 188.
ll 4 CSPC, XVIII, i523 xv (14), pp. 316-17. Documented
cases of outright defiance of royal authority on the high
seas or coastal waterways of the greater Chesapeake are
relatively rare, but they did occur, or at least were
alleged, from time to time.
In addition to the Two Brothers
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As a result of similar problems elsewhere in America,
British authorities extended the policy of restraint to
other colonies in the Act of 1707, a statute that prohibited
naval commanders from impressing colonists on their own
authority and required them to apply to the colonial
governors to assist with manpower deficiencies. 1 1 5

The

legislation apparently was enacted solely as a wartime
measure to encourage trade, but Anglo-Americans tended to
regard it as a universal condemnation of impressment.
Although British Attorney General Edward Northey rendered
his judgment in 1716 that the statute had expired, the
colonists continued to believe that it remained in
effect. 116
Confusion and disagreement over whether or not the law
was still in force insured that the impressment issue would
become a major source of contention between colonists and
guardship personnel, leading to violence and charges of
lawless behavior on both sides.

The dispute lay dormant

affair in Edenton harbor mentioned in chapter 4, Harry
Beverley, a Virginian who had been deputed to cruise local
waters against illicit trade, reported a similar incident in
1695. Attempting to examine a vessel in Maryland's Severn
River, Beverley testified that he was confronted by 20 or 30
members of a hostile crew who "appeared • • • with drawn
swords, giving me a great many abusive Words & Swore We
should not come on Board." Richard Hill, captain of the
merchant ship, subsequently denied the allegations (Md. A.,
XX, 322, 324).
115 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 115.
116 Ibid., 116-18.
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during the peaceful 1730s but flared up again in the next
decade after the outbreak of the wars of Jenkins' Ear and
the Austrian Succession.

Once again, undermanning and

desertion created an increased demand for impressment.

In

1742 Captain William Gordon of the royal sloop Hound
reported from Virginia that he had been plagued by a severe
manpower shortage ever since his arrival on the bay station,
his predecessor having left him "most miserably mann'd with
thirty short of complement."

Compounding the problem were

the "too frequent desertions in this Colony" which Gordon
attributed to "the high Wages offer'd by Merchant men the
natural unsteddiness of Seamen and • • • the great number of
Gallons of Rum which the Masters never fail to promise," all
of which, the naval commander grumbled, had "weight enough
with our unthinking people to make them leave."ll7
Gordon appealed for assistance to Governor Gooch who
responded by issuing a proclamation declaring that the
king's ships stationed in Virginia had been "so disabled and
weakened" by desertions "as not to be in a Condition to
defend the Coast and Trade, from the Insults of the Enemy"
and requiring officers and citizens to "use their utmost
Diligence to detect and apprehend all such Seamen." 118
The edict seems to have had a chastening effect on the

11 7 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm l/1829,
12/30/1742.
118 Adm 1/1829, 12/15/1742.
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deserters and their abettors, but it did not entirely
resolve Gordon's dilemma.ll9
Six months later the guardship officer acquainted the
Admiralty Board with what he described as "the greatest
grievance that ever happen'd to his Majesty's Officers in
Foreign parts."

What had so unnerved Gordon was that "a few

inconsiderate inconsiderable little traders under the
managements of a lawyer of the same stamp" had resolved to
prosecute any guardship captain who dared to impress a
sailor in Virginia, even if the mariner was a deserter from
the captain's own ship.

In fact, the Royal Navy officer

indignantly affirmed, a fellow commander had been brought up
on just such a charge and Gordon himself had been issued a
summons for allegedly impressing men from an outward bound
ship, an accusation that he emphatically denied. 120
The guardship captain also complained of having been
served a writ by a merchant who threatened to "trounce" him
for crimping "three Vagrants at a little bawdy house" in
Hampton even though local justices of the peace had
sanctioned the impressment.

Gordon conceded that the

"Governor, Councell, and Better sort" were all "highly
averse to prosecutions of this kind," yet these individuals
did not act as decisively to curtail the legal harassment as

ll9 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1829,
12/30/1742.
120 Ibid., 6/9/1743.
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the captain would have liked. 121

The admiralty, however,

did not hesitate to remind Governor Gooch that the 1707 Act
was no longer in effect and insisted that he put a stop to
all such proceedings against guardship officers.122

In

November Gordon reported that the merchants had dropped the
lawsuits and thanked the Lords of the Admiralty for their
"speedy regard to the representations of their officers"
which he felt would probably discourage similar litigation
in the future. 123
By foreclosing on the colonists' legal options,
however, British authorities once again were merely treating
a symptom of the impressment problem and failing to address
its causes.

Manpower deficiencies in the Royal Navy

persisted, guardship officers continued to crimp, and the
colonists remained adamant in their opposition.

If

Virginians could no longer readily harbor deserters or
resort to judicial means of redress, they found other means
to thwart or resist the press.
On September 10, 1744 the Council of Virginia read a
letter from Lord Banff "Complaining of a riotous and
tumultuous Behavior of the Inhabitants of

• Norfolk

towards himself & the People belonging to the Ship under his

121 Ibid.
1 2 2 EJC,

v,

134; ooty, British Admiralty Board, 119.

123 William Gordon to Board of Admiralty, Adm 1/1829,
11/21/1743.
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Lordships Command." 124

Ten days later the council

appeared to strike a pose conciliatory to the naval
commander by ordering Norfolk officials to restrict the
distribution of arms "upon any Allarm" and requiring local
magistrates and militia commanders "diligently to discharge
their Duty in preserving the Peace • • • and to give all
necessary Assistance to His Majestys Ships of War." 125
And yet the council, which Captain Gordon had
characterized as generally sympathetic to the plight of
guardship officers, also recommended sending a letter to
Banff which would allot a full share of blame for the
incident to the commander and his men.

The proposed letter

also, incidentally, shed some light on the nature of the
disorder since Virginia officials asserted their conviction
that the fracas had been occasioned by Banff's "Men entering
the Town in such a Multitude armed with Clubs" and expressed
the hope that "his Lordship will never permit his People to
come a Shore in any such Number or Manner" again.l 26
Though the exact causes and details of the disturbance
remain obscure, it seems likely that Banff's group
constituted a press gang and, even if it did not, that the
citizens of Norfolk perceived it as such.

124 EJC, V, 158.
125 Ibid., 161; Tarter, ed., Norfolk Order Book, 62-63.
126 EJC, V, 161-62.
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An incident the following year illustrates how
colonists could resist the press in a less confrontational
way.

In March 1745 Captain Richard Gwynne of the royal

sloop Falcon sent his lieutenant aboard the merchant ship
Allen "to Impress for his Majesty's Service all that was
liable thereto."

After a muster and thorough search of the

ship produced only "the Officers and a few Boys," the
lieutenant discovered (merely through the coincidental
arrival of a local man with the getaway craft) that the
officers had permitted the sailors to "Run away" in one of
the ship's boats.

Incensed "after their Lordships good help

and Indulgence to the Officers in protecting them from the
Press, that they should Encourage unprotected Men to
escape," Captain Gwynne advised the Admiralty Board that he
had detained the Allen's boatswain and carpenter pending
notification of their lordships' pleasure in the
matter. 127
As was the case in 1744, however, Chesapeake colonists
did not always seek to avoid conflict in opposing
impressment.

In 1749 a Captain Norbury complained of the

rough treatment he received at the hands of local residents
for pressing four vagrants in Norfolk.

This time the

Admiralty was not as supportive as it had been of William
Gordon six years earlier.

With the advent of peace and in

1 27 Richard Gwynne to Board of Admiralty, Adm l/1830,
3/11/1745.
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recognition of a heightened level of colonial opposition to
the press, the Lords of Admiralty admonished Norbury "to
behave more discreetly and not render his Majesty's service
disagreeable to his subjects."l28

Guardship officers may have exercised poor judgment at
times and neglected their duty to engage in questionable
enterprises at others, but they were hardly alone among
influential royal and proprietary officials in the
Chesapeake to do so.

Just as the improprieties of some

commanders merely reflected a more widespread profligacy in
the officer corps of the Royal Navy on the whole, so too,
were such abuses the products of a system and an age in
which corruption was countenanced, practiced, and even
encouraged by many of the king's most distinguished servants
in both the home and colonial governments.

128 Doty, British Admiralty Board, 122.
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CHAPTER IX
"Perhaps the Mismanagement and Abuses of the • • • Officers
have Driven them to it": Conclusion

It is one of the ironies of maritime lawlessness in the
greater Chesapeake that the royal officials assigned to
monitor and enforce imperial policy and regulations
habitually derided bay area residents for their direct or
supporting roles in wrecking, freebooting, and smuggling,
but rarely stopped to consider the ways in which official
connivance and corruption at all levels of imperial
administration, including their own, contributed to the
problem.

A telling illustration of how pervasive the

problem was, and how oblivious to it some crown officers in
the colonies were, is the situation in which Governor
Spotswood, indignant over John Holloway's legal defense of
pirates, addressed his complaint to British Secretary of
State James Craggs.

If the secretary was unresponsive to

Spotswood's grievance, as appears to have been the case, it
was very likely because he was preoccupied with his own
predicament, the imminent bursting of the South Sea Bubble

381
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in whose fraudulent schemes Craggs soon would be heavily
implicated. 1
Considering the extent of corruption in English
government during the colonial era, is it any wonder that
many colonists would regard pirates, contrabandists, and
wreckers as no more opportunistic or immoral than those who
sought or pretended to bring these "criminals" to justice?
In this respect many Chesapeake residents probably did not
dismiss as mere rhetoric pirate captain Samuel Bellamy's
cynical and contemptuous observation concerning British
authorities that "they villify us, the scoundrels do, when
there is only this Difference, they rob the Poor under the
Cover of Law, for sooth and we plunder the Rich under the
Protection of our own Courage." 2
As was the case with the introduction of piracy,
illicit trade, and wrecking in the early American colonies,
the example of the home government, its overseas agents, and
other English notables in overlooking, sponsoring, or
actually engaging in maritime illegality continued to
influence the attitudes and behavior of Chesapeake

1 Spotswood, Letters, II, 305 n. 80; Carswell, South
Sea Bubble, 219, 229, 234-35; Sperling, South Sea Company,
35.
The secretary of state died of smallpox while under
investigation and his father, James Craggs, Sr., committed
suicide the night before he was to appear before Parliament
to explain his own role in the scandal (Spotswood, Letters,
II, 305 n. 80; Sperling, South Sea Company, 35; Carswell,
South Sea Bubble, 243-44).
2 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 587.
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inhabitants throughout the colonial period.

While royal and

colonial authorities typically ascribed primary
responsibility for the commission of such transgressions to
the planters, shipmasters, and residents of the greater
Chesapeake, Benjamin Harrison and others offered an
alternative explanation.

If the colonists were indeed

guilty of lawlessness on their maritime frontiers, Harrison
suggested, "perhaps the mismanagement and abuses of the
government and the officers have driven them to it." 3
Since residents of the bay region seemed to require
little prodding in that direction, the Virginia attorney
probably overstated his case in asserting that "so long as
the evil was tolerable, duty and loyalty • • • kept them
[the colonists] from doing these things which they saw the
officers encouraging." 4

Nevertheless, the significant

number of local customs agents and colonial officials who
did engage in various forms of corruption obviously failed
to set the sort of example that English authorities hoped
the colonists would emulate.

Most disturbing of all, from

the perspective of those royal officials genuinely concerned
with maritime law enforcement, was the inescapable reality
that such behavior was not restricted to officials of
council rank and below.

3 CSPC, XVI, i656, p. 332.
4 Ibid.
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Allegations of graft and corruption on the part of
royal governors in the greater Chesapeake date back at least
to William Berkeley's tenure in Virginia.

In addition to

Giles Bland's charges concerning the governor's alleged
involvement in illicit trade, Berkeley apparently availed
himself of at least one other morally questionable profitseeking opportunity.

The issue concerned a custom that

developed sometime around the mid-seventeenth century that
shipmasters arriving at Eastern Shore harbors would leave a
present of wine or provisions for the governor with the
local collector.

Although the practice never was mandated

by law, Berkeley insisted on its observance, pointedly
reminding a collector in 1667 that he had not received his
annual presentation.s
The custom surfaced as an issue once again, this time
in a somewhat more controversial context, nearly a half
century later.

When Governor Spotswood was accused

anonymously in 1716 of various charges related to customs
abuses (most of which appear to have been without any
foundation), he was obliged to admit that he had accepted
one fee not specifically warranted by law, "the Governour's
Dues at the Cloasing out of Shipping."

The rationale that

Spotswood offered in his own defense was revealing.

This

particular perquisite, he insisted, had "been allow'd of
even from beyond the memory of Man" and had been "constantly
5 Wise, Kingdome of Accawmacke, 298.
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receiv'd" by all of his predecessors. 6

Whether due to

Berkeley's exertions or those of succeeding governors, the
custom evidently had become institutionalized over the
years, establishing a precedent for officially sanctioned
opportunism which could not have had an edifying effect on
the colonists.
Unfortunately for the crown (and, sometimes, the
colonists as well), the passive acceptance of unsanctioned
benefits represented only one of the milder forms of alleged
gubernatorial impropriety in the maritime sphere.

Among

critics of the governors' laxity in seeking to curtail
smuggling and, more disturbingly, their occasional promotion
of, and even direct participation in, illegitimate maritime
affairs, Edward Randolph was, as usual, particularly
outspoken.

Having commended Virginia governor Nicholson in

1692 for seizing a vessel that collector John Custis had
permitted to trade illegally, Randolph remarked that the
effect on contrabandists and corrupt customs agents would be
to cause them to worry that henceforth the governor would no
longer "leave the business of ye Customs to their manage
onely" as previous chief executives Lord Culpeper and
Effingham had done. 7
Maryland chief executives were hardly exempt from
criticism either.

Besides the charges of fostering and

6 Spotswood, Letters, II, 192.
7 Randolph, Letters, VII, 348-49.
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conducting illegal trade frequently levelled at Lord
Baltimore and his subordinates, in 1693 the surveyor general
accused the new royal governor, Lionel Copley, of permitting
Scotsmen and New Englanders to conduct illicit trade
directly to Scotland. 8

Randolph further alleged that

Copley played an active role in securing acquittals for
three ships which the customs official had seized for trade
law violations. 9

In addition to the governor's support of

Potomac River collector Nehemiah Blakiston in extorting
"extravigant fees" from shipmasters, the surveyor general
charged that the chief business of Copley's "second Jacall,"
Patuxent River collector (and subsequently Maryland attorney
general) George Plater, was "to plye for wine Brandee for
the Gonr amongst the ships." 10

Similar complaints

continued to be voiced in the eighteenth century.

In 1717

Annapolis resident Thomas Macnemara accused Governor John
Hart of importing "in partnership with some of the principal
inhabitants

wines sugar, etc. from Lisbon contrary to

the Acts of Parliament."

Macnemara attributed the success

of the smuggling venture to Hart's having "so farr awed or

8 Ibid., V, 142-43.
9 Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 127. For
Copley's indignant and ranting rebuttal to the "base and
ignominious aspersions" allegedly concocted by Randolph's
"hot and inveterate brain" see Md. A., VIII, 335.
1 0 Randolph, Letters, VII, 374, 378.
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influenced the Customs Officers, that they required no entry
to be made of the said goods."ll
Randolph was no more complimentary in his assessment of
the governors of North Carolina whose "grievous oppressions"
were said to include "their exacting extravagant Fees from
Masters of vessells • • • Whereby lawfull Traders have been
wholly ruined." 12

During the same period, James Blair and

Benjamin Harrison accused Governor Edmund Andros of
attempting to sabotage crown efforts to suppress illicit
trade in Virginia. 13

When the royal government issued

orders for the Maryland and Virginia governors to hire a
local vessel to cruise against smugglers, Harrison alleged
that Andros purposely contracted the vessel "at a very great
rate" and drew the funds not from the Treasury's account but
from the colony's standing revenue so that the whole project
"might be as burdensome as possible and therefore soon laid
aside." 1 4

The promotion of illicit trade by governors

from colonies outside the region further compromised the
crown's ability to control such activity in the greater
11 CSPC, XXX, #289, p. 141. Hart subsequently informed
English authorities that he could find no evidence of
contraband commerce between Maryland and any of the French
colonies, but there appears to be no record of his having
made any direct refutation of Macnemara's charge regarding
illegal trade with Portugal (CSPC, XXX, #417 i, p. 201).
12 Randolph, Letters, V, 271.
13 Perry, Church Papers, 14; CSPC, XVI, #656, pp.
331-32.
14 CSPC, XVI, #656, pp. 331-32.
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Chesapeake.

In 1692 mariner Thomas Smith submitted an

affidavit to the officers of the Liverpool Customs House
indicating that he had navigated a sloop from Bermuda, in
accordance with orders from the island's governor, to
Maryland and from there, in clear violation of the trade
laws, straight to Ireland and Scotland. 15
In addition to revealing participation in, and
encouragement of, activities directly antithetical to the
Acts of Trade, the documentary record occasionally offers
glimpses of other assorted improprieties committed by
colonial governors in the maritime sphere of the greater
Chesapeake.

In 1726, for example, former North Carolina

governor George Burrington was indicted for breaking into
the home of Edenton resident Thomas Parris.

Burrington

allegedly had threatened to murder Parris and his family,
but the ex-official's wrath was directed more
"particularly," it seems, toward another resident or guest
of the household, local customs collector Adam
Cockburne. 16

A 173e suit initiated by North Carolina's

advocate general reveals that another former governor,
Charles Eden, had failed to submit the king's share of whale
oil and bone recovered in the colony during his
administration, an embezzlement of funds which, over a

1S Ibid., XIII, #2719, p. 752.
16 NCHCM, 1724-173e, 227.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

389
ten-year period, amounted to an estimated loss of L2gg9 in
crown revenue.l7
As serious a problem as gubernatorial corruption and
misbehavior was, it hardly constituted the only high-level
obstacle to effective law enforcement in the maritime
sphere.

The exertion of influence by socially and

politically well placed individuals and interest groups and
the uneven application of justice that resulted certainly
must have contributed to an erosion of the public's faith
in, and respect for, the colonial extension of the English
legal system.

The pirate adventure of Henry Munday, member

of a prominent Maryland tobacco trading family, offers a
case in point.
In the summer of 1709, Munday returned to America from
a trading voyage to Africa where, he reported, his ship had
been plundered by pirates. 18

The story was convincing

enough to induce Maryland governor Nathaniel Blakiston to
issue a proclamation, in advance of Munday's arrival in the
colony, calling for the pirate captain's apprehension.

But

Munday subsequently aroused the governor's suspicion when he
entered the Patuxent River with a full cargo of 300 slaves,
suggesting to Blakiston that the shipmaster "had been no
great sufferer as he had represented to the Board." 19

17 N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. no. 24.
18 CSPC, XVIII, #694, #694 iii, pp. 462, 465.
19 Ibid., #694, p. 462.
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search of the vessel additionally revealed a quantity of
"money and plate" which Munday had neglected to report to
customs officials. 2 ~
Whether the captain and his men obtained the goods
(which, as it turned out, had been seized from a Royal
African Company ship) by overpowering the pirates or
colluding with them is unclear, but Blakiston concluded
that, in any event, Munday was "more guilty than any of
them" and his actions "more notorious than any."21
Despite the governor's further conviction that the
shipmaster also deserved "to be secured more than any," it
does not appear that Munday was ever prosecuted, a
circumstance evidently related to the influence of an
English special interest group. 22

Describing his own

reluctance to pursue the matter, Blakiston explained that he
was "always very tender and cautious of giving any just
grounds to the merchants at home to think they have the
least difficulty put upon them; for if Munday should be
secured it might be a means of the ship's miscarrying." 23
The influence of London merchants also may have played
a role in both advancing the career of Lower James River
district customs collector Richard Fitzwilliam and
2

~ Ibid., #694 ii, p. 463.

21 Ibid., #694, p. 462; #694 ii, p. 463.
22 Morriss, Colohial Trade of Maryland, 131.
23 ~' XVIII, #694 ii, p. 464.
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protecting him from charges of corruption in office.

The

report that Alexander Spotswood submitted to the
Commissioners of the Customs in 1719 not only detailed the
Virginia governor's personal knowledge of various abuses
allegedly committed by Fitzwilliam, but also referred to
representations against the collector "from other hands,
particularly from the Capt's of the Men of War, who have but
too much reason to Complain of his behavior in Countenancing
Pirats," including the specific charge that Fitzwilliam had
been dealing with Blackbeard.2 4
Normally, denunciations by a well respected governor
and Royal Navy commanders would have been more than
sufficient to ensure the removal of a mere local customs
agent from his post.

Fitzwilliam, however, was neither

discharged nor even reprimanded.

In fact, his professional

standing does not appear to have been diminished in the
least, as his subsequent appointments to the influential
offices of surveyor general of the customs for the southern
colonies and governor of the Bahamas clearly demonstrate.
To what may this remarkable resilience and invulnerability
to criticism be attributed?

Spotswood hinted obliquely at

the answer when he asserted that the residents of
Fitzwilliam's customs district would have petitioned crown
authorities "unanimously" for the collector's dismissal had

24 Spotswood, Letters, II, 328i Karraker, Piracy was a
Business, 2~8i Lee, Blackbeard, 156.
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they not been "aw'd by ye Interest he boasts of, and the
fear of worse usage upon his return" from a voyage to
England. 25
The "Interest he boasts of" almost certainly referred
to the same group of British merchants whose exorbitant
freight rates, opposition to measures designed to encourage
colonial shipbuilding, fulminations against the exportation
of bulk tobacco from the colonies, and excessive profits at
the Chesapeake planters' expense had earned them the
antipathy of many bay area inhabitants.

If Richard

Fitzwilliam had indeed cast his lot with the London traders
and was indebted to them for his success, he demonstrated
his gratitude by consistently supporting their commercial
interests during his tenure as surveyor general.
1729-3~

When in

Virginia planters sought, with Governor Gooch's

support, to repeal Parliament's prohibition against the
importation of tobacco stripped from the stalk, Fitzwilliam
placed himself in the forefront of those opposed to the
colonial position. 26

Among those who stood to lose the

most from the proposed repeal were, of course, the English
merchants whose freight revenues would have been reduced
significantly had the initiative succeeded.

Fitzwilliam has

also been identified as the principal adversary in England
of the governor's momentous tobacco inspection act, regarded
25 Spotswood, Letters, II, 328.
2 6 Flippin, William Gooch, 27 and n. 67.
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by many in the colonies and the home country as the best
hope for resuscitating the severely depressed Chesapeake
economy. 27

Once again, historians point to the surveyor

general's influential connections in England as the factor
which enabled him to oppose a royal governor with impunity,
a stance which in part earned him the opprobrium of Gooch
and the Virginia burgesses as a "turbulent Spirit unfit for
Society." 28
But if Fitzwilliam had his detractors in the colonies,
he also had his supporters.

Two of his principal allies

bear names which also, curiously, were associated with
maritime lawlessness in the greater Chesapeake.

When the

House of Burgesses voted on a petition to remove the
surveyor general from the Council of Virginia, it was
Speaker John Holloway, the Williamsburg attorney disparaged
by Governor Spotswood as a "constant patron and Advocate for
Pirates," who cast the deciding vote in Fitzwilliam's
favor. 29

After the measure was defeated, fellow

councilor John Custis, son and namesake of the corrupt
Eastern Shore customs officer, wrote to England to assure

27 Hemphill, Virginia and the English Commercial System
1689-1733, 164; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 41.
2S COS/1322, p. 64; Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act,"
45.
29 Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 41; Spotswood,
Letters, II, 354; CSPC, XXX, #See, p. 430.
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the royal customs agent that his allies were protecting
Fitzwilliam's interests faithfully during his absence. 3 ~
Similar connections between individuals known or
believed to have been involved in various forms of illegal
maritime activity in the gieater Chesapeake are not
uncommon.

North Carolina governor Charles Eden, for

example, a principal beneficiary of Blackbeard's freebooting
and the officiating magistrate at the pirate's wedding, had
a friendship of sufficient intimacy with the Williamsburg
attorney and legislator who infuriated Alexander Spotswood
with his defense of pirates that Eden saw fit to bequeath
"his Negroe Boy Taphy to the said Govr very good Freind John
Holloway Esqr in Verginia." 31

Tobias Knight, the North

Carolina secretary and customs official upon whose property
Blackbeard's booty was discovered, is said to have consorted
closely with Virginia collector and alleged Blackbeard
associate Richard Fitzwilliam. 3 2

3~ Horne, "Tobacco Inspection Act," 44.
31 CRNC, II, 538.
32 Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 163. Fitzwilliam
also served in the late 172~s on the commission to survey
the North Carolina-Virginia boundary.
Not only did he anger
Governor Gooch with his insistence on being paid as much as
the other commissioners, though he quit the survey well
before the others, but also because he favored the
proprietors' interest in establishing the border, a stance
which could be interpreted as a further indication of the
customs agent's close ties with Carolina officials
(C05/1322, p. 65).
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Henry Irwin, the Virginia collector who apparently
embezzled confiscated pirate effects with which he had been
entrusted, acted as an agent in a 1728 North Carolina land
purchase for Samuel Swann, very likely the same Samuel Swann
called to account four years later for suspected "Male
Practice" in neglecting to condemn a small vessel that he
had seized in his capacity as a local customs collector.33
Due to the existence of two or more Samuel Swanns during
this period, there is, admittedly, some uncertainty over
whether the venal official was the same person who was
involved with Irwin. 34

Even if they were different

individuals, however, they belonged to the same family
which, coincidentally, also included William Swann, the
Carolina customs agent whom Virginia officials accused of
misappropriating effects and charging excessive fees in
connection with salvage activities conducted on the wreck of
H.M.S. Garland.
One set of suspicious relationships extended beyond the
confines of the greater Chesapeake to include the home
country as well.

Robert Quary, the former pirate

collaborator who succeeded Edward Randolph as surveyor
general, was friendly with Micajah Perry, the prominent

33 Jones, Present State of Virginia, 242 n. 219; CRNC,
II, 767; N.C. St. Arch., CCR 142, doc. nos. 43, 45, 47, 50,
51.
3 4 Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography,
VI, pending.
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English merchant who in 1689 submitted a petition to English
authorities seeking a pardon on behalf of three pirates
apprehended in the Chesapeake. 35

As one of the most

powerful London merchants in the tobacco trade, Perry quite
likely belonged to the same group of English traders who
used their influence to prevent Henry Munday from being
prosecuted and who, years later, promoted the career of
another aspirant to the surveyor general's post, Richard
Fitzwilliam.

Like Perry, Fitzwilliam (whose position on the

Council of Virginia, it should be recalled, was secured by
pirate defender Holloway's vote) also sought to obtain a
pardon for a sea brigand, the convicted and condemned pirate
John Vidal in 1727.36

The connections between individuals linked with one or
more forms of maritime illegality reflect an inherent
interrelationship between the various types of lawlessness
themselves.

Obviously, bartering with pirates for foreign

booty or removing similarly uncustomed goods from a
shipwreck constituted trade law violations in a technical
sense, but a more conscious and intentional tie also
existed, a circumstance which some royal and colonial
authorities clearly recognized at the time.

Edward

Randolph, for instance, noted the association in his
35 NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxi; ~' XIII, #60, p. 19.
36 CSPC, XXXV, #707, p. 353; VMHB, XXXII, 242.
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repeated references to North Carolina as a haven for both
pirates and illegal traders.

Near the end of the

seventeenth century one English official linked the two most
troubling forms of maritime lawlessness even more clearly by
characterizing piracy and illegal trade as

11

the beloved

twins 11 of New York merchants.37
By

169~,

one scholar has observed, the only growth

areas in the New York economy were those related to Red Sea
and Indian Ocean freebooting enterprises. 38

The

Chesapeake also participated in eastern piracy, both
directly and indirectly, as was apparent in the Henry Munday
episode and in Governor Spotswood's unpopular efforts to
send shipmasters accused of trading with Red Sea pirates
back to England for trial.

Predictably, the involvement of

bay area residents in both local and distant pirate ventures
paralleled not only that of fellow Anglo-Americans, but also
one of the Chesapeake's most active and regular illicit
trading partners, the Dutch of Curaiao.

The Caribbean

island served not only as a clearinghouse for contraband

3 7 Cited in Karraker, Piracy was a Business, 46.
In
this particular regard, it is worth noting that an
inspection of Blackbeard's sloop after the battle with Royal
Navy forces in 1718 reportedly revealed correspondence
between the pirate captain, North Carolina Governor Charles
Eden, colonial secretary Tobias Knight, and some New York
traders, indicating not only the trade/piracy connection,
but suggesting cooperation between the greater Chesapeake
and other Anglo-American colonies in its pursuit (Defoe,
History of the Pyrates, 83).
38 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, 37.
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trade goods but pirate plunder as well.

Edward Randolph

reported that freebooters from the Red and South Seas
regularly conducted illegal commerce with "Carasaw and other
ill places" and the Earl of Bellemont complained that,
although the governor of the Dutch island pretended "great
innocence or ignorance •

there was never anything • • •

so publicly managed as the sale of [pirate captain William]
Kidd's spoils there."39
If illicit trade and piracy were closely related in the
minds of American colonists as "beloved twins," another
historian has suggested that the recovery of treasure from
sunken wrecks, legal or otherwise, constituted a "sister
activity." 40

The aftermath of the wreck of the Spanish

plate fleet in the early eighteenth century offers one of
the more demonstrable examples of the connection between
pirates and wrecking.

In fact, no single occurrence drew

sea marauders to the shores of North America to the extent
that the 1715 Spanish disaster off the Florida coast did.
As Alexander Spotswood informed royal authorities, the
swarming of pirates around the sunken fleet and the Spanish
salvage camp had worrisome implications for the greater
Chesapeake.

Among "those who stole away the Silver which

the Spaniards had fished up from the Wrecks of the Galleons,
in the Gulf of Florida" and subsequently made his way up the
39 CRNC, I, 468; CSPC, XVII, #890, p. 489.
4

° Karraker,

Piracy was a Business, 46.
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coast was Charles Vane, whose rendezvous with Blackbeard at
Ocracoke Inlet caused the Virginia governor to fear the
establishment of a pirate stronghold in the greater
Chesapeake. 41

Samuel Bellamy, whose crew "very much

infested" the Virginia coast in 1717, was another.42

So

was Josiah Forbes, whom Spotswood arrested and imprisoned
after the suspect's arrival in Virginia (along with three
others who also had sought to profit from the Spaniards'
misfortune) bent upon "Piratical designs." 4 3
During the half-century between 1670 and 1720,
governors and crown officials periodically expressed the
fear that pirates or Dutch traders might tap veins of
popular discontent and foment insurrection in the greater
Chesapeake.

such anxiety implies that forms of lawlessness

like wrecking, smuggling, and piracy also may have been
related to other illegal or subversive activities not
necessarily associated with maritime affairs per se.

The

case of Richard Clarke of Anne Arundel County, Maryland
provides an unparalleled, documented example of an
individual who, during the course of his criminal career,
managed to pursue an impressively broad spectrum of
illegitimate enterprises.

Known primarily for his piratical

41 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 135; Ellms, Pirates
Own Book, 349.
42 CSPC, XXIX, i595 i, pp. 317-18; Defoe, History of
the PyrateS; 585.
4 3 Spotswood, Letters, II, 170-71.
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machinations, Clarke was also accused of forgery and tobacco
fraud, conspiring with the Indians to attack Maryland
settlements, and counterfeiting Spanish pieces of eight.44
Clarke's case is, of course, exceptional and its
notoriety may be attributed to the sheer diversity of his
4 4 Md. A. XXV, 265-66; XXVI, 379, 451, 487, 513-14;
XXVII, 133-34; CRNC, I, 666; CSPC, XXII, #1210, p. 550.
Since the wrecks-ind subseque~alvage of Spanish treasure
ships furnished plausible pretexts for the introduction of
otherwise scarce specie into the Anglo-American colonies, it
is not unreasonable to suppose that enterprising
counterfeiters in the Chesapeake might have taken advantage
of such occurrences to put their wares into circulation.
In
fact, some documented instances of counterfeiting gold and
silver coins in the greater Chesapeake do coincide roughly
with Spanish treasure wreck and recovery episodes on the
North American coast and in the Caribbean. North Carolina
authorities prosecuted individuals accused of passing
"Considerable sumrns of Counterfeit Spanish Money" in the
colony in 1696, for instance, a year after two treasure
galleons wrecked near Cuba and at a time when Spanish
officials were stiil trying to reclaim riches that
Englishmen from Port Royal had salvaged illegally from other
sunken vessels several years earlier (NCHCR, 1670-1696, 270,
302; NCHCR, 1702-1708, xxviii, n. 53; Robert F. Marx,
Shipwrecks in the Americas (New York, 1983), 352, 381-82).
Not long after much of the Spanish treasure fleet came
to grief on the shores of the greater Chesapeake in 1750, a
notorious counterfeiter named Low Jackson was tried,
condemned, and put to death in Virginia for fabricating
Spanish "Double Double-loons" (Va. Gaz., 5/9/1751, p. 3; Pa.
Gaz., 5/16/1751, p. 2; Kenneth Scott, "Counterfeiting in
Colonial Virginia," VMHB, LXI, 7-8). As it turns out,
though, warrants for Low's arrest had been issued before the
Spanish fleet sailed and there is no evidence to indicate
that he conducted any counterfeiting operations after it
wrecked.
It is interesting to note, however, that the agent
assigned to capture Low was engaged simultaneously in the
effort to track down the "Spanish money pirated" by
opportunistic American mariners from the Guadalupe while it
was stranded in Ocracoke Inlet (after mutinous Spanish crew
members naively entrusted the Americans with most of their
silver chests), suggesting an association between the two
types of activity in the minds of British authorities (AGI,
"Consulados," legajo 861, fos. 54, 154, 155; Scott,
"Counterfeiting in Colonial Virginia," VMHB, LXI, 9).
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illegal activities and the magnitude of the danger that
colonial authorities believed he represented.

But the local

support that he enjoyed "notwithstanding his most equisite
villany" and the difficulty that government officials
experienced in apprehending such a well publicized and
reputedly dangerous felon also suggests that many of
Clarke's fellow Chesapeake residents did not regard his
pursuits (plotting with unfriendly Indians no doubt
excepted) as particularly extraordinary, objectionable, or
threatening. 45

A distressed Governor Seymour noted this

lack of concern in a 1707 letter to his Virginia counterpart
requesting Clarke's capture and extradition, complaining
that Virginians evidently had "forgott" a previous
proclamation to the same effect despite Seymour's contention
that the wanted man spent a good deal of time in their
colony. 46
The governor specifically identified "the Rose & Crowne
• in Elizabeth River" as an establishment that Clarke
was known to frequent, thereby calling attention to a social
and functional milieu in which many of the illegal
activities on the colonial maritime frontier were planned
and conducted.

As principal places of assembly, taverns or

ordinaries served an essential social and communal function

45 CRNC, I, 666.
46 VMHB, XVI, 76.
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in the colonial Chesapeake. 47

Often located near county

courthouses, they were typically of two sorts as described
by Virginia gentleman William Byrd II: "an ordinary well
supplied with wine and other polite liquors for the
worshipful bench" and "a rum ordinary for persons of a more
vulgar taste." 48

Many of those who frequented the latter

type constituted what one historian has identified as a
"sub-society" composed in part of sailors, vagrants,
beggars, indentured servants, slaves, free blacks,
tradesmen, laborers, and fleeing debtors. 49

Neighborhood

taverns represented major focal points for this group's
dealings, some of which, as one would expect from a
sub-society "complete with fences and receivers of stolen
goods," concerned illicit affairs. 50

4 7 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 17401790 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983), 30, 88-90, 94-98.
48 Frederick H. Schmidt, "British Convict Servant Labor
in Colonial Virginia," Ph.D. dissertation (College of
William and Mary, 1976), 244; Isaac, Transformation of
Virginia, 88-90.
4 9 Schmidt, "British Convict Labor," 245.
Significantly, an important component of the Clarke gang's
master plan was to attract "Housekeepers of desperate
Fortunes and other disaffected Persons to their Party." In
fact, the select investigative committee of the Maryland
assembly determined that "Clarke by his Prodigality in
disbursing • • • the Counterfeit Money had so insinuated
himself into the Minds" of indentured servants and debtors
that he succeeded in inducing a number of them to join with
the plotters "in their Cursed and wicked Design and Intent"
(Md. A., XXVII, 131-35).
50 Schmidt, "British Convict Labor," 245, 253.
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Because of their lower-class clientele and the illegal
or socially unacceptable activities that it pursued, the
less genteel taverns developed reputations as "Nurseries of
Vice" and "the common Receptacle, and Rendezvous of the very
Dreggs of the People." 51

Seamen in particular were so

notorious for their misbehavior at such establishments that
Virginia legislators enacted laws forbidding ordinary
keepers to entertain them without the express permission of
their ship's commander. 52

It is entirely consistent with

the dubious distinctions that attended both sailors and
ordinaries that the two groups of pirates who landed in the
bay in 1720 appear to have spent most of the time prior to
their arrest revelling at local taverns near the mouth of
the York River and at Hampton, respectively.53
The penchant of pirates for frequenting Chesapeake
taverns calls to mind the "alehouses" established along the
Irish coast in previous centuries to entertain freebooters
and to facilitate the exchange of their plundered goods with

51 Va. Gaz., 4/11/1751, p. 3; Patricia Gibbs, "Taverns
in Tidewater Virginia, 1700-1774," M.A. thesis (College of
William and Mary, 1968), 39.
52 Hening, Statutes, III, 400; VI, 25, 75. A similar
law was enforced scrupulously in North Carolina in 1768 when
the licenses of two female ordinary keepers were suspended
for selling liquor to seamen without their captain's
approval (Alan D. Watson, "Ordinaries in Colonial Eastern
North Carolina" North Carolina Historical Review, XLV, 69).
53 Defoe, History of the Pyrates, 207-08; Shomette,
Pirates on the Chesapeake, 221.
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local populations. 54

In the New World such establishments

(along with bordellos, jails, and the docks of port towns)
formed an integral part of what historian Marcus Rediker has
described as an informal "seaman's network" that operated
along the coast of North America and in the Caribbean to
provide mariners, including smugglers and pirates, with
information vital to their professions.55
The taverns patronized by the "more vulgar" sort
comprising the colonial Chesapeake's underworld undoubtedly
epitomized the social environment in which outlaws such as
Richard Clarke and other undesirables circulated and
exchanged information in the seaman's network of the bay
region.

Colonial records do not appear to contain any

evidence of a Rose & Crowne tavern on the Elizabeth River,
as Governor Seymour had indicated, but in 1702 a Swiss
traveller noted the presence of just such an inn across the
James River in Virginia's Elizabeth City County. 56

The

specific site of the tavern was next to Pembroke Church in
Hampton, a port town which was distinguished, despite its

5 4 Senior, Nation of Pirates, 56.
5 5 Rediker, Deep Blue Sea, 133-34.
56 Francis L. Michel, "Report of a Journey from
Switzerland to Virginia, 1701, 1702," VMHB, XXIV no. 1, p.
20 n. 30; Luther J. Kibler, "The History of Hampton and
Elizabeth City County," typescript mss. (Richmond, 1937),
48, 65b. The mouth of the Elizabeth River lies due south of
the city of Hampton, formerly a part of Elizabeth City
County, across the body of water known as Hampton Roads
where the James River flows into the Chesapeake Bay.
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modest size, by the remarkable number of ordinaries that
operated there.

Although Virginia law permitted only two

taverns per town, county records indicate that nineteen
licenses for ordinaries were granted between 1694 and
1102. 57

While it is impossible to know how many of these

actually were in business simultaneously, the number was
obviously too high for the liking of Governor Nicholson who
in 1699 insisted that local justices revoke the licenses of
all but the prescribed number.sa
The reason for the presence of so many ordinaries in
such a relatively small town was that Hampton, according to
one historian, was "thronged with seadogs." 59

Until the

emergence of Norfolk as a rival shipping center in
subsequent decades, Hampton functioned as Virginia's
principal port city and the seat of the collector's office
for the lower James River district where vessels were
required to enter and clear. 60

Not only was the lower

57 Rosemary c. Neal, Elizabeth City County, Virginia:
Deeds, Wills, Court Orders, etc. 1634, 1659, 1688-1702
(Bowie, Md., 1986), 32-34, 63.
58 Kibler, "History of Hampton and Elizabeth City
County," 49.
5 9 Starkey, First Plantation, 16.
60 Yorktown, which gained prominence as a Virginia port
during the first half of the eighteenth century, also hosted
a large transient population and contained a quantity of
ordinaries sufficient to evoke comment and concern (Edward
M. Riley, "The Ordinaries of Yorktown," WMQ, 2d ser., XXIII
no. 1, 23). One observer remarked that "The taverns are
many here, and much frequented, and an unbounded
Licentiousness seems to taint the Morals of the young
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James one of the busiest customs districts in the colony,
but it was also, according to Governor Spotswood, the one
"most Commodious for the designs of such as intend to carry
on an illegal Trade, because of vicinity to the [Virginia]
Capes." 61

During Spotswood's administration another

traveller declared that Hampton "had the greatest business
in Virginia" and carried on a thriving trade with
Pennsylvania and New York, two colonies which, as previously
indicated, also gained renown as alleged centers of
contraband trafficking and support for pirates. 62
Hampton also appears to have been a popular destination
for pirates seeking sanctuary and recreation.

In addition

to the freebooters who made merry at a Hampton tavern in
1720, pirate Lionel Wafer reported that he was heading down
"the great Bay of Chisapeek to Point-Comfort," a promontory
in the eastern part of Hampton, where he intended to settle
before his unfortunate encounter with a royal guardship in

Gentlemen of this Place"

(Anon., WMQ, 1st ser., XV, 222).

61 Spotswood, Letters, I, 15. Although Spotswood
identified the Lower James River district as the one where
illicit trade was "chiefly carryd on," two decades earlier
Edward Randolph noted the significance of Virginia's Eastern
Shore for much the same reason. That district, according to
the surveyor general, required "great diligence &
Circumspection" not only because it contained "many bays &
Creeks in it where Scotch & N : England men frequent," but
also since it lay "Nigh ye entry of ye Capes" (Ibid., 10;
Randolph, Letters, VII, 367).
6 2 Tyler, History of Hampton, 31.
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1688 spoiled those plans. 63

Considering the role that the

Lower James River district in general and the town of
Hampton in particular played in promoting maritime
lawlessness in the region, it was surely no accident that
the site chosen to display Blackbeard's severed head as a
warning to maritime lawbreakers and their abettors was a
sandy point at the entrance to the town's harbor.
Because of Hampton's importance in regional trade and
its proximity to the Virginia Capes, the town's association
with pirates and smugglers is better documented than that of
most ports in the greater Chesapeake.

Even so, little is

known about the seaman's network that existed there, much
less about any criminal activities that it supported.

One

reason for this is that Hampton, like other ports in the
Chesapeake, did not compare to New York, Philadelphia, or
Boston in terms of size and concentration of wealth and
property.

Hence, as A. Roger Ekirch has pointed out, the

population centers of the greater Chesapeake, such as they
were, failed to attract the criminal element to anywhere
near the same extent that major colonial cities elsewhere in
English America did.64

6 3 Wafer, Isthmus of America, 131; Dampier, Voyages, I,
537. Fort Monroe, constructed before the American Civil
War, currently occupies the location referred to as Old
Point Comfort.
64 Ekirch, Bound for America, 185-88.
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Consequently, most of the extralegal activity that was
planned at local drinking establishments probably was not of
the sort that would have upset or necessarily drawn the
attention of local residents.

Unlike murder and robbery,

smuggling and trading with pirates seem to have been
regarded by most colonists as "victimless" offenses which
few people, other than royal officials, considered truly
"criminal."

If the history of English smuggling provides a

reliable guide, though, it was precisely through such small,
lesser trafficked ports that much of the contraband trade
was conducted.

And with proven or suspected malefactors

like Collectors George Luke and Richard Fitzwilliam and
Naval Officer John Holloway in charge of duty collection and
trade law compliance, opportunities for customs fraud may
have abounded in this port of entry for the lower James
River district.
Despite the general paucity of information about
maritime lawlessness in the area's principal ports, glimpses
of illegal activity elsewhere suggest that, like Hampton,
other harbor towns may have served as local or regional hubs
of illicit enterprise.

Part of the extensive network that

supported Richard Clarke, for example, seems to have been
centered in Annapolis where the outlaw and his cohorts
allegedly conducted "Cabals" to plot their conspiracy
against the colonial government and recruited local debtors
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and indentured servants for their pirate expedition.65
Bath, North Carolina, where Blackbeard reportedly
resided for a time, also seems to have been a likely venue
for similar activity, especially during Governor Eden's
administration. 66

Ocracoke Inlet, the principal

thoroughfare for ships sailing through the Outer Banks to
and from Bath, was the site of the infamous meeting between
Blackbeard and Charles Vane and the place where, Alexander
Spotswood feared, the pirates planned to create a regional
bastion.

The colony's first official port of entry, Bath

was also the seat of the collector's office for Pamlico
Sound where Carolina governors Dobbs and Burrington
suspected that smuggling was being conducted on an imposing
scale. 67

In addition to Annapolis and Bath, and

especially as Hampton's prominence diminished after the
early decades of the eighteenth century, other maritime
entrepots such as Norfolk and, by the Revolution, Baltimore,
began to emerge as centers of both legal and illicit
maritime activity.68
65 Md. A., XXVII, 134-35.
66 c. Wingate Reed, Beaufort County: Two Centuries of
its History (Raleigh, 1962), 5~; NCHCM, 1724-173~, xxv.
67 For evidence of the continued participation of Bath
merchants in contraband trade in the decade preceding the
Revolution see below, p. 427.
68 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 2~~-~1, 209, 232, 258-59;
Wertenbaker, Norfolk, 40-44, 47. Norfolk attracted the
attention of royal authorities not only as a bulwark of
resistance to impressment, but also as center of illicit

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

410
By the seventh decade of the eighteenth century,
however, it could be argued that widespread maritime
illegality in the greater Chesapeake had become a thing of
the past.

The "golden age of piracy" in the region had long

since ended and official handling of the 1750 Spanish plate
fleet wrecks demonstrated (in contrast to the virtually
unrestrained pillaging that characterized the 1698, 1709-10
and 1715 episodes) that colonial governments could exert at
least some restraining influence on the rapacious impulses
of the area's coastal inhabitants.

Even the intractable

problem of contraband trade finally appeared to have been
solved.

Virginia governor Francis Fauquier announced in

1764 that the volume of illicit commerce conducted
throughout the Chesapeake had become so negligible that "the
Men of War stationed on our Coast think it hardly worth
watching," an appraisal corroborated the same year by
Maryland governor Horatio Sharpe with regard to his
colony. 69
But had extensive maritime lawlessness really ceased to
exist in the bay region?

Had illicit trade truly become so

insignificant, as Governor Fauquier asserted, that it no
longer warranted serious concern?

Certainly those

responsible for customs receipts in the home government did
trade.

See below, pp. 418, 422-25.

6 9 C05/1330, pp. 539-41; George Reese, ed., The
Official Papers of Frances Fauquier (Charlottesville, Va.
1983), III, 1169; Middleton, Tobacco Coast, 213-14.
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not think so.

A 1764 memorial from Treasury officials to

the Privy Council observed that "through neglect,
connivance, and fraud, not only is the revenue impaired, but
the commerce of the colony is diverted from its natural
course and the salutary provisions of many wise laws to
secure it to the Mother Country are in great measure
defeated." 7 a

Admittedly, the apparent frustration of

crown officials may have been somewhat disingenuous.
Charles Andrews has argued, for example, that British
officials habitually blamed smuggling, piracy and a host of
other factors for chronic revenue shortfalls when the real
problems were the mismanagement and corruption of the home
government itself. 71

No doubt this was true to a

significant extent, but the incompetence and hypocrisy of
the English administrators only would have encouraged
similar inefficiency and official venality in the Chesapeake
and certainly did not preclude continued contraband
trafficking by the colonists.
The evidence from the Chesapeake confirms that
corruption and customs fraud continued to plague the system
on the western shores of the Atlantic.

The laws of North

Carolina in 1754 included a statute forbidding the
exportation of tobacco not packed in casks "forasmuch as the
7 a APCC, IV, #520, p. 569; Andrews, Colonial Period of
American~tory, IV, 219.
7 1 Andrews, Colonial Period of American History, IV,
278-79.
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permitting of Tobacco in Bulk or Parcels to be waterborne •
may give great Opportunity to the clandestine running
the same on Board ships or Vessels." 72

The passage of

similar legislation in 1766 and again in 1774 represented a
tacit admission, articulated explicitly in the body of the
statutes themselves, that "the Laws heretofore in Force for
preventing frauds in his Majesty's Customs" had been
found "ineffectual to answer the Purposes thereby
intended." 73

In 1766 the Virginia assembly, enacting its

own law for preventing customs fraud, insisted that naval
officers furnish receipts for all fees that they collected
because, experience had shown, it was "almost impossible to
detect officers, who charge greater fees than • • • are
allowed." 74
Skeptics might dismiss the repeated re-enactment of
anti-smuggling and anti-fraud legislation by colonial
assemblies as nothing more than token responses designed to
placate British authorities who were clearly dissatisfied
with what they regarded as an unacceptably low level of
trade law compliance in the greater Chesapeake.

Evidence

from other sources, however, suggests that the problem was
not merely one of politics and perceptions but of substance.
Barely a month after declaring illegal trade to and from the
72 CRNC, XXIII, 402-03.
73 Ibid., 728-41, 948-52.
74 Hening, Statutes, VIII, 251.
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Chesapeake to be practically nonexistent, Governor Fauquier
flatly contradicted his own assessment by reporting to the
Board of Trade that "European Goods • • • are being brought
in promiscuously by every Ship which arrives from the Mother
Country." 75
But of all the indications of the status of illicit
trade in the greater Chesapeake during the years immediately
preceding the Revolution none was more revealing than the
comprehensive body of evidence compiled in 1770 by a special
investigator for the recently established American Board of
Commissioners of the Customs. 76

Appointed the Board's

first inspector general in 1767, John Williams was assigned
the task of examining and reporting on the customs service
of most of the coastal colonies.

Arriving in the Chesapeake

in 1770, he began his investigation in the James River where
he accused a collector of accepting a bribe to release one
ship suspected of illicit trade and permitting another to

75 Reese, Fauguier Papers, III, 1199. The governor
also called for an increase in the number of customs
officials specifically assigned to search merchant ships for
contraband because of the frequency with which illegal trade
was being conducted. His statement that the only two
"searchers" operating in the colony at the time were located
in the lower James River and the Eastern Shore attests to
the continued significance of these districts as suspected
centers of illicit trade (Flippin, Financial Administration
of Virginia, 36).
7 6 Joseph R. Frese, "The Royal Customs Service in the
Chesapeake, 1770: The Reports of John Williams, Inspector
General," VMHB, LXXXI, 280-318i Billings, Selby, and Tate,
Colonial VTrglnia, 321.
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unload without proper papers. 77
represented an anomaly, however.

These allegations
Nowhere else in his

travels through Virginia and Maryland rivers did Williams
impugn the integrity of local customs officers whom he
unfailingly portrayed as "men of exceeding good character,
both as to their public and private sections, and • • • very
exact in the business of the office." 78

But the praise

lavished upon these officials also represented an aberration
because the inspector general consistently found the customs
operation so deficient and abused in practically every other
respect that his report easily could be mistaken for any one
I

of the standard anti-smuggling diatribes of the preceding
century.
Like so many of his predecessors, Williams initially
remarked on the excellent opportunities for smuggling that
the region afforded, noting that "in all those rivers there
are many harbours, bays, and creeks for vessels of almost
any burthen, and landing places almost at every door where
they land goods imported, and deliver goods for
exportation." 79

More specifically, he detected a

discrepancy between the unusually large number of foreign
ships that arrived in the Chesapeake, according to their

77 Frese, "Royal Customs Service in the Chesapeake,"
282.
7 8 Ibid., 285-86, 290, 294, 297, 301, 303, 305, 308.
79 ~., 287, 318.
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cocquets, "almost wholly in ballast" and the abundance of
foreign goods available to local consumers. 80

"The

imports of dutiable goods by their entries are very
inconsiderable although their consumption must be great,"
Williams concluded, since French wines could be purchased
"at almost every store upon the river."

The only reasonable

explanation, of course, was that smuggling was being
conducted on a regular and extensive basis which, the
inspector general added, "Likewise • • • fully accounts for
the large quantity of teas, foreign linens &ca, which every
store is full of."81
Williams' observations suggest that remarkably little
had changed from the days when Edward Randolph, Robert
Quary, Francis Nicholson, and Alexander Spotswood inveighed
against the trade law violating proclivities of the
Chesapeake colonists.

The region's foreign trading partners

-- the Dutch and French, primarily, and the Spanish and
Portuguese as well -- remained the same as did the principal
facilitators of illicit commerce, the Scots, whose "frauds •
• • in the exportation of tobacco from Virginia and
Maryland," Williams determined, "prevails to a very
considerable degree."

Even the same methods of deception

continued to be employed.

Those seeking to avoid payment of

the penny per pound duty on enumerated intercolonial exports
80 Ibid., 296, 299, 304, 386, 309.
81 Ibid., 291-92.
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commonly shipped their tobacco falsely, the inspector
general reported, "under the denomination of casks of bread,
flour, corn, beans &ca."82
Part of the problem was that, as a result of
administrative errors or oversights, it was simply too easy
to commit customs fraud in certain areas.

Williams'

perceptions in this regard are remarkably similar to those
articulated by Edward Randolph over seven

de~ades

earlier.

Because customs houses in some districts were so distant
from the places where most of the business of landing
imports and loading exports was conducted, Williams
maintained that shipmasters entered only "such part of their
cargoes as they think proper; all which were usually landed
without the least control or inspection of any officer." 83
Consequently, the customs service throughout the Chesapeake
lay "greatly exposed to the imposition of smugglers." 84
As in Randolph's day, low salaries continued to affect
adversely the performance of local officials.

Williams

identified two districts, the Chester River in Maryland and
the South Potomac in Virginia, where the "narrow income" of
customs officers was "in no degree sufficient" to support
the men and their families. 85

As a result, one collector

82 Ibid., 315.
83 I bid., 311J5, 310, 311, 313.
84 Ibid., 290.
85 Ibid., 298, 308.
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continued to be involved in commercial affairs himself,
contrary to royal instructions promulgated late in the
previous century, as the owner of a brig which sailed "under
the management and names of the principal merchants in the
place."

Since the vessel operated under the effective

control of the merchants, Williams believed it served as "a
security to them; that if they are inclined to smuggle the
collector will not proceed against them, neither can he do
so without risking the loss of his own interest in their
hands." 86
The solutions that Williams proposed to remedy the
inadequacies of the system were likewise reminiscent of
those advanced by royal and colonial officials in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

So that local

revenue and inspection officers could oversee cargo loading
and unloading procedures more effectively, the inspector
general recommended centralizing customs operations by
"confining the landing and shipping of all goods in these
provinces at certain quays and wharfs." 87

Particularly

for those districts in which customs houses were located far
from the scene of most shipping activity, but for all others
as well, Williams emphasized the necessity of establishing a
"water guard," a term not defined in the report but one
which presumably referred to small, armed vessels capable of
86 Ibid., 308.
87 Ibid., 295, 316.
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pursuing contrabandists into the shallows much like those
frequently proposed and periodically stationed in the bay in
the late 1600s and early 1700s. 88
Like earlier customs investigators, Williams insisted
that trade law violations in the Chesapeake represented more
than occasional or petty infractions which ultimately had
little impact on total royal revenue receipts.

By moving

the customs house for the Lower James district from Hampton
to Norfolk (where Williams estimated that 95 percent of all
of the district's dutiable goods were landed), for instance,
the inspector general was convinced that having officers "on
the spot" would constitute such "a great restraint upon
clandestine practices" that local customs revenues would
actually double. 89

Taking a more comprehensive, regional

approach, Williams ascertained that although Maryland and
Virginia planters raised over 80,000 hogsheads of saleable
tobacco annually, local customs officials actually cleared
fewer than 63,000 each year.

The "deficiency" of some

17,000 hogsheads, the investigator concluded, could be
"accounted for no other way than it is clandestinely carried
away."

Estimating that 5,000 such casks were smuggled to

other colonies to evade the Plantation Duty, Williams
surmised that the remaining 12,000 were "secretly landed in
Great Britain

• by which practice the revenue in England

88 ~., 292, 311.
89 Ibid., 314.
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may sustain a loss of about 300,000 sterling per annum." 90

With revenue losses of this magnitude, British
officials had to be deeply concerned about the level of
customs fraud and duty evasion that Williams had discovered
in the Chesapeake.

But the home government must have been

equally disturbed by other aspects of the inspector
general's report which suggested the re-emergence of one of
the more unpleasant concomitants of those practices from the
crown's point of view: widespread, popular opposition to
royal authority in trade law enforcement.

Despite the

substantial volume of unlawful commerce which was being
conducted throughout the bay area, Williams noted that for
the past several years officials in some districts had made
few or no seizures whatsoever, a circumstance he attributed
in part to the officers'

inability to obtain "the least

support" in their efforts from the public, the courts, and
even the governors.91
The inspector general cited one case in which the
customs comptroller for Maryland's Pocomoke River received
the presiding judge's assurance that the trial of a
shipmaster accused of falsifying his vessel's register would
be postponed until the officer could bring a witness back
from the Eastern Shore to testify for the prosecution.
90 Ibid., 315.
9 1 Ibid. 288, 303.
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the comptroller's absence, however, the judge dismissed the
suit on the grounds that "the offence was not cognizable by
an admiralty court in Maryland."

The government's case

still could have been salvaged, Williams maintained, if the
colony's attorney general had been a "good man

• who

would act with spirit in • • • the interest of the crown."
Instead, the customs investigator pointedly observed (again
in a manner highly reminiscent of royal officials in
Maryland during the last decades of previous century) that
the "King's attorney" had been appointed by the colony's
proprietor, Frederick the sixth Lord Baltimore, and would
not "exert himself in any Crown causes where his lordship or
the peoples' interest" was concerned. 92

(The crown's

cause fared little better, as it turned out, in royal
Virginia where Governor Fauquier's successor, Norborne
Berkeley, Baron de Botetourt, refused Williams' request to
examine the account books of the colony's tobacco
inspectors.) 93
Another aspect of the Maryland case highlighted the
gap between the "peoples' interest" and that of the crown.
Not only did customs officials chronically "labour under
great discouragements in doing their duty," but in the
aftermath of this particular legal proceeding "the officer
was exposed by the failure in this cause to the insults and

92 Ibid., 303-04.
93 Ibid., 315.
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abuse of the common people." 94

As an isolated incident,

such an occurrence might not have elicited serious concern,
but similar episodes in the greater Chesapeake and elsewhere
in the colonies reflected a pattern of increased popular
resistance to the navigation laws that had begun to manifest
itself since the imposition of the Stamp Act in 1765.

That

same year Robert Heron, collector for the problematic
Pocomoke district, had complained to his superiors that "the
numberless abuses and continual threatenings to shoot me,
&c. makes me sensible of the melancholy situation of this
office," a post, he maintained, which was seated "amongst
nothing but a gang of smuglers." 95

Unfortunately for

those who sought to uphold the crown's interest in the
colonies, such antagonism was not always limited to taunts
and threats.
Virtually absent in the greater Chesapeake for a half
century or more characterized, for the most part, by benign
relations between customs officials and colonial planters,
merchants, and shipmasters, violence against royal revenue
officers and those suspected of collaborating with them
surfaced again in the 1760s and '70s.

Collector Heron was

victimized himself at a public auction when he tried to sell
a brig he had seized for trade law violations.

Not only

94 Ibid., 303.
95 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 466; Barrow,
Trade and Empire, 263; Frese, "Royal Customs Service in the
Chesapeake," 302 n. 79.
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would no one bid on the vessel, most of those in attendance
allegedly "being concerned in the illicit trade" themselves,
but the captain of the condemned ship, with a number of
"Scotch" supporters, attacked the customs officer and would
have murdered him, Heron asserted, had a compassionate
individual not intervened.

Imploring British authorities to

"contrive ways and means for our better protection from the
insults of such a Villanious set of People," the collector
reported that he never ventured out without being "doubly
armed with a hanger, a pair of pistols in my Pockets, and
another before me," evidently having reached the same
conclusion as a royal guardship commander eighty years
earlier that "noe officer of the Customes in Maryland can
live without a good guard."96
By the mid-176es colonial opposition to royal customs
regulations in the greater Chesapeake was becoming so
intense that even the mere suspicion of collaboration with
crown officials was sufficient to trigger a violent
reaction.

In April 1766 William Smith, the captain of a

merchant schooner, was accused by the ship's owner, John
Gilchrist, and others of having reported the presence of
contraband goods aboard another vessel owned by Gilchrist to
Captain Jeremiah Morgan, commander of the royal sloop Hornet
in Norfolk.

Although Smith insisted then that he had done

9 6 Atton and Holland, King's Customs, 466: Barrow,
Trade and Empire, 28.
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no such thing, an assertion which Morgan later confirmed,
Gilchrist and company bound the merchant captain's hands,
tied him behind a cart, and hustled him down to the county
wharf to be tarred and feathered.

"They then put me upon a

Ducking Stool and threw rotten eggs and stones at me," Smith
recounted, "by which means I have almost lost the sight of
my eyes." 97
The poor captain could not even hope for rescue by
municipal authorities since his tormentors included the town
mayor who, "instead of suppressing the insult, encouraged it
and threw stones

..

• himself."

Gilchrist's gang then

dragged Smith to the Hornet's anchorage and "bidding
defiance," threatened to treat Morgan likewise if he carne
ashore.

The incident ended when Norfolk alderman John

Phripp heaved Smith "headlong over the wharf," nearly
causing the hapless mariner to drown. 98

Concerned that

the unfortunate victim might be suspected of exaggeration,
Morgan insisted that "poor innocent Captain Smith" had not
recounted "half the story in his letter that I have heard
from others." 99

97 "Letters of Governor Francis Fauquier from the
Bancroft Transcripts, Library of Congress," WMQ, 1st ser.,
XXI, 167; Fauquier Papers, III, 1351-52.
--98 "Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 167-68;
Reese, Fauquier Papers, III,-r352.
9 9 "Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 166; Reese,
Fauquier Papers, III, 135~.
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Just over a year later, Captain Morgan himself became
the principal object of local antipathy when he organized a
press to "take up all them that did not belong to Ships" on
the Norfolk waterfront.

As usual, desertion was responsible

for the shortage of sailors aboard the Hornet, a
circumstance which the guardship officer blamed on local
inhabitants.

"Norfolk hurts the Trade prodigiously," the

commander maintained, because residents encouraged the
seamen to jump ship, assisted them in doing so, and profited
by their actions as well.

Morgan claimed that Norfolk had

become the regional center for procuring sailors, attracting
from all parts of the Chesapeake shorthanded shipmasters
whose expenditures while in port invigorated the local

economy. 1 ~~
As had often been the case in the

pre-175~

colonists did not submit to the press passively.

era, the
Although

the guardship officer insisted that he and his men had not
entered "the door of any House but was either a Publick
House or a Bawdy House," yet the royal mariners soon were
confronted by a "Mob" led by the mayor and composed of
"Whites & Blacks all arm'd."

Morgan retreated to the safety

of his ship, explaining afterward that he did not "care to
go to Norfolk Goal from the Account I had of the Treatment
my poor Master and several more of my People had at
different times received • • • there."
1

Two days later, a

~~ Reese, Fauquier Papers, III, 15~~.
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county court tried the commander in absentia and condemned
him "upon the Riot Act in Norfolk," relying heavily,
according to Morgan's intelligence, on the testimony of the
"poor Whores & Rogues depending upon the Sailors & those
depending upon the Smugglers I have made Seizures from."
Pleading his case against the colonists to Francis Fauquier,
the Royal Navy officer implored the governor "to remember
the many attempts they made upon my Life and yours" and
added that if the government were to prosecute all the local
residents who had participated in the disturbance, "there
would not be twenty left unhang'd" in Norfolk.101
Given the relatively short interval between the
unpopular British customs reforms instituted during Prime
Minister George Grenville's administration and the
unpleasant experiences of Collector Heron and Captains Smith
and Morgan,

it would be logical to link such riotous

outbursts in the bay region with the more universal
revolutionary fervor that was beginning to seethe throughout
the colonies.

Indeed, Morgan reported that the night before

the attack on Captain Smith "about thirty of • • • the
principal people of Norfolk," including the mayor, convened
at a tavern [where else?], resolved that Parliament's
imposition of taxes on America was "unconstitutional and
illegal," and decried the fact that, although Virginians had
been the first to oppose the Stamp Act, they had since
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become "mute and pusilanimous while • • • other Colonies
asserted their rights like Sons of Liberty." 102
Clearly, the causal relationship between the new
imperial measures and the belligerent hostility evinced
toward royal agents and suspected supporters of crown policy
is undeniable.

But to view these turbulent episodes solely

as examples of the anti-imperial ferment of the 1760s is to
ignore their significance as manifestations (albeit in a
more highly politicized context) of a well established
tradition of persistent, frequently violent opposition to
lawful authority that had characterized the coasts and
waterways of the greater Chesapeake for well over a
century. 103
In the decade or so before the Revolution, Virginia
accounted for far more ship seizures than any of the other
colonies that joined the rebellion.

Based on the available

evidence from Virginia's vice-admiralty records, however,
one scholar has surmised that many, if not most, of the ship
condemnations resulted not from infractions related to the
Stamp and Townshend Acts, but from violations of the long-

102 "Fauquier Letters," WMQ, 1st ser., XXI, 165-66;
Reese, Fauquier Papers, III, 1349.
103 In attempting to distinguish between the political
and economic motives of greater Chesapeake activists it
should be recalled that politics and maritime illegality had
been inextricably linked in the relationship between the
Chesapeake colonies and the home government ever since the
promulgation of the first Navigation Act in 1651.
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standing Navigation Act of 166e. 1 e 4

Public notices in

early 1767 demonstrate that in Captain Morgan's case,
moreover, the guardship officer's reputation as a menace to
illicit trade preceded his arrival in the bay and almost
certainly contributed to his unpopularity throughout the
region.

In February the Virginia Gazette printed a message

from Richard Todd of Bath, North Carolina, warning Virginia
merchants and shippers that Morgan had been "very assiduous"
in his pursuit of contraband, that he let "nothing escape
him," and that he and the Hornet were on their way to Cape
Henry.

"I am sincerely glad of his departure from our

inlet," Todd added, "for was he to stay, we should be ruined
to all intents and purposes."l05
The news in the Virginia Gazette also reveals that the
seamen's network in the greater Chesapeake had undergone a
profound and significant change.

Previously communicated by

means of a surreptitious, word-of-mouth system operating
mainly in disreputable establishments throughout the region,
critical information now was being relayed through the bay
area's published media.

Todd had asked the Gazette to print

104 Stout, Royal Navy, 133-34.
105 va. Gaz., 2/19/1767, p. 1. Todd I s notice also
indicates that New England mariners continued to participate
in the illegal trade of the greater Chesapeake. The North
Carolinian reported that the Hornet gave chase to two "New
Englandmen" whose crews had just enough time to stave in
seventeen hogsheads of rum and pump out the contents before
being apprehended. The smugglers were taken into custody
but released because, having destroyed the evidence, "the
proof [was] not sufficient to condemn them" (Ibid.).
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his message so that "it may give a hint to your
correspondents and customers."

By granting his request, the

newspaper left little doubt as to its principal aim in
disseminating the information about Morgan.

While the item

may have been considered newsworthy in its own right, the
Gazette had already demonstrated a commitment to publishing
such reports as a service to its commercial patrons.

In

January the paper printed a notice "to inform the publick,
especially the traders to North Carolina, that the Hornet
sloop of war" lay at Cape Lookout with its two tenders
"which strictly examine all vessels they meet with."
Although brief, the bulletin also made a point of describing
the guardship's support boats and their armament, presumably
to help contraband traders recognize and avoid the patrol

vessels. 1 ~ 6

The official reports of Collector Heron, Captain
Morgan, and Inspector General Williams offer compelling
evidence of an extensive, concerted, and sometimes violent
opposition to law enforcement in the bay region.

But if the

residents of the greater Chesapeake actually engaged in
maritime illegality more or less continuously from

165~

until the Revolution, why is it that such evidence appears
only sporadically throughout the period?

A distinctive

pattern in the colonial record of maritime law enforcement
1~6 va. Gaz., 1 I 1 I 1767, p.2.
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in the bay area suggests a likely explanation.

The two

intervals during which royal officials registered the most
urgent and the greatest number of reports about maritime
illegality

the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

centuries and from the 1760s to the Revolution -- were also
the periods of greatest crown concern with the regulation of
the empire and its commerce.
The intervening years, at least up until 1750, were
guided by the policy of "salutary neglect."

Emphasizing

accommodation rather than provocation, crown authorities
were content, so long as the empire prospered, to permit
Anglo-Americans to conduct their commercial affairs largely
as they saw fit.

With so little attention being paid to

smuggling, it is hardly astonishing that little was
discovered.

The relatively high incidence of complaints

about, and seizures relating to, contraband trafficking
during the periods of earnest crown attention to the matter
implies an obvious conclusion: that the imperial government
discovered evidence of substantial illicit trade only when
it bothered to look.
When it did care to concern itself with the problem,
the home government's effort to control illicit trade and
piracy was complicated by its previous, and in some
instances continuing, encouragement of such activities in
the Old World and the New.

The lionizing of English

swashbucklers who attacked Spanish treasure ships and the
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crown's support of contraband trading with Spanish
settlements fostered attitudes favorable to both practices.
With the heightened awareness of the difficulties that
freebooting was causing and the determination to establish
tighter control over the colonial administrative bureaucracy
near the end of the seventeenth century, English officials
did make a vigorous effort to eradicate piracy and enforce
the trade laws.
But old habits and convictions were not so easily
overcome.

Chesapeake residents continued to associate with

pirates until the abuses suffered at the hands of Blackbeard
and others caused them to abandon their former practice.
Area inhabitants also persisted in trading illegally with
England's foreign rivals both during and after Queen Anne's
war (as they did in subsequent international conflicts),
much to the chagrin of British authorities whose concurrent
support of the South Sea Company's contraband activities did
little to discourage the Chesapeake colonists in theirs.
Bay area tobacco growers did eventually acquiesce in an
inspection system that promised to inhibit smuggling, but
only after they had been convinced of the compensating
financial advantages of self-imposed regulation.
Apart from English custom and precedent, the greed and
indiscretions of colonial governors and other royal and
proprietary officials in the bay region itself may have had
a more direct influence on the attitudes of area
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inhabitants.

The issue was not simply that many of these

officials sanctioned or occasionally engaged in forms of
maritime illegality, but that they generally placed a higher
priority on their own prosperity than the welfare of the
colonies they served.

Historians have generally portrayed

Governors Copley of Maryland and Effingham of Virginia, for
example, as opportunists who came to the Chesapeake bent on
amassing wealth at the expense of the colonies over which
they were to preside. 1 a7

Similarly, North Carolina

governors Eden, Burrington, and Everard have been
characterized as "needy adventurers, • • • a cormorant brood
in that day, at least, not equalled in America."l08
Virginia Station contmanders Jones, Crofts, Purvis, Aldred,
and Brand all appeared to fit the same mold.

The example

set by such men could only have served to promote the view
that what constituted lawlessness was, to say the least, a
matter of subjective interpretation.
Compared to the transgressions of some public
officials, smuggling, trading with pirates, and helping
oneself to the effects of wrecked ships must have seemed
relatively innocuous to many colonists, hardly the heinous
crimes that English authorities decried so self-righteously.
Government policy and historical precedent in the home

10? Alfred T. Goodrick in Randolph, Letters, VI, 41;
Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 109.
108 William Saunders in~' II, ix.
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country, coupled with the standards of personal behavior set
by past and current leadership both in England and the bay
region, engendered and reinforced a belief that the imperial
navigation scheme, including the laws against piracy and
wrecking, was simply a game in which everyone, with the
exception of a few zealots, sought to manipulate the system
to their own advantage.
Such an outlook manifested itself not only in
widespread disregard for the Navigation Acts and statutes
concerning piracy and wrecking, but also in popular
opposition to maritime law enforcement in the provincial
courts, assemblies, and perhaps, polling places as well.
Common-law courts frequently exonerated those accused of
perpetrating or abetting smuggling, freebooting, and
wrecking.

Colonial assemblies habitually obstructed

legislation designed to curtail those activities.

And when

it came to choosing legislators to represent them, the
colonists appeared to have few qualms about electing
officials who had sought material advantage by actively
engaging in, or becoming associated with, some type of
maritime illegality themselves.

Moreover, some factional

alignments within the provincial governments appear to
reflect the establishment of common cause against what the
colonists traditionally regarded as unwarranted interference
by royal officials with customary prerogatives in the
maritime realm.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

433

Benjamin Harrison identified the existence of one such
clique, consisting not of elected officials but of a
majority of the Council of Virginia, when in 1698 he alleged
a conspiracy of silence to protect the interests of council
members who engaged in customs fraud and other self-serving
practices.

More common, however, was the development of

factions in the lower houses of colonial legislatures.

The

mutual hostility that developed between Governor Spotswood
and Virginia's House of Burgesses in the second decade of
the eighteenth century cannot be ascribed exclusively, or
even primarily, to disputes over maritime affairs.
Nevertheless, it does seem a remarkable coincidence that
some of the most powerful members of the assembly and
leaders of the faction opposed to Spotswood were men who
either directly participated in or were closely connected
with one or more forms of maritime illegality.
In the divisive election of 1715, for instance, Gawin
Corbin, the naval officer Spotswood dismissed in 1711 for
forging the "queen's letter," was not only voted into the
assembly but subsequently chosen to head the powerful
Committee on Privileges and Elections. 109

In 1718, one

year after a group of merchants complained to the Board of
Trade about the "many unwarrantable Practices" of South
Potomac district collector Daniel McCarty, the customs

10 9 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 120; Billings, Selby,
and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 181-82.
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officer was reelected to the House where he once again
assumed the role of Speaker.

Corbin, meanwhile, succeeded

to an even more prestigious chairmanship than his previous
one, that of the Committee for Propositions and Grievances,
a post he retained in 1720 following an election in which
John Holloway, defender of accused pirates and illicit
traders, also was returned to office. 1 10
Although the governor had achieved a reconciliation of
sorts with his political foes by then, the choice of
Holloway as Speaker, according to Spotswood biographer
Leonidas Dodson, "must have warned the governor that the
spirit of resistance was not yet dead in the lower
house." 111

Perhaps it is too much to argue that the

electorate's endorsement of Corbin, McCarty, and Holloway
constituted a popular mandate in favor of customs fraud and
abetting pirates, but it does indicate that, at the very
least, the voting public was not so upset about
participation in such questionable activities that it saw
fit to turn legislators out of office for pursuing
them. 112
ll 0 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 179; Billings, Selby,
and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 188.
111 Dodson, Alexander Spotswood, 262-63; Billings,
Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 193.
112 Though the members of the anti-Spotswood faction
may have been united in their resentment of the governor
and, in the cases of Holloway, Corbin, and McCarty, in their
involvement in maritime activities of questionable legality,
they do not appear to have been bound by any common ideology

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

435

Political divisions that may have been based in part on
conflict over the liberty to conduct illegal maritime
enterprises are much less in evidence after Spotswood's
departure from the governorship.

The executive styles of

Spotswood's immediate successors, Hugh Drysdale and William
Gooch, favored tact and diplomacy over hostile
confrontation.

During Gooch's long and generally harmonious

term, other circumstances -- primarily the success of the
tobacco inspection system and Walpole's policy of benign
indifference toward the colonies -- combined with the
governor's admirable political skill to prevent, for the
most part, the eruption of serious disputes either among
domestic factions or between the colony and the mother
country.

But the more assertive regulation of colonial

affairs under subsequent British administrations radically
altered that state of affairs.
For decades since the mid-172es colonial officials had
virtually abandoned, in the face of local opposition and the
disinterest of British authorities, any serious attempt to
enforce imperial trade policy rigorously.

Consequently,

Chesapeake residents continued to conduct their maritime
commercial affairs as they customarily had and colonial
or sense of personal allegiance. In the 173e and 1736
debates concerning Governor Gooch's tobacco inspection
system, the fact that Holloway, who stood to gain by having
two inspection warehouses built on his property, supported
the system while Corbin led the opposition, suggests that
self interest was what ultimately motivated these men
(Billings, Selby, and Tate, Colonial Virginia, 238, 245).
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customs agents adapted themselves to the practical reality
of the situation.

As James Henretta has observed of the

effort to enforce British customs regulations in the
colonies, "moderate men quickly became aware of the futility
of the struggle; only zealots • • • persisted in the fight
for the abstract principles conceived in London."ll3

By

the time a reinvigorated Board of Trade attempted to tighten
control of the overseas customs service in 1748, royal
officers in the greater Chesapeake were unprepared to
execute the new policy.

As a result, John Willliams's

investigation of customs affairs in the bay region over
twenty years later revealed a situation essentially
unchanged since Edward Randolph's era: illicit trade and
customs fraud on a significant scale, the same problems of
administration and enforcement, the same contraband
partners, and even the same smuggling techniques.
With the accession of George III in 1769 and the
emergence of George Grenville as chief minister by the end
of the Seven Years' War, the modus vivendi that had been
worked out between colonists and customs agents in the
greater Chesapeake was no longer acceptable to the leaders
of the home government.

Grenville insisted on stricter

customs regulation partly to raise additional revenues to
help pay for both the customs service itself and for

113 Henretta, "Salutary Neglect", 324.
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colonial defense, burdens which the colonists themselves
were loath to assume.
What is particularly noteworthy in the context of this
study is the manner in which bay area residents responded to
the more rigorous management of their commercial affairs.
In 1651, when authorities of the home government sought to
punish Virginians for their support of the losing side in
the Civil War, they imposed restrictions in the realm of
maritime trade.

over a century later, when Chesapeake

colonists expressed their discontent with the policies of
the mother country, they chose tactics adapted to the same
arena.

By thwarting and even attacking customs collectors,

organizing resistance at the hub of the seamen's network,
assaulting those suspected of informing on smugglers,
opposing the press by force and guile, and publishing notice
of guardship movements as a warning to illicit traders, the
colonists made the protection of customary prerogatives (or,
from the crown's point of view, flagrant illegal practices)
in the maritime sphere a central focus of their resistance.

The success of the Revolution ensured that
Anglo-Americans no longer had to pay hated royal customs
duties or abide by the commercial restrictions that the
Navigation Acts had imposed.

As a result, the incentive to

conduct illicit trade in the aftermath of the struggle for
independence was reduced significantly.

Now, perhaps,
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lawlessness would cease to exist as a standard feature of
the maritime environment of the greater Chesapeake.

But the

express concern of newly independent Virginians over the
potential for continued outbreaks of illegal, destructive
behavior suggests that while much of the motivation to
commit lawless acts had been eliminated, the impulses of
some greater Chesapeake residents to do so had not.
The concern related not to customs affairs, but to a
sphere of coastal activity which remained essentially
unaffected by the profound political realignments that the
Revolution produced: the old practice of wrecking ships.
Recognizing that "many vessels have been and may hereafter
be stranded on the sea coast, bay or river shores • • • and
the goods or other property belonging to such vessels may be
embezzled or stolen," legislators of the young commonwealth
adopted a new "Act Concerning Wrecks" in 1782 which
articulated the traditional concerns of the governing
authority.

The statute explicitly prohibited anyone from

entering (much less removing effects from) wrecked ships
without the commanding officer's permission. 114

Stiff

penalties were prescribed for individuals found to have
tampered with a stranded ship (including "death without
benefit of clergy" for those who made, or even assisted in
making, a hole in the side of a vessel in distresE) and for
any of the authorized "commissioners" of wrecks who "by
114 Hening, Statutes, XI, 51-53.
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fraud or wilful neglect" was found guilty of "abusing the
trust reposed in him." 115

The question of whether or not

lawlessness actually abated in the wake of the Revolution
lies beyond the scope of this study, but the Act of 1782
does reveal Virginia lawmakers' familiarity with past
criminal behavior and their continued anxiety regarding its
future repetition on the maritime frontier of the greater
Chesapeake.

115 ~., 52-53.
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